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ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / ^ujgy^SI / Number 2046 

FEB i a ,_, 

BBSBSUB8dr' n '»nr 1981 

Department of State 


Volume 81 / Number 2046 / January 1981 

Cover art : 

Reproduction of official poster 
commemorating the Bicentennial 
of the Department of State 

The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
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SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781-1981 (David F. Trask) 

The Secretary 

I Africa and U.S. Policy 

3 Securing a Safer Future 

5 Refugees: The U.S. Response 

Africa , 

8 Southern Africa: Four Years 

Later (Richard M. Moose) 


II Foreign Service Act, 1980 

(President Carter) 

East Asia 




ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue (Joint 
Press Statement) 

U.S. -China Sign Grain Agree- 
ment (White House State- 

U.S. -Japanese Relations in the 
1980s (Richard C. 




Strengthening the CSCE 
Process (Griffin B.Bell) 

Poland (President Carter, 
White House Statement) 

Human Rights 

21 Human Rights and Interna- 
tional Law (Patricia M. 

Middle East 

24 U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement 

(President Carter, Yitzhak 
Modai, Text of Agreement, 
Memorandum of Agreement, 
Department Fact Sheet) 

25 U.S. Hostages in Iran 
(Secretary Muskie) 

28 Iran Chronology, November 



29 International Narcotics Con- 

trol in the 1980s (Mathea 

United Nations 

30 General Assembly Votes on 

Afghanistan Situation 
(Donald F. McHenry, Text 
of Resolution) 

Western Hemisphere 

33 10th General Assembly of the 
OAS (President Carter, 
Secretary Muskie) 


36 Current Actions 


40 November 1980 

Press Releases 

41 Department of State 

41 U.S.U.N. 


42 GPO Sales 


^eNT o* 


Department of State Bicentennial 


To commemorate our bicentennial, we are pleased 
to present in this issue (center section) a short history 
of the United States Department of State by David F. 
Trask, the Historian. 

This article also has been issued as a separate 
pamphlet by the Bureau of Public Affairs; copies may 
be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

The Editors 


Africa and U.S. Policy 

Address before the African- 
American Historical and Cultural 
Society and the World Affairs Council 
of Northern California in San Fran- 
cisco on pi a mber 4, 19S0. 1 

I am grateful for the opportunity to ad- 
dress this distinguished gathering As 

you are aware — as I am only too aware 
—we are in a period of transition. I am 
now called a "lame duck" Secretary of 
State. I don't feel lame. And my voice is 
still working just fine. I intend to keep 
using it — now. and also in the years to 

Next month we will have a new 
President in Washington and a new Ad- 
ministration. They come to power in 
times of extraordinary challenge, both at 
home and abroad. They deserve the en- 
louragement and support of all who love 
this country. They shall have mine. 

It is in that spirit that I want to dis- 
:uss today a subject that will be vitally 
important in the years ahead — Ameri- 
:an policy toward the nations and the 
peoples of Africa. It is an appropriate 
subject to discuss — indeed, a necessary 
)ne — in this time of transition. There 
ire two reasons why that is true. 

The first is the record of President 
barter. I know the hazards involved in 
tying to select those current events that 
uture historians will find to have been 
lateful. But I want to take that chance 
lere. I suggest that the development of 
J.S. policy toward Africa — especially 
he steadfastness which helped make the 
Zimbabwe settlement possible — will 
me day be recorded among President 
barter's finest achievements and also 
imong the most significant international 
levelopments of this period. 

What has been tested in our policy 
oward Africa might be called the prag- 
natic application of democratic ideals, 
^nd it has received a ringing vindication 
-in an enduring peace in Zimbabwe and 
i real improvement in our relations 
hroughout the continent. So the first 
■eason why I want to discuss Africa 
)olicy now is that we need to understand 
-outside of the heat of a campaign when 
ve are beyond any motive either to belit- 
le or to exaggerate — that something 
rofoundly important is underway. 

My second reason for discussing this 
ubject is that if Africa policy has been 
in area of achievement for President Car- 
er, it can just as much a source of oppor- 
unity for President Reagan. 

We should not forget that the impe- 
tus for a more activist southern African 
policy, in assisting the independence pro- 
cess, had its roots in a Republican Ad- 
ministration. It was during the incum- 
bency of President Ford that the United 
States first considered seriously the issue 
of Southern Rhodesia and judged that 
our energies should best be devoted to 
convincing an unrecognized, isolated re- 
gime to adhere to the principles of free 

As I will develop more fully in a few- 
minutes, the new Administration has a 
special capacity, and a rare chance, to ad- 
vance the cause of justice in Africa and 
build our relations there. 

Before defining that opportunity, let 
me describe some of the realities which 
have been our guideposts in Africa, and 
then outline the elements of the policy 
now in place. 

Current Realities 

It is dangerous to generalize about 
Africa. It is a complex of diverse cultures 
and traditions, countries that are com- 
paratively wealthy and countries that 
are desperately poor. Experiences under 
different colonial powers have left a vari- 
ety of legacies — some bitter, some of 
real value. But despite this diversity, 
there are a number of central realities 
which bear on our policy. 

A first undeniable reality is that Af- 
rican nations are deeply important to the 
United States. We not only w r ant, we 
need good relations with them. African 
nations are increasingly important to us 
economically, both as markets and as 
sources of critical materials. African ac- 
tions are important politically. The 50 Af- 
rican countries make up nearly one-third 
of all the nations in the world. In the fu- 
ture they will play a growing part in de- 
termining whether humanity will be suc- 
cessful in addressing central challenges 
to our common future — to curb the 
spread of nuclear weapons, to curtail 
population growth, to ease hunger and 
disease, to manage the world's finite re- 
sources and guard them for generations 
to come. 

African nations have another impor- 
tance for Americans — one that is under- 
stood especially well by the African Cul- 
tural Heritage Society. For millions of 
our people, the tragedy of slavery sev- 
ered the thread of personal history. As 

those bonds are gradually restored — 
and as long, proud traditions are redis- 
covered— OUT own society, and all races, 
are the richer. So let us be absolutely 
clear on this point. Good relations with 
Africa are not only desirable; they are 
vital to our well-being 

A second reality that must concern 
us is that the people of Africa endure far 
more than their share of the world's 

• Two-thirds of the world's most im- 
poverished countries are in Africa. 

• Africa has more refugees than any 
other region — more than 3 million peo- 
ple without homes, with little hope. 

• Average nutritional standards in 
Africa are the lowest in the world, and 
they are getting worse. 

• The natural resource base of 
Africa is threatened, as thousands of 
acres of farmland each year dry to 

The implications for people are clear. 
As they take a dreadful toll in human 
terms, these same conditions can also 
breed frustration and turmoil. And they 
make African societies vulnerable to 
pressures from outsiders seeking to 
exploit the suffering of Africans for ends 
of their own. 

A third broad reality in Africa is a 
fierce determination to remain free from 
outside control. Nationalism, more than 
any ideology, shapes the dealings of Afri- 
can countries with the rest of the world. 

This reality has a number of results. It 
means, for example, that while African 
nations need and seek assistance from 
outside, they are not likely to accept 
domination — from either West or East. 

Nationalism also means we will see Af- 
rican societies evolving in their own 
ways, developing institutions appropri- 
ate to their own circumstances. They 
draw from their own histories and cul- 
tures, as well as from the experiences of 
both the West and the East. 

These, in very brief summary, are 
some of the realities a sound policy to- 
ward Africa must accommodate — our 
own growing interests in Africa; the ter- 
rible poverty in many parts of Africa and 
the turmoil it can bring; the surpassing 
importance of nationalism in the policies 

The Secretary 

of African nations. How do we address 

Elements of U.S. Policy 

I have described our policy as the prag- 
matic application of democratic ideals, lb 
some that might sound like a hopeless 
contradiction in terms — references to 
pragmatism and to idealism in a single 
phrase. But there is no inconsistency 
here, for it is clearly the case in Africa 
that we advance our interests by giving 
concrete meaning and expression to our 
most basic values — the commitment to 
human freedom and advancement we 
share with the peoples of Africa. Our 
policy has been firmly grounded in that 
abiding commitment to freedom. 

• Our policy strongly opposes racial 
injustice. In southern Africa we have 
given practical support to the evolution 
to majority rule. In Rhodesia, now Zim- 
babwe, that meant resisting a prema- 
ture, unilateral American breach of inter- 
national sanctions and continuing the 
pressure for a true peace. In South 
Africa, it has meant broadening our own 
voluntary arms embargo and support for 
a mandatory U.N. embargo. Beyond 
that, it has meant a clear message to 
South Africa that our relations depend 
upon achieving racial justice — that 
other issues will not dilute our commit- 
ment on that fundamental cause. 

• Our policy upholds the cause of 
peace. In Zimbabwe, in Namibia, on the 
Angola Zaire border and elsewhere, the 
United States has been strongly identi- 
fied with efforts to heal divisions and 
achieve peaceful solutions. 

• Our policy in Africa has promoted 
respect for human rights. President Car- 
ter's human rights policy has found a spe- 
cial resonance in Africa. Human rights 
dialogues have been initiated in Dar es 
Salaam, Dakar, Sierra Leone, Cape 
Town, and Khartoum. Last year the Or- 
ganization of African Unity adopted an 
African Declaration of Human Rights. In 
the broadest sense, the trend in Africa is 
clearly in the direction of greater democ- 
racy and freedom. Democracy is being 
restored in Nigeria and Ghana. Multi- 
party elections have resumed in Senegal 
and are expected in Uganda. And in some 

where there is only one party — as 
in Tanzania and Ivory Coast — there are 
numerous candidates for office, a grow- 
ing acceptance of dissent, and expanded 
protection of individual political rights. 

• Our policy has also been to sup- 
port economic development in Africa and 

to forge new economic links. Since Presi- 
dent Carter took office, American eco- 
nomic assistance to Africa has doubled, 
to more than $1 billion each year. Of 
course, it is still dwarfed by the need, 
but our aid has helped. And it has been 
concentrated on meeting the most urgent 
requirements of people, on easing their 
suffering, and on helping them become 

• And finally our policy supports Af- 
rican nationalism as the most dependable 
foundation for stable development and 
the strongest bulwark against outside 
intervention. Through the infusion of 
outside military means, the Soviets, the 
Cubans, and others have exploited and 
exacerbated a number of local and re- 
gional African conflicts. We have been, 
and must continue to be, responsive to 
the legitimate defense needs of African 
countries threatened by external pres- 
sures. Our security assistance to African 
nations has risen. But over the longer 
term, we will most effectively counter 
Soviet designs by holding to our own af- 
firmative course — seizing the moral ini- 
tiative on racial justice, working for the 
settlement of conflicts others might 
exploit, helping to build the strength and 
confidence of African countries so they 
can better resist external pressures. Be- 
cause we have done so, the striking dif- 
ference between American and Soviet 
aims has become increasingly clear to the 
governments and people of Africa. 

The approach I have outlined — a 
strategy grounded in principle as well as 
in interest — is working. We have been 
able to cement our ties with old friends, 
such as Ghana. And we have found meas- 
urable improvements in our relations 
with a number of key African countries 
— with Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea 
and Uganda, with Somalia, Sudan, and 
Guinea, with Mozambique, Congo- 
Brazzaville, the Central African Repub- 
lic, and others. 

Opportunities for 

the New Administration 

With this foundation, let me return to 
my earlier assertion that Africa policy is 
an area of great opportunity for the new 

In Rhodesia, before 1979, it was pos- 
sible for the Ian Smith government to 
cling to the hope that a conservative gov- 
ernment in Britain might lessen the pres- 
sure for true majority rule. Instead, the 
Thatcher government upheld that princi- 
ple with renewed vigor. It took the lead 

in new negotiations. As a result, a 
settlement was achieved. 

There are a number of areas where 
similar leadership by a Reagan Adminis- 
tration could have similar effects. Let me 
list some of them, not to second-guess 
the new President's priorities, but as 

In Zimbabwe, America has a strong 
interest in seeing the settlement succeed. 
Thus it is sound policy to offer the assist- 
ance that is badly needed to assure last- 
ing peace and stability. 

After a long and bitter conflict, Zim- 
babwe faces a massive task of recon- 
struction. Prime Minister Mugabe has 
embarked on a course of national recon- 
struction and reconciliation — to build a 
permanent peace by bringing the eco- 
nomic and social benefits of peace to the 
lives of people, black and white. Yet the 
strains in Zimbabwe are still severe. Our 
aid can help make a difference. 

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the 
conflict in Zimbabwe devastated the 
economies of surrounding countries. The 
nations of southern Africa are now com- 
bining to restore economic health to the 
region. They have asked the West to join 
them in this effort. The first meeting 
among western and southern African na- 
tions on regional development took place 
last week in Mozambique. 

American and Western interests 
could be greatly furthered by strong and 
active participation in southern African 
regional development and by the expan- 
sion of our trade and investment 
throughout the region. 

In Namibia, a peaceful settlement of 
a long and tragic conflict is now within 
reach. A date of March 1 has been set for 
implementation of the agreed settlement 
plan. Next month, the parties will meet 
to discuss final arrangements. 

The hour of decision has come for 
South Africa. If the Namibia settlement 
is implemented, it will bring peace and 
stability to South Africa's borders 
where a needless conflict is now costing 
South African lives and is providing ever 
greater opportunities for outside 

A new American Administration can 
argue with special force that it is in 
South Africa's own interest to stay on 
course and implement a settlement. 

A Namibia settlement would funda- 
mentally alter South African relations 
with neighboring states and with the in- 
ternational community. A settlement 
would prove that outside nations can 
work constructively with South Africa 
toward peaceful change and multiracial 

The Secretary 

Booperation. On the other hand, if South 
Africa refuses to allow the settlement to 
JO forward, its isolation in the world will 
Hrome more acute. 

South Africa has expressed concern 
ibout the impartiality of a U.N. settle- 
ment in Namibia. I would note, however, 
hat South Africa's own administrators, 
*ivil servants, and police will continue to 
hnction in Namibia during the elections. 
It is important to remember also the fair- 
iess. integrity, and understanding with 
vhich U.N. representatives have con- 
iucted recent Namibian negotiations, as 
veil as the standards of fairness which 
he United Nations has consistently fol- 
owed in its peacekeeping around the 
vorld. Finally, we Western nations which 
>roposed the settlement are wholly com- 
nitted to fair elections. Our national 
jonor as well as our national interests 
ire involved. 

And in South Africa itself, the ques- 
ion remains whether change will come 
hrough racial conflict or through negoti- 
ited progress. But change will come. It 
vi 11 come principally because mounting 
nternal pressures will become irre- 

It is in the interest of the United 
States to encourage early, meaningful 
■hange in South Africa. We cannot pro- 
vide a timetable or blueprint. That is for 
he people of South Africa — all the peo- 
)le, working together — to decide for 
hemselves. But the new American Ad- 
ninistration can be effective in encourag- 
ng progress in those areas where South 
African blacks are appealing for early 
hange. and where many South African 
vhites are receptive. We must find con- 
rete ways to support the efforts of those 
vorking for peaceful change through 
South Africa's churches, community or- 
ganizations, newspapers, and courts. We 
ould assist those South African efforts 
inancially and through the activities of 
mr companies, churches, universities, 
ind unions. 

These are but a few ideas, concen- 
rated on southern Africa. If our new 
Vdministration were to embrace the es- 
ential thrust of these policies, a funda- 
nental continuity in our policy would be 
issured, our credibility in Africa would 
>e enhanced, and our bonds of friend- 
hip throughout Africa would be 

In conclusion, let me stress a funda- 
nental point. As it affects the fate of the 
lations of Africa, American policy in the 
iiture will be important, but it will not 
>e decisive. The major determinants will 

Refugees: The U.S. Response 

Address before a conference on 
world hunger and refugees at the 
University of Southern California in 
Los Angeles on December 5, 1980.^ 

During my brief, but intensely rewarding 
tenure as Secretary of State, I was con- 
stantly reminded how the policymaking 
process — not just in this Administration, 
but in any Administration — inevitably 
pulls one toward the short-term perspec- 

How should the United States vote, 
tomorrow, on a critical resolution in the 
United Nations? What is the appropriate 
response to a sudden development in 
Seoul, or in Tehran, or on Capitol Hill? 
The natural tendency is to address to- 
day's problem and to defer tomorrow's. 
It's one I have struggled against over the 
past 6 months. I find it difficult to know 
where I'm headed if my eyes are fixed 
solely on the ground immediately in front 
of me. 

Today, I want to pursue with you 
that process of looking ahead — beyond 
the immediate crises, beyond the immi- 
nent transition of power. 

What are some of the longer term so- 
cial, economic, and technological forces at 
work in our world that will help define 
not just the next few years but the next 
decade or more? What do they mean for 
our own long-term security and well- 
being? And how will they shape the polit- 
ical choices we will face in the years 
ahead? To engage in such a look ahead is 
not to escape the present choices we face 
but to help illuminate them. 

Let me inject a cautionary note at 
the outset. I suspect that most of you 
were as enthralled as I by the photo- 
graphs recently sent back from our Voy- 
ager space satellite — by our ability to 
see, clearly and almost instantly, across 
billions of miles of space. 

Unfortunately, there is no similar 
technology that enables us to project our- 
selves across time — to see the future as 
clearly as we can see the rings of Saturn. 
National behavior, no less than the hu- 

man behavior that drives it, remains un- 
predictable — capable of unexpected new 
breakthroughs or of dangerous miscalcu- 

Nonetheless, there are some trends 
we can identify — deeper, sometimes less 
visible economic and social currents that 
will shape the political landscape over the 
coming years. 

Population Explosion 

Each day, there are over 200,000 more 
mouths to feed in the world, each year, 
75 million. By the year 2000, if these 
present patterns continue, the world will 
have an additional 1.5 billion inhabitants 
— an increase in the final quarter of this 
century that would equal all of the 
growth in the world's population from the 
birth of Christ through 1950. 

Most of that growth will take place 
in the developing world. By the year 
2000, developing nations will encompass 
nearly 80% of the world's people. They 
will be concentrated in increasingly 
crowded urban areas. The population of 
Mexico City will exceed 30 million, Cal- 
cutta will approach 20 million, Cairo, 17 
million. And nearly half of the citizens in 
developing countries will be under the 
age of 19. 

Our current estimates are that, in 
the aggregate, world food supplies will 
continue to grow. But in some poorer 
areas, the food available per person will 
decline, and food will be more expensive. 

Unless we reverse existing patterns, 
important resources that are needed to 
feed and sustain that burgeoning popula- 
tion will continue to disappear. About 1 
million acres of prime farmland are con- 
verted to urban use each year in the 
United States. Other farmland is drying 
into desert — a quarter million acres 
each year in northern Africa alone. And 
critical forests — which provide the pri- 
mary fuel for nearly 2 billion people — 
are disappearing at the rate of 50 acres a 

None of these trends is immutable or 

be internal — the quality of leadership, 
their economic choices, their political 

Where our policy will be decisive is 
in determining the kind of relations 
America can have with evolving African 
societies. In short, it is our own interests 
and our own future at stake in the qual- 
ity of our approach to Africa. 

As we change Administrations, I 
think all Americans can agree on this 
fundamental premise — that we want to 
sustain constructive relations with the 
countries of Africa; relations that uphold 
our interests and theirs and the ideals 
that draw us together. 

1 Press release 334. 

The Secretary 

irreversible. But they loom on the not- 
too-distant horizon, gathering clouds we 
must seek to understand and move to ad- 


In one essential aspect of reconciling hu- 
man needs and global resources, we have 
made a good beginning in recent years. I 
speak of our energy future. 

It is just a beginning, but it is 
grounded in an emerging international 
awareness that the end of the oil era is 
pressing upon us. Here at home, both our 
use and our imports of oil are finally 
going down. Domestic energy production 
is now going up. And the quest for new, 
renewable fuels is underway. 

But we are by no means out of the 
woods. The trend is unmistakably in the 
direction of declining world oil supplies 
and increasing costs. The entire world 
faces the difficult transition out of the era 
of bountiful and inexpensive oil. 

As we navigate this passage, the 
strains on the international economy will 
continue to be severe. Each time world 
oil prices rise 10%, world inflation jumps 
1%, and overall world growth falls by a 
half percent. As world growth rates lag 
— and that is the outlook at least in the 
near term — the flow of world trade suf- 
fers, and competition among trading na- 
tions grows more intense. 

The economic pressures on the less 
developed nations during this period of 
energy transition will be particularly dif- 
ficult. Those developing nations that im- 
port oil have seen their overall oil bill rise 
1,500% in the 1970s. Many have had to 
borrow heavily. Their debt now totals 
$300 billion. Just to service that debt and 
pay for their oil imports now costs devel- 
oping countries half of everything they 
earn from their exports. 

Thus even as we design and build a 
new energy future — one less reliant on 
petroleum — the international commu- 
nity, oil exporting nations no less than 
the importing nations, continue to face 
the essential task of bringing greater sta- 
bility to the pricing and the financing of 
our energy needs. 

Spread of Military Technology 

With the growing international access to 
nuclear power has come a greater poten- 
tial access to the technology of nuclear 
weapons. Some half-dozen additional na- 
tions have the capability to produce a nu- 
clear weapon within 2 years of a decision 
to do so. That is a chilling fact. Imagine 

how much more dangerous would be any 
of the smoldering regional disputes we 
see in the world if one or both rivals had 
nuclear weapons. 

And the unmistakable direction is to- 
ward greater and greater sophistication 
in the arsenals of the two nuclear super- 
powers — the United States and the So- 
viet Union. Greater accuracy and preci- 
sion in our weapons, increased reliance 
on mobility and concealment, new mili- 
tary frontiers outside the atmosphere and 
inside the atom — these new technologi- 
cal vistas will be explored and conquered 
in the years ahead. 

Whether the results of these new de- 
velopments will be greater security for 
our people or less, however, depends not 
on the genius of our advanced scientists 
but on the wisdom of our political lead- 

International Cooperation 

Individually and together, the develop- 
ments I have mentioned raise a central 
paradox for the next decade. For the na- 
tions of the world to shape their own 
national futures will require an unprece- 
dented degree of international coopera- 
tion. But the very challenges and strains 
which make that cooperation essential 
also make it intensely difficult. 

None of the developments I have de- 
scribed can be significantly affected un- 
less nations act together to do so. 

• Bringing population growth under 
sensible and humane control will require 
both international resources and national 

• Striking a decent balance between 
the growing demands of more people for 
a better life and the single planet which 
must sustain all life is, by definition, a 
global enterprise. 

• Managing national economies in 
ways that strengthen the overall health 
of the international economy rather than 
undermine it, building a security environ- 
ment and an enforceable regulatory re- 
gime that restrain the spread of nuclear 
weapons, bringing the strategic arms 
race under sensible control — all of these 
essential efforts require a commitment to 
negotiation and to compromise. 

Short-Term Advantages vs. 
Long-Term Interests 

But the same international factors that 
command cooperation also conspire 
against that cooperation. Hard times in- 
evitably drive peoples and nations toward 

preoccupations inward. The natural ten- 
dency is to invest attention and effort on 
protecting one's short-term advantage, 
even at the expense of the longer term 

What choice does the subsistence 
farmer have but to cut whatever fire- 
wood is available to cook the family's food 
regardless of the long-term ecological im- 
pact? What incentive is there for parents 
in an impovershed rural village to limit 
the number of their children when a 
larger family can be insurance against an 
uncertain future? 

The same principle applies to na- 
tions. We have already seen the tempta- 
tion to gain short-term national advan- 
tages when energy markets are tight, 
even if it drives up the longer term price. 
And when growth is slow and unemploy- 
ment is high — in our nation or in others 
— pressures mount to protect domestic 
industries from outside competition, de- 
spite the longer term costs to all trading 
nations from a protectionist spiral. 

By the same token, as growing de- 
mands for visible improvement in stan- 
dards of living press in on fragile new 
governments, we could see the politics 
of Third World nations become more 

As these internal frustrations are 
turned outward, the potential for re- 
gional rivalries and conflicts increases. 
And unless a pattern of mutual restraint 
is established on the part of outside pow- 
ers, these internal and regional tensions 
will be a source of growing tension and 
danger in East- West relations. 

In short, we face a period in which 
nationalistic impulses will be strong. The 
great challenge — for us and for others 
— will be to resist short-term expedients 
that only mortgage our future security 
and well-being, to take an enlightened, 
longer term view of our national 

Future Choices 

What does this mean for our own future 
and for the choices we face in the years 

Certainly, the next several years 
must be a time for building America's 
strength — for investing wisely in a mili- 
tary posture for the remainder of this 
century that will assure the balance and 
the stability upon which world peace 
rests, for regaining control of our energy 
future, for rejuvenating the productivity 
and competitiveness of the American 

Department of St; 

The Secretary 


But in the process of building our 
Strength we, too, must resist the tempta- 
tion to turn inward, to see unilateral solu- 
tions to problems that can only be solved 
through common action, to place barri- 
cades around our economy and ring our 
diplomacy with steel. 

We must be deeply conscious, in the 
years ahead, of the constant need to bal- 
ance the determined pursuit of our safety 
and prosperity in the short run with a 
willingness to cooperate and compromise 
in pursuit of long-term interests we share 
with others. 

There is no question that we face a 
period in which our own increased de- 
fense efforts are required. Soviet military 
power has increased steadily and signifi- 
cantly over the past decade. It would be 
highly dangerous for us to permit the 
global military balance to tilt in the So- 
viets* favor. 

But even as we modernize our own 
military capabilities, even as we maintain 
our staunch opposition to Soviet military 
adventures in Afghanistan and else- 
where, we must continue the quest for 
practical, achievable, equitable agree- 
ments that restrain the arms spiral. 

Military technology will not stand 
still while we talk about ways to control 
it. It will move ahead. Achieving bal- 
anced and enforceable restraints will be- 
come more difficult. 

If we are to keep a handle on this 
costly and increasingly dangerous compe- 
tition in strategic weaponry, w r e must 
build on the progress already achieved 
and press for further progress with a 
sense of urgency. 

A balance between short-term needs 
and longer term interests must also be 
maintained in the area of trade. We must 
insist that the rules of international trade 
be fair for American workers and Ameri- 
can industries. There will be situations in 
which temporary assistance to distressed 
industries will be necessary and appropri- 
ate. And we must be constantly sensitive 
to the immediate problems faced by 
workers and communities and companies 
disrupted by shifting patterns of world 

But if our response to a generally 
more competitive trading environment is 
to erect artificial barriers to an open 
trading system, we will only suffer in the 
long run. 

We are a nation that thrives on 
world trade. One out of seven jobs in 
manufacturing alone depends on our ex- 
ports. One acre of U.S. farmland of every 
three produces for exports. 

If others cannot sell to us, it inevita- 
bly becomes more difficult for us to sell to 

others. Protectionist answers drive OUT 
economy down and our inflation up. For 

the sake of our future prosperity, we 
must strive to make our own economy 
more competitive while keeping the 
international economy open to fair 

The same balance between short - 
and long-run interests will also be re- 
quired in the pursuit of a more stable and 
peaceful world. 

• We must be prepared to defend 
our vital interests if they are endan- 
gered. We must be willing and able to 
meet the legitimate defense needs of 
friends threatened by external pressures. 
And there will be security interests that 
require our continued relationship with 
governments that are unpopular with 
their own people. But we must also rec- 
ognize that our security over the longer 
term is best assured if, working together 
with others, we are effective in ad- 
dressing the conditions that breed insta- 
bility and conflict. 

• We must continue to be an active 
force for the peaceful resolution of poten- 
tially explosive regional disputes — in 
the Middle East, in southern Africa, in 
Central America, and elsewhere. 

• We must invest in the economic 
progress of developing nations because it 
will contribute to our own progress and 
because hopelessness and frustration are 
the combustible ingredients for violence 
and extremism. 

• We must continue to press for pro- 
gress on human rights, encouraging the 
growth of political and economic institu- 
tions that can accommodate to change 
peacefully and that rest on the solid foun- 
dation of popular consent. 

Finally, there is one other balanc- 
ing act implicit in all the others — recon- 
ciling the need for a tightened national 
budget with the need for greater re- 
sources to advance our international in- 

The United States now ranks 15th 
among the 17 major industrial countries 
in the amount we spend per capita on in- 
ternational assistance. No programs have 
a narrower constituency among the 
American people and in Congress. 

But we must come to recognize that 
helping to plant new forests in Africa, as- 
sisting small farmers in the Caribbean 
grow more food, aiding postwar recon- 
struction and reconciliation in Zimbabwe 
and Nicaragua, contributing to the ability 
of our friends in Southeast Asia to defend 
themselves from outside threats — these 
efforts are not "give-away" programs; 
they are not international charity. They 
are investments we make in our own fu- 
ture no less than the futures of others. 

All of the trends 1 have spoken of to- 
day are real, whether we like them or 
not. But all of them are the work of hu- 
man beings. And all of them can be har- 
nessed and controlled by human beings, if 
we have the will and the skill to blend 
with our current preoccupations a deter- 
mination to secure a safer future. 

1 Press release 336. 

Securing a Safe 

Address at Kansas State Univer- 
sity in Manhattan, Kansas, on 
December U, 1980S 

I'm grateful to Larry Berg and to the 
Institute of Politics and Government for 
inviting me to this conference and for 
drawing attention to the related prob- 
lems of refugees and hunger in the w r orld. 
And I want to express gratitude also to 
this audience, so many of whom have 
been in the forefront of efforts to help 
refugees here in California. 

America's history and its resources 
— what we are and what we have — make 
it impossible for us to ignore these is- 
sues. Indeed, our historic values and our 
unmatched wealth compel us not just to 
play a role but to play a role of leadership 
in dealing with them. 

Today I want to focus upon the sub- 
ject of refugees: on the moral and practi- 
cal issues that come to us in the human 
shape of up to 15 million refugees and dis- 
placed persons worldwide. I want to 
sketch for you the dimensions of the refu- 
gee problem as it confronts the United 
States and the world community. And I 
want to discuss what will be required of 
us — here at home and in our efforts 
abroad — if we are to deal responsibly 
with this issue. 

If my remarks have any central 
point, it is this: that the United States 
and the world community must deal not 
only with the pressing outward manifes- 
tations of the refugee problem but with 
its underlying causes — war, political per- 
secution, and other oppressions of the hu- 
man person. 

Dimensions of the Problem 

One picture, as the old saying puts it, is 
worth a thousand words. And surely this 
is true when we see the photographs of 

The Secretary 

suffering among the world's refugees. A 
year ago our hearts — and our consciences 
— were touched by the picture of a Kam- 
puchean refugee mother holding her dead 
child. Two weeks ago, newspapers car- 
ried a picture of a refugee woman in 
Somalia, crouching with her nearly naked 
child in a flimsy hut made of sticks and 

In recent years, such tragic scenes 
have become all too frequent as millions 
have been driven from their homes by 
wars, civil disturbances, religious or ra- 
cial persecution, or repressive govern- 
ment policies. 

• In West Asia and Southeast Asia 
there are 4-5 million refugees and dis- 
placed persons, including those driven to 
flight and near-starvation by Vietnam's 
drive against Laos and Kampuchea. In 
the past year alone, more than a million 
Afghans have become refugees, victims 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

• About 4 million Africans have fled 
their homes; there are 3 million refugees 
as displaced persons in the Middle East; 
tens of thousands of people flee Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union each year. 

• In our own hemisphere, there are 
now hundreds of thousands of refugees — 
not to mention the 136,000 Cuban and 
Haitian entrants who have come to the 
United States over the past 7 months. 

These figures represent a sharp up- 
surge in the numbers of refugees world- 
wide. Since last January, hundreds of 
thousands of men, women, and children 
have fled their homelands. This alarming 
situation is graphically illustrated by re- 
cent increases in the budget for the U.N. 
High Commissioner for refugees. Last 
year, the UNHCR spent $234 million for 
refugee relief. This year, the figure will 
more than double, to $568 million. And in 
spite of this dramatic increase, the need 
far outstrips the resources available for 
helping refugees. 

U.S. Position 

Where does the United States stand in 
its efforts to deal with the problem? 

Generally, we can be proud of our re- 
sponse. In the fiscal year that ended last 
September 30, the United States pro- 
vided more than $650 million for interna- 
tional refugee relief and resettlement 
programs. This includes our donations to 
international organizations, Food for 
Peace help to refugees, transportation 

for refugees to the United States, and 
placement aid to voluntary agencies here 
at home. We admitted well over 200,000 
refugees for resettlement in the United 
States. We received, in addition, 125,000 
Cubans and 11,000 Haitians who have 
sought asylum in the United States but 
have not been granted refugee status. 

Here at home, the Department of 
Health and Human Services provided 
more than $600 million for refugee assist- 
ance in FY 1980. And the generosity of 
private citizens through churches and 
other groups is beyond all counting. 

This generous response by the Fed- 
eral Government, by the States, by 
churches, voluntary organizations, and 
individuals suggests to me that the peo- 
ple of the United States remain true to 
their traditions of concern for human 
rights and generosity to people in need. 
We can be proud also that the Congress 
has responded to the world refugee crisis 
by passing an enlightened law — the Refu- 
gee Act of 1980. This act has several im- 
portant, even historic, provisions. 

• It creates a uniform standard for 
defining refugees. 

• It sets at 50,000 yearly the "nor- 
mal flow" of refugees and enables the 
President, in consultation with Con- 
gress, to adjust that number if refugee 
emergencies require. 

• It defines a fairer, more compre- 
hensive system of Federal assistance for 
refugee resettlement within the United 
States. This is aimed at helping refugees 
become — as soon as possible — self- 
sufficient, contributing members of our 

Having said all this, however, let me 
hasten to add: We are a long way from 
solving all the domestic problems that 
ensue from the world refugee crisis and 
the heavy flow of refugees to the United 
States. For the moment, let me touch on 
some of the issues we face. They are 
acute now; they will pose enormous chal- 
lenges to those in the future who seek to 
deal with refugee issues. 

Issues to be Faced 

The first problem is the problem of grow- 
ing impatience, weariness, and even re- 
sentment felt by our people about the 
burdens created by the acceptance of ref- 
ugees and emergency entrants. It will do 
no good to deny or minimize this reality. 

To begin with, some citizens ques- 
tion whether we can afford to spend so 

much on refugees while other pressing 
problems demand immediate attention 
and resources. The practical burdens of 
helping refugees establish new lives in 
the United States are, as you know, enor- 
mous. The sheer numbers of recent years 
and the unpredictability of recent refu- 
gee waves have made careful planning 
difficult. They have given our national 
refugee programs an air of permanent 
emergency. The arrival of unorganized 
boat flotillas from Cuba over a short span 
of weeks last spring made it necessary, 
for example, to press widely scattered 
military facilities into sudden service as 
receiving centers. 

Our social service programs — na- 
tional, State, and local — have been hard 
pressed by this sudden surge of refugees. 
The State and local social service machin- 
ery of Florida has been severely tested 
by the influx of Cuban and Haitian en- 
trants — just as California has extended 
itself to accommodate the influx of Indo- 
chinese refugees. 

You who have served in refugee 
sponsorship programs know the chal- 
lenge of finding jobs in stressful economic 
times for refugees who may not speak 
English; whose skills may not be readily 
transferable to our job market; who may 
have trouble finding adequate housing 
when such housing for the disadvantaged 
is already scarce. Perhaps because of 
such problems, public opinion is not al- 
ways receptive to large waves of refu- 
gees and immigrants. How shall we deal 
with this problem? 

To begin with, I would suggest that 
we put it in proper perspective. The 
United States — by virtue of its size, its 
wealth, and its humanitarian traditions — 
is, to be sure, the largest contributor to 
international refugee relief. We have re- 
ceived, in absolute figures, the largest 
number of refugees in recent years. 

But our contributions, I would sug- 
gest, are by no means disproportionate 
to our capacity. Our contribution to inter- 
national refugee relief agencies last year, 
for example, amounted to nearly $166 
million — an impressive sum. But at 74^ 
per American citizen, our contribution 
ranks not first but seventh in the world. 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzer- 
land, the Netherlands, and West Ger- 
many all contributed more, based on thei 
populations, than we. And some other 
countries have resettled more refugees 
as a proportion of their total populations, 
than we have. 

The Secretary 

Beyond reminding ourselves of these 

import am facts, it is essential that the 
Federal Government generously cushion 
the impact of refugee resettlement on 
State and local budgets, lb slash budgets 
in this area would not only press States 
and localities toward— or beyond — their 
fiscal limits, it would create new hard- 
ships for refugees and for our citizens. 
and it would aggravate the danger of so- 
cial tension between refugees and host 
communities. That is a danger we can — 
and should — avoid. 

Second, how shall we cope with sud- 
den influxes like that from Cuba last 
spring? To argue that we should be open 
and generous is not to say that the 
United States can accept — or should ac- 
cept — unlimited numbers of entrants or 
bear unlimited burdens. 

The arrival last spring of thousands 
of Cubans in hastily organized boat flotil- 
las casts this question and others into 
bold relief: What limits should we set, 
and how? What shall we do about the re- 
lated problem of massive unlawful entry 
into the United States? How can we as- 
sure that our refugee and immigration 
policies are free of the taint of racial 

A national commission on immigra- 
tion and refugee policy, chaired by 
Father Theodore Hesburgh of Notre 
Dame University, is pondering these 
questions now. But these questions 
should also be the focus of a careful na- 
tional debate. 

Third, what shall we do about the 
growing problem of "economic refugees?" 
Our law. and the U.N. convention on ref- 
ugees, define refugees as those fleeing 
political persecution, not poverty. But 
sometimes the line between the two is 
not so clear — as the plight of several 
thousand Haitians seeking asylum in the 
United States makes clear. Hunger, too, 
creates refugees. What should be our 
policy regarding those who flee both au- 
thoritarian rule and harsh, unremitting 
economic deprivation? There is no easy 
answer to this question. But every boat- 
load of hungry, miserable people sailing 
the Caribbean toward our shores sug- 

3 to me that we must find an answer 
that is both humane and practical. 

The problems I have discussed are 
problems we Americans feel because of 
our own experiences with refugees here 
at home. We Americans must work to- 
gether to solve them. But we must never 
forget — and other countries should re- 
member — that what America does takes 
place in a broader context. The refugee 
issue is a global issue; it requires a global 

So let me turn now to the interna- 
tional dimension of the problem. What 
should the international community do to 
help solve these pressing problems? 

International Dimensions 

To begin with, all nations must respond 
generously to help suffering people in 
camps and holding centers around the 
world. The funds must be provided. 
When necessary, all countries should be 
prepared to offer first -asylum — and many 
to provide permanent resettlement. This 
is an international obligation to be shared 
by all. 

Furthermore, there must be an ef- 
fort to establish clear, internationally ac- 
ceptable principles governing the status 
and welfare of refugees, as well as the 
obligations of nations toward refugees. 
The U.N. General Assembly is now con- 
sidering several proposals to define such 
principles. We believe that any such in- 
ternational agreement must include cer- 
tain points. 

• Large-scale expulsions of persons 
should be discouraged in the name of hu- 
manity and international order. I can im- 
agine no justification — political, social, 
racial, or religious — for a government to 
force large numbers of its citizens to flee 
their homeland. Such expulsions are hos- 
tile acts directed by sending countries to- 
ward receiving ones and, thus, are dou- 
bly unacceptable. 

• Persons displaced from their 
homelands should be allowed to return 
home voluntarily as promptly as condi- 
tions permit. The repatriation of persons 
following the end of the fighting in Zim- 
babwe and Nicaragua demonstrates that 
there are effective and humane ways to 
repatriate refugees. 

• Nations guilty of mass expulsions 
must be obliged to repatriate immedi- 
ately all criminals they have forced 
abroad, subject, of course, to the protec- 
tion of rights extended to all displaced 
persons. We can no longer tolerate any 
country's attempt to rid itself of its crim- 
inal elements by cynically exporting 
them to neighboring nations. 

• Our efforts must be focused on the 
fundamental human issues involved — on 
the human rights of refugees. Such an 
emphasis should cover not only the rights 
of refugees once they have left their na- 
tive lands but also the obligations of the 
governments of the nations they are 
leaving — obligations to protect would-be 

refugees pending their departure, rather 

than to harass them as now often occurs. 

Even if the community of nations can 
agree on programs based on these princi- 
ples, other questions will remain. 

Can we, without scaling down our 
other relief programs, increase interna- 
tional aid to African refugees? A rela- 
tively small fraction of the refugee relief 
budget has gone to Africa-reven though 
refugees in Africa constitute almost one- 
quarter of the world total. 

And can we improve conditions for 
refugees worldwide, without creating a 
"pull" which actually induces people to 
leave their homelands? 

If by raising such questions I seem 
to imply that the challenge is staggering 
I make no apology: It is. But the chal- 
lenge posed by the global tidal wave of 
refugees is one we cannot — must not — 
duck. The response of the United States 
to refugee problems must go beyond refu- 
gee relief. It must include strong support 
for human rights. It must include gener- 
ous programs for foreign assistance — to 
eliminate some of the hunger, disease, 
and misery that create refugees. 

Ultimately, we and the -work] can 
deal with the human tragedy of refugee 
migrations only by working to remove 
their root causes — by overcoming pov- 
erty, by working to alleviate hunger, by 
ending abuses of human rights within na- 
tions, by opposing military aggression, 
and by encouraging peaceful settlements 
of conflicts around the world. 

We are, of course, unlikely to solve 
these problems in a short time. We are a 
long way from having a world that is so 
just, so humane, so prosperous and stable 
that no person is forced to flee from 
home and country. But surely the effort 
to build such a world deserves the work 
of all people who cherish human dignity 
and the sanctity of human life. And while 
we seek to build such a world, let us take 
every practical step we can to alleviate 
human suffering — wherever we find 

1 Press release 333. 


Southern Africa: Four Years Later 

by Richard M. Moose 

Statement before the African 
Studies Symposium of the Black 
Studies Program at Pennsylvania 
State University, University Park, on 
October 13, 1980. Mr. Moose is As- 
sistant Secretary for African Affairs. 

During the last 4 years Africa, and 
southern Africa in particular, have 
received increasing attention from 
your government and from the Ameri- 
can people. We recognized, at the 
outset of the Carter Administration, 
that American values and American 
strategic and political interests dic- 
tated an American role — a more active 
American role — in southern Africa. I 
believe that we have good reason to be 
satisfied that our Africa policy has 
advanced these interests. 

The pursuit of these three princi- 
ples — human rights, racial equality, 
and democratic rule — has been the 
centerpiece of this Administration's 
Africa policy. Our forthright position 
and the progress we have made in 
southern Africa, based on these prin- 
ciples, have been the key to strengthen- 
ing our African relations. 

Our Africa policy is denned by the 
concentric relationships between South 
Africa and southern Africa, between 
southern Africa and the rest of Africa, 
and Africa and the United States. 
These relationships are substantively 
different today from what they were in 
1977. This evening, therefore, I would 
like to review the southern African 
situation as we found it in 1977, the 
basic principles underlying this Ad- 
minstration's policy, and the compo- 
nents of the policy as it developed. I 
would like to compare these to the 
situation in southern Africa today and 
to consider the implications for future 
policy of the ongoing processes in 
southern Africa. 

A basic theme of this Administra- 
tion has been consistency between 
what we see as fundamental American 
principles and the substance of our 
foreign policy. We have acted in the 
belief that American principles and 
American interests should be mutually 
reinforcing — justice at home; justice 
abroad. In southern Africa this mean! 
that our policies should be directed at 
progress toward the respect for human 

rights, economic opportunity, and the 
full political participation for all 
peoples regardless of race. We con- 
cluded that U.S. political and strategic 
interests required progress on all three 
southern African issues — Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, and South Africa. 

U.S. Policy 

In the early months of President Car- 
ter's Administration, a difficult course 
was set. Vice President Mondale met in 
Vienna with then South African Prime 
Minister | Johannes Balthazar] Vor- 
ster. The Anglo-American effort on 
Rhodesia got underway, and the con- 
tact group began negotiations on 

Forty-six months later Zimbabwe 
is independent, the Namibian negotia- 
tions have been substantially advanced, 
and white South Africa is engaged in 
an agonizing reappraisal of the grand 
design of apartheid. Meanwhile, the 
United States has developed stronger 
relations with African states through- 
out the continent. 

Our initial premise with regard to 
South Africa was that the system of 
apartheid is morally abhorrent and 
that our own traditions and principles 
required us, as a nation, to make clear 
our opposition. In addition, it was our 
judgment that apartheid, separate de- 
velopment, and racial discrimination 
undermined the pursuit of all of our 
interests — strategic, political, and eco- 
nomic. Our position was, therefore, 
clearly established on the basis of both 
moral principle and national interests. 

On this basis we made the future 
course of our relations with the South 
African Government dependent upon 
progress toward the elimination of 
apartheid. And let me emphasize here 
that while this statement of policy — 
while it invoked specific political prin- 
ciples — it did not include explicit po- 
litical prescriptions. Our actions and 
our statements over the last 4 years 
have been firmly based on the right 
and the need for full political partici- 
pation. Our position is that the best 
political system for South Africa is one 
agreed to by all South Africans but not 
dictated by any one party. It is in this 
light that our policy toward South 

Africa over the past 4 years should be 

Within the framework of our 
policy, we have taken a series of ac- 
tions which speak to the seriousness of 
our intent: 

• The United States fully sup- 
ported the U.N. Security Council man- 
datory arms embargo in November of 

• Suspended all nuclear coopera- 
tion with South Africa pending South 
Africa's adherence to the NPT [Non- 
Proliferation Treaty] and the adoption 
of full scope safeguards; 

• Unilaterally expanded the U.N. 
arms embargo to cut off any and all 
exports to South African military and 
police entities; 

• Further curtailed all official 
sports contact; 

• Limited official military coop- 
eration and representation; 

• Restricted visas for high-rank- 
ing South African military and police 
officers ; 

• Limited Eximbank and CCC 
| Commodity Credit Corporation] 
credit facilities; 

• Supported U.N. resolutions con- 
demning political repression by the 
South African Government; 

• Publicly and privately we are 
protesting bannings, detentions, and 
denials of passports of South African 
leaders and citizens; 

• Sent observers to political 
trials ; 

• Redrew our international visi- 
tors program to more accurately reflect 
the population balance in South 
Africa ; 

• Endorsed and promoted the Sul- 
livan code of fair labor practices ; 

• Gave technical support to black 
union leadership; 

• Continued to recognize the so- 
called independent homelands of 
Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and 
prospectively, the Ciskei; and 

• At the same time, have sought 
to strengthen our official and nonoffi- 
cial contacts with black organizations 
and leaders. 

And here at home we have sought 
to make the American public aware of 
the moral, political, and strategic con- 
sequences of apartheid for the United 
States. The change in attitude which 


these measures reflect represents a 

Blear break with the policy of pre\ ious 

As we anticipated these measures 
■rovoked strong reactions from all 
fronts- from those who say that what 
has been done is not enough to those 
who would argue that these measures 
have only served to stiffen the back of 
Afrikaner resistance or that we have 
only demonstrated that the United 
States is irrelevant to South Africa. 
There are elements of truth, antago- 
nism, and wishful thinking in these 
points of view. 

What is clear is that the ongoing 
discussions of Namibia independence, 
the changed U.S. policy toward South 
Africa, and the fact Zimbabwean inde- 
pendence have together produced an 
environment for South Africa which 
IB markedly different from that which 
existed in 1977. 

Internal (Changes 

South Africa underwent a period of 
fiux following the Soweto riots of 1976 
and the murder of Steve Riko. By 1979 
the new South African Prime Minis- 
ter. P. W. | Pieter Willem] Botha 
concluded, in his own words, that 
South Africans must "adapt or die." 
The facts appear to justify the Prime 
Minister's sense of urgency; the pace 
of events continues to accelerate. 
Look at what is occurring inside 
South Africa : 

• Black politics have taken on a 
new dynamism. Several increasingly 

erful and articulate black groups, 
including particularly the AN'C I Afri- 
can National Congress], Inkatha, the 
Committee of Ten, Black Conscious- 

AZAPO [ Azanian People's Orga- 
nization!, the PAC [Pan-African Con- 
- 1, the Coloured Labour Party, the 
Indian Reform Party are all actively 
promoting black political rights. More- 
over, these groups are searching for 
common ground between themselves. 
Perhaps more important, however, is 
the rise of a new center of black politi- 
cal power in the trade union movement. 

• The increasing strength of the 
black trade union movement in South 
Africa is one of the major historical 
developments there since 1948. This de- 
velopment, no doubt, reflects the larger 
role of the black population in the 
urbanized industrial sector. 

• The so-called colored community 

has been an integral part of these de- 
velopments and has undergone a his- 
toric shift of self-identification from 

almost white to almost black. Students 
have rejected Bantu education and the 
racial status quo ill their own name 
and in the name of the entire black 

• This black political and social 
evolution has been accompanied by in- 
creasing white questioning of the 
homelands premise — not that it was 
ever valid. Numerous recent reports, 

as unrealistic in today's world but un- 
just, and even indefensible. 

The business community is appre- 
hensive that the perpetuation of apart- 
heid not only limits prospects for 
growth but actually invites revolution 
and destruction. Changes within Afri- 
kanerdom have, thus, been stimulated 
by a complex of domestic economic, 
political, and social developments. 
These internal developments are cast 
against an external backdrop where 
South Africa's buffer states have dis- 
appeared, leaving South Africa the 

Increasingly, students, editors, writers, academies even, South Africa's 
military — we are told — now speak- of apartheid not only as unrealistic i)i 

today's world, bat unjust, and even indefensible. 

some official, have documented the non- 
viability of economic apartheid. In- 
deed, it has even been suggested in 
official quarters that separate economic 
development be abandoned in favor of 
regional economic cooperation. That is 
to say, the white community is search- 
ing for an economic alternative. 

• Certainly, the desperate search 
for political alternatives to the grand 
design of Malan and Verwoerd, short 
of one-man, one-vote, is clear from the 
plethora of constitutional schemes now 
being considered. In the process the 
Westminster political model is being 
abandoned, and a new white political 
system is taking shape in the form of a 
strong executive and cabinet decision- 
making. The Senate was dispensed 
with, with few notices or regrets, and 
replaced by the President's Council, 
whose fate, in turn, is uncertain with- 
out black participation. 

The search for a new political dis- 
pensation for a political alchemists' 
formula has seized the white com- 
munity. The most significant changes. 
to date, within the white community 
are in their expectations, in the search 
by the riding minority for new political 
structures, its movement toward an 
economic policy of unfettered economic 
growth, as well as its increased use of 
the language and style of reconcilia- 
tion. These attitudinal changes reflect 
an intellectual ferment within the 
Afrikaner community. Increasingly, 
students, editors, writers, academics 
even, South Africa's militarj — we are 
told — now speak of apartheid not only 

world's only surviving white minority 

In the face of this reality, the poli- 
ticians and advisers around the Prime 
Minister, including South Africa's 
senior military officers, have come to 
recognize that changes must be made 
in an effort to control both domestic 
discontent and international pressures. 
However, it is not yet evident that the 
white South African leadership under- 
stands the nature and the depth of 
black grievance nor is it prepared to 
enter into meaningful consultations 
with black South Africans. 

The majority of black South Afri- 
cans are clearly unwilling to accept 
a solution dictated by whites alone. 
They insist not on specific formulas 
for sharing power but rather on a 
national forum to discuss such formu- 
las. Black political leaders, across the 
spectrum, appeal for black political 
rights, for serious negotiation on 
pressing problems, and for cooperative 
planning of the country's future. A few 
— but too few — significant meetings 
have been held. And frequently, those 
who call for dialogue are detained, im- 
prisoned, or banned. The voices of con- 
ciliation and compromise across the 
country warn that it soon will be too 
late for talk. 

We acknowledge that the situation 
in South Africa has changed and is 
changing, and it would be a mistake to 
think that the South Africa of 1980 is 
the South Africa of 1977. But it would 

January 1981 


also be equally a mistake to interpret 
the difference as evidence of progress. 

Apartheid : Policy vs. Theory 

In considering change in South Africa 
in a historical perspective, we should 
underscore the continuous historical 
linkages in the policy of racial separa- 
tion from the Tribal Authority of 1924 
to the 1980 "constellation of states." 
Under whatever scheme, we are still 
dealing with a government that is pur- 
suing a policy of separate political 
development, however described. 

The contradictions between the 
historical continuity of apartheid pol- 
icy and the collapse of apartheid theory 
render the immediate future of South 
Africa highly uncertain. That future 
rests on the question of leadership. If 
the white leadership of South Africa 
accepts the ultimate implications of the 
multiracial character of that country, a 

The majority of black South 
Africans are clearly unwilling to 
accept a solution dictated by ivhites 

peaceful transition to the future is still 
possible. However, if the leadership 
cannot, or does not, rise to the occasion, 
the tragic consequences which ensue 
will be visited upon all South Africans. 

It would be even more tragic if it 
were believed that the existing system 
could be preserved by force of arms. It 
would be equally mistaken to believe, 
as some are theorizing now, that the 
problems of apartheid will be solved by 
redefining South Africa's political ori- 
entation in terms of "no permanent 
alliances, only permanent interests." 

What must be confronted is South 
Africa's permanent identity as an 
African country. South Africans can- 
not ignore southern Africa any more 
than the rest of Africa can ignore 

th Africa. Indeed, South Africans 
cannot detach themselves from the 
West any more than the conscience of 
the West can detach itself from apart- 
heid. The concentric relationships are 
the permanent reality which define 

th Africa's permanent identity and 
mine both its alliance and its 
in ten 

South Africa can no more ignore 
the fact that it is in Africa than its 

neighbors can ignore the various im- 
plications of its presence. South 
Africa's leadership has a choice in 
dealing with its neighbors much like 
that choice which it faces domestically. 
Events in the surrounding states pro- 
foundly affect the South Africans who 
are, in turn, major players in the 
future of their neighbors. The nature 
of South Africa's domestic situation 
will continue to be a key determinant 
in its external relations. 

External Relations 

Similarly, South Africa is clearly 
linked with Western civilization and 
the industrialized world. Out of their 
current anxiety and frustration and 
their rejection of outside criticism, 
some Afrikaners are casting about for 
ways to deny the existence of links to 
the West which they have worked — 
and continue to work — so assiduously 
to foster. Visitors are told that the 
critics and their governments are ir- 
relevant and that they do not matter to 
South Africa. Certainly, South 
Africa's trade statistics do not support 
this view, and neither does the be- 
havior of South Africans themselves. 
The truth of the matter is that white 
South Africans are probably more at- 
tentive and sensitive to what is said 
about them than most people. 

I had this brought home to me in a 
rather vivid way last January. I was 
repeatedly told during a visit that 
America had made itself irrelevant to 
events in South Africa. A few months 
later I noted in a press roundup, sent 
by our Embassy in Pretoria, that sev- 
eral South African papers had re- 
ported that the Legislature of 
Nebraska had voted to require state 
institutions to divest themselves of 
holdings in South Africa. Since I had 
not heard of this, I made further in- 
quiry, and I found that it appears that 
Nebraska's action was not accorded 
immediate newsworthiness anyplace in 
the American press and, yet, it made 
headlines in several South African 

The formula for our own relations 
with South Africa and with southern 
Africa must reflect the set of concen- 
tric and interlocking relationships. We 
must stick to the principles which have 
guided our Africa policy during the 
p ist years. But we must adopt the 
particulars of the last 3 or 4 years 

approach to the new realities of the 
South African and the southern Afri- 
can region. 

U.S. Role 

Our diplomacy and President Carter's 
determined stand on the Zimbabwe 
sanctions question helped to make pos- 
sible Zimbabwe's independence. We 
must now do our utmost again, in con- 
cert with others, to enable Prime Min- 
ister | Robert] Mugabe to translate 
independence into a better life for his 
people. In this assessment, we find our- 
selves in complete agreement not only 
with our European allies and Zim- 
babwe's black neighbors but with 
South Africa itself. What has and will 
happen in Zimbabwe will continue to 
exert a powerful influence on black and 
white attitudes in South Africa. Fur- 
ther assistance for Zimbabwe will be 
one of the important questions before 
the Congress when it returns. Presi- 
dent Carter has pledged increased 
assistance to Zimbabwe on our part. 

As Zimbabwe hopefully works out 
its problems, the nine Lusaka nations 
will be laying plans to develop South 
African regional economic linkages of 
common benefit. We will attend the 
forthcoming planning conference on 
this subject at Maputo in November 
and, the Congress willing, we will 
support its work. 

Within a few days representatives 
of the U.N. Secretary General will 
travel to South Africa to pursue 
agreement on the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 435 in 
Namibia. South Africa's response to 
this mission will be a key indicator of 
its willingness to live and work in 
peace with its neighbors. Just as every 
nation's interests are being served by 
Zimbabwe's impressive and orderly 
transition to democratic rule, so will 
an end to the conflict in Namibia open 
new possibilities for economic progress 
and political stability in southern 
Africa. It is, clearly, the intent and 
within the ability of all those who have 
supported Resolution 435 to insure the 
impartiality of an internationally su- 
pervised transition process. The credi- 
bility of our commitment to that 
endeavor is reinforced by ours and 
everyone else's self-interest in an or- 
derly and just outcome. South Africa 
will have an opportunity to establish 
its own good faith and credibility 
beginning a week from now. 



Turning to South Africa's domes- 
tic scene, one hoars fears expressed by 
white South Africans about something 
called "momentum." In their anxiety 
they worry that since Zimbabwe's in- 
dependence is a fact, it" Namibia poos, 
thou South Africa will bo next. But 
events in South Africa will not wait 
upon events in Zimbabwe or in 
Namibia. Events are moving at their 
own pace, and. as we observed earlier, 
that pace is accelerating. 

In this confusing and often am- 
biguous situation, wo must not fail to 
recognize change which is real and 
meaningful enough to merit our atten- 
tion and our praise. Wo must also rec- 
ognize, however, that we have lost 
credibility with black South Africa's 
increasingly diverse leadership; there- 
fore, it is essential that wo search for, 
and find, new and more meaningful 
ways to express our commitment to the 
aspirations of all South Africans. 

Although some white South Afri- 
cans charge that the United States 
fails to recognize and to act on their 
concerns, we are acutely aware of 
them. We consider that responding 
constructively to their legitimate se- 
curity concerns is one of the essential 
factors in any peaceful dismantling of 
the apartheid structure and the insti- 
tution of a system of full political 

At the same time, we will not 
allow ourselves to be denied a mean- 
ingful relationship with the black 
South African majority. Indeed, we 
must, in any event, do more to insure 
that our circle of contact with the 
newly emerging leaders continues to 
expand. The security and the welfare 
of the black majority is also an essen- 
tial factor in the conduct of our 


It is neither our choice nor our wish 
that our relations with South Africa 
deteriorate further. We would like for 
those relations to improve, but such 
improvement can only come on terms 
which are consistent with our princi- 
ples and acceptable to all South Afri- 
cans. Rut, in any event, even at the 
extremes of disassociation. there is no 
way in which our principles or our 
interests will ever permit us to be 
disinterested or uninvolved in the fate 
of South Africa. 

We recognize that South Africa is 
at a historical watershed : poised either 
to break out of self-inflicted shackles 

or to pull back from necessary eco- 
nomic, political, and social changes. 
The future is there for South Africa's 
loaders both black and white — to 
seize. The critical areas of change —in 
citizenship and constitutional arrange- 
ments have been repeatedly enunci- 
ated by prominent South African 

We are prepared to oppose, and to 
oppose strongly, the preservation of 
apartheid. Hut. we're equally willing 
to take the steps necessary to support 
a farsighted and courageous effort by 
all South Africans to come to terms 
with each other and with their 
neighbors. ■ 

Foreign Service 
Act, 1980 

0< TOBER 17, 1980' 

I am today approving H.R. 6790, the 
Foreign Service Act of 1980. This bill 
provides the first comprehensive revi- 
sion of personnel legislation for the 
U.S. Foreign Serice in 34 years. It is 
an important step in the reform, 
simplification, and improvement of 
personnel administration in the 
Government, a top priority of my 

Because of its special conditions 
of employment, including the require- 
ment of availability for worldwide 
service, the Foreign Service was ex- 
empted from most of the provisions of 
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
I recognized then, however, that the 
Foreign Service, operating under a 
1946 act designed for a far different 
world, was also in need of reform and 
that many of the civil service reforms, 
appropriately modified, would promote 
greater productivity and improve per- 
sonnel management in the Foreign 
Service as well. 

The Congress agreed, and we 
worked together to frame legislation. 
The Foreign Service Act of 1980 is 
the product of our nonpartisan col- 

While this bill was being drafted, 
events were occurring that brought 
home, vividly to all of us, the extraor- 
dinary demands placed on our Foreign 

Service personnel. They play an essen- 
tial role in the formulation and con- 
duct of U.S. foreign policy, and their 
service abroad often involves depriva- 
tion and danger. They are exposed to 
acts of terrorism and, in some places, 
to open hostility toward the United 
States and its representatives. We 
owe them our fullest support. 

The new Foreign Service Act 
recognizes the professionalism and 
dedication required by today's Foreign 
Service. It sets high performance 
standards, provides incentive awards 
for outstanding service, and strength- 
ens career development programs. It 
permits the President to promulgate 
a pay schedule that complies fully with 
the requirements of the Federal Pay 
Comparability Act. The Executive 
order I will sign, shortly, will achieve 
comparability between the Foreign 
Service and General Schedule pay 

When I signed the Civil Service 
Reform Act just 2 years ago, on 
October 13, 1978, I said that it would 
"bring efficiency and accountability 
and competence to the Federal Govern- 
ment that exceed what we have known 
in the past" and that it would put 
"incentive and reward back into the 
Federal system." Our experience since 
that law went into effect indicates that 
it is bringing real improvement to the 
Civil Service — and that the American 
taxpayers are getting a better return 
on their tax dollar. 

I take great pride in signing this 
bill today. It is a modern charter, well 
designed to meet the needs of the dedi- 
cated, able men and women of the 
Foreign Service in the decades ahead. 
I congratulate all Members of Con- 
gress and their staffs who devoted long 
hours and months to preparing it and 
who worked closely with my Adminis- 
tration in bringing it successfully to 

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27, 
1980. ■ 

January 1981 



ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

The third Ministerial meeting of 
the United States and the Association 
of South East Asian Nations 
i ASEAN J was held in Manila, Sep- 
tember 10-12, 1980. Following is the 
full text of the joint press statement. 

The Third meeting of the ASEAN- 
United States Dialogue was held in 
Manila on September 10-12, 1980. 

The Honorable Anthony C. Albrecht, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State, led the United States dele- 
gation which included representatives 
from the Department of State, Com- 
merce, Agriculture and Labor; from the 
Office of the United States Trade Repre- 
sentative; from the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development; from the Interna- 
tional Communication Agency; and from 
the United States embassies in ASEAN. 

The ASEAN spokesman was Ambas- 
sador Sime D. Hidalgo, Director General 
of ASEAN-Philippines. The ASEAN 
delegations were led by Mr. Umarjadi 
Njotowijono, Director General, ASEAN- 
Indonesia; Mr. M. Jusof Hitam, Director 
General, ASEAN-Malaysia; Mr. Aziz 
Mahmoud, Director General, ASEAN- 
Singapore; and Mr. Vudhi Chuchom, Act- 
ing Director General, ASEAN-Thailand. 
The Secretary General of the ASEAN 
Secretariat, Honorable Narcisco G. Reyes, 
was also in attendance. 

The welcome remarks of Foreign 
Minister Carlos P. Romulo as the chair- 
man of the ASEAN Standing Committee, 
were read by Mr. Hidalgo. 

Minister Romulo noted that the 
ASEAN-U.S. partnership has succeeded 
in moving into a "commitment stage" 
based upon "mutual respect and mutual 

He stressed that ASEAN and the 
United States share a long-range concern 
for the continued stability and sustained 
economic jo'owth of the region. This is 
manifested by their common position in 
support of the UN Resolution which calls 
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from Kampuchea. 

General Romulo expressed optimism 
that despite the political tension, ASEAN 
has not veered from the course leading to 
its goal of self-reliance, economic 
strength, political cohesiveness and mean- 
ingful cooperation with third countries. 

Noting the progress made in re- 
gional, cultural, social, and agriculture 

II as in energy cooperation, 
he urged the delegates to pursue the ac- 
tivities in energy-related cooperation as 
well as in small-scale industry and 

Finally, stressing that more needs to 
be done in the face of a worsening world 
economic crisis, he specifically endorsed 
several of the strategies set forth by U.S. 
Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, for 
industrial nations to follow. He suggested 
that these strategies might well serve as 
guidelines in broadening the base of this 

The two sides reviewed with satisfac- 
tion the continuing growth of ASEAN- 
U.S. cooperation which complements their 
close bilateral relationships. During the 
meeting, they reaffirmed the mutual value 
of the ongoing ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue as 
the forum for their consultation and col- 
laboration in support of peace and stabil- 
ity and economic development in South- 
east Asia. The meeting examined all 
aspects of ongoing economic, social, and 
cultural cooperation between ASEAN and 
the United States; and exchanged views 
on ways to further develop these rela- 
t'ons. A number of new project proposals 
were introduced and discussed and they 
will be further studied by ASEAN and 
the United States. 

The discussion also covered a wide 
range of economic areas of mutual inter- 
est to ASEAN and the United States. 
Both sides agreed on the need for more 
intensive, cooperative efforts to counter 
developments in the international eco- 
nomic environment which posed a threat 
to continuing economic growth. At the 
same time, they recognized the opportuni- 
ties for renewed growth associated with 
expanded U.S. -ASEAN cooperation. 

ASEAN and the United States ex- 
pressed satisfaction that the ASEAN- 
U.S. Dialogue has played a helpful role in 
the successful Common Fund negotiations 
completed in June of this year [1980]. 
The meeting also agreed to cooperate in 
the work of the forthcoming preparatory 
commission and particularly to elaborate 
positively operational aspects which will 
ensure a viable and effective common 
fund. ASEAN urged the United States to 
support the Philippines' bid for the site of 
the Common Fund headquarters. The 
United States expressed appreciation for 
being informed of the ASEAN position 
and agreed to give it early consideration. 
The meeting also discussed other meas- 
ures to overcome international commodity 
problems. These included the early estab- 
lishment of international commodity 
agreements covering commodities of 
mutual interest. In noting the successful 
conclusions of negotiations on the Inter- 
national Rubber Agreement (INRA), 
ASEAN expressed its appreciation to the 
United States for its support for Kuala 
Lumpur as the headquarters of INRA. 
Both sides agreed on the need for effective 
mechanisms to ameliorate the adverse 

effects of export earnings in stability. The 
meeting also exchanged views on tin with 
a view to paving the way for successful 
negotiations for a viable and effective 
sixth international tin agreement. 

The United States noted that bilat- 
eral agreements reducing tariff and non- 
tariff barriers have been concluded be- 
tween the United States and each of the 
ASEAN countries within the framework 
of the multilateral trade negotiations. 
The United States also urged the ASEAN 
countries to accede to the MTN Codes and 
agreed to clarify the various questions 
raised by ASEAN regarding the codes 
and certain tariff concessions made by the 
United States in the MTN prior to the 
ASEAN meeting on the MTN, scheduled 
in Manila on September 24-26, 1980. 

The United States also agreed to 
consider ASEAN request for additional 
product-specific tariff concessions, includ- 
ing some items previously discussed in the 
tropical products segment of the MTN. 
These discussions would take place in the 
context of bilateral trade negotiations 
which the United States is willing to 
undertake prior to January 3, 1982. 

In response to the ASEAN request 
for accelerated implementation of U.S. 
MTN tariff concessions, the United States 
reported that it had already made a maxi- 
mum effort in the MTN to accelerate 
staging of its tariff concession to 
ASEAN, but agreed to accept for review 
ASEAN country lists of those items 
which are not currently receiving acceler- 
ated implementation. 

Both sides expressed concern about 
growing protectionist pressures and their 
potential adverse impact on world trade, 
and, in particular the trade of developing 
countries. The United States reiterated 
its resolve to resist self-defeating protec- 
tionist pressures. It cited Secretary 
Muskie's speech at the UN Special Ses- 
sion in which he committed the United 
States to support a pledge by all countries 
to restrain protectionism and facilitate 

The United States reported that it 
has made substantial improvements in 
the U.S. Generalized Scheme of Prefer- 
ence since the last Dialogue. 

ASEAN expressed its appreciation 
to the United States for the inclusion of 
Indonesia as a beneficiary of the U.S. 
GSP and the liberalization of the cumu- 
lative rules or origin. ASEAN welcomed 
this positive contribution to improve de- 
veloping country access to the U.S. mar- 
ket. ASEAN urged further improvement 
in certain features of the program, spe- 
cifically in product coverage, competitive 
need limitations, and rules of origin. The 
United States suggested that the ASEAN 
countries submit requests during the 


East Asia 

annual product review to have additional 
products included in the list of eligible 
items. The United States also invited 
ASEAN to seek designation as a recog- 
nized regional association so as to qualify 
under the liberalized cumulative rules of 
origin. The United States also noted that 
ASEAN's GSP benefits continue to grow 
rapidly and indicated its willingness to 
send experts to the ASEAN countries to 

ain the GSP program. 

Both sides recognized the importance 
of the private sector in expanding 
ASKAX-U.S. economic relations and ex- 
pressed satisfaction with the formation 
of the ASEAN-U.S. Business Council. 

The meeting expressed confidence 
that the Council's proposed program will 
lead to closer cooperation between the 
private sectors in ASEAN and the 
United States. 

The United States delegation reaf- 
firmed the deep interest of the Export- 
Import Bank of the United States in the 
ASK AX countries, and its commitment to 
the expansion of economic and trade rela- 
tions in support of ASEAX objectives. 
They indicated the bank would finance at 
least $2 billion in transactions with the 
ASK AX countries over the next five 
yea is, including ASEAX industrial 

Recognizing the important stimulus 
which the programs of the Overseas Pri- 
vate Investment Corporation afford to 
the flow of private American investment 
to ASKAX. the U.S. side noted OPIC's 
confidence and enthusiasm for assisting 
ASKAX enterprises in locating appro- 
priate U.S. partners and in supporting 
them in establishing and sustaining in- 
vestments which will contribute to 
ASEAN's development goals. The U.S. 
side announced that a high-level delega- 
tion from OPIC would visit the region in 
October, 1980. 

Both sides reviewed the status of 
ASEAX-U.S. development cooperation, 
and expressed satisfaction with the prog- 

-ince the last Dialogue. The United 
States reiterated its strong commitment 
to regional development projects with 
ASEAN. In this connection, it announced 
that U.S. review of the ASEAX plant 
quarantine project has been completed 
and the United States is now ready to 
sign the formal project agreement. The 
United States also expressed its commit- 
ment to continue working with ASEAN 
on the ASEAX watershed conservation 
and management research program, and 
announced the scheduled arrival of a U.S. 
advisory team on September 14, 1980. 

ASEAX and the United States noted 
with satisfaction the signing of the proj- 
ect agreement on August 28, 1980, provid- 
ing for U.S. assistance in the establish- 
ment of an ASEAN Agriculture Develop- 
ment and Planning center in Bangkok, 

The United States also responded 
favorably to a new proposal presented by 

ASKAX for an ASEAX scholarship pro- 
gram for applied tropical medicine and 
public health. 

Both sides noted that continued in- 
creases in the world oil price call for 
greater cooperation among industrial and 
developing countries in accelerating the 
transition to non-oil energy sources. Thus, 
the recent tour of ASEAX energy experts 
to U.S. energy facilities and organiza- 
t ons has served to stimulate ideas for 
greater collaboration in energy matters 
between ASEAX and the United States. 
As a first step in energy cooperation, 
ASEAN and the United States have 
agreed on a program of technical assist- 
ance, professional development, and for- 
mal exchange. The United States looks 
forward to working with ASEAN to de- 
velop the next phase of energy coopera- 
tion program over the next few months. 
The United States also proposed estab- 
lishment of an ASEAN-U.S. consultative 
group on energy composed of senior offi- 
cials and ASEAN agreed to look into this 

The meeting reviewed the useful 
joint projects concerning drug control in 
the fields of law enforcement, preventive 
education and treatment and rehabilita- 
tion undertaken since the exchange of 
notes at the 1979 Ministerial meeting 
between ASEAN and the United States 
in Bali. They agreed to continue efforts to 
expand and improve this cooperation. 

In order to continue the effective 
dialogue on economic matters that has 
characterized the ongoing ASEAN-U.S. 
Dialogue, both sides agreed to establish 
an Economic Coordination Committee as- 
sociated with the ASEAN Washington 
Committee, as a forum for discussing 
economic issues of mutual interest. 

Both sides were pleased that agree- 
ment on the committee had been reached, 
and considered its establishment a major 
achievement of the Third ASEAN-U.S. 
Dialogue and a positive step in the 
strengthening of ASEAN-U.S. 

On shipping, both sides agreed that 
ASEAN and the other non-Communist 
developing countries' shipping lines be 
exempted from the constraints of the 
U.S. Ocean Shipping Act of 1980. 

It was agreed that the Fourth 
ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue would be held in 
the United States next year on dates to 
be mutually agreed upon. 

The ASEAN and United States dele- 
gations thanked the government and 
people of the Philippines for the warm 
hospitality extended to them during their 
stay in the Philippines. 

The Third ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 
was concluded in an atmosphere of 
mutual understanding and friendship. ■ 

U.S.-China Sign 
Grain Agreement 

OCTOBER 22, 1980 > 

Today, we signed, in Beijing, a grain 
agreement with the People's Republic 
of China which accomplishes two im- 
portant things. First, it will promote 
the sale of U.S. grain to a large and 
growing market. Second, it will fur- 
ther the process of building a long- 
term structure for U.S.-China rela- 

Under the terms of this agree- 
ment, China will purchase at least 
6 million metric tons (MMT) of U.S. 
wheat and corn annually for a 4-year 
period beginning January 1, 1981. 
The Chinese may purchase up to 9 
MMT without prior notice. 

Since the establishment of diplo- 
matic relations in January 1979, U.S. 
agricultural exports to China have 
expanded rapidly and will reach a 
record $2 billion in 1980. China is now 
our most important customer for 
cotton and one of the most important 
for other farm products. 

The agreement grew out of a 
dialogue dating back to Secretary 
| Bob] Bergland's'visit to the People's 
Republic of China in 1978. It will pro- 
vide important benefits for both U.S. 
farmers and consumers. It will help 
to moderate the wide swing in grain 
prices that are often associated with 
annual fluctuations in agricultural 
exports. The agreement will also pro- 
vide further stimulus to our dynamic 
agricultural export sector and con- 
tribute to our growing surplus in 
agricultural trade, which will reach 
$22 billion in 1980. 

The President takes great per- 
sonal pride in the fact that, in his 
Administration, he was able to take 
the difficult but enormously successful 
step of establishing full diplomatic 
relations with China, the largest 
country in the world. 

The establishment of diplomatic 
relations with China almost 2 years 


East Asia 

ago made it possible for us to move 
ahead to build a new relationship 
which truly enriches us in knowledge, 
trade, and culture. 

• Trade more than doubled from 
$1.1 billion in 1978 to $2.3 billion in 
1979. This year we estimated it will 
almost double again to $4 billion. 

• About 25 cultural and sports 
delegations from China visit our coun- 
try every 6 months, and we are recip- 
rocating with visits by orchestras 
and other cultural groups as well as 
our Olympic athletes. 

• We have 13 separate working 
agreements in science and technology, 
which not only give us current and 
future commercial benefits but make it 
possible for our scientists and tech- 
nicians to share in China's research 

in medicine, earthquake prediction, 
and agriculture. 

Important as they are, there is 
more to our relationship than trade 
and cultural ties. We have also begun, 
carefully and deliberately, to build a 
consultative relationship which will 
enable us to work together to identify 
and cooperate on issues of common 
interest, such as the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. 

This effort to construct a long- 
term strategic relationship is still new 
and, therefore, fragile. It is based on 
carefully written and painstakingly 
negotiated understandings set down in 
the joint communique establishing dip- 
lomatic relations between the United 
States and China. This Administra- 
tion has consistently made clear its 
resolve to honor those understandings. 

We have come a long way since 
that day almost 2 years ago when the 
President announced that we had 
reached agreement with the Chinese 
on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. Thirty years of mutual iso- 
lation and hostility have been replaced 
with a deepening consultative relation- 
ship which is already contributing 
significantly to American security and 
to the peace and stability in Kast Asia 
and the world beyond. 

U.S.-Japanese Relations in the 1980s 

' Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Pre idential Documents of Oct. 27, 


by Richard C. Holbrooke 

Address before the Japan Society 
in New York on November 21, 1980. 
Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

During the last few months, I have 
given a number of speeches on strate- 
gic issues in East Asia, the continuing 
war in Indochina, and the development 
of our new relationship with China. 
Although Japan has figured impor- 
tantly in those speeches, as the corner- 
stone of our strategic posture and our 
strategic interests in the area, I have 
not yet discussed, in any detail, how 
I see the evolution of U.S.-Japanese 
relations in the midst of these other 

In less than 2 months I shall be 
leaving my present position. I shall 
leave with a sense of satisfaction that 
our relations with Japan have matured 
into a full-fledged, more equal and 
productive partnership. Nevertheless, 
challenges remain before us in the 
1980s, challenges that will test our 
ability and creativity in adapting the 
U.S.-Japanese alliance to an increas- 
ingly uncertain environment. 

Recent Developments 

In the past 4 years, Japan's role in the 
world has begun the transformation 
from one of caution, with almost total 
attention to pragmatically centered 
economic activity, to political activism, 
partnership, and leadership. This 
change was first evident when Prime 
Minister | Takeo] Fukuda traveled to 
Southeast Asia in 1977, declared the 
"Fukuda Doctrine," and opened a new 
relationship for Japan with the 
nations of ASEAN | Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations]. Following 
that, and with Foreign Ministers 
[Sunao] Sonoda, [Saburo] Okita, and 
| Masagoshi ] I to playing leading roles, 
the sense of Japanese responsibility 
grew, not only within the government 
but in society at large. Under 
[former] Prime Minister | Masayoshi | 
Ohira and now Prime Minister 
I Zenko I Suzuki, the Government of 
Japan has actively reassessed the 
meaning of alliance and partnership, 
and the results, particularly in the 

last year, have been nothing short of 

• While hoping to improve rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union, Japan 
has, nonetheless, taken a forthright 
stand in imposing sanctions on Mos- 
cow, believing, as we do, that the 
invasion of Afghanistan cannot go 
unanswered. Japan has stood second to 
none in rejecting Soviet aggression. It 
joined the Olympic boycott — a difficult 
step for both the government and the 
private parties involved. It has main- 
tained economic sanctions even in the 
face of less principled behavior by 
others who have moved in to pick up 
contracts Japan might have had. It 
has provided massive new aid to 
Pakistan and Turkey not, as is so 
often alleged, because this would open 
export markets, but as an instrument 
for strategic purposes. 

• Japan accepted a cutoff of over 
10 ' ', in its crucial oil shipments when 
it refused to pay higher prices de- 
manded by Iran, thus aiding signifi- 
cantly in halting the spiraling price of 
petroleum. And also with regard to 
Iran, despite an unfortunate problem 
early in the hostage crisis, since then 
Japan has been second to none in its 
support for our efforts there, as well. 

• Japan has greatly expanded its 
policy-level contacts with Europe, 
working closely with the European 
Community, as well as with the United 
States, not only on Iranian sanctions 
but in developing a dialogue on a 
broad rage of issues. This global ap- 
proach is one of the striking features 
of the new Japanese policy. 

• The relationship with ASEAN 
has deepened, and Japan has worked 
very closely with those nations, pro- 
viding massive refugee assistance — 
second only to the United States — and 
playing a front-line role in the U.N. 
vote on Kampuchean credentials. Per- 
haps partially in recognition of the 
leadership role Japan played on the 
latter question, it was overwhelmingly 
voted in to serve on the Security 
Council recently. Only a year ago 
Japan had to withdraw from a similar 

• Again, in Southeast Asia, no 
nation has been more eager or more 
active in attempting to use its good 
offices and diplomatic resources to 


East Asia 

achieve a solution to the Kampuchea!) 

• And finally, Japan has adopted 
a supportive and constructive ap- 
proach to the allied effort to limit the 
damage of the Iran-Iraq war. 

Speculation that these steps were 
purely reactive and situational — that 
they did not obey any larger policy 
concepl was dispelled by the remark- 
able language in the Foreign Minis- 
ter's annual policy report I the Blue 
k issued in August. 

International relations are no longer con- 
sidered as a given condition for Japan, 
but rather something which Japan should 
help form. As a responsible member of the 
international community. Japan must be 
prepared to make difficult choices, even 
make sacrifices. Such an attitude is to be 
backed up by a strong conviction that 
Japan must defend its basic values, that 

reedom and democracy . . . and fur- 
ther strengthen solidarity and cooperation 
with free nations, such as the United 

tes and the Western European 

Few countries in the world today 
have stated their basic orientation so 

Part of the motivation for this 
new approach is simply greater uncer- 
tainty about the international environ- 
ment and a desire to seek safety in 
numbers. But I think a careful reading 
of Japanese political, public, and press 
opinion also reveals a new positive 
concept of Japanese interests and 

ponsibilities. No longer is it ade- 
quate in Japanese minds to be econom- 
ically strong and politically neutral. 
Peace in the Middle East and Persian 
Gulf is vital to Japan's interests. 

iet aggression anywhere is a po- 
tential threat to security everywhere. 
Individual willingness to accept unrea- 
sonable demands for high oil prices 
may produce short-term supplies but 
only at the cost of long-term disloca- 
tions that affect us all. 

Thus, Japan has moved firmly in 
the direction of an alliance involving 
all of the industrialized democracies — 
not a military alliance, for that would 
go well beyond what is politically fea- 
sible or desirable for Japan, but a 
political-economic alliance in which we 
all work together to achieve our 
common objective. 

V "Productive Partnership" 

In a very real sense, I would argue, 
this represents the first stages of im- 
plementation of the "productive part- 

nership" for the 1980s to which Presi- 
dent Cartel- and Prime .Minister Ohira 
dedicated their nations in May L979. 
You may recall that such partnership 
was based on "•shared political and 
economic ideals" and reflected our re- 
spective responsibilities in world 

One should not assume that this 
has been an inevitable evolution or 
that it will inevitably be sustained. 
The Japanese Government has had to 
work hard with all areas of its society 
and body politic to garner the broad 
support that the policy line now en- 
joys. And the success is all the more 
remarkable in light of the severe 
strains within the Japanese domestic 
political structure in recent times. 

As Japanese leaders frequently 
point out, the starting point for that 
policy is the relationship with the 
United States. It is, thus, incumbent 
upon the Japanese — and upon us — to 
assure that the relationship remains 
dynamic and that its essence remains 
unaffected by the specific trade prob- 
lems that seem to plague us from time 
to time. 

Indeed, it is important to remem- 
ber that the movement in Japanese 
policy I have described, and the in- 
creasing warmth in the relationship 
with the United States, has taken place 
during a time of considerable tension 
and frequent confrontation on the 
economic front. Given problems we 
have had in the past such as the textile 
issue, one hesitates to say that the 
level of problems over the past few 
years has been unprecedented. But I 
think it would be hard to find an 
earlier time when such a broad range 
of problems has existed on such basic 
economic issues as steel, color tele- 
visions, citrus trade, rice disposals. 
tobacco products, government procure- 
ment, nuclear reprocessing, and — most 
particularly — automobiles. And yet, 
as a recent poll by Potomac Associates 
and the Gallup organization showed, 
Americans continue to have an in- 
creasingly favorable view of Japan 
and of the Japanese people. 

Let me cite some of the figures. 
In that poll, 84C of the people had a 
favorable opinion of Japan — higher 
than West Germany (81'; t or Israel 
(78'; l or 17 other countries listed in 
the poll. Only 12', had an unfavorable 

But the economic problems did 
not escape those polled ; over three- 

quarters (76^5 I saw Japanese imports 
as a serious threat to American jobs 
today, and almost two-thirds I 6293 ' 
saw such a serious threat 5 or 10 years 
from now. The number of Americans 
seeing Japan as an economic threat 
over the longer term declines, while 
those seeing China as an economic- 
threat increase. 

Bilateral Relationship 

Here I think the successes have also 
been overwhelming, but 1 am con- 
cerned about what I would term the 
"pathology" of our trade disputes — 
concerned that over time the tendency 
both sides have to bring such disputes 
to the edge of political calamity may 
one day breach the firebreak we have 
all worked so hard to create between 
them and the underlying political, 
economic, and security relationship. 

What is that pathology ? The 
typical scenario is for the United 
States to identify a specific trade 
problem and raise it with Japan. The 
Japanese respond that it isn't much of 
a problem or there isn't much to be 
done about it or they'll try. Time 
passes. Nothing happens. Egged on by 
pressures from the Hill and from spe- 
cial interests in our business com- 
munity — and one must say, sometimes 
at the urging of some Japanese — we 
escalate it to the very brink of a 
political breach. An agreement is 
finally struck which the United States 
views as inadequate and Japan views 
as the result of totally unjustified 
public bullying which has taken place 
without due regard for its concerns 
and its problems. The immediate crisis 
passes, but scars have been left. The 
cycle then repeats itself on some other 
specific issue. 

Some people have argued that 
such pressures and confrontations are 
necessary to move both sides from 
extreme positions to more rational 
stances. That may be so, but it is 
precisely this pathology that I find 
deeply troubling, indeed, destructive. 

W r hat can we do about it? I think 
on the American side we must resist 
more vigorously the temptation to 
"hype" specific problems. We have not 
done that in the case of automobiles, 
however. We took our stand, of 
course, because we judged it in our 
best interest to do so. But the Japa- 
nese must appreciate that in addition 


East Asia 

to concerns for inflation and energy, 
part of our calculation has been one of 
fair play, that blaming Japan — and 
punishing it for something not en- 
tirely of their making — was simply 

Accepting the political burdens of 
this type of decision must be reci- 
procal. Thus, when the United States 
calls on Japan to take justifiable steps 
to open its markets further — as we 
are now doing on tobacco products and 
government procurement for telecom- 
munications — I believe it is incumbent 
upon Japan to respond with imagina- 
tive and serious proposals which re- 
flect the totality of our relationship, 
even if this means "taking the heat" 
from some special interests. Quite 
frankly, I think the Japanese Govern- 
ment has done just that in many cases. 
So my appeal is not only to Japanese 
officials but also to those special 
Japanese interests which may be in- 
volved in one instance or another, and 
to the Japanese press, which is ever 
vigilant for examples of U.S. pressure, 
to understand that we want to be rea- 
sonable, but that reason is a two-way 

I would also be less than frank if 
I did not say that the strength of 
feeling which at least some Americans 
have tor economic problems is, in part, 
a function of perceptions that Japan 
has gotten a "free ride" in the defense 
area, i do not happen to share these 

In fact, there is a growing myth 
in the United States that Japan 
doesn't have armed forces. 1 his myth, 
which the Japanese have helped to 
perpetuate, creates a base ol misinfor- 
mation from which the issue is falsely 
debated. The question is not whether 
Japan should rearm. Japan already has 
a significant defense escablishment. 
Consider the following tacts : The 
Japanese Navy includes 45 destroyers 
and escorts and more than 35 mine- 
sweepers ; Japanese air power counts 
more than 370 combat aircraft. All of 
tnese figures are larger than the 
figures for the same categories in the 
7tn Fleet and 5th Air Force. The real 
question is how much and how fast 
should Japan build its existing forces 
and contribute to the common defense. 

With a defense budget which has 
increased at almost 7% annually in 
real terms over the last decade and 
which now exceeds $10 billion — includ- 
ing about $1 billion for support of 

U.S. forces in Japan, forbidden from 
having offensive military forces by a 
Constitution shaped with U.S. influ- 
ence — that country now has the 
seventh or eighth largest defense 
budget in the world. But on a per 
capita basis the burden ($82) is about 
one-seventh of what Americans pay 
( $550 ) , and over half of the Ameri- 
can public wants Japan to increase its 
defense effort. 

There is no question that the 
quality of the so-called "defense 
debate" in Japan has changed mark- 
edly in the last 3 years, even in the 
past 12 months. Not only is the 
Japanese Government considering an 
almost 10 r ; budget increase this year, 
but the nature of the debate about 
Japan's role has changed dramatically. 
And I think, over time, the combina- 
tion of increased military spending 
and other contributions to our com- 
mon security such as economic assist- 
ance will ease the concerns of most 
Americans about any "free ride." In 
our view, a change in the Japanese 
Constitution is not necessary. 

The Coming Decade and Beyond 

Because we will continue to provide 
the strategic umbrella in East Asia 
and, indeed, throughout the world, we 
will doubtless regain some elements of 
the "senior-junior" relationship we 
have had in the past. But true part- 
nership, which is the only sustainable 
model between two countries such as 
ours, must mean — if not an end — at 
least, a major change in the "unequal" 
nature of our relations. Japan is now a 
major global power, and both of us 
must continue adjusting to this fact. 
It will not be easy. But we in the 
United States must respect legitimate 
Japanese concerns, must abandon the 
idea that "consultation" means asking 
what others think and then doing 
what we want anyway, must be willing 
to accept that parallel policies are 
sometimes as good as — if not better 
than — identical approaches, must be 
willing to follow as well as lead. 

And Japan must put into active 
practice the notions with which it is 
now seized — that while protection of 
national interests is every nation's 
first priority, the interests of the 
major powers involve responsibilities 
that go beyond immediate concerns, 

that fairness and equity and partner- 
ship are concepts that must be broadly 

Economies. The course of U.S.- 
Japanese relations over the next 
decade will depend more on what we 
do in the United States to strengthen 
our own economy than on any other 
single factor. We must increase pro- 
ductivity and stimulate efficient, com- 
petitive industries. At the same time, 
not only do real barriers to trade still 
exist in Japan, but a perception re- 
mains from past experience that Japan 
is "unfair." I believe Japan has a 
responsibility to go beyond simply 
eliminating the relatively few remain- 
ing barriers. They must change psy- 
chological attitudes toward foreign 
imports nurtured during the postwar 
reconstruction period and actively 
facilitate competition from abroad, if 
they are to maintain that kind of 
access to the American market. And 
they must take care that their domes- 
tic and foreign economic policies do 
not — and are perceived not to — 
disrupt competitive markets abroad. 

Security. We do not seek a rede- 
fined role for Japan. We recognize 
and respect their constitutional con- 
straints. But the challenges are great, 
and the resources increasingly scarce. 
We are augmenting our own efforts 
to counter these trends, but I am only 
stating the obvious when I say that 
the Congress and the American 
people will not understand — and will 
not tolerate — the staggering costs 
they will be asked to bear without 
significant action by our allies as well. 
As I have indicated, I think in both 
the purely military field and in for- 
eign aid, the trends are all in the right 
direction. I would only underscore the 
importance that these trends continue 
— and even accelerate — and that we 
work together in the closest possible 
way in support of our shared objec- 

Energy. Twice in the last 4 years 
we have faced near crises with Japan 
over energy-related issues. The first 
was nuclear reprocessing; the second, 
oil. Both of these problems are now 
well understood and, indeed, we have 
moved to a new stage of cooperation 
in research and development of new 
energy sources. But the efforts to date 
are, in my personal view, grossly in- 
adequate to the real needs; the poten- 
tial for controversy is tremendous. I 


think we can make the accommoda- 
tions necessary to avoid the pitfalls 
and, working together with other 

nations, make historic contributions to 
the quality of life not only of our own 

ens but of all mankind. But it will 
require patience and vision on both 

is greater than at any time in the 

A Global Perspective 

Our fundamental challenge during the 
1980's will be to consolidate and inte- 
grate our major alliances — with 
NATO, with Japan, with AXZUS 
[ Australia. New Zealand. United 
States pact ]. This process is well 
underway in the Pacific, but there is 
work yet to be done. Our strategic 
interests in remaining a vital Asian 
power are more apparent today than 
ever. But there cannot be a strong 
American policy in the Pacific if it 
doesn't begin with a strong U.S.- 
Japanese relationship. 

This fact seems to be appreciated 
today by the American public, as 
illustrated by the Potomac Associates 
poll I cited earlier. Although the poll 
showed that the American public cor- 
rectly identified Japan as the major 
source of threat to American jobs, 
there was a very significant growth in 
acceptance of Japan as a major treaty 
ally and a country to whom the 
United States should commit its own 
national prestige if Japan's security 
is threatened. Almost 70 ''< believe we 
should come to Japan's defense if at- 
tacked, up from only 37 r ' f 6 years ago. 
This suggests to me that the American 
public is capable of making the some- 
times difficult distinction between 
trading rivals and strategic partners. 
That distinction is essential if we are 
to continue to build U.S. Pacific policy 
around an unbreakable Tokyo- Wash- 
ington alliance. 

Over the next several years we 
shall be facing a historic opportunity 
to draw Tokyo into an increasingly 
active partnership with the United 
States and Western Europe. Japan's 
recognition of a broader context for 
its own security concerns has been 
marked over the past year and will 
increasingly contribute to coordination 

among the United States, Western 
Europe, and the Pacific allies, particu- 
larly Japan. 

In doing this, however, we must 
take care to balance the defense 
aspect of our alliance with its political 
and economic dimensions. The issue 
of sharing the defense burden must be 
addressed in the broader context of 
economic, political, and security coop- 
eration among the allies. This will 
make it possible for Japan to find 
alternate — perhaps unique — ways to 
carry its "fair share" without feeling 
pressured to assume an uncomfortably 
high military profile. By the same 
token, it can help reassure Japan's 
neighbors that the development of 
more impressive Japanese defense 
capabilities — or a rising Japanese 
defense budget — do not foreshadow 
independent or militaristic policies. 

Clearly, Japan is moving gradu- 
ally, and in its own unique way, to- 
ward a growing defense budget. They 
will never move as fast as some 
Americans want them to. But the 
trend, it seems to me, is unmistak- 
able. The Japanese, as you all know, 
tend to do the opposite of what we do 
with our defense budget. We try to 
make our budget as big as possible for 
domestic purposes. The Japanese try 
to make theirs look as small as possi- 
ble — in fact, smaller than it really is — 
for domestic purposes. So there is a 
wide misperception among Americans 
— even many in the government — 
about how much the Japanese are 
already doing. 

In this regard, we should also 
keep our sights on what we want in- 
creased defense spending to accom- 
plish, and how the burden can be most 
equitably and rationally shared. This 
applies not only to Japan but to our 
Western European allies, as well. To 
the extent that we put all of the 
emphasis on a single alliance issue — 
defense spending — we could create an 
exaggerated sense of disarray and 
unnecessarily encourage domestic 
political resistance among our allies. 


Finally, we must take pains to insure 
that our consultations with Japan 
about strategic issues are fully de- 
veloped. Japan's increasingly active 
international role will affect our in- 
terests and policies; ours will affect 

East Asia 

theirs. We shall both want to be 
appropriately involved in each other's 
decisions. For example, we must keep 
Japan's concerns and views fully in 
mind as we make decisions about our 
future security relationship with 
China. It is a strategic issue relating 
significantly to our alliances. 

This will require, above all, that 
the President must persxmally commit 
to maintaining the relationship and 
prevent those people in the Congress 
or in the domestic agencies who see 
special reasons to put stress on the 
relationship from letting that stress 
destroy it. I do not take it for granted 
that the lip service which we all pay to 
U.S. -Japanese relations automatically 
converts into a growing and improved 
relationship. It takes real determina- 
tion and skill at every level of the 
U.S. Government. 

Earlier this week I had breakfast 
with Saburo Okita, the former Foreign 
Minister of Japan. We reflected to- 
gether on the last 4 years, and we 
agreed that if it had not been for the 
full personal commitment of three 
Prime Ministers and four Foreign 
Ministers, and for the efforts of Presi- 
dent Carter, Vice President Mondale, 
Secretary Vance, Ambassador Mans- 
field, Bob Strauss, Henry Owen, Secre- 
tary Muskie, and a handful of other 
people, we might not have gotten 
through these 4 years without a major 
shock or a crisis. But I am proud to be 
able to say that we did. We have been 
particularly privileged to have Mike 
Mansfield as our Ambassador in Tokyo. 
He's the most extraordinary Ambassa- 
dor I've ever worked with, and his con- 
tribution to the strength of the U.S.- 
Japan relationship today exceeds that 
of anyone. 

A firm foundation exists today for 
the kind of relationship with Japan 
that will best serve both our interests 
and the interests of global stability in 
the 1980s. It is essential that this 
relationship be understood and 
preserved. ■ 



Strengthening the CSCE Process 

by Griffin B. Bell 

Opening address delivered on 
November 13, 1980, at the folloivup 
meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
which opened in Madrid on November 
11, 19S0. Ambassador Bell is chairman 
of the U.S. delegation. 

It is appropriate that this second re- 
view meeting of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
should be held in Democratic Spain. 
From the days of Queen Isabella, 
Spain has played a major role in 
Europe, and the explorations of Colum- 
bus — sailing under the Spanish Crown 
— established the link between the Old 
World and the New, a link recognized 
at our Conference. It is also appropri- 
ate that the Spanish delegation should 
be headed by Javier Ruperez, my dis- 
tinguished colleague, for we well 
remember the active and constructive 
role he played in the negotiation of the 
Helsinki Final Act. In expressing my 
own delegation's view of that historic 
document, I can do no better than to 
quote the words of His Majesty Juan 
Carlos, the King of Spain. He said: 
"The main themes of international 
comity are reflected in the basic docu- 
ment of this Conference, the Helsinki 
Act of 1975, with regard to security 
as well as to cooperation, to humani- 
tarian acts, to the right of free com- 
munication, and to the overall main- 
tenance of individual and social 

The United States is fully com- 
mitted to the process which began with 
the signing of the Final Act by the 
heads of state of our 35 nations. We 
are committed to that process because 
we believe it represents the soundest 
basis on which we can develop and 
strengthen our mutual relations. We 
support that process, as well, because 
it is founded on principles whose 
validity and truth have been tested 
and confirmed in our own experience 
throughout our own history as an 
independent nation. Let me cite a few 

• The Final Act demands respect 
for the sovereign equality of all 
nation-. This principle was a touch- 

- of our early history as a nation, 

for we had to fight to establish and 
then to maintain our sovereignty and 
national identity. 

• The Final Act proclaims the 
principle of self-determination of peo- 
ples, a principle which is basic to our 
American Revolution. Indeed, it was 
fitting that a visionary American 
President, Woodrow Wilson, should 
have championed that principle follow- 
ing World War I and that his efforts 
should have aided the emergence of 
several of the nations represented at 
this Conference. And it is fitting that, 
today, my country should be in the 
forefront of those calling for self- 
determination where it is ignored or 

• The Final Act embodies, at its 
core, the great principle of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, a 
principle born during the European 
enlightenment, nurtured by such great 
thinkers as Locke and Voltaire, and 
given voice by Thomas Jefferson in 
these words from our Declaration of 
Independence: "We hold these Truths 
to be self-evident, that all Men are 
created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalien- 
able Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happi- 

Let no one doubt, thei-efore, the 
fidelity of the United States to the 
commitments we undertook at Hel- 
sinki. We could no more turn our back 
on those commitments than we could 
turn our back on our own heritage as 
a nation. 

CSCE is more than a document. 
It is a dynamic and positive process — 

• A process which is slowly but 
surely breaking down the barriers 
which grew up at the height of the 
cold war. 

• A process which is bringing 
people together across the East-West 

• A process which facilitiates the 
exchange of ideas and information and 
the growth of economic contacts, and 

• A process which calls on each of 
us to carry out the obligations we 
assumed at Helsinki and which calls on 
all of us to examine how well those 
obligations are being carried out. 

This Madrid meeting is the sec- 
ond major gathering since that his- 
toric day in Helsinki. The Belgrade 
meeting made clear that CSCE was a 
continuing process because it con- 
firmed that the nations which signed 
the Final Act could come together 
periodically to examine how their 
commitments to one another had been 
honored and implemented. Such peri- 
odic examinations of the record are 
necessary. Without them, the great 
undertaking of Helsinki might re- 
main a static, not a dynamic, concept. 
It was, therefore, encouraging for my 
government that, although the discus- 
sions at Belgrade were sometimes 
difficult and always frank, the Bel- 
grade gathering provided — by con- 
sensus — for the holding of a similar 
meeting at Madrid as the next major 
step in the Helsinki process. We can 
hope that this process will continue as 
all nations come to recognize the truth 
that strong and confident governments 
have nothing to fear from plain speak- 
ing, from whatever source it might 

Because of our conviction that 
CSCE is a positive process, indispen- 
sable to the advancement of security 
and cooperation in Europe, my govern- 
ment will be second to none in working 
to insure that this Madrid meeting 
further strengthens the CSCE process. 
We are not here to confront and to 
polemicize ; we are here to cooperate 
and to construct. 

Human Rights 

Those gathered around this table will 
hear often over the next several weeks 
that the words of the Final Act on 
human rights and human contacts must 
be interpreted in different ways when 
applied in different social systems. 
This argument is untrue — and pro- 
foundly harmful to the spirit of our 
enterprise. The men and women who 
are citizens of our countries do not 
possess human rights because they 
are members of this or that social 
system. They possess human rights 
because they are human beings. Those 
rights derive, in the words of the Final 
Act, from the "inherent dignity of the 
human person and are essential for 
his free and full development." 

To put it another way, I would 
like to cite a story involving the 



great Russian writer Lev Tolstoy and 
our American President Abraham 
Lincoln. Tolstoy was an admirer of 
Lincoln, ami he liked to explain Lin- 
coln's greatness to the simple people 
on liis estate. Lincoln, Tolstoy said, 
was a great man because his every act 
was rooted in humanity, truth, justice. 
or pity. That description, it seems to 
me. suggests the principles on which 
the human rights in the Final Act are 

The Final Aet itself tells us what 
those rights are. They include the 
freedom of thought, of conscience, and 
of religion or belief. They include the 
freedom effectively to exercise civil. 
political, economic, social, cultural, 
and other rights and freedoms. They 
inlude the right not only to practice 
but also to profess religious belief ac- 
cording to the dictates of one's own 
conscience. And they are. taken to- 
gether, an essential factor for peace, 
for justice, and for friendly relations 
and cooperation among states. Govern- 
ments can deny them — but they can 
neither change, nor reduce, nor 
destroy them. 

The principles I have just re- 
peated come from the Final Act. but 
not only from the Final Act. They are 
principles which summarize over 2,000 
years of our intellectual and political 
history, from Aristotle's charter for a 
just state, to Tom Paine's fiery defense 
of political freedom, to the eloquence 
of Dag Hammarskjold in the cause of 
human dignity. Those principles speak 
from our common heritage. They speak 
in the voices of patriots revered by 
each of our nations. They speak to all 
of us here and to all of the citizens of 
our countries. The question which his- 
tory will ask about our endeavor is 
how well we lived up to those princi- 
ples — whether we advanced or set 
back the cause of human rights and of 
human freedom. 

It is a question which, in the first 
instance, each of us must ask himself 
or herself. We in the United States 
have done so and will continue to do so. 
I believe the U.S. record of imple- 
mentation is something we can be 
proud of. We are a free society — free 
enough to admit our shortcomings and 
concerned enough to try to correct 
them. The degree to which we have 
fulfilled our obligations under the 
Helsinki Final Act is an open book for 
all to read. We are willing to profit 
from examination, suggestions, and 

criticism. And this should come as no 
surprise, for the very first document 
of our republic our Declaration of 
Independence, signed on July 1, 177<> 
—states that we owe "a decent respect 
to the opinions of mankind." 

\ iolations in Oilier Countries 

Just as the obligations undertaken 
under the Final Act require each of us 
to look carefully at our own implemen- 
tation record, so they require each of 
us to look carefully at the implementa- 
tion record of others. The record 
since our meeting in Belgrade has had 
some bright spots, especially in the 
area of freer movement across inter- 
national frontiers. 

• A number of countries — among 
them Romania, the German Democrat- 
ic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
and Bulgaria — have made important 
efforts to resolve the outstanding cases 
of their citizens who wish to be re- 
united with their families elsewhere. 

• In several countries — such as 
Hungary, the German Democratic 
Republic, and Poland — there have been 
efforts to explore how church and state 
can better live with each other, con- 
sistent with the commitment in the 
Final Act to expand religious freedom. 

• In Eastern Europe, as a whole 
in 1971), over 50,000 ethnic Germans 
were granted permission to join their 
relatives in the West. 

• There has been encouraging 
progress in some countries toward 
creating more responsive and diverse 
social and economic systems. 

• Several countries have under- 
taken studies of their own implementa- 
tion records with a view to improving 
the performance. We hope this trend 
will continue. 

• There has been some success in 
the security area of CSCE, where con- 
fidence-building measures have been 
implemented. Progress in economic, 
technical, and scientific cooperation 
has also been achieved, notably by the 
signature last year of the trans- 
boundary air-pollution agreement. In 
both the economic and security areas, 
progress has been modest, yet the 
Final Act has served as a catalyst 

for imaginative thought which bodes 
well for more ambitious steps when 
circumstances permit. 

• Finally, the situation in and 
around the divided city of Berlin has 
remained relatively calm. It is of fun- 
damental importance to European 

security and cooperation that Berlin 
continues to receive the full benefits of 
the Final Act and the quadripartite 

As encouraging as this evidence 
of progress has been, there is a darker 
side of the record of implementation 
which must also be considered. In this 
regard, I must mention, first of all, the 
invasion of the independent nation of 
Afghanistan by aimed forces of the 
Soviet Union, forces which remain in 
that country even as our meeting con- 
venes. I shall not recite all the pro- 
visions of the Final Act — and indeed, 
of the U.N. Charter and other solemn 
agreements — which this invasion vio- 
lated. Nor will I pause to refute the 
transparent explanations which Soviet 
leaders have offered for their action. 
I will say only that the Soviet invasion 
cast a dark shadow over East-West 
relations which no meeting, no pro- 
nouncement, nothing, in fact, but the 
total withdrawal of Soviet troops, can 

Were this the only instance in 
which the obligations of the Final Act 
had been ignored since our last meet- 
ing, our task here would be solemn 
enough. But this is not the case. As I 
have cited examples of progress, so 
must I call attention to a lamentable 
record of continued denial of human 
rights written over the past 3 years by 
the governments of some signatory 

• In the Soviet Union, in direct 
contravention of the Final Act, West- 
ern radio broadcasts — including those 
of BBC | British Broadcasting 
Corporation], Deutsche Welle, the 
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, 
and Radio Liberty — have been jammed. 

• In the German Democratic Re- 
public, a new and punitive increase in 
required currency exchanges for 
Western visitors has drastically re- 
duced the ability of West Germans, 
particularly, the elderly and the poor, 
to visit family and friends in the East. 

• In the Soviet Union the Jewish 
emigration rate, which encouragingly 
reached a record high in 1979, has 
declined in 1980 by 50'; , while at the 
same time, harassment and denial of 
exit permits continue as before. 

• In Czechoslovakia, the courage- 
ous members of the Charter 77 group, 
created to monitor compliance with the 
Helsinki Final Act, have suffered con- 
tinued harassment and periodic impris- 
onment. As I speak, Vaclav Havel, a 



spokesman for this group, is serving 
out his 4-year term under harsh condi- 
tions of confinement, and 

• In 1976 eleven men and women, 
citizens of the Soviet Union and long- 
time activists in the Soviet human 
rights movement, formed the Moscow 
Helsinki watch group to monitor the 
implementation of human rights com- 
mitments under Principle VII of the 
Final Act and under Soviet law. 
Similar groups appeared in the 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and 
Armenia. The reaction of the Soviet 
authorities was to subject these brave 
people to brutal repression. Of the 71 
individuals who have belonged to the 
Soviet Helsinki watch groups, 24 have 
been tried and found guilty, and 19 of 
them are currently serving a total of 
156 years in forced-labor camps and 
exile. Eleven more have been placed 
under investigative arrest. Nine others 
were already serving previous sen- 
tences when they joined the Helsinki 
watch. Seven have emigrated, two 
were stripped of their citizenship 
while traveling abroad, one was ex- 
changed for a Soviet spy, and one has 

I will name only a few members of 
this remarkable group, but they are 
representative of all those in the 
Soviet Union who strive for the rights 
that are promised them in the Soviet 
constitution and in the Helsinki Final 
Act. All the world knows of Professor 
Yuri Orlov, the physicist, a coura- 
geous man always in the forefront, 
founder of the Helsinki group. The 
world also knows of Anatoly Shcharan- 
skiy, falsely accused of espionage in an 
attempt to intimidate the Jewish 
emigration movement. Orlov was sen- 
tenced on May 18, 1978, to 7 years of 
strict-regimen camp and 5 years of 
exile. Shcharanskiy was sentenced on 
July 14, 1978, to 3 years in prison and 
10 years of strict-regimen labor camp. 
Members of the other groups I have 
mentioned met similar fates. In the 
Ukraine and Lithuania, Mykola 
Rudenko and Viktoras Petkus were 
also sentenced to long prison terms 
because they sought fulfillment of 
Final Act commitments. All those who 
are free have the inescapable duty to 
speak out on their behalf and on 
behalf of the many others. 

Finally, I speak now of a gentle 

and compassionate humanist, a man 
who has devoted his life to helping the 
poor and the oppressed. Listen to his 

Despite all that has happened, I feel that 
the questions of war and peace and dis- 
armament are so crucial that they must 
be given absolute priority even in the 
most difficult circumstances. It is impera- 
tive that all possible means be used to 
solve these questions and to lay the 
groundwork for further progress. Most 
urgent of all are steps to avert a nuclear 
war, which is the greatest peril confront- 
ing the modern world. 

Could anyone disagree with those 
words? Can we not all unite around 
the thought they express? Do we not 
all recognize that this thought goes 
right to the heart of the deepest needs 
and yearnings of mankind? On Janu- 
ary 22 of this year [ 1980] , the author 
of those words was exiled to the closed 
city of Gorky in the Soviet Union. 
When Andrei Sakharov was banished, 
some of our best hopes for a spirit of 
security and cooperation in Europe 
were banished with him. 

There are those who charge that 
incidents such as these prove the 
worthlessness of the Final Act. My 
government strongly disagrees. The 
fact that a principle has been violated 
does not make that principle less valid, 
or reduce our obligation to seek fuller 
implementation of the Final Act. In 
that spirit, the United States will 
make every effort, within the context 
of the Final Act, to help create a more 
secure, a freer, and a better life for 
the 1 billion people who live within 
the borders of the states represented 
here. But CSCE will provide the means 
to this end only if its provisions are 
taken seriously and are seen to be 
taken seriously by our citizens. There- 
fore, my country will continue to speak 
out, in specific terms, against abuses 
of human rights. We call on all of you 
to do the same and to recognize that 
we cannot expect our citizens to have 
faith in future commitments if past 
commitments are ignored. 

Our expectations for the present 
meeting are modest. The events I have 
mentioned have created an interna- 
tional climate which is not conducive 
to ambitious steps in the areas covered 
by the Final Act. It would be idle to 

pretend that CSCE can somehow be 
insulated from the overall state of 
East-West relations. Indeed, such a 
pretense could only diminish the im- 
portance of the commitments under- 
taken at Helsinki. 

But we do see some possibility of 
progress. For example, we and our 
allies have been doing intensive work 
to develop confidence-building meas- 
ures which will be militarily significant, 
verifiable, and applicable to the whole 
of Europe. We hope that our consid- 
eration of such measures at this meet- 
ing will point the way toward a more 
secure future for us all. We are fully 
prepared to join with you in seeking 
to realize the full potential of con- 
fidence-building measures — we ask 
only that we concentrate on concrete 
steps and avoid empty declarations. 


President Carter has asked me to give 
you the following message — he extends 
his warmest greetings to the delegates 
to this historic review meeting. For 
the President, CSCE is a unique and 
valuable forum which unites all the 
nations of Europe, the United States, 
and Canada, in a common effort to rid 
the world of artificial barriers to the 
free exercise of human rights and to 
the free movement of people and ideas 
across international boundaries. It is 
his firm conviction that it must be our 
common goal to preserve and enhance 
the Helsinki process toward the day 
when its provisions are fully imple- 
mented and true security and coopera- 
tion among our nations have finally 
been achieved. ■ 


DEC. 3, 1980 x 

The United States is watching with 
growing concern the unprecedented 
buildup of Soviet forces along the 
Polish border and the closing of cer- 
tain frontier regions along the border. 
The United States has also taken note 
of Soviet references to alleged "anti- 
Socialist" forces within Poland. We 



A Short History of the 
U.S. Department of State, 

The Early Years, 1781-1823 

by David F. Trask 
uilh the assistance of 
David V. Baehler 
and Evan M. Duncan 

The United States Department of 
State traces its origin to the "Depart- 
ment of Foreign Affairs" created by 
Congress on January 10, 1781. Six 
years had passed since the 13 seaboard 
Colonies — now formed into the United 
States — had begun their rebellion 
against the authority of Great Britain. 
Congress believed that they had earned 
themselves "a place among the rising 
potentates of Europe" and felt the 
need to cultivate "a friendly cor- 
respondence and connection with 
foreign countries." 

The need for diplomacy was ap- 
parent from the start. Given the over- 
whelming military strength of Great 
Britain, the United States could hope 
to gain independence only if it 
attracted support of other countries, 
especially France and Spain. In 1775 
Congress established the Committee 
of Secret Correspondence to com- 
municate with prospective supporters 
abroad and sent emissaries to other 
governments. Benjamin Franklin 

This unfinished sketch by Benjamin West of the signing of the Preliminary Articles of Peace 
between the United States and Great Britain on November 30, 1782, in Paris ending the 
American Revolution shows (left to right) John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Henry 
Laurens, and W. Temple Franklin (grandson of Benjamin Franklin and Secretary of the 
American Commission). The British Commissioner and his secretary never appeared at 
West's studio. This sketch now hangs in the John Quincy Admas State Drawing Room at the 
Department of State. (Department of State photo) 



The Livingston Brothers 

13 South Sixth Street, 


Robert R. Livingston (Department of State photo) 

Robert R. Livingston was born in 
New York City in 1746. He served on 
several committees of the Continental 
Congress, including the one that 
drafted the Declaration of Independ- 
ence. He was the first Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, serving from 1781 to 
1783. In 1789 he administered the oath 
of office to President George Washing- 
ton. As Minister to France (1801-04), 
he helped arrange the Louisiana 

Edward Livingston, Robert's 
brother, was born in 1764 at "Cler- 
mont," New York. After serving as a 

Edward Livingston (Department of State photo) 

Representative from New York and 
as Mayor of New York City, Living- 
ston moved to New Orleans in 1804. 
He was a Representative from 
Louisiana (1823-29) and a Senator 
(1829-31) before serving as Secretary 
of State under President Andrew 
Jackson (1831-33) . He then served 
as Minister to France (1833-35). 
His chief concern was with the French 
spoliation claims, involving compensa- 
tion for damages to American ship- 
ping during the wars of the French 

served briefly as chairman of the 
committee, which in 1777 was renamed 
the Committee for Foreign Affairs. 

Unfortunately, this committee's 
scope was strictly limited. As one 
of its most active members, James 
Lovell said : "There is really no such 
thing as a Committee for Foreign 
Affairs existing — no secretary or 
clerk further than I presume to be one 
and the other. The books and papers of 
that distinguished body lay yet on the 
table of Congress, or rather are locked 
up in the Secretary's [Secretary of 
Congressl private box." Franklin, 
sent to France as a representative of 
the United States, recognized the need 
for improved administration of 
foreign policy. Noting that Congress 
had placed the finances of the country 

in the hands of one person, he wrote: 
"I wish they would do the same with 
their [foreign] correspondence, by 
appointing a single secretary for 
foreign affairs." The first constitution 
of the new nation, the Articles of 
Confederation, permitted Congress to 
select "such committees and civil 
officers as may be necessary for 
managing the general affairs of the 
United States." 

Shortly after the congressional 
resolution of January 10, 1781, 
Congress selected Robert R. 
Livingston, a delegate from New York, 
as the first Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs. He took office on October 20, 
1781, and served until June 4, 1783. 
Livingston experienced considerable 
frustration in office. One historian 
notes that his duties were not 
"clearly defined and he was never 

Copyright b.v Robert Shard 1980. 

Soon after taking office as Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Robert R. Liv- 
ingston set up his offices in a small, 
plain, brick house at 13 South Sixth 
Street in Philadelphia. This building 
was the first home of an office of 
foreign affairs as an entity separate 
from Congress. 

The building had been erected in 
1773. It consisted of three stories and 
an attic, with two rooms to each story ; 
it had a gable roof which sloped to 
front and rear. A room on the second 
floor overlooking the street served as 
Livingston's office. Various "great 
personages" of the time "frequently 
clambered up the dark and narrow 
winding stairs" to transact business 
with the Secretary. Livingston's staff 
consisted of two Under Secretaries, a 
translator of French, and a clerk. The 
two Under Secretaries shared a back 
room on the second floor and the 
translator and the clerk occupied the 
ground floor. 

The building ceased to be the 
home of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs after Livingston resigned in 
1783. A succession of tenants then 
occupied it, using it at different times 
as a residence, a shop, and a boarding 



given a free hand." Later he served 
as Minister to France and in 1803 
negotiated the Louisiana Purchase. 
John Jay, another New Yorker, 

• who had helped Franklin negotiate the 
Treaty of Paris (1783) that ended the 
Revolutionary War, was appointed 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs on May 
7, 1784, and he remained at this post 
until 1790. Jay became a severe critic 
of his own organization, whose powers 
were ill defined and whose leader was 
never granted sufficient freedom of 
action. During the national debate on 
whether to adopt the new constitution 
drafted in 1787, Jay cogently sum- 
marized his critique of congressional 
foreign policy under the Articles of 

They may make war, but are not 
empowered to raise men or money to 
carry it on. They may make peace, but 
are without power to see the terms of it 
imposed. . . . They may make alliances, 
but [are] without ability to comply with 
the stipulations on their part. They may 
enter into treaties of commerce, but 
[are] without power to enforce them at 
home or abroad. 

In short, Jay concluded, Members 
of Congress "may consult, and deliber- 
ate, and recommend, and make requi- 
sitions, and they who please may 
regard them," that is, obey. He 
thought that few would do so. 

The Constitution put into effect in 
1789 obviated much of Jay's criticism. 
Article II, section 2 makes the Presi- 
dent "Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States" 
and also gives the Chief Executive the 
power, "by and with the Advice and 

* Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur." Finally, the 

| President "shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Con- 
1 suls. . . ." These provisions placed the 
conduct of foreign affairs principally 
in the hands of the executive branch, 
but certain powers conferred upon the 
legislative branch — especially to 
' declare war, appropriate funds, and 
! advise and consent on treaties and 
< appointments — gave Congress signifi- 
cant ability to influence foreign policy. 
The Constitution did not specify 
I an exact division of responsibilities 
between the President and Congress 
for the direction of foreign relations, 
but early precedents confirmed execu- 
tive predominance. Thomas Jefferson 
clearly delineated the reasons for this 

development; he insisted that "the 
President is the only channel of com- 
munication between this country and 
foreign nations, and it is from him 
alone that foreign nations or their 
agents are to learn what is or has been 
the will of the nation." He concluded 
that other countries should not be 
given an opportunity to play off the 
executive against any other branch. 
Ever since the earliest days of the 
Constitution, Presidents and Secre- 
taries of State have adopted this view, 
although they have recognized the 
important role of Congress in the 
foreign policy process. 

On May 19, 1789, James Madison 
of Virginia, then sitting in the House 
of Representatives, began the process 
that redefined the functions of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs under 
the new Constitution. He proposed the 
creation of "an Executive Department 
to be denominated the Department of 
Foreign Affairs." At its head would be 
"an officer, to be called the Secretary 
to the Department of Foreign Affairs." 
On July 27 Washington signed legisla- 
tion to this effect. Soon, however, a 
new law passed Congress giving cer- 
tain domestic responsibilities to the 
new Department as well as foreign 
duties. On September 15, President 
Washington approved this substitute, 
which set up a Department of State 
with a Secretary of State at its head. 
The President immediately appointed 
Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, then 
Minister to France, to be the first 
Cabinet member under the Constitu- 
tion to hold the position of Secretary 
of State. The author of the Declara- 
tion of Independence took up his new 
duties on March 22, 1790. 

The small executive Department 
did not grow rapidly during its early 
years. Jefferson's initial staff con- 
sisted of a chief clerk, three other 
clerks, a translator, and a messenger. 
(The title "clerk" refers to officers 
charged with the composition of mes- 
sages to overseas missions and other 
correspondents.) The Department's 
domestic budget for 1790, not count- 
ing expenses of employees overseas, 
amounted to a mere $7,961 — the cost 
of salaries, rent, and supplies such as 
firewood and stationery. The Secre- 
tary of State's salary was $3,500. Total 
expenditures in 1791, both domestic 
and foreign, were $56,600. In 1807 the 
Department's staff included only a 

Domestic Duties of 
the Department of State 

On September 15, 1789, Congress 
passed "An Act to provide for the safe 
keeping of the Acts, Records, and Seal 
of the United States, and for other 
purposes." This legislation changed 
the name of the Department of For- 
eign Affairs to the Department of 
State because certain domestic duties 
were assigned to the agency. Among 
these duties were: 

• Receipt, publication, distribu- 
tion, and preservation of the laws of 
the United States; 

• Preparation, sealing, and re- 
cording of commissions given to 
Presidential appointees. 

• Preparation and authentication 
of copies of records and authentica- 
tion of copies under the Department's 

• Custody of the Great Seal of the 
United States ; and 

• Custody of books, records, and 
papers of the former Secretary of the 
Continental Congress, except those of 
the Treasury and War Departments. 

Many comparable functions were 
added at various times since 1789, 
among them issuance of patents on 
inventions, publication of the census 
returns, management of the mint, 
controls of copyrights, and regulation 
of immigration. 

Most domestic functions have 
been transferred to other agencies. 
Among the few that remain in the 
Department are: storage and use of 
the Great Seal, performance of pro- 
tocol functions at the White House, 
drafting of certain Presidential proc- 
lamations, and replies to public in- 

chief clerk, five other clerks, and some 
part-time help, along with a few 
retainers. The Secretary of State's 
salary had been raised to $5,000 per 
year. In 1818 a Presidential order 
authorized a staff that included a chief 
clerk, seven other clerks, and a few 
others. In 1820 expenditures for 
domestic operations reached $87,300 ; 
overseas operations totaled $253,400. 
The early overseas service of the 
United States was as unpretentious as 



Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of 
State, began the distinction between the 
Diplomatic and Consular Services. He estab- 
lished the policy of neutrality in European 
conflicts. When he took office in 1790, the 
Department included 8 domestic employees, 
2 diplomatic missions, and 10 consular posts. 

(Department of State photo) 

Treasury Department 
Building, Washington, D.C. 

The first home of the Department of 
State in Washington, D.C, was in the 
"Treasury Department Building" 
which was shared with other govern- 
ment offices. It was located to the east 
of the White House, about where the 
center wing of the present Treasury 
Department building stands. 

Completed in June 1800, the build- 
ing was a plain two-story structure of 
brick on a free-stone foundation, with 
a basement and a dormer-windowed 
attic. There were 14 rooms on the first 
floor, 14 on the second floor, and 8 in 
the attic. After approximately 3 
months in the overcrowded Treasury 
Department building, the Department 
of State moved into one of a block of 
houses on the north side of Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue between 21st and 22nd 
Streets Northwest. 

the domestic establishment. Jefferson 
immediately drew a troublesome dis- 
tinction between a diplomatic service, 
assigned the task of conducting politi- 
cal relations with foreign countries, 
and a consular service, which dealt 
primarily with commercial matters 
and the needs of American citizens 

Benjamin Franklin had become 
the first American Minister to serve 
overseas when, on March 23, 1779, he 
presented his credentials to King 
Louis XVI of France. Other leading 
statesmen served as envoys during the 
1780s — among them John Adams in 
the Netherlands, John Jay in Spain, 
and Thomas Jefferson in France. By 
1791 diplomatic missions had been 
established in five European countries 
— England, Spain, France, Holland, 
and Portugal. Ministers concentrated 
mostly on two important responsi- 
bilities; they reported on significant 
activities in their countries of resi- 
dence and executed formal diplomatic 
instructions transmitted to them from 
the Department of State. 

Thomas Barclay of Pennsylvania 
was the first American actually to 
take up consular duties. He was ap- 
pointed consul in France on October 2, 
1781, replacing William Palfrey who 
was lost at sea on his way to France. 
By 1792, 16 consulates had been 
created, most of them in Europe. In 
1790 Secretary Jefferson asked consuls 
to provide "such political and com- 
mercial intelligence as you may think 
interesting to the United States." He 
mentioned particularly news of Ameri- 
can ships and also "information of all 
military preparations and other indi- 
cations of war which may take place in 
your ports." 

A congressional act of April 14, 
1792, first provided legislative pre- 
scriptions for the Consular Service. 
Although this law made no specific 
mention of commercial reporting, con- 
suls provided commercial information 
and met the needs of American citizens 
within their jurisdictions. Consuls 
were expected to maintain themselves 
largely by charging fees for their 
services, not always a bountiful source 
of income. Unlike their counterparts 
of today, they did not receive salaries 
or allowances for expenses. Because of 
the uncertainty of adequate compensa- 
tion, consuls frequently served for 

First American Consuls 


William Palfrey (Department of State photo) 

William Palfrey of Massachusetts was 
not only the first American consular 
officer but was also the first member of 
the diplomatic service to lose his life 
in the line of duty. A lieutenant 
colonel in the Continental Army and 
former Paymaster-General, Palfrey 
was appointed consul to France on 
November 4, 1780. He was lost at sea 
en route to his post. His name is the 
first on the plaque in the lobby of the 
Department of State listing the 
martyrs of the foreign service. 

Thomas Barclay of Pennsylvania, 
a merchant residing in France, was 
the first American consular officer to 
serve abroad. He was commissioned 
"vice consul in France" on July 10, 
1781, and was commissioned as consul 
on October 5 to replace Palfrey. In 
addition to his consular duties, Barclay 
served as commissioner to settle for- 
eign debts of the United States in 
Europe and negotiated a treaty of 
amity and commerce with Morocco in 
1786. He was appointed consul in 
Morocco in 1791 but died in Lisbon in 
1793 before he reached his post. 


Department of 


The First American Diplomat 

Benjamin Franklin, dressed in "the simple costume of an American agriculturalist," 
captivated Parisian society and laid the groundwork for French recognition of American 

independence. Department of Stale photo) 

Benjamin Franklin was no stranger to 
diplomacy when he was appointed on 
September 26, 1776, to a three-man 
commission charged with the critical 
task of gaining French support for 
American independence. He had al- 
ready served in Great Britain as an 
agent for Pennsylvania between 1757 
and 1762 and again from 1764 to 
1775. His scientific and literary en- 
deavors had made him the most 
distinguished American of the age. 

French aristocrats and intellec- 
tuals saw Franklin as the Enlighten- 
ment personified. His picture soon 
appeared on medallions, rings, watches, 
and snuffboxes, while fashionable 
ladies adopted the coiffure a la 
Franklin in imitation of the fur cap 
which he wore instead of a wig. His 
popularity prepared the way for 

France to recognize American inde- 
pendence and to conclude treaties of 
alliance and commerce in 1778. 

Franklin was appointed Minister 
to France on September 14, 1778, and 
presented his credentials on March 23, 
1779, becoming the first American 
Minister to be received by a foreign 
government. His home in Passy be- 
came the center of American diplo- 
matic activity in Europe. Franklin 
then served with John Adams and 
John Jay on the Plenipotentiary 
Commission that negotiated the peace 
treaty with Great Britain. 

When Thomas Jefferson succeeded 
Franklin in 1785, the French Foreign 
Minister, Vergennes, said: "It is you, 
Sir, who replace Dr. Franklin?" 
Jefferson replied, "No one can replace 
him, Sir; I am only his successor." 

many years in only one location, and 
they were often inactive. In 1807 a 
consul in La Guaira, Venezuela, was 
relieved of his duties because "not a 
single communication" had been re- 
ceived from him since his appoint- 
ment in 1800. 

Besides working through the reg- 
ular foreign services, Presidents asked 
special agents to carry on particularly 
important negotiations. The first such 
agent was Gouverneur Morris of New 
York, who made an unsuccessful 
attempt in 1790 to arrange British 
compliance with certain provisions in 
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783. The 
use of special executive agents gave 
the executive branch options that 
otherwise might not have existed, 
given the small size of the Diplomatic 

Representatives of the United 
States traditionally wore unpreten- 
tious clothing and adopted simple 
manners, a departure from the osten- 
tatious practice at European courts. 
(For a notable exception, see box on 
"Consular Uniforms.") Americans 
deemed this policy appropriate for 
emissaries of a young republic that 
had repudiated monarchical tyranny. 
Thomas Jefferson, the most hospitable 
of men, was particularly opposed to 
undue ceremony and rigid protocol. 
He refused to recognize formal social 
distinctions at dinners held in the 
White House during his Presidency, 
especially the order of precedence — 
seating by rank. This practice greatly 
annoyed the foreign diplomatic corps. 

Even if the democratic ideology of 
the new nation had not imposed repub- 
lican simplicity, the meager salaries 
paid to American ministers would 
have produced the same effect. In 1817 
President James Monroe, a former 
Minister to France and Secretary of 
State, complained to a congressional 
committee about the nation's failure 
to provide sufficient salaries and allow- 
ances for members of the Diplomatic 
Service. He insisted that an American 
diplomat could accomplish his duties 
only by gaining access to the most 
important social circles. "By taking 
the proper [social] ground ... he will 
become acquainted with all that passes 
and from the highest and most 
authentic sources. . . . Deprive him of 
the necessary means to sustain this 
ground, separate him from the circle 
to which he belongs and he is reduced 
to a cipher." Congress did not respond 
to such importunings; ministers ap- 



Diplomatic Dress 

The United States took exception to 
the prevailing custom that obliged 
diplomats to wear elaborate costumes. 
Secretary of State William L. Marcy 
of New York, who served during the 
Administration of President Franklin 
Pierce, issued a dress circular order- 
ing American diplomats to wear "the 
simple dress of an American citizen." 
This term meant a full-dress suit. The 
difficulty was that American repre- 
sentatives could easily be confused 
with entertainers, undertakers, or 
servants. James Buchanan, Minister 
to Great Britain, avoided this problem 
by requesting that the Department 
allow him to wear "a very plain and 
black-hilted dress sword" when he 
appeared at court. 

During the Civil War, Charles 
Francis Adams reverted to a costume 
that included breeches, buckles, and 
silk stockings. Queen Victoria is said 
to have remarked, "I am thankful we 
shall have no more American fu- 
nerals." In 1937 President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt issued an Executive order 
that provided: "No person in the 
diplomatic service shall wear any uni- 
form or official costume not previously 
authorized by Congress." 

pointed to the most important posts, 
such as those in London and Paris, 
were regularly forced to draw upon 
private means. This circumstance 
sometimes had the unfortunate effect 
of foreclosing diplomatic service to 
people without personal fortunes. 
At the very beginning of the 
Department's history, certain person- 
nel practices were adopted that 
adversely affected American foreign 
relations for many years. Little or no 
interchange took place between those 
serving at home and those in overseas 
posts. Moreover, no provision was made 
to encourage transfers between the 
Diplomatic Service and the Consular 

Service. These circumstances limited 
flexibility and interfered with the 
development of professionalism ; the 
basis for a professional career in the 
foreign service was not built until the 
20th century. This situation reflected 
the general suspicion of all things for- 
eign that characterized the early 
history of the United States. It also 
mirrored the declining importance 
attributed to foreign affairs after the 
War of 1812. Thereafter most Ameri- 
cans concentrated on the domestic 
activities of their government rather 
than on foreign operations. 

The early Department of State and 
its foreign missions were chronically 
overworked, and so was the Secretary 
of State. John Quincy Adams, one of 
the most conscientious of men, com- 
plained of excessive responsibilities 
shortly after assuming his duties as 
Secretary in 1817. "Business crowds 
upon me from day to day requiring 
instantaneous attention," he wrote to 
his wife Louisa, "in such variety that 
unless everything is disposed of just 
as it occurs, it escapes from the 
memory and runs into the account of 
arrears." Despite the great prestige of 
the Secretary of State in the early 
days of the nation, Congress remained 
extraordinarily penurious when allo- 
cating funds to conduct foreign rela- 
tions, a condition that endured 
throughout the 19th century. 

Only the most strenuous exertions 
of those who served in the Department 
or in the overseas missions insured 
proper attention to the business at 
hand. The unusual abilities of the early 
Secretaries of State helped to counter 
financial stress and to reinforce the 
prestige of the Department. John 
Quincy Adams summarized this cir- 
cumstance. Because of "the superior 
real and inherent importance of the 
Department of State in the organiza- 
tion of this Government, and . . . the 
successive transfer of two Secretaries 
of State to the Presidency [Madison 
and Monroe], a general impression has 
pervaded the Union of a higher con- 
sideration due to that Department, 
and that in the practice of the Gov- 
ernment it is the natural introduction 
to the head of the Executive." 

Despite important constraints on 
the Department of State, the United 
States achieved a remarkable number 
of triumphs in foreign affairs during 
the early years. During the 1790s the 
Jay treaty (1794) and the Pinckney 
treaty (1795) regularized relations 

Consular Uniforms 

The early 19th century American 
consul was a dashing fellow in gold- 
trimmed uniform with cocked hat and 
a sword. This was on ceremonial 
occasions when, it is just possible, he 
liked to forget that he received no 
allowances for "house or office rent, 
books, stationery, or other ordinary 
expenses of office." 

A 42-page booklet, General 
Instructions to the Consuls and Com- 
mercial Agents cf the United States, 
1838 notes that: "The Consular uni- 
form (as prescribed by the circular 
from this department, dated August 8, 
1815, hereto annexed) must be worn 
on all visits of ceremony to the author- 
ities of the place, and on all proper 

The uniform was described as 
follows : 

"Single breast coat of blue cloth, 
with standing cape or collar, and ten 
navy buttons in front; one button on 
each side of the cape; four on each 
cuff; four under each pocket flap; and 
one on each hip and in the folds ; two 
on each side in the centre ; and one on 
each side of the same, at the lower 
extremity of the skirts. 

"The font, (from the cape down 
to the lower extremity of the skirts,) 
cuffs, cape, and pocket flaps, to em- 
broidered in gold, representing a vine 
composed of olive leaves, and the 
button-holes to be worked with gold 
thread ; the button-holes to correspond 
with the width of the embroidery, 
which is not to exceed two inches in 
any part. 

"Vest and small clothes of white, 
and navy buttons; the former to have 
ten in front, and four under each 
pocket flap. With this dress, a cocked 
hat, small sword, and shoes and 
buckles are to be worn. The hat to be 
furnished with gold loop, gold tassels, 
and black cockade, with gold eagle in 
the centre ; added to which, it is to be 
understood that the mountings of the 
sword, and shoe and knee buckles, are 
to be gold ; otherwise gilt." 



"■ Burning of Washington, 

The home of the Department of State 
after 1801 was known merely as "the 
public building west of the President's 
house" and stood on the present site 
of the Old Executive Office Building 
at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Ave- 
nue, N.W. When British forces invaded 
Washington on August 24, 181 1. this 
building was burned, along with the 
Capitol and the White House. While 
the Department's library was lost, 
Chief Clerk John Graham had already 
seen to the removal of many important 
records, including the originals of the 
Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution. They were stored in a 
deserted gristmill on the Virginia side 
of the Potomac River, 2 miles above 
Georgetown, and were later moved to 
Leesburg, Virginia, until after the 

When .lame- Monroe and Robert R. Livingston negotiated the purchase of the Louisiana 
territory from France in 1803, they made the greatest real estate bargain of all time and set a 
jr. ( tdent for the acquisition of land. For $15 million, the United States gained 828,000 
square miles, thus doubling its size. I 

John Quincy Adams became the youngest 
American Chief of Mission when he was ap- 
pointed Minister to the Netherlands in 1794, 
at the age of 27. As Secretary of State (1817- 
25), he negotiated a boundary settlement 
with Great Britain, acquired Florida from 
Spain, and helped formulate the Monroe 
Doctrine. (Library ol Congress photo) 



with England and Spain. The purchase 
of Louisiana in 1803 during President 
Jefferson's first Administration guar- 
anteed eventual control of the North 
American Continent between Canada 
and Mexico. Extreme dangers to the 
nation materialized during the War of 
1812, but they were surmounted dur- 
ing the Administration of President 
Madison. And finally President 
Monroe's Administration arranged the 
Adams-Onis treaty with Spain (1819) , 
which added Florida to the national 
domain and settled the boundary with 
Mexico on most advantageous terms. 

However impressive, these accom- 
plishments were not equal in impor- 
tance to the formation of a general 
foreign policy for the United States 
that was to endure for over a hundred 
years : the idea that the United States 
should observe political isolation from 
European powers during time of peace 
and maintain strict neutrality during 
periods of warfare in Europe. Franklin 
anticipated this posture when he ob- 
served that "a virgin state should 
preserve its virgin character and not go 
suitoring for alliances, but wait with 
decent dignity for the application of 
others." In 1796 President Washington 
expressed this general outlook in 
classic form, arguing in his Farewell 
Address : "The great rule of conduct 
for us in regard to foreign nations is 
... to have with them as little political 
[as distinct from commercial] connec- 
tion as possible." Europe, he continued, 
had its own set of interests, and these 
interests were very different from 
those of the United States. Fortu- 
nately, the state of international rela- 
tions tended to confer freedom of 
action upon the nation. "Why forego 
the advantages of so peculiar a situa- 
tion? Why, by interweaving our des- 
tiny with that of any part of Europe, 
entangle our peace and prosperity in 
the toils of European ambition, rival- 
ship, interest, humor, or caprice?" 
Therefore, concluded Washington, "it 
is our true policy to steer clear of 
permanent alliances with any portion 
of the foreign world, so far, I mean, 

as we are now at liberty to do it." 
Thomas Jefferson, although of very 
different political views from Wash- 
ington, confirmed the national con- 
sensus on the virtues of isolation and 
neutrality, restating the principle 
cogently in his First Inaugural Ad- 
dress (1801) : ". . . peace, commerce 
and honest friendship with all nations, 
entangling alliances with none." 
If it was appropriate for the 
United States to avoid intervention in 
European affairs, it seemed equally 
logical that Europe should desist from 
further interference in the affairs of 
the Americas. Secretary of State John 
Quincy Adams enunciated this prin- 

ciple in 1823. He was the real author 
of the Monroe Doctrine, which stated 
simply : "We could not view any inter- 
position for oppressing [the nations 
of Latin America], or controlling in 
any other manner their destiny, by 
any European power in any other light 
than as the manifestation of an un- 
friendly disposition toward the United 
States." Although the young country 
lacked the means to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine, and other powers 
did not fully accept it for many years 
to come, its presentation in 1823 
marked the completion of the project 
that had begun in 1775 — the inde- 
pendence of the United States. 

The Monroe Doctrine extended the principles of neutrality and independence from European 
conflicts to the entire Western Hemisphere. ( Library of Congress photo) 



The Expansionist Years, 1823-1867 

During the 44 years between the birth 
of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and 
the purchase of Alaska from Russia 
(1867) , the Americans devoted their 
national energies to extending their 
dominion across North America and to 
building a diversified economy. They 
were permitted to concentrate on these 
endeavors because no serious external 
threats arose except during the Civil 
War (1861-65) . A stable balance of 
power materialized in Europe after the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, the 
maintenance of which deterred possi- 
ble aggressors from interventions in 
the New World. Any nation that at- 
tempted to interfere in the affairs of 
the Americas would have exposed itself 
to considerable difficulty on the eastern 
side of the Atlantic. Therefore, the 
United States enjoyed a long period of 
"free security," that is, an extended 
moratorium on serious external chal- 
lenges like those that had menaced it 
before 1815. 

It was now possible for the am- 
bitious republic to practice a liberal 
form of nationalism, one that stressed 
good will toward other nations and 
emphasized internal development 
rather than active foreign policies. 
John Quincy Adams set the tone for 
nearly a century of foreign policy on 
July 4, 1821, when, speaking of his 
beloved country, he said : "Wherever 
the standard of freedom has been or 
shall be unfurled, there will her heart, 
her benedictions, and her prayers be. 
But she does not go abroad in search 
of monsters to destroy." The republic 
would influence the world by offering 
an example rather than by exercising 
force. Americans would be "well- 
wishers to the freedom and independ- 
ence of all" ; their government would 
be "champion and vindicator only of 
her own." 

These sentiments prevailed in the 
United States throughout the 19th 
century. In 1850, for example, Presi- 
dent Millard Fillmore restated the 
fundamental premise of liberal nation- 
alism when he insisted that the 
United States must grant to others 
what it deemed imperative for itself — 
the right to establish "that form of 
government which it may deem most 
conducive to the happiness and pros- 
perity of its own citizens." This prin- 
ciple meant that "it becomes an im- 
perative duty not to interfere in the 
government or internal policy of other 
nations." Although Americans might 
"sympathize with the unfortunate or 
the oppressed everywhere in their fight 
for freedom, our principles forbid us 
from taking any part in such foreign 

The shift toward domestic con- 
cerns and the practice of liberal 
nationalism slowed the growth of the 
Department of State throughout the 
19th century. Secretaries of State 
after 1823 dedicated themselves more 
to preserving than expanding the 
influence of the Department. Presi- 
dents paid more attention to the 
Treasury or the War Department than 
to the guardians of foreign relations. 

The low priority attached to for- 
eign relations resulted in a tendency 
to depreciate diplomacy and its practi- 
tioners. Secretary of State Edward 
Livingston sorrowfully summarized 
this attitude as early as 1833. Ameri- 
cans thought of their ministers as 
privileged characters "selected to en- 
joy the pleasures of foreign travel at 
the expense of the people ; their places 
as sinecures; and their residence 
abroad as a continued scene of luxuri- 
ous enjoyment." Congress frequently 
adopted parallel views. In 1844 the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
proposed to assign ministers to a cir- 
cuit of legations, for example, a minis- 
ter resident to serve Bolivia, Chile, 
and Peru. In 1859 Representative 
Benjamin W. Stanton of Ohio said that 
he knew of "no area of the public 



A Most Undiplomatic Diplomat 

Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a natural- 
ized citizen of French extraction, was 
sent to Spain as the American Min- 
ister in 1853. The principal issue in 
U.S. -Spanish relations at the time was 
the future of Cuba. Soule sympathized 
strongly with those who wished to 
annex Cuba, a course of action that 
would provide territory in which 
slavery could prosper. Before Soule 
went to Spain, he made a strong pro- 
annexationist speech in New York, a 
serious diplomatic indiscretion that 
prejudiced his mission before it had 
begun. To add insult to injury, upon 
his arrival in Spain, he made an 
impertinent speech to the throne. The 
Spanish Government requested its 
revision before accepting it. 

Soule further compromised his 
mission when, to avenge an alleged 

insult to his wife, he fought a duel 
with the French envoy in Madrid, the 
Marquis de Turgot. A bullet from 
Soule's weapon lamed the Marquis 
for life. 

When Spanish authorities seized 
an American steamer, the Black- 
Warrior, in Cuban waters, Soule 
immediately demanded that Spain pay 
an indemnity of $300,000 and dismiss 
the responsible officials within 48 
hours. The Spanish Government re- 
buffed these demands, choosing to deal 
with the ship's owners rather than 
the U.S. Government. 

Soule's most famous diplomatic 
enterprise was the drafting of the 
Ostend Manifesto. This document 
stemmed from Soule's meeting with 
the American Ministers to Britain 
and France in October 1854. Soule's 
despatch to Secretary of State William 
L. Marcy recommended an attempt to 
purchase Cuba from Spain for up to 
$120 million. What if Spain refused 
to sell? "Then," the message stated, 
"by every law, human and divine, we 
shall be justified in wresting it from 
Spain if we possess the power." 

When this bellicose message was 
made public, it aroused great criticism 
in Europe and the United States. 
Opponents of slavery unequivocally 
opposed acquiring Cuba under any 
circumstances. Marcy then rejected 
Soule's message and instructed him to 
continue negotiations for the purchase 
of Cuba. Soule, correctly assuming 
that his usefulness in Spain was at an 
end, submitted his resignation, bring- 
ing to an end one of the stormiest 
diplomatic tours in the annals of the 
Department of State. 

service that is more emphatically use- 
less than the diplomatic service — 
none in the world." 

The practice of the "spoils sys- 
tem" — the award of government 
appointments in return for political 
support — reinforced the proclivity to 
undervalue the Department of State 
and the foreign services. President 
Andrew Jackson believed that "the 
duties of public officers are ... so 
plain and simple that men of intelli- 
gence may readily qualify themselves 

for their performance. . . . More is lost 
by the long continuance of men in 
office than is generally to be gained by 
their experience." This view helped to 
perpetuate amateurism in all aspects 
of government. The egalitarian cele- 
bration of the common man some- 
times worked against efforts to im- 
prove the quality and status of those 
who conducted foreign relations. 

The growth of the Department 
and its overseas missions during the 
years from 1830 to 1860 roughly 
paralleled the increase of the general 
population. The Department of State, 
which moved to the District of Colum- 
bia in 1800, was housed from 1819 to 
1866 in the Northeast Executive 
Building located near the White House 
on Pennsylvania Avenue. Only four 
regular clerks were added to the De- 
partment between 1818 and 1845 to 
cope with an expanded workload. In 
1856 the Department consisted of 30 
officers and 27 supporting personnel, 
and in 1860 the foreign services em- 
ployed only 281 people. Congress did 
not authorize the appointment of an 
assistant secretary of state until 1833. 
A second assistant secretary was per- 
mitted in 1866. The strains of office, 
including domestic political criticism, 
imposed great burdens on most Secre- 
taries of State. One of them, John 
Clayton of Delaware, who served 
President Zachary Taylor in 1849-50, 
noted the consequences. "The situation 
I have filled was . . . more difficult, 
more thorny and more liable to mis- 
representation and calumny than any 
other in the world, as I verily believe." 

The difficulties of those who con- 
ducted the nation's foreign relations 
led one of President Jackson's Secre- 
taries of State, Louis McLane of 
Delaware, to undertake the first gen- 
eral reorganization of the Department 
since 1789. In 1833 McLane converted 
the Chief Clerk into an administrator 
with broad responsibilities for the 
everyday direction of the Department. 
He also set up a bureau system to 
permit orderly discharge of business. 
Seven such units were established, of 
which the two most important were 
the Diplomatic Bureau and the Consul- 
ar Bureau. In the Diplomatic Bureau 
three clerks managed correspondence 
with the overseas missions. One took 
responsibility for England, France, 
Russia, and the Netherlands. Another 
dealt with the rest of Europe, the 
Mediterranean, Asia, and Africa. A 
third communicated with the Ameri- 
cas. The five other bureaus covered 
domestic affairs — translation; ar- 
chives, laws, and commissions; par- 
dons, remissions, copyrights, and 
library; disbursing; and superin- 

The number of overseas missions 
increased from 15 in 1830 to 33 in 
1860. Most were located in Europe or 
Latin America, although the begin- 




The U.S. Passport 

meet (1. Knight was Director of the Passport Office from 1955 to 1977. (Department of state photo) 

The term "passport" derives from the 
French words passer, to enter or leave, 
ind port, a port. It literally means a 
jermit to leave a country. Issuance of 

irta and travel documents was 
irst mentioned as a function of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in 
1782. The Department of State did not 
eceive exclusive authority to issue 
mssports until 1856. Prior to that 
late, governors, mayors, and even 
lotaries public were known to issue 

its. During the 19th century, 
he U.S. Government only required 
ravelers to obtain passports in war- 
ime. They would not be required of 
ill travelers until 1914. 

The earliest surviving U.S. pass- 
port was issued in France by Benja- 
min Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John 
Adams to W. D. Cheevert, David 
Sears, and their servants on Decem- 
ber 27, 1778, for travel to Holland. 
During the 1790s many passports 
were issued collectively to merchant 
ships and their crews. 

An interesting variation of this 
type was issued in 1796 to ships bound 
for the Mediterranean. The top por- 
tion was detachable in a scalloped 
pattern and was forwarded to Algiers 
for distribution to Algerian captains. 
If an American ship was stopped, its 
captain was supposed to produce the 

lower section of the passport and 
match it with the upper section. The 
ship would then be allowed to proceed. 

The passport function is the 
activity of the Department that the 
general public is most likely to en- 
counter. There are passport agencies 
in Washington and 13 other major 
cities employing 649 persons. During 
fiscal year 1980, 3,045,041 passports 
were issued, and over 14.6 million 
valid passports are in circulation 



Marine Security Guards 

During the 19th century, the U.S. 
Navy was frequently called upon to 
protect American lives and property 
in remote parts of the world. Marine 
detachments usually took part in these 
operations and on occasion were 
expected to protect diplomatic mis- 
sions. The first such instance took 
place in 1835, when four Marines from 
the U.S.S. Brandyivine were assigned 
to protect the Consulate in Lima, Peru. 
The next year, one Marine was de- 
tailed to this task. Legation guard 
detachments were stationed at various 
times in Tokyo, Seoul, and Managua. 
A Marine detachment helped defend 
the Legation in Peking during the 
Boxer Rebellion, and a Legation Guard 
remained in China until World War II. 

Civilian guards were unable to 
maintain adequate security at overseas 
missions, and the Department accord- 
ingly turned to the Armed Forces. The 
Secretary of State and the Secretary 

of the Navy signed a memorandum of 
agreement on December 15, 1948, 
which established the present Marine 
Security Guard program. The first 
detachments left for Bangkok and 
Tangier on January 2, 1949. Today 
1,112 Marines are assigned to 119 
Foreign Service posts throughout the 
world. Their mission is the mainten- 
ance of internal security. In an emer- 
gency, their basic task is to gain time 
for personnel to reach safety and for 
the host government to fulfill its 
obligations to protect diplomatic 

Five Marine Security Guards 
have been killed in the line of duty. 
The most recent fatality was Corporal 
Steven Crowley, who lost his life in 
the attack on the U.S. Embassy in 
Islamabad on November 21, 1979. 
Nine other Marines are among the 
hostages in Tehran. 

Tounsend Harris was the first American 
diplomat to be stationed in Japan. As Consul 
General at Shimoda, he negotiated a com- 
mercial treaty opening Japanese ports to 
American trade. Me then served as Minister 
Resident < 1H.")!M>2). 

nings of American interest in the 
Pacific Ocean and East Asia led to 
modest representation there. Ministers 
were sent to China in 1843 and Japan 
in 1859, and a resident commission 
was stationed in the Hawaiian Islands 
in 1843. 

By 1860, 45 people held appoint- 
ments in the Diplomatic Service, a 
remarkably small number for 33 mis- 
sions. Their maintenance cost the 
United States about $370,000, an in- 
crease from about $200,000 in 1833. 
Total expenditures overseas rose from 
$294,000 in 1830 to $1.1 million in 
1860. Some ministers supplemented 
their staffs by appointing "unpaid 
attaches," usually young men of pri- 
vate means who performed certain 
duties in return for admission into 
local society and opportunities for 
personal study and travel. 

Similar growth occurred in the 
Consular Service. The number of posts 
increased from 141 in 1830 to 282 in 
1860, reflecting the considerable ex- 
pansion of foreign trade from 1840 to 
1860. Consular functions enlarged, but 
hardships bedeviled life in the service. 
The American consul at Genoa during 
the 1840s, C. Edwards Lester, sum- 
marized the situation : "An American 
consul is often a foreigner, almost 

The Hulsemann-Webster 

In 1850 the Austrian charge in Wash- 
ington, the Chevalier Hulsemann, who 
strenuously objected to supposed 
American interference in the domestic 
affairs of Hungary, communicated an I 
insulting message to the Department 
of State. His Government, he stated, 
had "deemed it proper to preserve a 
conciliatory deportment making ample 
allowance for the ignorance of the 
Cabinet of Washington on the subject 
of Hungarian affairs and its disposi- 
tion to give credence to the mendacious 
rumors which are propagated by the 
American press." 

To this statement Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster replied in kind: 
"Nothing will deter either the Govern- 
ment or the people of the United 
States from . . . forming and express- 
ing their own opinions freely and at 
all times upon the great political 
events which may transpire among 
the civilized nations of the earth. 
Their own institutions stand upon 
the broadest principles of civil liberty; 
and believing those principles ... to 
be ... in fact the only principles of 
government which meet the demands 
of the present enlightened age — the 
President has perceived with great 
satisfaction that in the constitution 
recently introduced into the Austrian 
Empire many of these great principles 
are recognized and applied." 

always a merchant, can't live on his 
fees, nor even pay the necessary ex- 
penses of his office ; The] is scolded or 
cursed by everybody that has anything 
to do with him, and is expected to 
entertain his countrymen, not only 
with hospitality but with a consid- 
erable degree of luxury." 

However trying, Genoa was surely 
a more desirable post than the Brazil- 
ian port of Pernambuco, now called 
Recife. In 1858 Consul Walter Stapp 
reported from Pernambuco that one of 
his predecessors had resigned before 
taking up his office because he had 



Caleb Gushing, American commissioner to 
China, negotiated the Treaty of Wang-hsia in 
1844, gaining most-favored-nation commer- 
cial privileges and extraterritoriality for 

Americans in China. (Library of Congress photo) 

received "such mournful accounts of 
this place as to disgust him in advance 
of his arrival." Moreover, he continued, 
"four others have left their bones to 
bake in these fearfully hot sands, with- 
out a slab of stone or a stick of wood 
to point the stranger to their graves." 
Beset by difficult climates and low 
salaries, consuls rarely received much 
assistance from their government. In 
1833 Secretary Edward Livingston 
noted that officials in the domestic 
service of the nation were "surrounded 
with the means of obtaining informa- 
tion and advice" but that "abroad, an 
officer is entrusted with the most 
important function, out of the reach 
of control or advice, and is left with, 
comparatively speaking, no written 
rules for his guidance." A few consuls 
apparently succumbed to temptation. 
An auditor reported in 1861 that the 
consul in Liverpool had not reported 
expenditures of public money for 3 
years, "contracting public and private 
| debts, which . . . probably exceed 
$200,000. It is perhaps some consola- 
tion to know that this plunderer no 
longer disgraces the Government 

Congress delayed action to im- 
prove the situation of American rep- 
resentatives abroad until 1856, when 
it enacted a reform of the Diplomatic 
and Consular Services. The law con- 

A 1 9th Century View 

"Consul, n. In American politics, a 
person who having failed to secure an 
office from the people is given one by 
the Administration on condition that 
he leave the country." 

Ambrose Bierce 

The Devil's Dictionary 

centrated on the most publicized prob- 
lem — inadequate compensation. It 
prescribed salaries for ministers that 
ranged from $17,500 per year for 
London and Paris to $10,000 per year 
for most other places. (The ceiling of 
$17,500 for heads of mission endured 
90 years, until 1946.) In addition, 
consuls were given regular salaries. 
Fees collected at consulates were 
henceforth to be sent to the Treasury. 
Written regulations were developed to 
improve the performance of the for- 
eign services. 

The act of 1856 represented a 
step forward, but it fell short of 
providing for truly professional for- 
eign services. Most ministers and 
consuls gained appointment because of 
personal wealth, political services, or 
social position. Many lacked qualifica- 
tions — even the most elementary 
knowledge of diplomatic etiquette. For 
example, John Randolph of Virginia, 
when presenting his credentials at 
St. Petersburg, said to the Czar, 
"Howya, Emperor? And how's the 
madam ?" One of the few talented 
diplomats of the era who made a career 
in the foreign service, Henry Wheaton, 
argued in vain for a professional 
service that recognized merit and 
granted tenure to the deserving. Those 
with necessary qualifications — linguis- 
tic skill, awareness of diplomatic 
forms, and appropriate experience — 
should, he thought, "be employed 
where they can do most service, while 
incapable men should be turned out 
without fear or partiality. Those who 
have served the country faithfully and 
well ought to be encouraged and trans- 
ferred from one court to another, 
which is the only advancement that 
our system permits of." Wheaton 
joined others in complaints about in- 
adequate compensation. 

Despite the U.S. failure to create 
professional foreign services, many 
were the accomplishments of the ex- 
panding nation in foreign affairs, and 
the Department of State made signifi- 
cant contributions in almost every 
instance. One striking achievement of 
the period was the successful resolu- 
tion of many disagreements with the 
one nation — Great Britain — that 
might have threatened the security of 
the United States. Peaceful settle- 
ments regularly resolved Anglo- 
American controversies over bound- 
aries, fisheries, and trade, notably 
through the so-called friendly conven- 
tions of 1817-18, the Webster-Ash- 
burton treaty of 1842, the Oregon 
treaty of 1846, and the Clayton- 
Bulwer treaty of 1850. Of comparable 
importance were successful negotia- 
tions that furthered the march of the 
United States across the continent, 
especially the treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo that ended the Mexican war 
with the annexation of New Mexico 
and California in 1848 and the pur- 
chase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. 
In all these situations, the United 
States took advantage of favorable 
bargaining positions. Despite the 
handicap of amateur diplomacy, no 

Nicholas Trist, Chief Clerk of the Depart- 
ment of State, followed General Winfield 
Scott's army to Mexico City. Ignoring an 
order recalling him to the United States, 
Trist negotiated the treaty of Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo with Mexico in 1848, extending 
American territory to the southwest from 
the Nueces River to the Pacific Ocean. 

(Library of Congress photo) 



Seward's Abortive 

At the beginning of President Lincoln's 
Administration in April 1861, the new 
Secretary of State, William H. Seward of 
New York, proposed to end domestic 
political strife over the all-consuming 
question of slavery by pursuing an active 
foreign policy, one that might lead to dec- 
larations of war against France or Spain, 
thus uniting domestic factions against a 
foreign threat. Seward even volunteered 
himself as the principal prosecutor of 
such a policy. The President tactfully re- 
buffed this extraordinary proposal. 
Thereafter, Seward, whom Henry Adams 
described as having "a head like a wise 
macaw; a beaked nose; shaggy eyebrows; 
unorderly hair and clothes; hoarse voice; 
off-hand manner-free talk; and perpetual 
cigar," subordinated himself to the Presi- 
dent and served him loyally and effec- 

serious setbacks marred the nation's 
foreign affairs between 1823 and 1867. 

The most dangerous challenge to 
the nation's security during the 19th 
century occurred during the Civil War. 
That tragic struggle between the 
Union and the Confederacy created 
excellent opportunities for European 
nations to meddle in the Western 
Hemisphere either by violating the 
Monroe Doctrine or by extending aid 
to the rebellious South. In this in- 
stance the remarkably effective collab- 
oration between President Abraham 
Lincoln and his Secretary of State, 
William H. Seward of New York, 
proved equal to the situation. The 
Secretary's success in fending off 
serious trouble during the Civil War 
proved that great achievements in 
foreign relations almost always de- 
pended on close relations between the 
President and the Department of 
State. The American Minister in 
London, Charles Francis Adams, third 
in a line of distinguished statesmen 
from Massachusetts, established him- 
self among the most successful diplo- 
mats of his time, preserving the neu- 
trality of Great Britain until the 
Union Army finally prevailed over its 
opponents. If the Confederacy had 
received significant assistance from 
European nations, especially Great 
Britain, the war might have had a 
much different outcome. 

The triumph of the Union in 1865 
prepared the way for still another era 
of remarkable national progress, 
finally ending the dispute over the 
relative merits of national supremacy 
and states' rights. The nation emerged 
from the Civil War more powerful and 
secure than at any time in its history; 
it would continue to enjoy virtual 
immunity from international dangers 
— "free security" — for another 50 



The Rise to World Power, 1867-1913 

The purchase of Alaska from Russia on March 30, 1867, gave the United States its first 

noncontiguous territory. (Library of Congress photo) 

The 30 years after the Civil War are 
justly considered the least active in 
the history of American foreign rela- 
tions. Free security, that fortunate 
byproduct of the generally stable in- 
ternational balance of power, lingered 
on, permitting Americans to devote 
themselves to their prime preoccupa- 
tion — internal development. During 
these years, the westward movement 
was completed, and the nation experi- 
enced extensive industrialization and 

The absence of foreign threats to 
national security and the continuing 
national stress on domestic concerns 
during the latter years of the 19th 
century explain why the conduct of 
foreign relations did not deviate much 
from earlier practice. As late as 1894, 
an observer noted that the public was 
"less familiar with the duties of our 
diplomatic and consular agents than 
any other branch of the public serv- 
ice," a logical outcome because mem- 
bers of the foreign services lived 
abroad and could not be observed at 
work. As before the Civil War, xeno- 

phobic Americans regularly con- 
demned their representatives abroad 
as subversive. In 1885, for example, 
Senator William E. Robinson of New 
York insisted that "this diplomatic 
service is working our ruin by creat- 
ing a desire for foreign customs and 
foreign follies. The disease is im- 
ported by our returning diplomats and 
by the foreign ambassadors sent here 
by monarchs and despots to corrupt 
and destroy our American ideals." The 
Senator's solution was to quarantine 
entering diplomats "as we quarantine 
foreign rags through fear of cholera." 
Another familiar pattern endured 
beyond the Civil War — meddlesome 
political interference with the Depart- 
ment of State. In 1869, for example, 
President Ulysses S. Grant made 
Elihu B. Washburne, a friend from 
Galena, Illinois, the Secretary of State 
for a mere 12 days so that he could 
enjoy the prestige of having held that 
position when he took up his respon- 



sibilities as Minister to France. Fortu- 
nately Washburne's successor, Hamil- 
ton Fish of New York, established 
close relations with President Grant 
and managed to minimize unwise 
appointments and policies. 

Like previous Secretaries, Fish 
recognized that he could not adminis- 
ter the Department efficiently without 
the President's strong support. When 
General Orville Babcock, another one 
of Grant's friends, attempted to inter- 
fere in the affairs of the Department, 
Fish bluntly informed the President 
that he could not tolerate such activi- 
ties. If the President showed lack of 
confidence in him, he wrote, "or when 
the influence of the head of the Depart- 
ment in the administration of its 
affairs, or the formation of its policy, 
is overshadowed by others, a sensible 
or sensitive man will appreciate that 
the time for his retirement has 

Political appointments remained 
the order of the day despite growing 
public concern, manifested in support 
for creation of the Civil Service 
(1883), which did not cover the for- 
eign services. In 1885, when the Demo- 
cratic Party gained control of the 
executive branch for the first time in 
24 years, Congressman Jonathan 
Chace of Rhode Island contrasted 
American and British practice on such 
occasions. "Whenever a change of ad- 
ministration occurs in Great Britain 
. . . members of the diplomatic service 
know that no change will take place in 
regard to their positions, but all over 
the world today every man in the dip- 
lomatic and consular service of the 
United States is packing his trunk and 
engaging his passage preparatory to 
returning home." 

Nevertheless, certain members of 
the foreign services developed special 
competence and pursued careers in 
diplomatic and consular assignments. 
Prominent among them was Eugene 
Schuyler, who first served as consul at 
Moscow in 1867 and later held other 
posts in Europe before ending his 
service as the American representative 
in Cairo in 1889. Another was William 
Lindsay Scruggs, who began his career 
as Minister to Colombia in 1873 and 
moved on to several other positions, 
including service as Minister to Vene- 
zuela during the Administration of 

Alvey A. Adee 

Alvey A. Adee began his diplomatic 
career as a private secretary at the 
Legation in Spain in 1869. He became 
a clerk in the Department in 1876 
and Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau 
2 years later. Appointed Third Assist- 
ant Secretary of State in 1882 and 
Second Assistant Secretary in 1886, 
he became First Assistant Secretary 
of State just before his death in 1924. 
Adee approved or drafted almost 
all outgoing correspondence and was 
a stickler for correct style and usage. 
In times of crisis he would install a 
cot in his office. Deaf, reclusive, and 
unmarried, he dedicated his life to the 
operation of the Department, advising 
Presidents and Secretaries of both 
parties and briefing diplomatic and 
consular officers. A longtime resident 
of Washington is said to have re- 
marked as Adee bicycled past him : 
"There goes our State Department 

President Benjamin Harrison (1889- 
93) . Two men who developed impres- 
sive reputations as regional specialists, 
Henry White (Europe) and William 
W. Rockhill (East Asia), extended 
their activity well into the 20th 

Abuses in the Consular Service 
persisted into the late 19th century 
despite strenuous efforts to correct 
them. In 1872 a representative of the 
Treasury, DeB. Randolph Keim, re- 
ported the results of an extensive 
investigation of the Consular Service. 
He uncovered many irregularities, 
among them collection of illegal fees, 
improper exercise of judicial powers, 
fraudulent accounting, faulty admin- 
istration of estates left by Americans 
who died abroad, issuance of illegal 
passports, and sale of the American 
flag. Keim thought that the most im- 
portant feature of his investigation 
was the "ingenuity displayed by con- 
sular officers, since the Act of 1856 
particularly, in defrauding the Gov- 
ernment and grasping gains from 
various outside sources besides." 

Few changes in basic foreign 
policies can be detected during the 
generation after the Civil War; the 

Elihu B. Washburne had the shortest term 
of office of any Secretary of State — 
March 5-16, 1869. As Minister to France 
(1869-77), he witnessed the Franco-Prussian 
War, the Paris Commune, and the fall of an 
empire and the birth of a republic. 

( Department of State photo) 





Frederick Douglass 

'The Yankee King of Spain" 

Frederick Douglass was born into 
slavery in Maryland. After escaping 
bondage, he became a leading aboli- 
tionist. Following the Civil War he 
received two diplomatic assignments. 
In 1871 he served as secretary of a 
commission sent to Santo Domingo to 
explore the possibility of annexing 
that island. More important, in 1889 
he became Minister to Haiti and 
charge d'affaires to Santo Domingo. 
In this capacity he became involved 
in an unsuccessful attempt to acquire 
the Mole St. Nicolas in Haiti as a 
coaling station. In 1891 Douglass re- 
signed his office after critics alleged 
that he showed undue regard for the 
Haitian point of view. 

The appointment of Daniel E. Sickles 
as Minister to Spain in 1869 was the 
culmination of a flamboyant public 
career. As Secretary of the Legation 
in London (1853-55), Sickles had 
helped to arrange the conference of 
ministers that produced the Ostend 
Manifesto. He also had his mistress 
presented to Queen Victoria. As a 
Democratic Congressman from New 
York, Sickles gained notoriety for 
shooting his wife's lover in Lafayette 
Square, being acquitted of murder, 
and then forgiving his wife. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War, 
Sickles raised a brigade of volunteers 
in New York City and maintained 
them at his own expense until they 
were taken into the Army. He led the 
"Excelsior Brigade" into battle and 
rose to the rank of Major General and 
to the command of the Third Corps of 
the Army of the Potomac. At Gettys- 
burg, he moved his corps to an exposed 
position and lost most of his troops 
and his right leg. (The bones of his 
leg are on display in the Army Medical 
.Museum. j In the spring of 1865, 
Sickles conducted a diplomatic mission 
to Colombia to arrange the passage 
of American troops through Panama. 

Sickles was appointed Minister 
to Spain as a reward for his early 
support of Grant's campaign for the 
Presidency. He was instructed to offer 
help to Cuba in purchasing inde- 
pendence from Spain, opening the way 
to eventual annexation. Spanish 
opinion was outraged, and General 
Prim, the Spanish Prime Minister, 
was assassinated before he could 
reconsider. After King Amadeo I 
declined the offer of purchase, Sickles 
plotted with Spanish republicans in 
the vain hope that they would be more 
willing to sell after they came 
to power. 

Sickles lived lavishly in Madrid, 
renting a box at the opera and having 
his secretary, Alvey A. Adee, order fine 
wines and luxury goods for him from 
London and Paris. Sickles frequently 
traveled to Paris, where he had an 
affair with Isabella II, formerly the 
Queen of Spain. Isabella herself was 
notorious for her affairs, and there 
had been much speculation about the 
paternity of her children. Parisian 
society promptly dubbed Sickles "the 
Yankee king of Spain." Sickles also 
married Caroline de Creagh, lady-in- 
waiting to the former Queen. 

On October 21, 1873, the Spanish 
warships captm-ed the steamer 
Virginias, as it carried arms to in- 
surgents in Cuba. After Spanish au- 
thorities executed the captain and 
most of the crew, many of whom were 
American citizens, the United States 
demanded the release of the ship and 
the remaining prisoners. Sickles was 
instructed to close the Legation and 
return home if the Spanish Govern- 
ment did not accept these demands 
within 12 days. Sickles, however, was 
ready to close the Legation after 
5 days. The crisis was averted when 
the Spanish Government offered to 
negotiate in Washington rather than 
Madrid, and Sickles then resigned. 

Sickles left for Paris on March 27, 
1874, and lived there for 5 years. 
After his return to the United States, 
he devoted the rest of his life to the 
preservation of the Gettysburg battle- 
field and to defending his conduct 
during the battle. 

Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett, America's 
first black diplomat, was Minister Resident 
and Consul (ieneral in Haiti from 1869 to 

1877. ' Department of State photo) 



James Russell Lowell, Minister to Spain (1877-80) and to Great Britain (1880-85), was one of 
many distinguished American authors who held diplomatic or consular posts. 

(Library of Congress photo) 

overarching principles of isolation and 
neutrality remained firmly entrenched. 
In 1894 Secretary of State Walter Q. 
Gresham of Illinois reaffirmed Wash- 
ington's "great rule of conduct" in 
commenting on what he deemed a ques- 
tionable departure from the policy of 
"no entangling alliances" — an agree- 
ment with Germany and Great Britain 
to share control of the Samoan Islands. 
"Every nation, and especially every 
strong nation, must sometimes be con- 
scious of an impulse to rush into diffi- 
culties that do not concern it, except in 
a highly imaginary way," he noted. To 
contain this tendency Gresham offered 
a traditional remedy: "To restrain the 
indulgence of such a propensity is not 
only the part of wisdom, but a duty we 
owe to the world as an example of the 
strength, the moderation, and the 
beneficence of popular government." 

Perhaps the most notable develop- 
ment in foreign policy was the eleva- 
tion of the Monroe Doctrine into an 
unquestioned article of faith as the 
nation gave increasing attention to 
Latin America. Secretary of State 
James G. Blaine of Maine responded to 
this development; he inaugurated the 
modern Pan American movement in 
1889, although it did not prosper until 
the early years of the 20th century. 

George H. Butler, nephew of a prominent 
Massachusetts Congressman, was appointed 
Consul General in Alexandria, Egypt, in 
1870. He dismissed all consular agents, 
auctioned off their commissions, and pur- 
chased dancing girls. Shortly before his re- 
call in 1872, he was involved in a brawl with 
three former Confederate officers. 

The limited importance assigned 
to foreign relations after the Civil 
War was reflected in the modest 
growth of the Department of State 
and the foreign services. In 1880 the 
Department had only 80 employees 
compared with 42 in 1860, and the 
total declined to 76 in 1890. The num- 
ber of diplomatic missions increased to 
only 41 in 1890, up from 33 in 1860, 
while the number of consular posts 
grew during the same period from 
282 to 323. Diplomats numbered 45 in 
1860 and 63 in 1890. The Consular 
Service expanded much more, employ- 
ing 1,042 people in 1890 compared 
with 236 in 1860. 

Expenditures on domestic and for- 
eign operations rose from $1.3 million 
in 1860 to only $1.8 million in 1890. 
These were limited increments, indeed, 
when compared with the increase of 
the general population, which approxi- 
mately doubled between 1860 and 1890. 

In 1870 the Department under- 
went a significant reorganization at 
the initiative of Secretary Fish. The 
principal change was a further elab- 
oration of the bureau system that 
Secretary McLane had inaugurated in 
1833. To cope with the growth in over- 
seas missions and consulates, Fish 
established two diplomatic bureaus 
and two consular bureaus with geo- 
graphic responsibilities. The First 
Diplomatic Bureau and the First Con- 
sular Bureau dealt with Europe, 
China, and Japan. The second pair of 
bureaus managed communications 
with the rest of the world — Latin 
America, the Mediterranean region, 
Russia, Hawaii, and Liberia. Five 
other bureaus were created — the Chief 
Clerk's Bureau, the Law Bureau, the 
Bureau of Accounts, the Statistical 
Bureau, and the Passport Bureau. The 
reorganization of 1870 endured for 39 
years, undergoing only minor adjust- 
ments during that period. 

In 1888 the Department of State 
moved into an imposing new home — 
the State, War, and Navy Building 
located at 17th Street and Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue, N.W., and in 1893 the 
United States finally upgraded envoys 
accredited to the most important for- 
eign powers to the rank of ambassador. 
Previously all missions had been lega- 
tions headed by ministers. Embassies 
were established in Great Britain, 




State, War, and Navy Building 

In 1869 Congress recognized that the 
building housing the Department of 
State ( the Washington City Orphan 
Asylum ) was inadequate because of 
the high rent, shortage of space, and 
the severe fire hazard. Consequently a 
commission was appointed to recom- 
mend a site and submit plans for a new 
executive office building to house the 
Department of State. By February 
1870, it was agreed to construct a 
building on a site west of the White 
House, a site which was then partially 
occupied by the buildings of the War 
and Navy Departments. 

The construction was to be done 
in stages beginning with the south 
wing in order to avoid interfering 
with the business of the War and 
Navy Departments. This would allow 
these two departments to remain in 
their buildings until later when those 
buildings would have to be razed to 
make way for the other wings. Just 
before the south wing was completed 
in June 1875, the Department of State 
began moving in. The War and Navy 
Departments moved into the east wing 
immediately after it was ready for 
occupancy in April 1879. The north 
wing was completed in late 1882 and 
the War Department moved into it in 
February 1883. The west and center 
wings were occupied in early 1888. 

Upon completion it was reputed to 
be the largest and finest office building 
in the world. Exclusive of basement 
and sub-basement, it has a total floor 

area of about 10 acres and contains 
nearly 1-% miles of corridors 12 feet 
wide. These are paved with black slate 
and white marble. The eight spiral 
stairways with steps of gray granite 
are unsupported by either beams or 
arches. There is very little woodwork 
in the entire building, the most note- 
worthy being the doors. 

The south wing had been planned 
and built for the exclusive use of the 
Department of State. The Secretary 
had his office on the second floor at the 
southwest corner and the diplomatic 
reception room — the scene of the 
signing of many historic documents — 
adjoined the Secretary's office. 

Because of the pressure of space, 
the Department of State was forced to 
move some of its office out of this 
building and into rented quarters in 
other parts of the city. In 1918 the 
Navy Department moved to new 
quarters and all State Department 
offices were reunited in this building 
where they remained until 1936. 
In 1930, following the departure of 
most of the War Department, the 
name of the building was changed to 
the Department of State Building. 
Again, however, the structure grew 
overcrowded and another exodus to 
outlying buildings became necessary. 
In 1947 the Department of State 
moved to a new location at 320 21st 
Street, Northwest. The old State, War, 
and Navy Building now houses the 
executive offices of the President. 

France, Germany, and Italy after 
those nations conferred ambassadorial 
rank on their representatives in 

These changes did not mean that 
the Department and the foreign serv- 
ices had altered their traditional prac- 
tices. One historian described the 
Department of 1898 as "an antiquated 
feeble organization, enslaved by prece- 
dents and routine inherited from 
another century, remote from the pub- 
lic gaze and indifferent to it. The 
typewriter was viewed as a necessary 
evil and the telephone was an instru- 
ment of last resort." Most of the old 
problems endured into the 20th cen- 
tury. The Department and the foreign 
services were shorthanded ; employees 
at home and abroad were seriously 
underpaid. Appointments were still 
subject to the spoils system, Congress 
having failed to legislate a system of 
selection and promotion by merit and 
job protection through the award of 
tenure to the deserving. 

Suddenly, the general circum- 
stances that had influenced the Depart- 
ment of State since 1815 were vastly 
altered as the result of a short but 
important war. In 1898 the United 
States became involved in a struggle 
with Spain that stemmed from popular 
support for the independence of Cuba. 
The decision to free Cuba was a star- 
tling departure from the practice of 
traditional liberal nationalism, but as 
a surprise it did not compare with the 
results of the war. The Treaty of Paris 
(1898) provided for Cuban independ- 
ence and also for the cession of impor- 
tant Spanish possessions to the United 
States — notably the island of Puerto 
Rico in the Caribbean Sea, the entire 
Philippine archipelago in the western 
Pacific Ocean, and the small island of 
Guam in the central Pacific Ocean. 

This assumption of colonial re- 
sponsibilities overseas in two widely 
separated regions, a stunning aberra- 
tion from liberal nationalism, reflected 
not only the temporary enthusiasms of 
1898 but a basic change in the inter- 
national posture of the United States. 
The old foreign policies reflected the 
circumstances of the earlier 19th cen- 
tury, but by the 1890s the situation 
had changed greatly. The nation had 
acquired almost all the attributes of a 
great power; it stood ahead or nearly 
ahead of almost all other countries in 
the critical measures of power, such as 
population, geographic size and loca- 
tion, economic resources, and military 



This striking rise in international 
status portended comparable shifts in 
foreign policy. President William 
McKinley drew attention to the new 
situation in the instructions he gave 
to the delegation of American states- 
men who negotiated the Treaty of 
Paris with Spain. "We cannot be 
unmindful that without any desire or 
design on our part the war has 
brought us new duties and responsi- 
bilities which we must meet and dis- 
charge as becomes a great nation on 
whose growth and career from the 
beginning the Ruler of Nations has 
plainly written the high command and 
pledge of civilization." Another con- 
temporary observer, George L. Rives, 
extended this interpretation. "Whether 
we like it or not," he wrote, "it is plain 
that the country is now entering into 
a period in its history in which it will 
necessarily be brought into far closer 
and more complex relations with all 
the other great Powers of the world," 
an outcome that would outmode estab- 

lished foreign policy. "We shall now 
and henceforth be looked upon as hav- 
ing cast aside our traditional attitude 
of isolation." 

During the 16 years between the 
brief war with Spain in 1898 and the 
outbreak of the First World War in 
1914, the United States greatly en- 
larged its role in world politics. The 
nation measurably altered its posture 
toward the areas that it had pene- 
trated in 1898 — the Caribbean-Latin 
American and Pacific-East Asian re- 
gions — and thereby added significantly 
to the burdens of the Department of 

Latin American policy involved an 
imposing revision of the Monroe Doc- 
trine. Throughout the 19th century the 
Monroe Doctrine was aimed primarily 
at European powers, which were 
warned to avoid further colonization 
in the New World. It did not imply 
the right to intervene in the affairs of 
Latin American nations. President 
Theodore Roosevelt, reacting to con- 

cern that certain European nations 
might be able to penetrate Latin 
America by the device of collecting 
debts that certain nations had repu- 
diated, asserted a policy in 1904 that 
became known as the Roosevelt Corol- 
lary to the Monroe Doctrine. No Latin 
American nation that adhered to 
acceptable international standards of 
behavior, he said, need fear interven- 
tion by the United States. But what 
about less scrupulous countries? 
"Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence 
which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in 
America, as elsewhere, require inter- 
vention by some civilized nation." 
Moreover, he continued, "in the west- 
ern hemisphere the adherence of the 
United States to the Monroe Doctrine 
may force the United States, however 
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such 
wrongdoing or impotence, to the exer- 
cise of an international police power." 
This pronouncement led to a series of 
interventions in the Caribbean-Latin 

Olney's Fiat 

In 1895 Secretary of State Richard 
Olney addressed a diplomatic despatch 
to London for communication to the 
British Government concerning a 
boundary dispute between Great 
Britain and Venezuela. This message 
gave early indication, even before the 
war with Spain in 1898, that the 
United States was moving toward a 
new assertiveness in international 
politics on the basis of its rise to great- 
power status. Olney's note offered a 
stirring defense of the Monroe Doc- 
trine. "Today the United States is 
practically sovereign on this continent, 
and its fiat is law upon the subjects to 
which it confines its interposition. 
Why? It is not because of the pure 
friendship or good will felt for it. It is 
not simply by reason of its high char- 
acter as a civilized state, nor because 
wisdom and justice and equity are the 
invariable characteristics of the deal- 
ings of the United States. It is be- 
cause, in addition to all other grounds, 
its infinite resources combined with 
its isolated position render it master 
of the situation and practically in- 
vulnerable as against any or all other 

Spanish and American delegates sign the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. The Spanish 
Empire in the New World came to an end, and the United States acquired an overseas empire 
and took its place among the great powers. (Library of Congress photo) 


Department of State Bulletin 


American region that greatly enlarged 
the U.S. presence there and added to 
the workload of the Department of 


Meanwhile, the acquisition of the 
Philippines triggered the development 
of a new American policy for East 
Asia. As the United States gained a 
foothold in the region, European 
incursions in China threatened to cut 
off access to that vast country, just 
when Americans hoped to create a 
great trade in Chinese markets. Ac- 
cordingly, Secretary of State John 
Hay of Ohio proposed in 1899 that 
nations interested in China should 
"enjoy perfect equality of treatment 
for navigation," that is, maintain the 
principle of free trade — the "open 
door." In 1900 Hay extended the open- 
door policy to include respect for the 
territorial and administrative integ- 
rity of China. This commitment to the 
open-door policy led the United States 
by degrees into much expanded par- 
ticipation in the activities of East 
Asia, another source of additional 
responsibilities for the Department of 

These extraordinary additions to 
the international political commit- 
ments of the United States ineluctably 
fostered many internal changes in the 
Department of State and its overseas 
establishments. The foreign policy 
community grew at a rapid rate. The 
Department was thoroughly reorga- 
nized to meet its new responsibilities, 
and important steps were taken 
toward the development of profes- 
sional, democratic foreign services. 

The Department of State ex- 
panded considerably during the years 
between the war with Spain and the 
First World War. When Hay became 
Secretary of State in 1898 the Depart- 
ment met a domestic payroll of 82 
people; by 1905, when Elihu Root of 
New York succeeded Hay, the number 
had risen only to 119, but at the end 
of 1910, during the Secretaryship of 
Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, 
the payroll had advanced to 234. The 
Diplomatic Service grew modestly 
from 93 people in 1900 to 121 in 1910. 

Expansion required a considerable 
increase in the annual budget. The 
expenditures of the Department at 
home and overseas increased from 
$3.4 million in 1900 to $4.9 million in 
1910. The Consular Service experi- 
enced a particularly significant addi- 
tion to its workload. The annual total 
of fees collected rose from $533,000 in 

1898 to 1.6 million in 1916. This three- 
fold jump reflected an expansion in the 
nation's foreign trade from $1.8 billion 
to $3 billion during the same period. 

The growing responsibilities of 
the Department of State forced a thor- 
ough reorganization in 1909. The re- 
former, Assistant Secretary of State 
Francis M. Huntington Wilson, suc- 
ceeded in enlarging the number of 
leadership positions so that thereafter 
the Department had three Assistant 
Secretaries of State, a Counselor to 
undertake special assignments, and a 
Director to administer the Consular 
Service. Lines of authority were clari- 
fied, permitting senior managers to 
make better use of personnel. Most 
important, however, was the creation 
of bureaus to deal with four distinct 
geographic regions — Western Europe, 
the Near East, the Far East, and 
Latin America — a move that fostered 
improved communication between the 
Department and the overseas missions. 
Several other bureaus and divisions 
were created to deal with various new 
responsibilities, notably a Bureau of 
Trade Relations and a Division of 
Information. A number of talented 
foreign service officers were brought 
to Washington to staff the new geo- 
graphic bureaus, adding a much- 
needed leaven of experience. 

Although the expansion and reor- 
ganization of the Department consti- 
tuted striking departures, the most 
distinctive feature of the early 20th 
century was a strong movement 
toward fully professionalized and 
democratic foreign services. The 
transformation in American foreign 
relations that began at the end of the 
19th century forced the nation to rec- 
ognize that it paid dearly for amateur- 
ism in the conduct of foreign policy. 
One critic summed up the need for 
expertise in an article published in 
1897 : "As we would not put a ship 
into the hands of a commander igno- 
rant of navigation, an army under the 
control of a general without military 
training, a suit at law into the hands 
of a counsel who never opened a law 
book ... so we should not put the for- 
eign affairs of our government into 
the hands of men without knowledge 
of the various subjects which go to 
make up the diplomatic science." Given 
the changed circumstances, President 
Theodore Roosevelt emphasized the 
necessity to upgrade performance: 
"The trouble with our ambassadors in 
stations of real importance," he told a 

"Father of the 
Foreign Service" 

Wilbur J. Carr (1870-1942) was born 
in Ohio and entered the Department 
of State as a clerk in 1892. He became 
Chief of the Consular Bureau in 1902, 
Chief Clerk in 1907, and served as 
Director of the Consular Service from 
1909 to 1924. A believer in scientific 
management and administrative effi- 
ciency, Carr took pride in having 
brought Consular Service operations 
"as near to perfection as possible." 
He strove to extend professionalism 
and merit to all aspects of the Depart- 
ment, working for passage of the 1906 
Consular Reorganization Act and 
helping to draft the Rogers Act. 

Carr served as Assistant Secre- 
tary of State from 1924 to 1937. His 
duties included those of Chairman of 
the Board of Foreign Service Per- 
sonnel and Budget Officer of the 
Department, a combination which 
allowed him to administer the transi- 
tion from sepai-ate Diplomatic and 
Consular Services to a unified profes- 
sional Foreign Service. His last 
assignment was Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia from 1937 until the 
German occupation in 1939. "The 
Father of the Foreign Service" then 
retired from the Department, having 
served for 45 years under 17 Secre- 
taries of State. 



President Grover Cleveland signed an 
Executive order on September 20, 1895, that 
instituted examinations for consular appoin- 
tees, a significant step toward professionali- 
zation of the Consular Service. 

(Department of State photo) 

Joining the Diplomatic Service in 19<W, 
Joseph ('. Grew served as Minister to Den- 
mark <1920), Switzerland (1921-24), and as 
Ambassador to Turkey (1927-32) and to 
Japan 1932—11). He concluded his career as 
I nder Secretary of State (1944-45). 

friend, "is that they totally fail to give 
us real help and real information, and 
seem to think that the life work of an 
ambassador is a kind of glorified pink 
tea party." 

Various means of insuring profes- 
sional and democratic foreign services 
were available to the Department. 
Among them were abandonment of the 
spoils system in favor of guaranteed 
tenure, adoption of the merit system 
as the basis for award of pay increases 
and promotions, selection of foreign 
service officers by competitive exami- 
nation, and adequate pay and allow- 
ances. All of these practices had been 
widely publicized earlier as part of the 
campaign that culminated in the pas- 
sage of the Civil Service Act in 1883, 
applicable only to domestic servants of 
the government. They were equally 
appropriate for the Diplomatic and 
Consular Services, and all of them re- 
ceived attention during the first years 
of the 20th century. 

President Grover Cleveland antic- 
ipated the reform movement in 1895, 
when he issued an Executive order 
that made entrance into the Consular 
Service contingent upon competitive 
examination, but the most important 
steps occurred during the Administra- 
tions of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt 
and William Howard Taft. 

In November 1905, President 
Roosevelt established the merit system 
for all diplomatic and consular posi- 
tions, except those of minister and 
ambassador, along with competitive 
entrance examinations. In 1906 Secre- 
tary Root shepherded a law through 
Congress that created a grade classifi- 
cation system for consular positions 
and also to conduct annual inspections 
of consular establishments. However, 
this statute did not mention President 
Roosevelt's examination system or 
merit promotion ; President Roose- 
velt remedied these omissions by 
means of another Executive order 
issued in June 1906. A few years later, 
in 1909, President Taft set up a board 
of examiners to administer both oral 
and written examinations to prospec- 
tive diplomats. 

In 1915 Congress passed the 
Stone-Flood Act, which permitted ap- 
pointment of certain diplomatic and 
consular officers to functional posi- 
tions, rather than to specific posts in 
the field. This step permitted reassign- 
ment by administrative transfer 
rather than Presidential appointment. 

This sequence of events vastly 
encouraged the proponents of technical 
competence in the Diplomatic and 
Consular Services, although more re- 
mained to be doi.e. The movement 
owed something to the earlier agita- 
tion for the creation of a civil service 
but even more to the spirit of progres- 
sivism that swept the nation during 
the first two decades of the 20th 
century. The Progressives emphasized 
administrative measures designed to 
enhance efficiency and minimize the 
baneful influence of excessive parti- 
sanship, especially in the form of 
political appointments. They opposed 
undue favoritism to the wealthy and 
privileged. President Roosevelt told a 
friend in 1908: "I am anxious to have 
it understood that it is not necessary 
to be a multimillionaire in order to 
reach the highest positions in the 
American diplomatic services." 

This concern stimulated passage 
of the Lowden Act (1911) ; it was the 
first legislation to provide for the pur- 
chase of buildings to house overseas 
establishments. The author of this 
measure, Representative Frank O. 
Lowden of Illinois, hoped to open the 
way to the most important diplomatic 
positions for deserving members of the 
foreign services regardless of their 
economic circumstances. "It ought to 
be possible," he said, "for the lowest 
man in the foreign service to feel that 
it is within his power, if his service 
justifies it, to reach the highest posts." 
This sentiment faithfully reflected the 
Progressive conviction that compe- 
tence should be the only basis for 
advancement in the public service. 

The new assertiveness of the 
United States in world politics not 
only reflected the nation's rise to 
world power; it also stemmed from 
basic changes in the pattern of inter- 
national relations. The stable inter- 
national balance of power that had 
endured since the downfall of Napo- 
leon in 1815 — the source of so much 
national advantage in the form of free 
security during the 19th century — 
showed definite signs of collapse dur- 
ing the first years of the 20th century. 
Its final dissolution in 1914 precipi- 
tated the first European general war 
in a hundred years. Notable expansion 
and improvement in the Department of 
State after 1898 helped to prepare it 
for the unprecedented challenges that 
it encountered during the First World 
War of 1914-18 and after. 



The Test of Total War, 1913-1947 

The First World War marked one of 
the great turning points in modern 
history. It signaled an end to the 
century of general international 
stability and extensive economic, 
social, and political progress that had 
underwritten the security of the 
United States during its rise from a 
small and struggling country to an 
honored place among the great powers. 
The conflict of 1914-18 inaugurated 
an age of international disequilibrium 
that endured to the latter decades of 
the 20th century, generating political 
turbulence and organized violence on 
an hitherto unimaginable scale. 

The First World War vastly af- 
fected the position of the United States 
in the international community be- 
cause it destroyed the general stability 
that had nurtured Washington's 
"great rule of conduct" during more 
than 100 years of extraordinary na- 
tional accomplishment. It drew the 
nation into any number of interna- 
tional entanglements that would have 
seemed inconceivable a few scant 
years earlier. Political isolation, how- 
ever appropriate during the 19th 
century, no longer served the national 

When general warfare began in 
1914 between the Allied Powers 
(Great Britain, France, Russia, 
Japan, and later Italy) and the Central 
Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
and Turkey), the United States an- 
nounced strict neutrality in keeping 
with tradition, but this course ulti- 
mately proved untenable. During the 
period of neutrality (1914-17) two 
prewar trends came rapidly to a tragic 
conclusion. As the Americans experi- 
mented with their newfound power in 
world affairs after the war with Spain, 
they decided that their national in- 
terests and aspirations had become 
complementary with those of the 
ancient enemy, Great Britain, and com- 
petitive with those of Germany, 
another rising power. Developments 
after 1914, which led to an ungovern- 
able conflict with Germany over the 
legality of unrestricted submarine war- 
fare against neutral shipping, simply 
accelerated a political process that had 
begun some years earlier. 

Nevertheless America's entrance 
into the First World War in April 
1917 as an associate of the Allies re- 
flected the vision of President Wood- 
row Wilson more than the outcome of 
the controversy over submarine war- 
fare. By 1917 the conflict had been 
transformed into a quasi-global con- 
flict that verged on total war. Wilson 
came to believe that only the United 
States could shape an effective peace 
settlement, given the political and 
moral debility of the contending bellig- 
erent coalitions. The fundamental rea- 
son he decided on the intervention of 
1917 was to insure that the United 
States would play a decisive part in the 
outcome of the war. Only by this 
course could he hope to dominate the 
postwar peace conference. 

The President's plan for the 
future, outlined in the 14 points of 
January 1918 and augmented by later 
pronouncements prior to the end of the 
war in November 1918, envisioned 
restoration of a stable, equitable, and 
enduring international balance 
through the workings of a beneficent 
arrangement to provide collective 
security — the League of Nations — 
based on a consensus of the great 
powers. Wilson's attempt to banish 
warfare forever culminated the con- 
version of the United States from 
isolation to engagement in a mere 

The many changes that accom- 
panied World War I posed great chal- 
lenges for the Department of State. As 
the executive agency charged with 
principal responsibility for the conduct 
of foreign relations, it was forced to 
assume duties undreamed of in earlier 
years. Even before the United States 
entered the war, the Department's 
workload spurted dramatically. Both 
the Diplomatic and Consular Services 
expanded their reporting functions to 
provide desperately needed informa- 
tion. They also augmented their sup- 
port activity abroad. American citi- 
zens made demands for help, and 



"None Is Swifter Than These" 

The earliest American diplomatic 
courier was Peter Parker, master of 
the brig Dispatch, who was commis- 
sioned by the Continental Congress on 
July 10, 1776, to deliver messages to 
J.H. and Samuel Delap in Bordeaux. 
The letters, relating to obtaining mili- 
tary supplies from France, were 
weighted so that they could be thrown 
overboard in the event of capture. 

The Department did not begin to 
hire couriers on a regular basis until 
World War I. Outgoing despatches 
would be entrusted to shipmasters, 
junior naval officers, or private citizens 
as necessary. "Bearers of despatches" 
were entitled to $6 per diem plus a 
travel allowance, payable by the De- 
partment upon completion of their 
mission. They also carried a special 
passport to certify their official char- 
acter. One of the first such special 
couriers was a Post Office employee 

named Nat Crane, who left Savannah 
for London on May 24, 1819. 

The Embassies in London and Paris 
became the first American diplomatic 
posts to hire full-time couriers in 
December 1914. At the end of the First 
World War, the American Commission 
to Negotiate Peace asked Major Amos 
J. Peaslee, who had organized a 
courier system for the Army, to per- 
form a similar service for the Depart- 
ment. The Diplomatic Courier Service 
began operations in Paris on Decem- 
ber 2, 1918, using military personnel. 
It was disbanded the next year when 
the Peace Commission concluded its 
activities, but 11 Marines and one 
civilian were then designated as 

The Courier Service was dis- 
banded again on July 30, 1933, as an 
economy measure. President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt ordered its reestablish- 

ment in 1934, while attending the 
London economic conference. The sys- 
tem was still based in Paris and had 
three regular couriers. By 1941 
established service had been instituted 
to China, Japan, and the Americas. 
A regular system of worldwide sched- 
ules came into being after World 
War II. 

The Diplomatic Courier Service 
reached its peak strength of 100 after 
World War II. There are presently 74 
couriers. Despite the hazards of wars, 
revolutions, shipwrecks, and plane 
crashes, only five couriers have lost 
their lives in the line of duty. No 
pouch or letter has ever been stolen 
from a diplomatic courier. The emblem 
of the Diplomatic Courier Service is a 
golden eagle in flight. Its motto, "none 
is swifter than these," is taken from 
Herodotus' description of Persian 

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919. At the close of World War I, the United 
States briefly abandoned isolation and attempted to establish not only a lasting peace but a 
new international order. (Libra) ol Congress photo) 

American missions located in bellig- 
erent countries often acted as care- 
takers for enemy interests in these 
countries. For example, the American 
Embassy in Berlin represented Brit- 
ish, Japanese, and Italian interests in 
Germany until the United States 
abandoned neutrality. 

The burgeoning responsibilities 
of the foreign services caused an in- 
crease in personnel and expenditures. 
Many temporary employees were as- 
signed to duties at home and overseas. 
Resignations and retirements were 
minimized to retain experienced offi- 
cers. Congress authorized a significant 
number of new permanent positions, 
including 27 in the Diplomatic Service, 
a jump from 70 to 97. The domestic 
payroll grew from 234 people in 1910 
to 708 in 1920. Expenditures jumped 
from $4.9 million in 1910 to $13.6 
million in 1920. 

For the first time since the ear- 
liest years of the nation, the American 
people gave sustained attention to 
foreign affairs. The Department ac- 
cordingly attracted considerable atten- 
tion and even praise, a welcome change 
from the general apathy or distrust 
that characterized the heyday of isola- \ 



A Man Behind the Throne 

For a time Edward M. House of Texas 
exercised much more influence on 
President Wood row Wilson's foreign 
policies than the Secretary of State, 
Robert Lansing of New York. He came 
to Wilson's attention during the cam- 
paign of 1912 and soon became the 
President's most intimate friend. A 
quiet, self-effacing man, but one of 
large ambition, House established close 
relations with important European 
leaders, particularly in Great Britain. 

The President sent him to Europe 
twice during the period of neutrality 
(1914-17) to explore the possibility 
of mediating the European conflict. 
House later served as a special execu- 
tive agent during the period of Ameri- 
can belligerency (1917-18) represent- 
ing the United States at an important 
inter-Allied conference held in Paris 
during November 1917 and at the 
prearmistiee negotiations in October- 
November 1918. During the war 
House also headed a group of experts 
known as the "Inquiry" who prepared 
information to be used by the Ameri- 
can delegation to the postwar peace 

President Wilson made House one 
of the American peace commissioners 
in 1919, and the Texan played a sig- 
nificant role in the negotiations that 
took place in Paris. Unfortunately for 
him. he betrayed a tendency to com- 
promise some of Wilson's positions, 
probably the reason for a rapid cooling 
of their friendship. When House re- 
turned from Europe he was no longer 
welcome at the White House. 

tion. The rise of the "new diplomacy" 
— a term used to describe statecraft 
responsive to the desires of popular 
majorities — brought international 
politics and its practitioners fully into 
the consciousness of people who had 
never before concerned themselves 
with foreign relations. 

And yet, despite its enlarged 
operational responsibilities and re- 
spectability, the Department of State 
lost much of its influence on the mak- 
ing of foreign policy. Almost all the 
significant decisions of the conflict — 
to pursue strict neutrality in 1914, to 
intervene on behalf of the Allies in 
1917, to champion the League of 
Nations in 1918, and to negotiate a 
peace treaty on American terms in 
1919 — emanated from the White 
House without decisive contributions 
from the Secretary of State and his 

Several factors helped displace 
the Department of State as the prin- 
cipal source of advice concerning the 
most crucial questions of war and 
peace. One important reason was that 
President Wilson and his several Sec- 
retaries of State did not establish 
close and confidential relations with 
each other, almost always a precondi- 
tion for influential leadership from 
the Department of State. Wilson re- 
lied primarily on others for advice, 
notably an intimate friend, Edward M. 
House of Texas. A less obvious but 
equally significant reason was that the 
Department was poorly organized to 
meet the requirements of wartime. It 
tended to act slowly, and it lacked ex- 
pertise in treating military issues. 
Moreover, the exigencies of the na- 
tional emergency dictated the partici- 
pation of many agencies in decisions 
about foreign relations — notably the 
War Department, the Navy Depart- 
ment, the Treasury, and temporary 
organizations such as the War Indus- 
tries Board — but the Department of 
State was not prepared to take a lead- 
ing role in coordinating this activity. 
Finally, modern communications 
rendered the President less dependent 
on the Department for information 
than in earlier periods. 

The experience of modern war- 
fare revealed that the Department of 
State would have to undergo major 
changes. In January 1920, Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing of New York 
put his finger squarely on the reason, 
writing to a sympathetic Congress- 
man, John Jacob Rogers of Massa- 
chusetts: "The machinery of govern- 
ment provided for dealing with our 
foreign relations is in need of complete 
repair and reorganization. As ade- 
quate as it may have been when the 
old order prevailed and the affairs of 
the world were free from the present 
perplexities it has ceased to be re- 
sponsive to present needs." Three 

Lucile Atcherson passed the examination for 
the diplomatic service in 1922 and became 
the first woman Foreign Service officer. 

(Photo taken in 1978) (Department of State photo) 

categories of reform were required 
to revivify the Department. The for- 
eign services must be fully profes- 
sionalized and democratized; the 
structure of the Department must be 
modernized to deal effectively with a 
whole new range of policy matters in 
a transformed environment; and rela- 
tions between the Department and 
other participants in the foreign policy 
process must be clarified and con- 
ducted in a new institutional context. 

Measurable improvement occurred 
in the first of these dimensions after 
the First World War, when Congress 
completed the prewar movement to- 
ward a fully professional and demo- 
cratic foreign service. Representative 
Rogers, who led the congressional 
campaign, stated his objective in 1923: 
"Let us strive for a foreign service 
which will be flexible and democratic ; 
which will attract and retain the best 
men we have ; which will offer reason- 
able pay, reasonable prospects for pro- 
motion, reasonable provision against 
want when old age comes to a faithful 
servant." Hugh Gibson, a respected 
diplomat interested in reform, sup- 
ported Rogers, arguing that improve- 
ments in the Diplomatic and Consular 

January 1981 



Services would attract the most quali- 
fied candidates so that "we can choose 
our men by the only good method — 
that is, by keen competition." He 
hoped for creation of "a real diplo- 
matic career, which is open to any 
American citizen who has the neces- 
sary qualifications." 

The Rogers Act, which became 
law on May 24, 1924, codified the re- 
form of the foreign services. It estab- 
lished a career organization based on 
competitive examination and merit 
promotion. To eliminate invidious 
distinctions between the Consular and 
Diplomatic Services, the two groups 
were amalgamated into a unified orga- 
nization whose members were made 
available for both types of activities. 
Henceforth, members of what was 
now called the "Foreign Service of the 
United States of America" would be 
commissioned in a given class with 
specified salaries rather than to over- 
seas missions or posts. Salaries would 
range from $3,000 for the lowest level, 
Class 9, to $9,000 for Class 1. Officers 
would be placed in positions for 3 
years with the presumption of regular 
rotation to other assignments. The 
Rogers Act granted regular home 
leave and set up a good retirement 
system. It also authorized representa- 
tional expenses, although these allow- 
ances were not granted until 1931. A 
special reinstatement provision per- 
mitted career officers who became 
chiefs of mission to remain in the 
Foreign Service after completing their 
tours of duty. Earlier they had been 
required to resign without assurance 
of a future Presidential appointment 
to other responsible duties, a sure way 
of discarding the most experienced and 
competent officers at the height of 
their abilities. 

Related actions helped support 
the fundamental objectives of the 
Rogers Act. In 1925 the Foreign Serv- 
ice School was founded to provide 
specialized training in languages and 
other necessary skills — recognition 
that modern complexities of function 
required educational updating at all 
stages of a career in the Foreign Serv- 
ice. In 1926 Congress passed the For- 
eign Service Buildings Act, an im- 
provement of the Lowden Act. It 
permitted purchase or construction 
of buildings overseas for the use of 
missions and consulates. This measure 
further lessened the need to possess 
independent means in order to ris< 
the high' <>f the Foreign 

Foreign Relations 
of the United States 

In 1861 Secretary of State William H. 
Seward decided to publish his im- 
portant diplomatic despatches. This 
decision established the policy of 
publishing the record of American 
diplomacy. The documentary publi- 
cation entitled Foreign Relations of 
the United States is the oldest and 
most extensive enterprise of its kind. 

The editors of the Foreign 
Relations series include in volumes 
"all documents needed to give a 
comprehensive record of the major 
foreign policy decisions within the 
range of the Department of State's 
responsibilities, together with ap- 
propriate materials concerning the 
facts which contributed to the formu- 
lation of policies." The editors are 
enjoined to honor "the principles of 
historical objectivity." They may not 
omit information "for the purpose of 
concealing or glossing over what might 
be regarded by some as a defect of 

In addition to annual volumes for 
every year except 1869, certain special 
sets have been prepared, covering 
important topics such as the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919 and the 
summit meetings of the Second World 
War. To date 283 volumes have been 
published. Volumes covering the 1950s 
are now beginning to appear. 

Certain defects of the Rogers Act 
became apparent after a few years, 
especially inequities in the promotion 
of people serving in consular assign- 
ments, and Congress moved to correct 
them in 1931. The Moses-Linthicum 
Act reorganized the Board of Foreign 
Service Personnel to insure impartial 
promotion practices. Other sections 
of the law improved salaries, author- 
ized paid annual leave and sick leave, 
set up an improved retirement system, 
and conferred career status on clerks 
in the Foreign Service. Unfortunately 
many of these gains proved transient. 
Economies in government that ac- 
companied the Great Depression led 

to suspension of promotion, a reduc- 
tion of 15$ in salaries, abolition of 
representational and living allowances, 
elimination of paid home leaves, and 
suspension of recruiting for 4 years. 
The result was a 10% reduction in the 
size of the service between July 1932 
and December 1934. 

The Department of State did not 
undergo a thorough structural reorga- 
nization after the First World War. 
In 1924 the Secretary, who had final 
responsibility for policy and adminis- 
tration, had relatively few senior of- 
ficials to help him. The Under Secre- 
tary provided support on policies of 
special import. Three Assistant Secre- 
taries helped with certain matters — 
the First Assistant Secretary with 
economic and financial questions, the 
Second Assistant Secretary with inter- 
national law and related questions, and 
the Third Assistant Secretary with 
administration. The Chief Clerk su- 
pervised the Department's clerks and 
looked after its property. The Director 
of the Consular Service served as 
budget officer for the Department as 
well as the principal consular official. 
The Solicitor handled legal business, 
and the Economic Adviser made 
recommendations concerning interna- 
tional trade and finance. Five geo- 
graphic bureaus maintained communi- 
cations between Washington and 
missions abroad. Various other orga- 
nizations, such as the Division of 
Passport Control and the Bureau of 
Accounts, provided various types of 

From time to time modifications 
were made in the basic structure cre- 
ated in 1909. New divisions or bureaus 
were created on occasion to manage 
new functions or to improve estab- 
lished ones. For example, a Division 
of Publications was established in 
1921 to centralize work on informa- 
tional projects such as the documen- 
tary series Foreign Relations of the 
United States. In 1929 a Division of 
International Conferences and Pro- 
tocol was formed to cope with a con- 
siderable increase in the number of 
multilateral negotiations that oc- 
curred during the postwar decade and 
after. In 1938 a Division of Cultural 
Relations appeared that dealt with a 
new form of activity — cultural diplo- 
macy — and also a Division of Inter- 
national Communications that pro- 
vided modern telecommunications. 


Department of State Bulletii 


In the absence of an overall re- 
rganization, those changes, however 

ielpful in themselves, did not make 
ufficient impact. The failure to mod- 
rnize the Department of State re- 
lected the general decline in the 
lat ion's commitment to an energetic 
oreign policy after the Senate re- 
uidiated the Treaty of Versailles, 
resident Wilson was the first Ameri- 
an leader to develop an international 
■ion that cast the United States in 
he role of global leader, but the nation 
vas not yet prepared to accept perma- 
lent international responsibilities 
omensurate with its power. Charles 
Dawes, who served as Ambassador 
eat Britain during the Adminis- 
ration of President Herbert Hoover 
1929-33 ^i, could say only half hu- 
norously that being: an ambassador 
ma hard on the feet and easy on the 

During; the 1920s Americans 
toutly resisted international com- 
nitments of a truly binding character, 
largely because of leadership from 
Secretary of State Charles Evans 
lughes. the Administration of Presi- 
lent Warren G. Harding sponsored 
he Washington Naval Disarmament 
Conference of 1921-22. and Secretary 
f State Frank Kellogg, who served 
'resident Calvin Coolidge, played a 
lading role in the creation of the 
aris Peace Pact ( 1928 1 , a multi- 
ateral instrument that outlawed of- 
ensive warfare. But these accomplish- 
nents did not alter the strongly iso- 
ationist cast of American foreign 
>olicy — a reversion that stemmed not 
nly from disillusionment after the 
: irst World War but from the absence 
f apparent challenges to national 
ecurity. Clear and present dangers 
naterialized after 1929 during the 
Jreat Depression. These massive eco- 
lomic shocks reinforced the country's 
solationist inclinations during the rise 
>f totalitarianism. 

The consequence of these develop- 
nents for the Department of State and 
he Foreign Service was a tendency to 
.ccept the relatively low priority at- 
ached to international affairs during 
he "long armistice" from 1919 to 
939. In the 1920s the Department of 
'ommerce rather than the Department 
<t State provided leadership in spon- 
oring expanded international trade 
nd investment. During the early 
■ears of President Franklin D. 
toosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, 
he Secretary of State. Cordell Hull 

Despite rejection of the Versailles TYeaty and the League of Nations, the United States 
hosted the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference in 1921-22. Representatives of nine 
nations reached agreements to limit naval construction and to respect each other's interests 
in the Far East. (Library of Congress photo] 

of Tennessee, strongly supported ef- 
forts to reduce barriers to interna- 
tional trade, but this enterprise was 
not by itself sufficient to combat the 
Depression or deter German aggres- 
sion in Europe and Japanese expan- 
sion in East Asia. 

The Department of State grew 
slowly during the interwar years. 
Between 1920 and 1930, the domestic 
work force increased from 708 to only 
714, the Foreign Service from 514 to 
633, and annual expenditures from 
$13.6 million to $14 million. The func- 
tions of the Foreign Service did not 
change materially. Its members de- 
voted themselves to representation, 
negotiation, reporting, protection of 
American citizens and their interests, 
trade promotion, and consular tasks. 
One historian has described the gen- 
erally backward state of the organiza- 
tion when Secretary Hull assumed 
control. "In 1933 the Department was 
small, placid, comfortably adjusted to 
the lethargic diplomacy of the pre- 
ceding decade, and suffused with 

Charles Evans Hughes served as Secretary 
of State from 1921 to 1925. His opening 
speech to the Washington conference on the 
limitation of armaments proposed naval 
restrictions that "sank" more ships in 15 
minutes "than all the admirals of the world 
have sunk in a cycle of centuries." He later 
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
(Department *»i State photo) 



Cartoonist Clifford K. Berryman views recognition of the Soviet Union. (Library of Congress photo) 

William C. Bullitt served as the first Ameri- 
can Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1933- 
36); he was also Ambassador to France 
(1936—40). (Department of State photo) 

habits of thought that reached back 
to a still earlier day." Overseas mis- 
sions were in a comparable state. 
"The Foreign Service — genteel, slow- 
moving, and complacent — also cher- 
ished its ties with the past." Although 
many highly qualified people served at 
home and abroad, their presence did 
not in itself insure effective institu- 
tional performance: "Individual com- 
petence is seldom proof against out- 
moded procedures and relaxed stand- 
ards of accomplishment." The United 
States still lacked an apparatus for 
the conduct of foreign relations ap- 
propriate to the modern era. 

The neglect of foreign relations 
that characterized the interwar years 
dissipated rapidly with the onset of 
the Second World War; the undeniable 
menace of Hitler's Germany and its 
partners, Italy and Japan, forced the 
U.S. Government to increasingly inter- 
ventionist policy, particularly given 
the Axis victories of 1939-41, when 
the nation again adopted neutrality. 
President Franklin Roosevelt took the 
initiative: He launched rearmament, 
authorized the sale of destroyers to 
Great Britain in return for leases on 
certain bases in the western Atlantic, 
and eventually provided wholesale 
economic assistance to the anti- 

\ perennial problem in American foreign policy. lUbrai photo] 


Department of State Bulletin 


Ruth Br>an Owen, daughter of William 
Jennings Bryan, was America's first woman 
Chief of Mission. She served as Minister to 
Denmark from 1933 to 1936. 

(Department of Stale phutoi 

German coalition of Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union by means of the 
Lend-Lease Act I 1941 ). Nevertheless, 
the United States did not enter the 
war until the Japanese air raid 
against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 

The American intervention of 
1941. like that of 1917, committed the 
United States to another period of 
intense international activity, an 
outcome that added greatly to the 
tasks of the Department of State. It 
accepted responsibility for evacuating 
Americans from combat zones, repre- 
senting the interests of belligerents 
in enemy countries, assisting prisoner- 
of-war exchanges, maintaining liaison 
with the International Red Cross, and 
dealing with refugees. 

During the war the most notable 
increase in business within the De- 
partment occurred in the economic 
field. Officials of the Department 
helped coordinate the activities of 
various wartime agencies set up to 
mobilize the nation for total war and 
to assist in the reconstruction of 
liberated territories. The Department 
also created a complex system to pro- 

vide efficient international communica- 
tions, a vital aspect of waging global 

To perform its tasks, the foreign 
policy community grew at an un- 
equalled rate. In 1940 the Department 
had 1,128 domestic employees, and it 
survived on total expenditures of 
$24 million, of which less than $3 
million was spent at home. By 1945 the 
staff had grown to 3,767 people, and 
the budget for all operations had risen 
to about $50 million. Recruiting for 
the career Foreign Service was sus- 
pended during the war, but a Foreign 
Service Auxiliary was created to pro- 
vide additional assistance. It sought 
experienced elders with necessary 
qualifications and young people with 
abilities comparable to those of 
successful prewar candidates for the 
Foreign Service. By January 1946, 
the Auxiliary included 976 people. 

To manage international tasks 
that would not be taken on by the 
Department, a number of wartime 
agencies came into existence. Among 
them were the Board of Economic 
Warfare, the Office of War Informa- 
tion, the Office of Strategic Services, 
the Lend-Lease Administration, and 
the Office of the Coordinator of Inter- 
American Affairs. 

And yet, as during the First 
World War, the President largely 
ignored the Secretary's advice on 
policy ; the Department of State con- 
fined itself mostly to day-to-day opera- 
tions. Secretary Hull proved influential 
only in one area — preparation of plans 
for postwar international organiza- 
tion. This situation stemmed from the 
Department's failure to organize for 
fully effective performance in war- 
time. Wartime decisions required 
coordination of political ends and 
military means, but the Department 
of State lacked the means — expertise 
and institutions — to exert dominant 
influence on the shaping of grand 
strategy. Like President Wilson before 
him, President Roosevelt turned to a 
coterie of trusted advisers, among 
them Harry Hopkins, Vice President 
Henry A. Wallace, General George C. 
Marshall, Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles, and Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. 
Although Secretary Hull was usually 
informed of important decisions, he 
rarely participated in the great war- 
time conferences at which the leaders 
of the grand alliance forged the 
victory of 1945. His inability to gain 
the President's full confidence kept 

Another Man 
Behind the Throne 

Harry Hopkins spent his earlier career 
as a social worker. He came to Wash- 
ington in 1933 as one of the New 
Dealers. His first assignment was to 
administer employment relief; he 
headed the Work Projects Administra- 
tion. In 1938 he became President 
Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce. 

As World War II approached, 
President Roosevelt turned increas- 
ingly to Hopkins for crucial assign- 
ments. He first served as the administra- 
tor of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 and 
then moved to the White House as 
a special assistant. In this capacity he 
was sent on secret missions to serve as 
the President's eyes and ears. In July 
1941 he went to Moscow to work out 
cooperation with Stalin after Germany 
attacked the Soviet Union. He attended 
all of the great wartime summit con- 
ferences such as Casablanca (1943) 
;md Yalta (1945) held to coordinate 
the strategy and policy of the "grand 
alliance" — the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union. Closely 
attuned to the needs and desires of 
the President, he also gained the con- 
fidence of Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin. 
His last public service, after the death 
of President Roosevelt, was to visit 
Moscow in a successful effort to obtain 
Russian cooperation in creating the 
United Nations. 

the Department from a reasonable 
part in many major decisions. It is 
not surprising that Secretary Hull 
should have commented bitterly to- 
ward the end of his service: "When 
I accepted this office, I knew that I 
would be misrepresented, lied about, 
let down, and that there would be 
humiliations that no man in private 
life could accept and keep his self- 
respect. But I made up my mind in 
advance that I would accept all these 
things and just do my job." 

In 1943 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 
of Virginia became Under Secretary 
of State and immediately began to 
plan a major reorganization of the 
Department of State, an enterprise 
that stemmed directly from wartime 

'l* : 




embarrassments. One journalist sum- 
marized the situation aptly: "Not- 
withstanding the personal prestige of 
the Secretary of State [Hull], the 
organization he heads has only to be 
mentioned in almost any circle, Amer- 
ican or foreign, to arouse either 
doubt, despair, or derision." Stettinius* 
reorganization marked the dividing 
line between the old Department of 
State and the present agency. He 
began the process of making adjust- 
ments to insure that the Department 
would participate effectively in shap- 
ing the nation's foreign relations 
during the difficult postwar era that 
lay ahead. 

Stettinius concentrated on certain 
key deficiencies of the Department, 
particularly unsound division of re- 
sponsibility for certain important 
functions, inadequate means of ob- 
taining and disseminating informa- 
tion, and ineffective long-range 
planning. On December 20, 1944, 
shortly after Stettinius succeeded 
Hull as Secretary of State, he issued 
Department Order 1301, which con- 
centrated similar functions in the 
same office and related offices under 
a senior official, either the Under Sec- 
retary or one of six Assistant 

To coordinate the work of the 
Department, insure follow-through, 
and conduct long-range planning, 
Order 1301 created several new orga- 
nizations. A Staff Committee consist- 
ing of the Secretary and his principal 
subordinates became the chief mana- 
gerial group. The task of making 
initial investigations of policy matters 
and controlling interoffice projects was 
given to a Coordinating Committee. 
A Joint Secretariat was charged with 
monitoring Department activity to 
insure efficient action on decisions. 
Finally a Policy Committee and a 
Committee on Postwar Problems were 
created to undertake long-range 

Secretary Stettinius also recog- 
nized the need to improve the manage- 
ment of functions that overlapped the 
jurisdictions of the traditional geo- 
graphic bureaus. New bureaus were 
set up to deal with trade relations, 
cultural diplomacy, and public infor- 
mation. Another important functional 
organization came into being in 
September 1945 — the Interim Re- 
search and Intelligence Service, the 
forerunner of the present-day Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research. These 

innovations minimized fragmentation 
of jurisdiction that so frequently im- 
mobilized the Department when quick 
decisions were required in a crisis. 

Certain other steps that continued 
the modernization of the Department 
were taken during the service of 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes 
of South Carolina, who succeeded 
Stettinius in July 1945, shortly after 
Harry S. Truman became President. 
The most important activity was to 
gather several temporary wartime 
organizations into the permanent 
structure of the Department, espe- 
cially those that dealt with interna- 
tional economic affairs. In August 
1946 the Department created an Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs. This 
official teamed with an existing Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic Affairs to 
supervise economic activities and to 
establish effective relations with 
certain international institutions such 
as the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development, the Inter- 
national Monetary Pund, and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization. 

To modernize personnel practices, 
Congress passed the Foreign Service 
Act of 1946, which became law on 
August 13, 1946. It was intended to 
"improve, strengthen, and expand the 
Foreign Service . . . and to consolidate 
and revise the laws relating to its 
administration." To improve the ad- 
ministration of the Foreign Service, 
the act of 1946 established a Director 
General and a Board of the Foreign 

Service, and to maintain the principle 
of competitive entrance it set up a 
Board of Examiners. It also provided 
for improvements in assignments 
policy, promotion procedures, allow- 
ances and benefits, home leave, and 
the retirement system. Recognizing 
the growing importance of expertise 
in certain critical areas, it created the 
Foreign Service Reserve for people 
needed in specialist categories such as 
lawyers, doctors, economists, and 
intelligence analysts. Finally the act 
converted the Foreign Service School 
into the modern Foreign Service 
Institute to offer advanced training 
for Foreign Service officers in subjects 
of particular importance to the 

The new Department of State 
emerged from World War II better 
prepared to play a leading role in the 
foreign policy process and fully aware 
that the tasks ahead loomed more 
difficult than any encountered in 
earlier years. In July 1945, Secretary 
Byrnes recognized the extent of the 
postwar challenge. "Today there is no 
doubt that the people of this war- 
ravaged Earth want to live in a free 
and peaceful world. The supreme task 
of statesmanship in the world over is 
to help them understand that they 
can have peace and freedom only if 
they tolerate and respect the rights 
of others to opinions, feelings, and 
way of life which they do not and 
cannot share." 

As President Harry S. Truman watches. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., signs 
the United Nations Charter in San Francisco on June 2f>, 1945. 


Department of State Bulletin 


The Age of Global Leadership, 

In April 1947 the Department of 
State occupied new quarters located 
in a section of Washington, D.C., 
known as Foggy Bottom. This move 
coincided with one of the most 
striking departures in the history of 
American foreign relations. The 
United States and the Soviet Union, 
allies during the Second World War, 
had emerged from that conflict as the 
sole world powers. By 1947 efforts to 
maintain cooperation had broken 
down. President Harry S. Truman, 
working closely with two Secretaries 
of State, George C. Marshall of 
Pennsylvania and Dean G. Acheson 
of Maryland, took decisive steps to 
preclude Soviet aggression against 
regions in which the United States 
had vital interests. 

A leading expert on Soviet affairs 
in the Department of State, George 
F. Kennan (soon to become head of 
the Policy Planning Staff), developed 
the intellectual basis for what became 
known as the policy of "containment." 
Kennan concluded that "the main 
element of any United States policy 
toward the Soviet Union must be 
that of a long-term patient but firm 
and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies." This concept 
inspired a series of successful ini- 
tiatives undertaken from 1947 to 
1950 in which the Department of 
State played a leading role. 

The first step was the "Truman 
Doctrine" of March 1947. Reacting 
to fear that Greece and Turkey might 
fall victim to subversion for lack of 
support from friendly nations, 
President Truman asked Congress to 
authorize $400 million in emergency 
assistance to the two nations. To 
justify this course he stated: "I 
believe we must assist free peoples 
to work out their destinies in their 
own way." The key to preventing 
overthrow of free nations was to 
attack the conditions of "misery and 
want" that nurtured totalitarianism. 

Very soon this general idea was 
applied to Western Europe. In June 
1947, Secretary Marshall proposed 
the extension of massive economic 
assistance to the devastated nations 
of Europe, saying that the policy 

Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
(1947-49) proposed the European recovery 
program, better known as the Marshall plan. 

(Department of State photo) 

of the United States was not directed 
"against any country or doctrine but 
against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
and chaos. Its purpose should be the 
revival of a working economy in 
the world so as to permit the 
existence of political and social con- 
ditions in which free institutions 
can exist." Congress later authorized 
the European Recovery Program, 
better known as the Marshall plan. 
An investment of about $13 billion 
in Europe during the next few years 
resulted in an extraordinarily rapid 
and durable reconstruction of 
Western Europe. 

It soon became apparent that 
there must be a political-military 
dimension to the policy of contain- 
ment. In June 1948, Senator Arthur 
H. Vandenberg of Michigan, a strong 
proponent of bipartisan foreign 
policy, sponsored a resolution in the 
Senate that set the nation's course. 
It called for "progressive develop- 
ment of regional and other collective 
arrangements for individual and 



collective self-defense in accordance 
with the purposes, principles, and 
provisions of the [United Nations] 
Charter." President Truman had 
already applied this concept to Latin 
America. The Rio pact, signed in 
September 1947, provided that "an 
armed attack by any State shall be 
considered as an attack against all 
the American States and, conse- 
quently, each one of the said Con- 
tracting Parties undertakes to assist 
in meeting the attack." Collective 
security was invoked once again in 
the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed in 
Washington in April 1949, it created 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation ( NATO) . The Rio pact and the 
NATO pact ended the policy of no 
entangling alliances. Economic assist- 
ance to endangered regions and 
collective defense agreements with 
likeminded nations became the prin- 
cipal means of insuring containment 
of the Soviet bloc. 

Dean Acheson was the architect of postwar 
collective security. While he was Secretary 
of State (194&-53), the United States negoti- 
ated the North Atlantic Treaty, signed 
treaties of peace and mutual defense with 
Japan, and committed its armed forces to 
the defense of South Korea. 

1- abian Ba< hrachj 

During the Presidency of Dwight 
D. Eisenhower (1953-61), the United 
States ratified a number of bilateral 
and multilateral treaties designed to 
extend the wall of containment around 
the Soviet Union and its allies. 
Among these arrangements were the 
Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) ; the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) ; and bilateral 
treaties with Japan, South Korea, the 
Republic of China, and the Philip- 
pine Republic. 

At times the United States was 
forced to counter unexpected probes 
along the dividing line between the 
free nations and their rivals. In 1948 
the United States and its European 
allies fended off a dangerous threat 
to the western zones of occupied 
Berlin. When the Soviet Union 
interdicted land access, the city 
received supplies by means of a 
massive airlift. Eventually the Rus- 
sians were forced to lift the blockade. 
When North Korea invaded South 
Korea in 1950, the United States 
sponsored a "police action" under the 
auspices of the United Nations to 
curb the aggressor. After a long 
struggle the United Nations Com- 
mand preserved the independence 
of South Korea. In 1954 the United 
States took a strong stand in favor 
of Taiwan when the Chinese People's 
Republic bombarded certain islands 
off the Chinese mainland. In 1955 
assistance began to flow to the new 
nation of South Vietnam, created 
after the withdrawal of France from 

The evolution of containment had 
remarkable effects on the agencies 
most concerned with American foreign 
relations. Soon after the Second 
World War, Congress created a new 
institutional structure to reach sound 
decisions relating to national security 
and to put those decisions into effect. 
The National Security Act of 1947 
recognized that the President must 
have the ability to control national 
security policy and that to achieve 
this object there must be "a single, 
top-ranking body to form and cor- 
relate national policy." The institution 
founded to perform this function was 
the National Security Council (NSC). 

The creation of the NSC did not 
displace the Secretary of State as 
the President's senior adviser on 
international questions; it simply 
insured that all concerned agencies 
would make cooperative contributions 
to the decisionmaking process in 
appropriate measure. The principal 
participants in the NSC, acting at 
the direction of the President, are 
the Vice President and representatives 
of the Department of State, the De- 
partment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and, on occasion, interde- 
partmental groups ranging in nature 
from small informal committees to 
large, highly organized councils. 
Proliferation of interagency organi- 
zations reflected the fact that few 
national-security issues could be dealt 
with by only one agency. 

The NSC structure for making 
national security decisions provided 
an institutional vehicle through which 
the Department of State could exert 
a continuing influence on the nation's 
"grand strategy," that is, the sys- 
tematic design for insuring national 
security that pulls together the basic 
means of exercising national power — 
political, economic, psychological, and 
military measures — something that 
the Department had found difficult to 
accomplish during the troubled years 
between 1914 and 1945. 

Nevertheless, the Department of 
State realizes its full potential in the 
new institutional context only if the 
Secretary of State gains the confi- 
dence of the President. The Depart- 
ment's signal contributions to the 
containment policy stemmed from 
close associations between President 
Truman and Secretaries Marshall and 
Acheson. Truman was always anxious 
to complete action on important ques- 
tions ; he wanted to make his de- 
cision as soon as he had a sound basis. 
Secretary Acheson, notes his biog- 
rapher, "could always provide an 
adequate basis, or its appearance, 
before any rival body. ... In the 
race with time, which was the key 
to influence over the President, 
Acheson was unbeatable." Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles estab- 
lished effective communication with 
President Eisenhower after 1953, 
thereby insuring that the Department 
of State continued to receive a hearing 
at the White House. 


Department of State Bulletin 





ohn Foster Dulles extended American al- 
iances to Southeast Asia and the Middle 
Cast. As Secretary of State (1953-59), he 
raveled half a million miles and visited 60 
■ountries. He coined such colorful de- 
criptions of his policies as "liberation," 
going to the brink," "agonizing reap- 
praisal," and "massive retaliation." 

Department of State photo) 

The revolution in American 
foreign policy that occurred after the 
Second World War greatly affected 
the position of the Secretary of State. 
Before 1941 domestic political con- 
siderations rather than the need for 
expertise in foreign affairs usually 
guided the President in his choice of 
the senior foreign policy adviser, but 
after 1945 most of the Secretaries 
were selected because they possessed 
broad experience and technical skills 
deemed essential to effective per- 
formance. Before 1941 Secretaries 
usually remained in Washington, 
depending on ambassadors or execu- 
tive agents to conduct negotiations 
overseas, but after 1945 Secretaries 
traveled extensively. Before 1941 
Secretaries did not usually concen- 
trate on the management of the 
Department of State, but after 1945 
they had to give large amounts of 
time to administration. The burdens 
of office have greatly increased, but 
there has been a significant com- 
pensation. Secretaries have gained in 
prestige, a consequence of the high 
priority accorded to foreign relations 
in recent years. 

Yew Department of State Building 

The present home of the Department 
r>f State is at 2200 C Street, North- 
west. On January 5, 1957, President 
Eisenhower joined with Secretary 
Dulles in laying the cornerstone. The 
President used the same trowel that 
was used by George Washington to lay 
the cornerstone of the U.S. Capitol in 
1793. A sealed metal box containing a 
selection of historic documents was 
deposited in the cornerstone. The 

building was completed in 1961. 

This structure covers four square 
blocks and has seven floors of office 
space. An eighth floor is used for 
official functions such as diplomatic 
dinners and receptions. These rooms 
are furnished largely with a growing 
collection of antiques and art treasures 
provided by the American people on 
loan or as gifts. 

Extensive international activity 
after the Second World War led to 
great changes in the Department of 
State. Members of the Foreign Serv- 
ice performed duties that went far 
beyond the traditional missions of 
political representation, negotiation, 
and reporting. Knowledge of varied 
scientific, economic, cultural, and 
social issues became essential. In 
1970 a Department publication, 
Diplomacy for the 70's, drew attention 
to this development. It noted that the 
agency now had to conduct "critically 
important programs for promoting 
our commercial exports, for con- 
cessional sales of agricultural com- 
modities, for narcotics control, for 
military and development aid, for the 
inspection and licensing of airline 
routes, for cooperation in the peaceful 
applications of atomic energy, for 
scientific and technological exchange, 
for coordinating international mone- 
tary policy, and for communicating 
directly with people of other countries 
through the media of press, radio, 
and television." 

To provide an adequate institu- 
tional framework for its varied 
responsibilities, many of which could 
not be accommodated in the existing 
geographic bureaus, the Department 
established many new functional 
organizations. As of 1980 there were 
14 such units, each headed by an 
Assistant Secretary of State or an 
official of comparable rank, as 
against five geographic bureaus. 
Functional bureaus created since the 
Second World War cover such diverse 
concerns as Intelligence and Research, 
Congressional Relations, Politico- 
Military Affairs, Oceans and Inter- 
national Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, and Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. 

Certain other functions earlier 
housed in the Department of State 
are now the responsibility of other 
organizations. The U.S. International 
Communication Agency (USICA) 
manages international informational 
activities and cultural relations. 
Foreign economic assistance is now 
in the hands of the Agency for 
Inteinational Development (AID). 
Another vital enterprise— arms con- 
trol negotiations — is the principal 
task of the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency (ACDA). 

January 1981 



To assist the Secretary of State 
the Department now has a large team 
of central managers. The Deputy 
Secretary of State serves when neces- 
sary as the Acting Secretary and, 
with the Counselor of the Department, 
is available for special assignments. 
Four Under Secretaries of State 
oversee important functional areas — 
political affairs; economic affairs; 
management; and security assistance, 
science, and technology. Special sup- 
port for the Secretary comes from 
the Executive Secretariat, a unit set 
up to control information flow and to 
follow up decisions, and from the 
Policy Planning Staff. 

Administrative problems also 
materialized overseas when many 
agencies of the U.S. Government 
entered the foreign field. This influx 
ultimately caused jurisdictional dis- 
putes, disorderly management, and 
widespread inefficiency. To restore 
order President Eisenhower issued a 
series of Executive orders that 
established the Ambassador as the 
supervisor for all operations within 
his country. The chief of mission 
became the leader of a "country team" 
that included representatives of all 
organizations with operational re- 
sponsibilities, for example, the De- 
partment of Defense, the U.S. 
Information Service (the precedessor 
agency of USICA) , the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Peace Corps. 
Further improvement occurred in 
1966 when President Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk arranged for "country directors" 
in the geographic bureaus, who sup- 
ported chiefs of mission ; they com- 
municated policy guidance and 
mobilized operational and adminis- 
trative support for the country 

The revolution in foreign policy 
produced much greater growth in 
the Department of State than in any 
previous period. A few statistics 
graphically illustrate this pattern. 
The domestic work force enlarged 
from 1,128 in 1940 to a postwar high 
of 8,609 in 1950. The total declined to 
6,983 in 1970, but rose to 8,433 in 
1980, still below the level of 1950. 
The Foreign Service expanded at a 
similar rate. From a mere 840 in 

1940 it jumped to a high of 7,710 
in 1950. The total number in all 
categories of the Foreign Service in 
1980 was 5,861. The budget of the 
Department also rose spectacularly, 
even if inflation is taken into account. 
In 1940 the total expenditure was 
$24 million but by 1950 it reached 
$350.9 million. After a decline to 
$246.6 million in 1960, expenditures 
climbed to $447.8 million in 1970 
and to $2,354,139,275.69 in 1980. 
Even so the Department of State has 
the lowest budget of all Cabinet 

After the accomplishments of 
the immediate postwar years, the 
Department of State suffered a 
crippling blow when it became the 
prime target of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy's search for subversives 
in the U.S. Government. In February 
1950, shortly after the Soviet Union 
acquired nuclear weapons and Mao 
Zedong seized power in China, the 
Wisconsin Senator launched his anti- 
Communist crusade with a speech in 
Wheeling, West Virginia. Depicting 
the international position of the 
United States in the most dire terms, 
he insisted: "How can we account 
for our present situation unless we 
believe that men high in the govern- 

ment are concerting to deliver us to 
disaster? This must be the product 
of a great conspiracy on a scale so 
immense as to dwarf any previous 
venture in the history of man." He 
announced that he had a list of 205 
subversives — "a list of names that 
were made known to the Secretary 
of State as being members of the 
Communist Party and who never- 
theless are still working and shaping 
policy in the State Department." 
Senator McCarthy never made public 
such a list. A number of the most 
experienced Foreign Service officers — 
notably the Department's corps of 
Far Eastern experts — were forced out 
of the Department or their reputations 
were otherwise seriously damaged. 
Senator McCarthy never proved any 
of his irresponsible allegations. 

McCarthy's allegations had a 
lasting effect on those who remained 
in the Department. John W. Ford, a 
security officer at the time, has since 
noted that "few people who lived 
through the McCarthy era in the 
Department of State can ever forget 
the fear, intimidation, and sense of 
outrage which permeated Foggy 
Bottom." In 1978 the Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs, David 
D. Newsom, said: "I can recall the 

Loy W. Henderson began his diplomatic career as Vice Consul in Dublin in 1922. His 39 years 
of service included assignments as Minister to Iraq (1943-45), Ambassador to India (1948-51) 
and to Iran (1951-54), and Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (1955). The 
Department's international conference room was dedicated to him in 1976. 

menl "i State photoj 


Department of State Bulletin 


nock of the taunts and suspicions 
fveled at the State Department and 
lose who served in it. It must be 
itisfying. but not full recompense, 
>r those who suffered in that period 
> have our nation now realize that 
ley were substantially right." 

The notion that the Department 
?rved the nation's enemies lingered 
n for many years. Senator Henry 
[. Jackson of Washington put his 
nger on one reason for the tendency 
) level unjustified criticism at the 
department. "We know that the State 
department has been a target for all 
f the problems of the cold war 
ecause it is called the State De- 
artment — it is the Foreign Office. It 
i a very popular target — and does not 
ave any constituents." The relative 
bsence of powerful and assertive 
.ipport from organized interest 
roups, especially in comparison with 
lost other major agencies, renders 
le Department of State vulnerable to 
•responsible charges, especially in 
eriods of international stress. It 
sually can be attacked without fear 
f serious retaliation. 

While the Department struggled 
ith McCarthyism, it also sought to 
lodernize its personnel practices, 
ostwar growth produced what one 

Diplomatic and 

Consular Posts 

















































historian described as "inertia, inflex- 
ibility, and loss of efficiency in the 
use of personnel." Stanton Griffis, a 
businessman who served as Ambas- 
sador to several countries, later 
satirized the confused situation. 
Overseas missions constituted "a 
fantastic network of men, women, and 
typewriters, who report [on] . . . 
political, economic, labor, and agri- 
cultural conditions." These reports 
then went to Washington, where they 
were immediately filed away. Then 
"the home team, having properly 
disposed of the information from the 
field, proceeds to write its own endless 
reports to go forward to the same 
ultimate fate in the embassies 
throughout the world." 

The personnel problems of the De- 
partment of State attracted the 
attention of a commission, headed by 
former President Hoover, created to 
investigate all aspects of government 
organization after World War II. 
In 1949 the commission called for 
reforms to eliminate one important 
source of difficulty — invidious distinc- 
tions between the Foreign Service and 
the civil servants who staffed the 
Department's headquarters in 

Several years later, in 1954, Secre- 
tary of State John Foster Dulles 
asked Henry M. Wriston, the 
President of Brown University, to 
undertake a study of the Department's 
personnel practices. Dulles drew 
attention to a number of concerns, 
among them poor morale because of 
managerial shortcomings, low intake 
into the Foreign Service, and inequi- 
ties that stemmed from differences in 
the treatment of different categories 
of employees. After examining these 
matters, President Wriston called for 
integration of many Civil Service 
employees into the Foreign Service. 
There followed several years of 
"Wristonization"; by the end of 
1957 the Foreign Service had more 
than doubled in size to 3,436 officers. 
By August 1959, 1,523 Foreign Service 
officers held positions in the Depart- 
ment, a device intended to improve 
communications between Washington 
and the missions overseas and to fulfill 
the legal requirement that Foreign 
Service officers spend a portion of 
their careers at home. 

Although the reforms of the 
early postwar years served the De- 
partment well, the march of events 
during the 1950s and especially the 

1960s posed new difficulties. The 
innovative concept of containment 
began to lose some of its utility as 
a rough balance of power was estab- 
lished in Europe and East Asia. As 
East-West tensions subsided some- 
what, new strains developed along a 
North-South axis. After the Second 
World War, which completed the 
destruction of the great European 
colonial powers, ancient peoples 
everywhere in Africa and Asia 
recaptured their sovereignty. A 
"revolution in rising expectations" 
throughout the Third World spawned 
new international issues that greatly 
complicated the task of statecraft. 

The need to make significant 
changes in the foreign policy of the 
United States became fully apparent 
during the war in South Vietnam. 
The modest intervention that began 
in 1955 after the departure of France 
from Indochina turned into a major 
enterprise during President Johnson's 
Administration (1963-69). In 1968, 
after 3 years of warfare that led to 
the introduction of over 500,000 
American troops into South Vietnam, 
President Johnson decided to dis- 
engage from a struggle that had lost 
popular support at home. 

The election of President Richard 
M. Nixon in 1968 led to important 
changes in direction. In February 
1970, acting on the advice of Henry A. 
Kissinger, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security 
Affairs, President Nixon presented 
a report to Congress entitled 
U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 
in which he described certain basic 
changes that had taken place in 
the world since 1945. The world, he 
believed, had largely recovered from 
the damage of the Second World War; 
many new nations had come into 
existence in Africa and Asia; the 
monolithic structure of international 
communism had been fractured 
because of developments in China and 
Eastern Europe; the United States no 
longer possessed a monopoly of 
nuclear weapons; and a significant 
moderation had occurred in inter- 
national ideological conflict. Given 
these developments, President Nixon 
continued, the United States in the 
future should rely more heavily on 
partnership with likeminded peoples; 
it should maintain sufficient military 



President Carter 
and Human Rights 

President Carter made human rights 
one of the cornerstones of his foreign 
policy. In his Inaugural Address, 
delivered on January 20, 1977, he set 
the tone for his later activity in this 

"To be true to ourselves, we must 
be true to others. We will not behave 
in foreign places so as to violate our 
rules and standards here at home, for 
we know that the trust which our 
nation earns is essential to our 

"The world itself is now domi- 
nated by a new spirit. Peoples more 
numerous and more politically aware 
are craving, and now demanding, their 
place in the sun — not just for the 
benefit of their own physical condition 
but for basic human rights. 

"The passion for freedom is on 
the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there 
can be no nobler nor more ambitious 
task for America to undertake on this 
day of a new beginning than to help 
shape a just and peaceful world that 
is truly humane." 

strength to support its foreign policy 
while at the same time seeking arms 
control and disarmament; and it 
should constantly manifest "willing- 
ness to negotiate," abandoning the 
postwar tendency to reject the likeli- 
hood of successful diplomatic contacts 
with Communist nations. 

President Nixon, acting on these 
principles, pursued two important 
enterprises that culminated in 1972. 
In February he visited Peking, setting 
in motion a long-term movement 
toward normalization of relations 
with the Chinese People's Republic. 
In .May he traveled to the Soviet 
Union and signed agreements that 
contained the results of the first 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
' SALT I I . New negotiations were 
begun to extend arms control and 
disarmament measures (SALT II). 
Those developments inaugurated a 
period of "detente" that accorded 
with a general tendency among the 
American people to favor a lowered 
profile in world affairs after the 
chastening experience in Vietnam 
that ended in 1975 with the last 
withdrawal of American personnel. 

Improvements in relations with 
the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peo- 
ple's Republic, signaling a possible end 
to the cold war, did not lead to general 
improvement in the international 
climate. The international economy 
experienced considerable instability, 
leading to a significant modification 
of the international financial system 
that had been set up at the end of 
World War II. A keystone of that 
system was a stable U.S. dollar, to 
which other nations pegged their 
currencies. The dollar eventually 
came under severe attack, especially 
after adverse developments in the 
international balance of payments. 
In 1971 the dollar was devalued, a 
decision that inaugurated a period of 
unstable currency exchange rates. 
Two years later the international 
economy suffered another blow when, 
after Israel and Egypt fought a 
fourth war, the Arab oil-producing 
nations instituted a boycott of oil 
shipments to important consumers, 
particularly in Europe and East Asia. 
Henry A. Kissinger, appointed Sec- 
retary of State in October 1973, 
became deeply involved in efforts to 
resolve the longstanding dispute 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 

After President Jimmy Carter 
took office in 1977, he and his Secre- 
taries of State, Cyrus R. Vance of 
New York and Edmund S. Muskie 
of Maine, continued the search for 
further arms control agreements with 
the Soviet Union and for restoration 
of political stability in the turbulent 
Middle East. President Carter's most 
distinctive modification of general 
foreign policy was his energetic pro- 
motion of international human rights. 

As the nation passed through the 
1970s the Department of State came 
to grips with certain new challenges 
as it made adjustments to the 
changing pattern of world politics. 
Among these challenges four deserve 
special mention. Continuing attempts 
have been made to achieve effective 
managerial and personnel arrange- 
ments. The Congress has asserted 
considerable influence in the foreign 
policy process, a significant departure 
from prior practice. Efforts have 
been undertaken to meet the require- 
ments of equal employment oppor- 
tunity. Finally, an outburst of inter- 
national terrorism has exposed the 
Foreign Service to great danger in 
many parts of the world. 

Growing concern about the effi- 
ciency of the Department of State 
during the late 1960s ultimately led 
to a major self-study conducted in 
1970. Thirteen task forces of Foreign 
Service and Department employees 
thoroughly investigated all activities 
and produced the report, Diplomacy 
for the 70's, that made many 
recommendations. The task forces 
traced the difficulties of the Depart- 
ment to "weakness in the area of 
management capability." The agency 
still lacked the modern managerial 
know-how required for efficient 
operations in the complex environment 
of the modern world. "Because of the 
diversity and complexity of our 
overseas activities, effective coordi- 
nation calls for a wide range of 
management skills and management 
tools. The traditional reliance of 
Foreign Service officers on experience 
and tradition is no longer good 
enough." What was required? "The 
diplomacy of the seventies calls for a 
new breed of diplomat-manager, just 
as able as the best of the old school, 
but equipped with up-to-date tech- 
niques and backed by a Department 
organized on modern management 

Members of the Foreign Service 
had been bombarded ever since the 
Second World War with call after call 
for change in their professional 
attitudes and activities. For example, 
Senator J. William Fulbright of 
Arkansas, the Chairman of the 
Senate's Committee on Foreign 
Relations, noted in 1964 that a 
contemporary Foreign Service officer 
"must not only know how to use the 
traditional tools of diplomacy, but . . . 
must also be expert in the new 
instruments of foreign policy such as 
economic aid and cultural exchanges." 
To maintain professional proficiency 
the modern diplomat must constantly 
acquire additional education. "If 
there is a continuous process of 
improvement in the people involved in 
implementing foreign policy, the 
procedures and techniques employed 
will be improved as a natural by- 

Diplomacy for the 70' s called for 
"a new spirit in the Department." 
One of the task forces insisted that 
the times required "a tremendous 
effort ... to shake off old habits, 
old ways of doing things, old ways of 
dealing with each other. What we 
are proposing is a change of outlook 


Department of State Bulletir 



and method." The report concluded: 
"The traditional mode of reflection 
and detachment cultivated by diplo- 
mats trained in the old school must 
be reinforced by a more dynamic and 
aggressive style if the Department 
is to play the role which the President 
expects of it." 

Not everyone welcomed such 
riews. One historian notes that some 
Foreign Service officers opposed 
radical change, considering them- 
selves "an embattled and misunder- 
stood elite who functioned as political 
reporters and policy planners." 
Rather than retooling for changing 
responsibilities, these officers some- 
times argued through their profes- 
sional organization, the American 
Foreign Service Association, that the 
Foreign Service should be given 
increased political responsibility by 
placing career officers in high-level 
positions at home and abroad. 

The conflict between those who 
defended the older model and those 
>vho wanted to modernize the Foreign 
Service found expression in a long- 
standing dispute over whether 
Foreign Service officers should be 
greneralists or specialists. Those 
jpposed to change argued that the 
diplomat should continue to rely 
primarily on general experience and 
intuition. Those interested in reform 
:laimed that the future belonged to 
specialists with advanced training. 
Henry Wriston called for balance. 
Specialized skills were essential in 
the modern era, but it seemed evident 
:hat specialists tended "to become so 
narrow as to lose perspective; then 
each specialism conceives of its own 
oailiwick as 'most vital.'" Wriston 
concluded that "no rule of thumb can 
establish the proper balance" between 
general and special skills. He believed 
that the best specialists would "broad- 
en rather than narrow their interests 
.vith experience and on becoming 
senior officers [would 1 prove to be 
?ood generalists." 

This outlook is reflected in the 
nost recent attempt to resolve the 
personnel problems of the Department 
-){ State — the Foreign Service Act 
if 1980. Its principal provisions 
represent a turn away from the 
effort to establish an integrated 
Foreign Service; henceforth em- 
ployees of the Department of State 
irho are not liable for overseas service, 
including specialists formerly placed 
in the Foreign Service Reserve, will 












































* < 

Exclusive of Contingencies." 

be members of the Civil Service. 
When the act is put into effect, it will 
produce a Foreign Service of 6,850 
people and a domestic work force of 
3,800 people, a total of approximately 
10,650 employees. The act seeks to 
encourage qualities in the Foreign 
Service that are essential to the 
modern practice of diplomacy. Under 
Secretary of State David D. Newsom 
summarized these qualities in 1978: 
"An understanding of our own nation; 
a balanced sensitivity to other societies 
and peoples ; a firm grasp of the sub- 
ject matter of international relations; 
and the skill to bring this knowledge 
together in advancing both the 
interests of our country and the 
establishment of working under- 
standings with others." 

The principle of executive 
predominance in the conduct of 
foreign relations was not seriously 
challenged until recent times, but the 
need to finance economic assistance 
and other important aspects of an 
active foreign policy has upgraded the 
role of Congress in the foreign policy 
process. Recognizing this develop- 
ment, the Department of State desig- 
nated an Assistant Secretary for Con- 
gressional Relations in 1949 to improve 

liaison with Capitol Hill. Bipartisan 
approaches to foreign affairs mini- 
mized executive-legislative tensions 
during the earlier postwar years, but 
burgeoning public opposition to the 
war in Vietnam during the 1960s 
caused Congress to question executive 
behavior and even to sponsor inter- 
national activities on its own. 

The most significant initiative 
of Congress has been in the field of 
international human rights. Seeking 
to stimulate more active support of 
oppressed people, Congress enacted 
a series of statutes during the 1970s 
that placed legislative constraints on 
various types of economic and military 
assistance to governments that 
consistently violated internationally 
accepted human rights. Differences 
of view between the legislative and 
executive branches narrowed when 
President Jimmy Carter expressed 
strong support for an active human 
rights policy. 

In other respects, however, 
President Carter encountered con- 
gressional resistance. The Senate 
manifested considerable reluctance 
to accept a treaty providing for the 
return of the Panama Canal Zone to 
Panama before finally giving its 
consent. Even greater Senatorial 
doubts about the SALT II Treaty, 
reinforced by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, 
caused the President to postpone 
further consideration of the 

During the 1960s the activities of 
the civil rights movement in the 
United States led to the passage of 
legislation designed to insure equal 
employment opportunity in the 
Federal Government, and the Depart- 
ment of State undertook to meet its 
responsibilities in this respect. Much 
needed to be done. Although women 
and members of minorities had long 
formed part of the Department of 
State, they were seriously under- 
represented, particularly in the higher 

The Department of State first 
appointed women to full-time positions 
in 1874, but they were deemed unquali- 
fied for other than clerical duties. 
In 1905, for example, Assistant Secre- 
tary Frederick Van Dyne said: "The 
greatest obstacle to the employment of 
women as diplomatic agents is their 
well known inability to keep a secret." 
The first woman to achieve super- 
visory rank was Margaret Hanna, who 



entered the Department as a clerk in 
1895 and became Chief of the Corre- 
spondence Bureau in 1918. A few other 
women rose to managerial positions 
during the 1920s, including Ruth 
Shipley, who assumed the leadership 
of the Passport Division in 1921. 
The first woman to enter the 
Foreign Service, Lucile Atcherson, 
was not appointed until 1922, after the 
First World War. The first entrant 
after the passage of the Rogers Act 
was Pattie H. Field in 1925. Con- 
tinuing doubts about the ability of 
women to endure the trials of duty 
overseas worked against acceptance 
of women in the Foreign Service. 
After Atcherson and Field were 
appointed, a senior diplomat suggested 
that "it would be a wise thing to 
refrain from taking any more women 
until we can form an idea of their 
usefulness from observation of those 
we have already taken in." To exclude 
women who scored high on written 
examinations, another official observed 
that examining boards might award 
failing grades on oral examinations. 

Eugenie M. Anderson was the first woman 
Ambassador (Denmark, 1949-53) and the 
first woman to sign a treaty on behalf of the 
United States, (Oepartn photo) 

The first women given political 
appointments to high-level diplomatic 
positions occurred during the 1930s. 
In 1933 President Roosevelt named 
Ruth Bryan Owen, the daughter of 
former Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan, as Minister to Den- 
mark, and in 1937 Florence Jaffray 
Harriman was appointed Minister to 
Norway. Career women did not attain 
ambassadorial rank until after the 
Second World War. The third woman 
to enter the Foreign Service, Frances 
E. Willis, was made Ambassador to 
Switzerland (1953-57). She later 
served in Norway and Ceylon. The first 
woman career diplomat to become an 
Assistant Secretary of State was 
Ambassador Carol C. Laise, who be- 
came head of the Bureau of Public 
Affairs in 1973. She later served as 
Director General of the Foreign 

Blacks were similarly under- 
represented in the work force of the 
Department. As in the case of women, 
blacks sometimes served in the lower 
ranks but rarely became supervisors. 
The first black appointed to the rank 
of Minister was Ebenezer D. Bassett, 
who went to Haiti in 1869. James 
Milton Turner was made Minister to 
Liberia in 1871. The best known black 
abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, 
became Minister to Haiti and Charge 
d'Affaires to Santo Domingo in 1889. 
It became common practice to assign 
blacks to these countries, but few 
were sent elsewhere. 

The first black to enter the For- 
eign Service was Clifford R. Wharton 
( 1925 ), and he was also the first 
career diplomat of his race to serve 
as chief of mission, becoming Minister 
to Romania in 1958 and Ambassador 
to Norway in 1961. Like the women 
who entered the Foreign Service 
during the 1920s, Wharton experienced 
discrimination. When he decided to 
take the competitive examination for 
the Foreign Service, he discovered 
that his prospective associates 
"couldn't care less ; they didn't want 
me in the Department of State." 
His early diplomatic career was spent 
mostly in posts traditionally reserved 
for blacks, especially Liberia. Wharton 
remembers having commented smil- 
ingly to a personnel officer after 
receiving an undesirable assignment 
in 1946: "You're not only discrimi- 
nating against us [with] in the 
Service, but you're exporting dis- 
crimination abroad. . . ." 

Frances E. Willis was the first woman For- 
eign Service officer to be appointed a U.S. 
Ambassador (Sw itzerland, 1953-57), the first 
to attain the rank of Career Minister, and 
the only one to be named Career Ambas- 
sador. She served as Ambassador to Norway 
(1957-61) and to Ceylon (1961-64). 

(Department of State photo) 

Clifton R. Wharton was a clerk in the Con- 
sular Commercial Office when he took the 
first Foreign Service examination (1925). He 
became Third Secretary at the U.S. Embassy 
in Liberia and later was Minister to 
Romania (1958) and Ambassador to Norway 
(1961). He was the first black Foreign Ser- 
vice officer and the first to serve as Chief of 
Mission to a European country. 
" pai mi ■ 


Department of State Bulletin, 


'arl T. Rowan, with his family, signs his 
ommission as Ambassador to Finland in 
J63. He also served as Deputy Assistant 
ecretary of State for Public Affairs ( 1961- 
St and Director of the U.S. Information 

Ljrencv (1964—65). (Department of Slate photo) 

Hispanics have served in the 
)epartment of State since 1820. when 
oseph M. Espada of New York be- 
ame a consular agent in Mexico, but 
ike women and blacks they have been 
mderrepresented up to the present, 
tamon Leon Sanchez of Florida was 
nade U.S. consul at Cartagena, Co- 
ombia, in 1840. An Hispanic, James 
I'iosca of California, and his son, 
fames Viosca, Jr., served successively 
is consuls at La Paz, Mexico, from 
[877 to 1906. 

The first Hispanic chief of mis- 
don was Romualdo Pacheco of Cali- 
'ornia, who became Minister to a 
rroup of Central American states in 
[890. No other Hispanic achieved 
•omparable rank until William E. 
Gonzales of California became 
Minister to Cuba in 1913 and to Peru 
n 1919. Twenty others have since 
served as chief of mission, four of 
.vhom were career Foreign Service 
officers. Horacio Rivero, Jr.. of Cali- 
fornia was the first Hispanic to be 
fiamed chief of mission to a European 
sountry — Spain in 1972. Mari-Luci 
Jaramillo was the first Hispanic 
woman to become chief of mission, 
oroing to Honduras as Ambassador 
in 1977. 

Patterns of prejudice and dis- 
crimination, prevalent elsewhere as 
well as in the Department of State, 
finally attracted extensive critical 
attention during the 1960s, and im- 
portant attempts have been made in 

recent years to insure equal oppor- 
tunity through the workings of 
energetic affirmative action programs. 
During the 1970s Secretaries of State 
William P. Rogers, Henry A. 
Kissinger, and Cyrus R. Vance all 
devoted considerable attention to 
this effort. 

One of Secretary Vance's earliest 
acts was to issue a statement to the 
Department in which he announced 
his intention to "exercise personal 
leadership in prohibiting discrimi- 
nation because of race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, age, or handi- 
cap . . . [and] in carrying out a con- 
tinuing affirmative action program 
designed to promote equal opportunity 
for all applicants and all employees." 

True to his pledge, Secretary 
Vance appointed an executive-level 
task force to spur affirmative action, 
but much remains to be accomplished 
before the Department achieves the 
goals established by recent Secre- 
taries. Presumably there should be a 
reasonable relationship between the 
incidence of racial and ethnic groups 
in the general population and their 
representation in the Department of 
State. A look at the profile of the 
Foreign Service reveals great dis- 
parities. Women constitute slightly 
more than half of the general popula- 
tion but only 10.2 % of the Foreign 
Service. About 12^ of the population 
is black, but blacks constitute only 
3.5' ^ of the Foreign Service. His- 

panics make up more than 5% of the 
population, but they are a minuscule 
1 .5 ' ; of the Foreign Service. 

No development of recent years 
has been more troubling than the rise 
of terrorism as a political weapon 
aimed at Americans representing their 
country abroad. Numerous attacks on 
American posts overseas and frequent 
kidnappings and killings of Americans 
have occurred in recent years, adding 
a tragically large number of names to 
the list of those who have given their 
lives in the line of duty. In August 
1968, Ambassador John Gordon Mein 
was assassinated in Guatemala, the 
first chief of mission to be murdered 
in the line of duty. Since then other 
Ambassadors have been killed in 
Sudan, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Afghani- 
stan. Kidnappings have occurred in 
places as widely separated as Zaire, 
Brazil, and Jordan. 

The most serious of all such 
episodes was the seizure of the Ameri- 
can Embassy in Tehran on Novem- 
ber 4, 1979, and the subsequent deten- 
tion of more than 50 hostages. This 
event brought home to the American 
people once again the extreme dangers 
that the Foreign Service must face in 
many assignments outside the country. 
The steadfast courage of the American 
hostages in Tehran and their families 
at home reflected the best traditions 
of the Department of State and the 
other agencies represented among the 

An aerial view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran prior to its seizure and occupation 
in November 1979. (Department of State ph 



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. . • 1911 



Diplomatic service is not normally con- 
sidered a hazardous profession. 
Nevertheless over 100 Americans have 
died or been killed while on active duty 
with the Foreign Service. Some fell 
victim to tropical disease, earthquakes, 
or volcanic eruptions; many others 
died a hero's death in the midst of 
war, while saving lives, or at the hands 
of assassins. 

To honor those who lost their 
lives "under heroic or tragic circum- 
stances," the American Foreign Serv- 
ice Association in 1033 dedicated a 
plaque. Among the names . . . 

William Palfrey, lost at sea, 1780 
Abraham Hanson, African fever, 

Liberia, 1866 
John F. Flint, drowned saving life, 

El Salvador, 1875 



, I 
v M VlfT 'MM l*M 





h ii w i r '"■ i 
" H H 
DON '■' ' 

Victor F. W. Stanwood, murdered, 
Madagascar, 1888 

Maddin Summers, exhaustion, 
Moscow, 1918 

Douglass MacKiernan, killed by gun- 
fire, Tibet, 1950 

Barbara A. Robbins, killed in bombing 
of Embassy, Vietnam, 1965 

That plaque, and a second one 
unveiled in 1973, are in the diplomatic 
lobby of the Department of State. In 
recent years, the names of those who 
have died of disease contracted at 
tropical posts have not been added. 
Yet the list continues to grow . . . 

Ambassador John Gordon Mein, assas- 
sinated. Guatemala, 1968 

John Paul Vann, killed in a helicopter 
in a night battle, Vietnam, 1972 

Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and 
George Curtis Mooi-e, murdered 
while held hostage, Sudan, 1973 

John S. Patterson, murdered while 
held by kidnappers, Mexico, 1974 

Ambassador Rodger P. Davies, killed 
by sniper fire during mob attack on 
Embassy, Cyprus, 1974 

Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr., 
and Counselor Robert O. Waring, 
murdered en route to an appoint- 
ment with the President-elect, 
Lebanon, 1976 

Ambassador Adolph Dubs, killed while 
being held hostage, Afghanistan, 

CWO Bryan L. Ellis (U.S. Army) and 
Cpl. Stephen J. Crowley (USMC), 
killed during an attempted mob 
takeover of the Embassy, Pakistan, 



secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance joins members of the Iran Working Group in the 
Department's Operations Center following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. 

Depar;: photo) 

L'harge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen (right) 
>re>ents a \alor award for "outstanding per- 
r ormance and bravery ... in support of U.S. 
nterests and citizens, December 197H to 
February 1979" to Foreign Service officer 
Michael Metrinko in July 1979 in Tehran. 
Hoth Laingen and Metrinko are among the 
»2 Americans held hostage in Iran as of pub- 
ication date. Department fStati 

After two centuries the Depart- 
ment of State — its offices and its people 
— comprises one of the world's nerve 
centers of human affairs. During 
the earliest days of the Republic, it 
made indispensable contributions to 
the preservation of our independence. 
Throughout the 19th century, as the 
United States changed gradually into 
a great power, the Department loyally 
supported the foreign policies associ- 
ated with isolation, neutrality, and 
expansion. Across the 20th century, as 
Americans came to accept the respon- 
sibilities of leadership, the Depart- 
ment, like the nation it serves, has 
experienced remarkable growth in 
size, influence, and function. 

Every era has its agenda of chal- 
lenge, danger, and opportunity. 
Entering its third century, the Depart- 
ment of State must struggle with the 
problems of nuclear weapons, popula- 
tion explosion, depletion of natural 
resources, and the seemingly unman- 
ageable acceleration of technological, 
social, and political change. 

For two centuries the men and 
women of the Department have chosen 
this form of public service because 
they are deeply committed to the 
search for solutions to the problems 
of tomorrow. Throughout the world 
they daily face the threat of disease, 

terrorism, war, kidnapping, and death. 
Along with these hazards come the 
normal demands of day-to-day 
problemsolving, decisionmaking, and 
coping with life at home or abroad. 
All things considered the people of 
the United States have been 
well served. 

David F. Trask was born in Erie, 
Pennsylvania, in 1929. He received a B.A. 
degree from Wesley an University (1951) 
and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Har- 
vard in 1952 and 1958. He served in the 
U.S. Army (1952-54) and from 1955 to 
1966 was an instructor or assistant pro- 
fessor at Boston University, Wesleyan 
University, and the University of 
Nebraska. Dr. Trask was professor of 
history at the State University of New 
York from 1966 until May 1976, when he 
became Historian of the Department of 

Dr. Trask is a member of the Ameri- 
can Historical Association, the Organiza- 
tion of American Historians, the Society 
for Historians of American Foreign Rela- 
tions, the National Council on Public His- 
tory, and Phi Beta Kappa. He is also the 
Department of State's representative on 
the National Historical Publications and 
Records Commission. 

His major publications are The 
United States in the Supreme War 
Council: American War Aims and Inter- 
Allied Strategy, 1917-1918 (1961), Gen- 
eral Tasker Howard Bliss and the "Ses- 
sions of the World," 1919 (1966), Victory 
Without Peace: American Foreign Rela- 
tions in the 20th Century (1968), World 
War I at Home (1970), Captains and 
Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Rela- 
tions, 1917-1918 (1972). He is the co- 
author of The Ordeal of World Power 
(1975) and the coeditor of A Bibliog- 
raphy of United States-Latin American 
Relations Since 1810 (1970). 



























































































>tic personnel includes both Ci 

vil Service and Foreign 


NOTES: Domes 

Overseas personnel includes Foreign Service only. 

Note on Authorities 

This history depends heavily on certain 
authorities who have written about 
the U.S. Department of State. The two 
best histories of the Department are 
Gaillard Hunt, The Department of 
State of the United States: Its History 
and Functions (New Haven, 1914), 
and Graham H. Stuart, The Depart- 
ment of State: A History of Its 
Organization, Procedure and Personnel 
(New York, 1949) . The two best 
works on the Foreign Service are 
William Barnes and John Heath 
Morgan, The Foreign Service of the 
United States: Origins, Development, 
and Functions (Washington, 1961 ) , 
and Warren F. Uchman, Professional 
Diplomacy in the United States 
1779-1939: A Study in Administrative 
History (Chicago, 1961). 

For information about the Secre- 
taries of State consult the multi- 
volume series edited by Samuel Flagg 
Bemis and Robert F. Ferrell, 
The American Secretaries of State 
and Their Diplomacy (New York, 
1927- ) ; Norman A. Graebner, ed., 
An Uncertain Tradition: American 
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth 
Century (New York, 1961) ; Alex- 
ander DeConde, The American Secre- 
tary of State: An Interpretation 
(New York, 1962) . For a useful 
reference work see John E. Findling, 
Dictionary of American Diplomatic 
History (Westport, 1980). For ex- 
amples of recent specialized scholar- 
ship see Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., 
"Bureaucracy and Professionalism in 
the Development of American Career 
Diplomacy," in John Braeman et al., 
Twentieth-Century American Foreign 
Policy (Columbus, 1971) ; Richard H. 
Werking, The Master Architects: 
Building the United States Foreign 
Service 1890-1913 (Lexington, 1977) ; 
Rachel West, The Department of State 
on the Eve of the First World War 
(Athens, 1978) ; Robert D. Schul- 
zinger, The Making of the Diplomatic 
Mind: The Training, Outlook, and 
Style of United States Foreign Service 
Officers, 1908-1931 (Middletown, 

Other references published by the 
Department of State are The Secre- 
taries of State: Portraits and Bio- 
graphical Sketches, Homes of the 
Department of State, 1774-1976, and 
United States Chiefs of Mission, 
1778-1973 and its supplement for 
1973-74. ■ 



jcretaries for 
>reign Affairs 

Robert R. Livingston 

John Jay 

f State 

)TE : Daniel Webster and James 
llespie Blaine were each appointed to 
o nonconsecutive terms as Secretary of 
Bte. Therefore, they are counted twice 
this list. 

1. Thomas Jefferson 

2. Edmund Randolph 

Timothy Pickering 


John Marshall 

5. James Madison 



Robert Smith 

James Monroe 

John Quincy Adams 

Henry Clay 

Martin Van Buren 

Edward Livingston 

i ) McLane 

John Forsyth 

Daniel Webster 



Abel Parker Upshur 

16. John Caldwell Calhoun 

17. James Buchanan 

John Middleton Clayton 


Daniel Webster 

20. Edward Everett 

21. William Learned Marcy 


Lewis Cass 

2.3. Jeremiah Sullivan Black 



24. William Henry Seward 

25. Elihu Benjamin Washburne 

26. Hamilton Fish 

27. William Maxwell Evarts 

James Gillespie Blaine 

29. Frederick Theodore 

Frelinghuysen 1881-85 

30. Thomas Francis Bayard 

31. James Gillespie Blaine 

32. John Watson Foster 


Department of State Bulletin 


Walter Quintin Gresham 

36. William Rufus Day 

39. Robert Bacon 

January 1981 

Richard Olney 

John Hay 


John Sherman 

Elihu Root 

40. Philander Chase Knox 

41. William Jennings Bryan 



42. Robert Lansing 

43. Bainbridge Colby 

44. Charles Evans Hughes 

45. Frank Billings Kellogg 

46. Henry Lewis Stimson 

47. Cordell Hull 

jh Edward Reilly Stettinius, Jr. 
L944 46 

49. James Francis Byrnes 

50. George Catlett Marshall 



51. Dean Gooderham Acheson 

52. John Foster Dulles 

53. Christian Archibald Herter 

14. Dean Rusk 

55. William Pierce Rogers 

56. Henry Alfred Kissinger 

Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr., was 
designated Secretary of State on 
December 16, 1980, by President- 
elect Reagan. 

57. Cyrus Roberts Vance 

January 1981 

58. Edmund Sixtus Muskie 


Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr. 



now from postwar history that such 
negations have sometimes preceded 

military intervention. 

The United States continues to 
elieve that the Polish people and au- 
horities should be free to work out 
heir internal difficulties without out- 
ide interference. The United States, 
b well as some Western governments, 
nd also the Soviet Union, have 
Hedged economic assistance to Poland 
11 order to alleviate internal Polish 
ithculties. The United States has no 
nterest in exploiting, in any fashion, 
he Polish difficulties for its political 

Foreign military intervention in 
bland would have the most negative 
onsequences for East-West relations 
n general and U.S.-Soviet relations in 
articular. The Charter of the United 
,'ations establishes the right of all 
tates. both large and small, to exist 
ree of foreign interference, regard- 

if ideology, alliances, or geo- 
raphic location. I want all countries 
i) know that the attitude and future 
olicies of the United States toward 
he Soviet Union would be directly and 
ery adversely affected by any Soviet 
se of force in Poland. 

Human Rights and International Law 

1 Text from White House press 
elease. ■ 

)KC. 7. 1980 2 

'reparations for possible Soviet 
ntervention in Poland appear to have 
een completed. It is our hope that no 
uch intervention will take place. The 
I.S. Government reiterates its state- 
lent of December 3 regarding the 
ery adverse consequences for U.S.- 
loviet relations of Soviet military 
ntervention in Poland. 

2 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
)ec. 15. ■ 

by Patricia M. Derian 

Statement based on an address 

pre pa ted far the National Association 
of Women Judges in Washington, D.C., 
on October ■>, 1980. Ms. Derian is 
Assistant Secretary for Unman Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. 

It is rare in government to find that 
one's work immerses one in ideas and 
concepts which, over time, can have a 
profound and lasting impact on the 
course of our country's future. But 
that has been my lot for the past 3V-> 
years as I and others have sought to 
integrate the international concern for 
human rights into our relations and 
policies with other nations. 

That effort — making human rights 
a central part of U.S. foreign policy — 
is perhaps the most innovative ap- 
proach that the United States has ever 
taken in this area. It is an attempt to 
express our commitment to the protec- 
tion and enhancement of human dig- 
nity throughout the world. It is a 
reflection of the values and traditions 
that have long been the hallmark of 
our country. With human rights as a 
major component of our foreign policy, 
the United States has made a sustained 
commitment to a world free from gov- 
ernmental violations of the integrity of 
the person ; a world free from want of 
food, shelter, health care, and educa- 
tion ; a world free to enjoy civil and 
political liberties. 

While the philosophical content of 
our human rights policy may seem 
largely ethical, ideological, or political, 
what is often poorly understood is the 
major role that law has played in 
establishing a framework in which 
human rights and human decency can 
be promoted and furthered. 

I have noted with some curiosity 
that, over the past few years, many 
people who should know better have 
been surprised to learn that there is an 
emerging, growing, and, indeed, vigor- 
ous body of international law of human 
rights. This lack of awareness may well 
be explained by the fact that there is 
no formal international judicial system 
in which human rights laws are regu- 
larly adjudicated. The lack of such a 

system has made difficult a general 
apprehension that international human 
rights law imposes substantial obliga- 
tions on all governments. 

Multilateral Treaties 

While human rights law has not had 
the advantage of such a judicial sys- 
tem, which would aid in the develop- 
ment of y cohesive and coherent body 
of law, a law of human rights has. 
nonetheless, developed. Broadly, it has 
emerged as a result of international 
treaties; international customary law 
and practice ; and domestic laws, regu- 
lations, and court decisions evidencing 
international custom or acceptance of 
general principles. 

Of these, among the most impor- 
tant are the U.N. Charter and numer- 
ous international treaties and other 
instruments developed in an effort to 
promote respect for human rights. 

The U.N. Charter is probably the 
first and certainly the most important 
treaty to recognize human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individual 
human beings as matters of legitimate 
concern to the entire world community. 
As set forth in Article 1 (3 ) of the 
charter, the purpose of the United Na- 
tions, among other things, is "to 
achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humani- 
tarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion." Article 55 
states that the United Nations shall 
promote "universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms for all without dis- 
tinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion," while under Article 56 "all 
Members pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action in co-opera- 
tion with the | United Nationsl for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55." 

Shortly after the founding of the 
United Nations, the idea of an inter- 
national bill of human rights was ad- 
vanced. The first step was taken on 
December 10, 1948, when the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted and pro- 
claimed the Universal Declaration of 


Human Rights 

Human Rights. The purpose of the 
declaration is to be "... a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and edu- 
cation to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms. . . ." 

While adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly, the declaration lacks the 
binding force of a treaty. It has, none- 
theless, proved to be a frequently in- 
voked explanation of the scope of the 
human rights and fundamental free- 
doms recognized by treaty — that is, by 
the U.N. Charter. It has also been con- 
tributing year by year to the develop- 
ment of a customary international law 
of human rights. 

After adopting the declaration, 
the United Nations drafted, adopted, 
and opened for signature two major 
international covenants on human 
rights — one covering civil and political 
rights with an optional protocol ; the 
other economic, social, and cultural 
rights. These three instruments com- 
plete the international bill of human 
rights begun with the Universal Dec- 
laration, providing legal as well as 
moral force to international human 
rights. All have now entered into force. 
The two covenants have been signed 
but not yet ratified by the United 
States, inasmuch as the Senate is still 
considering the President's recom- 
mendation to the Senate for its advice 
and consent. 

It has been one of my greatest 
personal frustrations that, despite the 
Carter Administration's commitment, 
the work of many nongovernmental 
organizations and legal societies, and 
my own efforts, the Senate has still not 
voted in favor of ratifying either of 
these extremely important instru- 
ments. They are cornerstones of the 
law of international human rights. Our 
failure to ratify these treaties, obvi- 
ously, makes it more difficult for us to 
argue persuasively for the need to 
adhere to universal standards of 
human rights. 

Because of their importance to 
human rights law, I would urge you to 
acquaint yourself with the two cove- 
nants and other pertinent human 
rights instruments. The State Depart- 
ment has prepared a compendium of 
selected human rights documents. Your 
efforts to support and seek the ap- 
proval of these two covenants would be 
a major contribution in advancing the 
law of human rights. 

The charter and the two covenants 
are by no means the only multilateral 
effort at promoting human rights. 
There are over 20 treaties now in place 
and they include, inter alia : the Con- 
vention on the Prevention and Punish- 
ment of the Crime of Genocide, the 
International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimi- 
nation, the Convention concerning the 
Abolition of Forced Labor, the Ameri- 
can Convention on Human Rights, the 
Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, the Covention on the Reduc- 
tion of Statelessness, and numerous 
treaties for the promotion and ad- 
vancement of women. Of these there 
are the Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women, the Convention on 
the Nationality of Married Women, 
and the recent Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi- 
nation Against Women, which the 
United States signed in Copenhagen 
this past summer. All of these conven- 
tions create binding legal obligations 
on the parties to them. Currently being 
drafted at the United Nations is a 
treaty to strengthen legal guarantees 
against, and procedures to eliminate 
torture, a practice already forbidden 
by customary international law. 

Regional Arrangements 

It is not only on the global level that 
efforts to promote human rights take 
place ; by and large, some of the most 
innovative attempts have occurred on 
regional levels. Indeed, it may well be 
that regional arrangements will most 
rapidly advance the commitment to 
human rights by all nations. 

Perhaps the most highly developed 
regional achievement is the European 
Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Free- 
doms. The European convention estab- 
lished a commission and a court for 

handling both state and individual 
complaints. The members of the Orga- 
nization of American States have 
promulgated the American Convention 
on Human Rights, which also includes 
both a commission and a court. Thus, 
for the first time in our history, a 
human rights court has been estab- 
lished in the Americas, headquartered 
in San Jose, Costa Rica. The League of 
Arab States has set up a Permanent 
Arab Commission on Human Rights. 
The Organization of African Unity is 
reviewing a draft on an African char- 
ter on human rights and the possibility 
of establishing a commission on human 
rights for Africa. Under the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975, Western Europe, the 
United States, Canada, and Eastern 
Europe — 35 nations — agreed upon a 
set of principles to reduce tension and 
political conflicts in Europe, including 
among them "respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms." With the 
exception of the Helsinki Final Act, 
which was made expressly nonbinding, 
each of these regional initiatives 
creates or contemplates creating legal 

In some instances individuals are 
able to assert their human rights in 
courts or other appropriate forums. 
For example, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights establish specific pro- 
cedures for the bringing of complaints 
by private individuals where the nation 
concerned has agreed to such a pro- 
cedure. So, too, does the racial dis- 
crimination convention and the Ameri- 
can Convention on Human Rights. 

Role of Domestic Courts 

Again internationally recognized 
human rights may be adjudicated by 
domestic courts in some jurisdictions. 
A case in point is the recent Pena case 
which was initially heard in the U.S.' 
Eastern District Court of New York. 
The case involved a tort claim brought 
by the father and sister of a teenage 
Paraguayan who was allegedly tor- 
tured to death in Asuncion by the de- 
fendant Pena-Irala, a Paraguayan 

Human Rights 

police officer who was found and served 
• \' a York. The suit was brought 
pursuant to a ITS'.* law. now codified as 
B8 U.S.C. section I860. Section L350 

allows an alien to sue in Federal Dis- 
trict Courts for a tort in violation of 
the law of nations or treaties of the 
United States. 

Thus a threshold question con- 
fronting the court was whether torture 
is a violation of the law of nations in 
the sense of section 1350. If not. the 
court would lack jurisdiction to hear 
the case. 

The district court considered 
itself bound, by views in earlier cases 
decided by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, to reject jurisdiction. Those 
views appeared to exclude from the 
reach of the law of nations wrongs in- 
dicted by a state on its own nationals. 

On appeal, the second circuit 
sought an opinion from the State De- 
partment. The State Department 
irafted, and the Department of Justice 
tiled, a brief showing that the inter- 
national law of human rights today 
may extend to a wrong by a state 
igainst its own citizens and that tor- 
ture is such a universally recognized 
Vrong. The court of appeals adopted 
this view and remanded the case to 
the district court. 

Some international treaties, such 
U the Genocide Convention, provide 
for the prosecution of individuals who 
lave allegedly violated the human 
rights of others. 

Frequently, the provisions of a 
particular human rights treaty are 
ncorporated into the domestic law of a 
itate in such a manner that it can be 
invoked directly by individuals. In 
some states, once a treaty is ratified, it 
automatically becomes a part of the 
lomestic law; in others, additional 
mplementing legislation is required. 
S'eedless to say. these are not merely 
icademic concerns. Domestic courts in 
:he United States are, at times, faced 
vith the question of whether a human 
■ights treaty is self-executing, thus 
permitting the benefits of the treaty to 
>e applied directly to a litigant. I 
should note that in transmitting four 
uiman rights treaties to the Senate in 
February 1978. President Carter rec- 
>mmended that the United States de- 
dare that they are not self-executing. 

During the early 1970s numerous 
suits were brought in domestic courts 
in an effort to "prevent the I'.s. Gov- 
ernment and other U.S. interests from 
aiding the forces of racial repression 
in southern Africa." While the suits 
did not succeed, they were of the ut- 
most importance in raising the con- 
sciousness of lawyers, judges, govern- 
ment officials, and the general public to 
the existence of human rights law and 
its potential application in domestic 

While there is, in my view, a 
clearly recognizable code of human 
rights law binding on states and ap- 
plicable to individuals, the major flaw 
i:i the development of human rights 
law is one of enforcement. The im- 
plementation of human rights law 
largely depends on the consent of 
nations. The competence of various 
international courts to render a judg- 
ment against a nation which has vio- 
lated its human rights obligations 
rests on that nation's consent to the 
c uirt's jurisdiction. However, even if 
that consent is forthcoming, an ad- 
verse judgment against a consenting 
nation may or may not be effectively 
enforced. Where a court may, as is the 
case of the International Court of Jus- 
tice, render advisory opinions, those 
opinions, while deserving great re- 
spect, are, by definition, not binding, 
unless by virtue of some special 

Currently, the implementation and 
enforcement of human rights law are 
largely dependent on voluntary compli- 
ance, moral pressures, and other forms 
of influence. Ideally, and perhaps with 
time, there will emerge a viable court 
system with the International Court of 
Justice as the final court of appeal. 
Already many of the regional arrange- 
ments for the promotion and protec- 
tion of human rights have established 
some form of juridical mechanism for 
lodging complaints. 

What I have sought to do here 
today is to show in a rather brief form 
that human rights is something more 
than a controversial, ideological, or 
political concept. Human rights is law 
and, as such, when a nation violates 
individual human rights, it is violating 
international law. The efforts of the 
U.S. Government to make human 
rights a central part of our foreign 
policy is, in effect, an effort to incor- 
porate within our foreign policy the 

international law which establishes 
standards of human decency and 
human dignity. In that human rights 
is something beyond an ethical, ideo- 
logical, or political concept and is also 
very much a legal concept. 

The question I am often asked is : 
"What is the future of the U.S. human 
rights policy under a different Admin- 
istration 7" I say that if human rights 
is international law, and I believe that 
it is, there can be no other course for 
the U.S. Government but to apply and 

enforce that law. 

What I have attempted to do here 
today is to provide a better under- 
standing of the role that the law plays 
in enhancing human rights. The con- 
cept of human rights is a concept of 
world order. It is a proposal for struc- 
turing the world so that every indi- 
vidual's human worth is realized, every 
individual's human dignity is pro- 
tected. The purpose of laws is to create 
a meaningful, rational, and just frame- 
work in which the pursuit of personal 
and societal enjoyment can take place. 
This thought has never been expressed 
better than in the preamble to the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The drafters of the declaration clearly 
understood the important role that law 
must play if the goal of respect for 
universal human rights is ever to be 
realized. They wrote: 

... it is essential, if man is not to 
lie compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resmt. to rebellion apainst tyranny 
and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of 
law. ■ 



U.S.-lsrael Oil Agreement 

In a ceremony at the White House. 
on October 17, 1980, President Carter 
and Israeli Minister Yitzhak Modai 
signed the Contingency Implementing 
Arrangements for the June 22, 1979, 
Memorandum of Agreement between 
Israel and the United States. 

Following are remarks made by 
the President and Minister Modai on 
tliat occasion, texts of the agreement 
and the June 22, 1979, Memorandum of 
Agreement, with annex, and a 
Department fact sheet. 


President Carter 

I'm very pleased to announce this 
morning the completion of our con- 
tingency arrangements for assuring 
Israel's oil-supply security. 

These arrangements further ful- 
fill a promise that I made last year in 
connection with Israel's withdrawal 
from the Gulf of Suez oil fields and its 
conclusion of the treaty of peace with 
Egypt. In making peace, Israel com- 
mitted itself to dependence solely on 
imported oil — a very bold and courage- 
ous and generous decision in this 
troubled time. At the time of Israel's 
withdrawal, in 1975, from a portion of 
the Egyptian Sinai, the United States 
gave assurance that Israel would count 
on our help and could depend on us if 
it could not attain oil during its own 

We renewed and extended this 
duration of the assurance in June of 
1979, so that the establishment of 
peace with Egypt would not lessen 
Israel's long-range energy security. 
Now we have spelled out the emergency 
conditions under which the 1979 oil- 
ply agreement may be activated. 
This contingency plan is a carefully 
defined understanding between friends, 
gned to insure that all relevant con- 
are taken into account. Both our 
nations hope this agreement will never 

e to be activated, tint if it should 
become necessary, the United States 
will be a steadfast and dependable 
friend of Israel. 

'I tn agreement is one aspect of 
• I hope will be a broad range of 

cooperation in strengthening Israel's 
energy security. We're exploring now 
how we might work together further 
on research and development and for 
new 7 energy technologies, especially 
shale oil extraction and the use of 
solar power for energy. 

Our cooperation in energy and in 
other fields is for the cause of peace. 
It is against no nation. It is for the 
people who yearn for a secure future. 
It is in this spirit that I congratulate 
the negotiators of the oil supply under- 
standings and invite now Secretary 
Muskie, representing the United States 
of America, and Minister Modai, rep- 
resenting the great nation of Israel, to 
proceed with the signing of the 
appropriate documents. 

[At this point, Secretary of State Ed- 
mund S. Muskie and Israeli Minister of 
Energy and Infrastructure Yitzhak 
Modai signed the "Contingency Imple- 
menting Arrangements for the Memoran- 
dum of Agreement of June 22, 1979 
Between Israel and the United States."] 

Minister Modai 

The peace agreement between Israel 
and Egypt is probably the most im- 
portant event, certainly in the Middle 
East, but probably also in the entire 
world in this generation. 

It came about due to the leader- 
ship of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion 
(Begin) 2 , President Sadat, and 
through the devoted efforts and active 
participation of yourself. 

The State of Israel, in order to 
achieve this peace agreement, has 
made very large sacrifices. A major 
sacrifice was the relinquishing of the 
Alma oil field, which we discovered 
and developed, and this, in addition to 
giving up the Abu Rudeis oil field as 
part of the interim agreement in 1975. 

Now you and the Congress under- 
stood the big risk taken by the State 
of Israel in giving up its opportunity 
for oil self-sufficiency and, therefore, 
an agreement that guarantees oil sup- 
ply to Israel was signed in June of 
1979. Now, that agreement did not 
contain the specifications of the condi- 
t ions in which that agreement could 
have been activated and, therefore, we 
felt — -we in Israel felt — that we need 
to have a better definition of which are 
the conditions in which your guaran- 
tee will come into effect. After tedious, 

long negotiations — over a year — we 
are finally signing, here today, the 
specifications under which that agree- 
ment will come into effect. 

That is certainly the completion 
of a promise, I may say, of an offer 
made by you when you were in Israel; 
I believe in February of 1979. 

Obviously, nobody can foresee 
future developments in the next 15 — 
now it's only 14 — years, but we are 
very happy to have a document which 
is so clear, so detailed, and which 
relates to such a vital and delicate 
issue. I would like to thank you, 
Mr. President, you Mr. Secretary, and 
your staffs for a job so very well done. 

President Carter 

I'd like to say to the press that follow- 
ing this ceremony, or perhaps already, 
the details of the agreement will be 
described. Has that been done yet? 
It will be done. So, your questions 
about the detailed agreement will be 
answered after this meeting. 

I would like to say, informally 
but sincerely, on behalf of the Ameri- 
can people, that we are very proud to 
have this agreement. The proposal was 
made voluntarily by me, on my own 
initiative, when I was in Jerusalem at 
the time when we were trying to bring 
to a conclusion the basic elements of 
the peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt. Israel has taken a courageous 
step in bringing peace to that entire 
area by voluntarily giving up control 
of and the use of these oil wells, some 
of which they, themselves, discovered 
and developed. 

We anticipate that Israel will con- 
tinue to receive their oil from present 
sources, but if those supplies should be 
interrupted or if exorbitant prices 
should be imposed upon Israel, above 
and beyond normal marketing prices 
as described in this detailed document, 
then the United States will meet this 
obligation to our friend, the Govern- 
ment of Israel. 

I consider this to be not only an 
investment in the security of Israel 
but also a very sound investment in 
the security of the United States of 
America. And it's a further demon- 
stration of our unfaltering commit- 
ment and steady progress toward the 


Middle East 

ttmprehensive peace in the .Middle 
Sast. which all of us so deeply desire, 
psed upon the security of Israel, in 
jvery sense and meaning of that word. 

Mr. Minister, thank you very 
nuch for your coming here to con- 
•lude this document. And I hope you'll 
ixtend my best wishes to Prime .Min- 
ster Begin and to all the officials of 
Israel who've made this progress 





OF JUNE 22, 1979 



I. This agreement is to specify the con- 
ditions for the activation of the June 22, 
1979. Memorandum of Agreement 
i MOA i between the United States and 
Israel on oil supply and the means by 
which the MOA would be implemented. 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the 
MOA. Israel may give notification to the 
United States Department of State 
(Bureau of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs). The notification is to 
include the information Israel deems 
necessary to substantiate its view that 
it is unable to secure its needs, or some 
part thereof, through normal procedures. 
Supporting documentation is to be pro- 
vided on request. Consultations between 
the United States and Israel would then 
take place as soon as possible, and in no 
event later than two weeks following 
notification, to confirm that Israel is 
unable to supply its requirements by 
normal procedures. Upon this confirma- 
tion, implementation would proceed, 
Israel's supply right and allocation right 
would be establisbed and the United 
States would make oil available to Israel 
as soon as practicable after notification. 
The United States will make every effort 
to ensure that this period is less than 
60 days. 

3. Absent a shortfall in the amount 
of oil physically available to Israel on the 
world market, the MOA could be acti- 
vated when Israel: 

(a) is paying for all its imported oil 
an average price higher than the average 
cost of the most expensive 20'v of crude 
oil imported into the United States; and 

(b) has to buy at least 60' v of its oil 
through short-term, indirect purchases. 

The time period for measurement of these 
factors would be the 90 days preceding 

•I. 1 f Israel were to lose one of its 
two existing main sources of long-term 
supply (or a replacement source pro- 
viding ■--' i or more of Israel's oil 
imports), notwithstanding Israel's 
reasonable efforts to retain said sources 
of supply, without immediately replac- 
ing it with an equivalent source, the 
MOA could be activated immediately. 
Israel's allocation right during activa- 
tion pursuant to this paragraph would be 
equal to 120 days of supply from the lost 
main source, following which the MOA 
would be deactivated unless the con- 
ditions of paragraph 3 have been met. 
The United States and Israel would seek 
to measure the factors for an activation 
under paragraph 3 without including oil 
which may be made available from the 
United States pursuant to this para- 
graph. If this paragraph is activated 
under section 1(b) of the MOA, Israel's 
allocation right would be adjusted in 
accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 

5. Israel's shortfall and supply right 
under section 1(a) of the MOA would be 
determined by comparing actual and ex- 
pected deliveries of oil secured through 
normal procedures with current normal 
co.ncstic requirements. The allocation 
right as determined pursuant to the above 
should include such oil as may be neces- 
sary to maintain its reserves at a level 

of six months of consumption. 

6. Under section 1 (b) , if the IEA 
General Trigger emergency procedures 
have not been activated, Israel would 
sustain from its consumption a reduction 
in its oil supplies up to a level of 1'A in 
accordance with applicable IEA Selective 
Trigger Rules. The United States would 
thereafter meet any shortfall in Israel's 
normal requirements. Should the IEA 
General Trigger emergency procedures 
be activated, the U.S. Government would 
make oil available for purchase by Israel 
in accordance with the IEA General Allo- 
cation formula. The formula requires: 

(a) demand restraint measures 
which reduce consumption by 795 or 10' '< 
depending on the loss of supplies in the 
IEA area; and 

( b) a proportional drawdown of 
stocks after imposition of the demand 
restraint measures. 

The United States will keep Israel 
informed of any changes in the IEA 
emergency measures and procedures 
relevant to the MOA and any interpre- 
tations thereof. 

7. Once the Geneial Trigger is acti- 
vated, demand restraint for Israel would 
be calculated using the same base period 
as that used by IEA countries. The 
Emergency Reserve Drawdown Obliga- 
tion (ERDO) for Israel would be calcu- 
lated using the IEA formula as if Israel 
has the same reserve obligation as a 

member nation. The IEA currently 
requires an emergency reserve commit- 
ment for each country equivalent to 90 
days of imports for domestic 

On this basis, an ERDO would be 
calculated for Israel and, in turn, a 
supply right derived. Israel's allocation 
right would be calculated by subtracting 
available supplies from its supply right. 
The allocation right would determine the 
amount of oil to be supplied to Israel 
under the MOA. The initial supply 
right would be calculated as of the date 
of notification under the MOA. 

8. After activation, United States 
and 'sraeli experts would meet every 
three months, or more often on request, 
to review Israel's oil supply situation 
and its attempts to obtain oil and to 
adjust Israel's allocation right accord- 
ingly. Israel's allocation right would be 
adjusted to the extent oil is available to 
Israel under normal procedures. Israel 
would continue to make its best efforts to 
secure oil independently in such manner 
as to reduce or eliminate its dependency 
on oil made available by the United 
States under the MOA. When Israel's 
allocation right is reduced or eliminated, 
the United States would take appropriate 
measures to adjust or end its arrange- 
ments for oil supply to Israel in an 
orderly fashion. 

9. Although the actual sequence and 
methods of supply would depend on the 
conditions existing at the time, the 
United States affirms that, in its current 
judgment, the following options are the 
most practical means of supplying oil to 
Israel pursuant to sections 1 (a) and 
1(b) of the MOA: 

(a) The United States would first 
try to use its good offices with other 
nations and with private companies to 
arrange for alternative foreign sources 
of supply for sales to Israel. Price and 
other terms would be worked out between 
the supplier and Israel. 

(b) If option A is not sufficient, the 
United States could attempt to buy oil on 
the world market for resale to Israel at 
cost. The United States would seek the 
most reasonably priced oil available. 

(c) If there is no other more suit- 
able alternative, the United States cur- 
rently foresees fulfilling its obligations 
under the MOA by making oil available 
to Israel through swaps or direct sale 
of domestically produced oil. 

10. In any of these arrangements the 
United States will, to the extent possible, 
take into account the types of crude oil 
most suitable to meet Israel's require- 
ment as well as commercial and logistic 
considerations. It is recognized that the 
API mix of the oil supplies could cause 
slight variations in the total amount of 
oil required. 

11. Under the terms of the MOA, 


Middle East 

the price paid for oil supplied by the 
United States shall be comparable to 
world market prices current at the time 
of transfer. Israel will, in any event, 
reimburse the United States for the costs 
incurred by the United States in provid- 
ing oil to Israel hereunder. 

If the United States provides 
domestic oil to Israel, the price charged 
would be acquisition cost or the replace- 
ment cost, whichever is higher. Replace- 
ment cost means the actual cost to the 
U.S. refiners of replacing oil sold to 
Israel; if this cannot be precisely 
determined, replacement cost will be con- 
sidered to be equivalent to the average 
cost (C.I.F.) to U.S. refiners of the most 
expensive 10 r /r of similar quality crude 
oil imported into the United States. 

12. The U.S. Government would 
make all necessary arrangements with 
appropriate U.S. agencies and relevant 
suppliers to implement fully the U.S. 
commitment to make oil available for 
purchase by Israel. 

13. The United States would keep 
Israel informed of the progress toward 
making oil available to Israel. The United 
States would inform Israel of the 
arrangements it has made as soon as 
possible with the objective of enabling 
Israel to have a ship or ships ready to 
load when and where the oil becomes 

14. Arrangements would be made 
for appropriate participation of United 
States flag carriers in the transportation 
of oil from the United States under para- 
graph 9(c) above. If Israel is unable 

to secure the necessary means to trans- 
port to Israel oil made available pursuant 
to the MOA, the United States Govern- 
ment would make every effort to help 
Israel secure the necessary means of 

15. In the event of war or damage to 
Israel's refining capacity or storage 
installations, to adjusu for variations of 
API gravity crude oil, or for other rea- 
sons, Israel may require refined petro- 
leum products. In that event, the United 
States and Israeli Governments would 
promptly consult as to the means by 
which Israel might acquire and transport 
such products. 

16. With regard to security arrange- 
ments, the United States and Israel will 
be prepared to take security precautions 
normal in such circumstances in their 
own ports for ships controlled by the 
other. It is assumed that Israel will work 
out security arrangements with third 
country officials to the extent that third 
country ports might be involved in the 

1 raeli supply line. 

17. Quarterly or more frequently 
upon United States request, Israel shall 
inform the United States of the quantity, 
quality, price and other relevant condi- 
tion:- of oil imports into Israel, Israel's 

U.S. Hostages in Iran 

NOV. 3, 1980 ' 

We have seen, during the past 12 
hours, several developments in the 
hostage issue. These should be viewed 
as initial steps in a process which will 
require time, patience, and diplomacy. 

Reports from Tehran state that 
the Ayatollah Khomeini has agreed 
with the militants that the hostages 
can be transferred to government 
control. We believe, as we have said 
previously, it is in our interest for the 
government to assume direct responsi- 
bility for the well-being and security 
of the hostages. 

We welcome reports that the 
Algerian Government will be involved. 
Deputy Secretary | Warren] 
Christopher has met with the Algerian 
ambassador and discussed their role 
in connection with the actions of the 
Iranian Parliament. 

Finally, the reports from Tehran 
that the Prime Minister's office has 
established a working group in con- 
nection with implementation of the 
Parliament's decision are also welcome. 

The President said yesterday that 
we cannot predict when the hostages 
will be home with us. We have affirmed 
that any decisions we make will be 
consistent with two fundamental 
objectives stated by the President — 
a solution must protect our national 
honor and vital interests and insure 
the safe return of the hostages. 

There has been progress ; how- 
ever, much remains to be done. We 
will continue to pursue our goals with 
patience, diligence, and determination. 
Americans are united in their desire 
to see their fellow citizens come home 
safely with honor and with pride in 
their nation. 

1 Copies made available to news 
correspondents by Department spokes- 
man John Trattner. ■ 

requirement for the preceding 3-month 
period and its forecast for imports and 
requirements for the next 0-month period. 
18. United States and Israeli experts 
will meet annually or more frequently at 
the request of either party to review 
Israel's oil situation in light of prevailing 
market conditions and to review and, if 

necessary, further develop or modify 
these contingency implementing arrange- 
ments by mutual agreement. 

19. These arrangements shall be sub- 
ject to and interpreted and applied in 
accordance with the MOA, including 
paragraph 4 thereof. 

20. These arrangements shall apply 
for an initial period of five years and 
shall continue to apply for additional 
periods of three years for the duration 
of the MOA, unless suspended by either 
party at the expiry of any period upon 
written notice at least 6 months prior 

Suspension of these arrangements 
'. "iall in no way affect the continued 
validity of the MOA. In the event of sus- 
pension, both parties will make every 
effort to reach renewed agreement on 
contingency implementing arrangements. 

DONE in duplicate, at Washington 
this seventeenth day of October, 1980. 


Yitzhak Modai 


Edmund S. Muskie 






JUNE 22, 1979 

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agree- 
ment between the Governments of the 
United States and Israel signed 
March 26, 1979, Israel and the United 
States have entered into the Oil Supply 
Arrangement set forth herein as 
follows : 

1. Israel will make its own inde- 
pendent arrangements for oil supply to 
meet its requirements through normal 
procedures. In the event Israel is unable 
to secure its needs in this way, the United 
States Government, upon notification of 
this fact by the Government of Israel 
will act as follows: 

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet 
all its normal domestic requirements is 
unavailable for purchase in circum- 
stances where no quantitative restric- 
tions exist on the ability of the United 
States to procure oil to meet its normal 
requirements, the United States Govern- 
ment will promptly make oil available for 
purchase by Israel to meet the shortfall 
in the aforementioned normal require- 
ments of Israel. Oil will be made avail- 
able to Israel as soon as practicable after 


Department of State Bulletin 

Middle East 

lotification; the United States will make 
■very effort to ensure this period is less 
ihan 60 days. 

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet 
ill of its normal requirements for 
lomestic consumption is unavailable for 
purchase in circumstances where quanti- 
tative restrictions through embargo or 
otherwise also prevent the United States 
from procuring oil to meet its normal 
requirements, the United States Govern- 
ment will promptly make oil available 
for purchase by Israel in accordance with 
the International Energy Agency con- 
servation and allocation formula as 
applied by the United States Government, 
in order to meet the shortfall in Israel's 

tial requirements. Oil will be made 
available to Israel as soon as practicable 
after notification; the United States 
will make every effort to ensure this 
period is less than 60 days. 

(c) If Israel is unable to secure the 
ssary means to transport to Israel oil 

make available pursuant to this Agree- 
ment, the United States Government will 
make every effort to help Israel secure 
the necessary means of transport. 

2. Prices paid by Israel for oil pro- 
vided by the United States hereunder 
shall be comparable to world market 
prices current at the time of transfer. 
Israel will, in any event, reimburse the 
United States for the costs incurred by 
the United States in providing- oil to 
Israel hereunder. 

3. Israeli and United States experts 
will meet annually or more frequently at 
the request of either party, to review 
Israel's continuing oil requirement and 
to develop and review any necessary con- 
tingency implementing arrangements. 

4. This Memorandum of Agreement 
is subject to applicable United States 
law. The United States administration 
may seek additional statutory authoriza- 
tion that may be necessary for full imple- 
mentation of this Memorandum of 

5. This Memorandum of Agreement 
shall enter into force on November 25, 
1979 and shall terminate on November 25, 
1994. The oil supply arrangement of 
September 1, 1975 between the Govern- 
ments of Israel and the United States 
shall be in force during the period from 
the date of this Memorandum of Agree- 
ment to November 25, 1994 and shall be 
performed and implemented in accord- 
ance with the provisions of this 
Memorandum of Agreement. 


In connection with the Memorandum of 
Agreement being entered into on this date 
between the Government of Israel and the 
Government of the United States, Israel 
and the United States understand that: 

Because of the unique security 

situation of Israel its oil reserves are 
and should be at the level equal to six 
months of Israel's oil consumption; and 
in this connection U.S. oil supplies 
should be at such levels that U.S. ability 
to meet its oil requirements will not be 
adversely affected. 


The Memorandum of Agreement 
( MOA ) on oil supply, concluded by the 
U.S. and Israel on June 22, 1979, was 
an integral part of the process result- 
ing in the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Peace between Egypt and Israel. As 
part of that treaty, Israel agreed to 
give back to Egypt oil fields in the 
Gulf of Suez. The MOA contains a 
commitment by the U.S. to make oil 
available for purchase by Israel if 
Israel could not find enough on its own, 
through normal procedures, to meet its 
domestic requirements. (This was 
very similar to an agreement con- 
cluded with Israel in 1975 when Israel 
returned oil fields to Egypt as part of 
a partial withdrawal from the Sinai. 
That agreement was folded into the 
1979 MOA.) 

Section three of the Memorandum 
of Agreement provided that the two 
nations should meet to develop con- 
tingency implementing arrangements. 
There have been five meetings over the 
course of the past year and an agree- 
ment outlining such arrangements has 
now been reached. These implementing 
arrangements are entirely subject to 
the parent MOA. 

The implementing arrangements 
provide for three ways in which the 
MOA could be activated: 

• The first occurs when Israel 
simply cannot obtain enough oil to 
meet its needs, no matter what price 
or terms it offers. In this case, the 
United States would provide Israel, 
directly or indirectly, a sufficient 
quantity of oil to make up the 

• A much more complex situation 
arises when Israel can physically 
obtain oil but only by paying an 
excessive average price and by buying 
under very insecure arrangements. In 
the case of oil, as with any commodity, 
if a country is willing to pay enough 

it may be able to find modest amounts 
even during times of severe world 
shortage. This fact was taken into 
account in the formula in paragraph 3 
whereby the MOA would be activated 

if Israel has to pay an average price 
for its nil greater than the average 

cost of the most expensive 20' ', of 
crude oil imported into the United 
States and has to buy at least f>0' ; 
of its oil through short-term, indirect 
purchases. This formula reflects the 
basic purpose of the 1979 MOA as an 
emergency supply commitment and, 
at the same time, recognizes the 
market reality that even though oil 
may be available, it cannot be obtained 
through normal procedures. 

o Paragraph 4 provides for a 
special emergency activation of the 
commitment when Israel loses one of 
its main sources of supply despite its 
efforts to maintain that source. If 
Israel cannot immediately replace it 
with an equivalent source, the United 
States would provide oil, directly or 
indirectly, to make up the shortfall 
for 120 days. If, after this period, 
Israel was suffering a physical short- 
fall or qualified under paragraph 3, 
the United States would continue to 
provide oil. 

If the MOA is activated, the 
United States would first try to find 
foreign oil for Israel. If that proves 
inadequate, the United States would 
provide domestic oil. There would be 
no subsidy involved. Israel would pay 
the higher of the acquisition cost or 
the cost to U.S. refiners of obtaining 
replacement oil. If the actual replace- 
ment cost could not be determined, 
an imputed replacement cost equal to 
the average of the most expensive 
10 r ' f of U.S. imports of similar quality 
would be charged. 

Whenever the United States pro- 
vides oil to Israel, Israel would have 
the obligation to continue to look for 
oil on the world market, and if it finds 
some, the U.S. obligation would be 
reduced accordingly. 

If the United States is suffering 
a shortfall and the MOA were acti- 
vated, Israel, under paragraphs 6 and 
7 of the implementing arrangements, 
would be treated as a hypothetical 
participant in the emergency oil- 
sharing system of the International 
Energy Agency ( IEA ) . It would have 
the same demand restraint and stock 
drawdown obligations as an IEA 
member. This means that Israel would 
receive at most 93$ of its normal 
requirements for domestic consump- 
tion and might receive less depending 
on the shortfall among IEA nations. 
Israel is not a member of the IEA 

January 1981 


Middle East 

and would not receive an oil allocation 
from the IE A. 

The implementing arrangements 
will apply for an initial period of 5 
years and additional periods of 3 
years for the duration of the MO A 
( 1994 unless extended ) . Either party 
could suspend the implementing 
arrangements at the expiry of any 
period. This would in no way affect, 
however, the continued validity of the 

Israel's oil consumption is cur- 
rently about 160,000 barrels per day, 
less than 1% of U.S. consumption. 
Since the initial U.S. oil-supply com- 
mitment was made in 1975, Israel has 
been able to obtain sufficient oil 
through its own efforts without re- 
course to the United States, even 
during periods of tight oil market 
conditions. Israel is currently meeting 
all its oil needs, and it is expected that 
it will continue to be able to do so, 
but under emergency circumstances, 
Israel could turn to the United States 
under the MOA and these implement- 
ing arrangements. 

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27, 1980. 

2 White House correction. 

:; Made available to news corre- 
spondents by Department spokesman 
John Trattner. ■ 

Iran Chronology, 
November 1980 

November 1 

In a newspaper editorial, hard-line 
Islamic Republican Party announces it 
favors release of the hostages before U.S. 
elections because during this period, the 
U.S. is "ready to Rive more concessions," 
and a new U.S. President "would see no 
reason to submit to the rights of our 
nation." The editorial goes on to warn, 
however, that if conditions are not met, 
the hostages would remain captive and 
could possibly be tried for espionage. 

November 2 

Hostages' 305th day of captivity. 

Iran's Parliament approves a report 
by the seven-member commission endors- 
ing the conditions laid down earlier by 
Khomeini for freeing the hostages. The 
commission's report also specifics that 
the U.S. would not only have to accept the 
conditions but also carry them out. 

November 3 

Military captors, with Khomeini's 
approval, turn jurisdiction of hostages 
over to the Iranian Government but not 
the hostages themselves. 

November 4 

In a message conveyed to the Carter 
Administration through the Algerian 
Embassy, the Iranian Government calls 
for a quick reply by the U.S. to its con- 
ditions. U.S. declines the request. 

Tens of thousands of Iranians 
demonstrate in Tehran streets cele- 
brating the 1-year anniversary of the 
takeover of the U.S. Embassy and 
capture of the hostages. 

November 5 

Militant captors state that the 
hostage crisis is prolonged because of 
Gov. Reagan's election, but there will be 
no change in the terms for freeing them. 
The government also states that the 
election would have no effect. 

Carter Administration officials 
suggest that the President will agree to 
conditions if Iranian authorities accept 
a "narrow interpretation" of the Iranian 
Parliament's "ambiguous demands." 

November 7 

Former Foreign Minister Ghotbza- 
deh is arrested and imprisoned for 
criticizing the Government's management 
of the broadcasting system. 

Hostages remain in Embassy; Iran 
Government makes no move to take 
custody despite earlier announcement. 

November 10 

Deputy Secretary Christopher and 
a small delegation depart Washing- 
ton, D.C., for Algiers carrying the U.S. 
response to the Iranian Parliament's 
terms on release of the hostages. While 
in Algiers, he meets with Algerian 
Foreign Affairs Minister Benyahia. The 
Algerian Government agrees to serve as 
intermediary for the U.S. response and 
agrees to transmit it to the Iranian 

After Ghotbzadeh spends 3 days in 
prison, Khomeini orders his release. 

November 11 

Deputy Secretai-y Christopher 
departs Algiers for Washington, D.C. 

November 13 

Iranian official committee studies 
U.S. reply to its terms but makes no 
public comment. 

November 16 

Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani states 
that the Parliament is "too busy" to 
discuss the hostage issue further. 

November 19 

Rafsanjani states that the U.S. has 
accepted "in principle" Iran's conditions 
but release of the hostages will be delayed 
until the demands are actually met. 

November 20 

U.S. confirms it has accepted, in 
principle, the four conditions Iran set 
"as a basis for resolution of the crisis." 

November 22 

Iran states it wants a "yes or no" 
answer from the U.S. on conditions set. 
Ahmad Azizi, public relations director of 
Prime Minister Rajai, reaffirms that Iran 
"cannot accept the responses with room 
for compromise or negotiations or 
anything like that." 

November 23 

Algerian delegation arrives in 
Algiers carrying the Iranian response 
on hostages. 

November 24 

Preoccupied with decisions on 
whether to attend the Arab League 
meeting in Amman, Algiers delays 
informing U.S. of Iran's latest stand. 

November 25 

Algerian intermediaries arrive in 
Washington, D.C, carrying Iran's re- 
action to U.S. proposals. Meanwhile, 
Iranians remain adamant on conditions 

November 26 

At the State Department, Deputy 
Secretary Christopher, along with some 
of the members of the delegation who 
accompanied him to Algiers, meets with 
the Algerian representatives to transmit 
and explain the Iranian position and the 
U.S. response for release of the hostages. 
While in Iran, the Algerian delegation 
was assured that the hostages are in 
good health. 

November 27 

Hostage discussions continue between 
Deputy Secretary Christopher and the 
Algerian delegation. 

Militant captors report that hostages 
have been handed over to the govern- 
ment, but a spokesman for the militants 
refuses to say when or how the transfer 
had taken place. 

November 28 

The report that the hostages have 
been handed over to the government is 
denied by another militant captor. An 
Iranian official states he cannot confirm 
the report that the hostages have been 

November 29 

Militants reassert that hostages have 
been handed over. ■ 


Department of SU 


International Narcotics Control 
in the 1980s 

by Mathea Falco 

Statement before the House Seleet 
C<>»i»/ittee on Narcotics on Septem- 
:. 1980. Ms. Faleo is Assistant 
tar \j for International Narcotics 
Matters. 1 

The Role of Crop Destruction 

The goal of the international narcotics 
control program since its inception 
has been, to the extent possible, to 
prevent illicit narcotics crops from 
entering the United States. The ideal 
circumstances would be to eliminate 
worldwide production of illicit sub- 
stances, and in the absence of such 
preventive measures, to secure the de- 
struction of substances grown for the 
illicit drug market. In our ongoing 
discussions with other countries, the 
goal of illicit crop destruction is 
always a factor. Most countries with 
whom the United States has narcotics- 
related bilateral programs have suc- 
cessfully destroying crops to some 
extent; notably Mexico, but also 
Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and Peru. 
The key questions for the Depart- 
ment of State this decade will remain 
how to convince more governments to 
undertake crop destruction and how 
to make such crop destruction more 
effective. Insofar as U.S. foreign policy 
with respect to marijuana is con- 
cerned, the key factor will be consist- 
ency between our foreign policy and 
our domestic policy. Foreign percep- 
tion of internal indecision on this 
question, as on any foreign policy 
issue, makes effective representation 
abroad more difficult. 

New Approaches to International 
Narcotics Control 

International Financial Investi- 
gations. While illicit crop destruction 
should remain a primary goal of our 
international narcotics policy, we must 
also try, in the 1980s, to improve inter- 
national cooperation in interdiction 
efforts and drug trafficker judicial 
proceedings. One promising area for 

improving our ability to detect and 
apprehend major drug traffickers is 
through narcotics related financial 
investigations. International coopera- 
tion on criminal money handling will 
not only facilitate the apprehension 
and prosecution of drug traffickers but 
could also lead to legal changes which 
would make criminal money handling 
harder. This would increase the costs 
and reduce the incentives to partici- 
pate in drug trafficking. 

As you know, taking advantage 
of existing financial techniques has 
become a major concern of the Depart- 
ment of Justice in domestic narcotics- 
related investigations. A priority for 
the Department of State during the 
1980s will be to expand international 
cooperation in applying innovative 
financial techniques to drug cases 
where the money involved crosses 
national borders. 

In doing so, there will be several 
issues underlying the international 
discussion. The first will be the ques- 
tion of access to foreign records, 
whether corporate, banking, or tax 
records. A second related issue for 
domestic and international discussion 
will be the question of privacy ; that is, 
access by foreign investigators to 
U.S. held records. A third area will be 
increased cooperation in criminal pro- 
ceedings, both on the question of 
informant testimony and in the trans- 
mission of evidence between countries. 

Potential points of focus for dis- 
cussion and cooperation in this area 
are numerous. 

First, there are bilateral mutual 
assistance treaties, such as those we 
have negotiated with the Government 
of Colombia and other countries. 

Second, we can work toward the 
establishment of international guide- 
lines or agreements, such as those 
contemplated in the resolution on 
financial transactions that the United 
States proposed in the Commission 
on Narcotics Drugs this year. 

There are numerous other oppor- 
tunities for constructive international 
dialogue on improved investigative 
and judicial cooperation in multi- 
lateral fora. 

Poppies in Thailand — a source 

of heroin and other narcotic drugs. 

Development Assistance. Devel- 
opment assistance will continue to be 
a critical dimension to international 
narcotics control in the 1980s. Increas- 
ingly, it is evident that a foreign 
government's ability to undertake 
effective crop destruction programs is 
related to the availability of realistic 
economic alternatives to growers. 
This is especially the case where illicit 
narcotics production makes a sub- 
stantial contribution to the national 
economy or where narcotics produc- 
tion is a primary means of support for 
geographically separated ethnic 

Assisted by the legislative efforts 
of the members of this committee, we 
have made significant progress in 
focusing U.S. development assistance 
in ill.^it narcotics growing regions. 
In the future, multilateral lending 
institutions as well as our own bilateral 
development agencies must begin to 
consider the deleterious effects of 
illicit narcotics production. Lending 
policies must take into account that the 
problem is not only for consuming 
countries but also for the developing, 
producer countries. Public health and 
sound economic development are both 

January 1981 



disrupted in illicit producer countries. 
Not only is there often a domestic 
drug abuse problem, but illicit nar- 
cotics production may interfere with 
critical food production, as well as 
siphoning away resources from the 
legitimate economy. The United States 
must continue to articulate these 
problems in the international financial 
community and insist to the greatest 
extent possible that they be taken into 
consideration in lending policies and 
development projects. 

Methaqualone and Other 
Abused Drugs 

While most abused drugs in pill form 
are produced in the United States, 
international traffic in methaqualone 
is posing a severe problem to our 
country. During the next decade sub- 
stances like methaqualone will have to 
be the focus of increased international 
dialogue. The main instrument for 
international cooperation in this area 
is the Psychotropic Substances Con- 
vention. Issues to be worked out will 
include the development of acceptable 
import-export procedures to control 
the movement of scheduled substances, 
particularly where the United States 
is seeking stricter controls for foreign 

Regulation of Licit 
Narcotics Production 

A very critical problem will continue 
to be the regulation of the production 
of licit narcotics derived from opium 
poppies for the medicinal market. The 
leadership role of the United States in 
preventing the proliferation of sup- 
plies of licit raw materials must be 
continued. Unless new suppliers are 
effectively discouraged from increas- 
ing production, there will be a sub- 
stantial oversupply situation, and 
diversion of opiates to the heroin 
market will undoubtedly occur. A 
serious oversupply situation has 
already been predicted by the Inter- 
national Narcotics Control Board, and 
this remains of grave concern to the 
Department of State. 

Increased Resources in 
Drug-Related Foreign Programs 

U.S. bilateral programs have proved 
to be the most effective means of 

General Assembly Votes on 
Afghanistan Situation 

Following are Ambassador Donald 
F. McHenry's statement in the U.N. 
General Assembly on November 19, 
1980, and the resolution adopted by 
the Assembly on November 20. 


Less than a year ago the conscience of 
the world was shocked by the grim 
events in Afghanistan: a massive invasion 
by Soviet armed forces; the overthrow of 
the [Hafizullah] Amin regime and the 
killing of its leaders; and the launching of 
a campaign of violence and terror against 
the Afghan people by Soviet forces and 
their Afghan surrogates. 

There is nothing new in the Soviet 
Union's use of force to maintain its 
domination of other nations. The pattern 
set in 1953, when Soviet troops put down 
the East German workers' uprising, was 
repeated in 1956 in the bloody suppres- 
sion of the Hungarian revolution and, in 
1968, in the destruction of Czechoslo- 
vakia's experiment in liberalization. 
Now, in 1980, the Soviet Union has gone 
beyond Eastern Europe to assault the in- 
dependence of a nonaligned and Islamic 
nation — a nation intensely proud of its 
culture and religion. 

Their attack and cynical demand that 
client states recognize the reality of mili- 
tary occupation are in blatant violation of 
the most important principles of interna- 
tional law and the U.N. Charter: 

• A state must not use force against 
the territorial and political independence 
of another state; 

• A state must settle international 
disputes by peaceful means; 

• All states must respect the princi- 
ple of self-determination; and 

• Human rights must be respected 
by all governments. 

The Soviet intervention and occupa- 
tion was also — and remains today — a se- 
rious threat to the security and stability 
of an important and strategic region of 
the world. 

The United Nations responded 
urgently to the Afghanistan crisis. We 
joined in supporting a draft Security 
Council resolution which called for Soviet 
withdrawal. But for a veto by the Soviet 
Union it would have been adopted. As a 
result, an overwhelming majority of the 
members of this Assembly swiftly 
adopted a resolution in an emergency 
special session on January 14 which 
called for immediate withdrawal of for- 
eign troops and restoration of freedom 
and sovereignty for the Afghan people. 

Since then, the invasion and occupa- 
tion have been condemned by virtually all 
major international bodies including the 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
on January 29 and again on May 21, the 
UN. Human Rights Commission on 
February 14, the Foreign Ministers of 
the European Common Market and the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
on March 7, and the Interparliamentary 
Union Council on April 12 and again on 
September 24. 

Deepening Crisis 

Notwithstanding those urgent appeals, 
the crisis has deepened in Afghanistan. 
The Soviet Union has ignored the man- 
date of January 14. It has pursued and 
intensified its policy of military interven- 
tion and occupation in total disregard of 
world opinion. 

In the face of this Assembly's de- 

reducing the amount of illicit nar- 
cotics available in the United States. 
But effective bilateral programs 
require a sustained commitment over 
a period of years. For instance, the 
United States has contributed approxi- 
mately $90 million to our successful 
opium eradication program with the 
Government of Mexico. Similar levels 
of effort will have to be maintained 

elsewhere if we are to achieve a world- 
wide reduction in illicit narcotic pro- 
duction. While we expect increasing 
contributions from other countries to 
narcotics control programs, a sub- 
stantial U.S. effort is still required. 

1 The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the com- 
mittee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 2CM02. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

United Nations 

nand for withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
loscow has increased its force — which it 
lescribes as a "limited contingent" — from 
0,000 in early January to 85,000 today. 
tad more than 30,000 troops are massed 
ust across the border of the Soviet Un- 

In defiance of this Assembly's appeal 
or the restoration of sovereignty and 
elf-determination for Afghanistan, the 
loviet Union has sought to tighten its 
Kilitical and military grip on that country 
hrough a regime which is entirely de- 
tention on Soviet armed might for its 
urvival. It should be clear to all that this 
egime does not and cannot represent the 
K-ople of Afghanistan. 

In violation of the Assembly's appeal 
(i refrain from coercion and constraint, 
he Soviet Union and its Afghan agents 
pave waged a brutal campaign of violence 
ind terror in an effort to subdue the 
Afghan people. 

But the Soviet Union has failed to 
ichieve its grim objective in Afghanistan, 
rhe Afghan people have resisted in a 
struggle for national liberation. And for 
ill the Soviet Union's divisions, its so- 
)histicated weaponry, and its ruthless 
nethods, including arbitrary arrests and 
mprisonment, it has failed to crush this 
druggie. Soviet forces have failed en- 
irely to pacify the countryside. They are 
ronfined to the towns and cities, which 
ire armed camps. And even there, guer- 
illa attacks on Soviet personnel and 
strikes and demonstrations against the 
nvader are commonplace. 

The struggle of the Afghan people to 
•ecover their freedom and independence 
s an inspiration to those who oppose 
;yranny. But the cost of their struggle 
las been high. Even as we meet today, 
nore Afghan freedom fighters are dying, 
ind more fields and villages are being 
aid waste as Soviet forces use the tactics 
)f terror to impose a Soviet peace. Their 
:ragedy is unfolding in a country which, 
since its independence in 1921, has con- 
sistently followed a policy of neutrality 
ind nonalignment. 

In spite of the cloak of Soviet cen- 
sorship, these facts of Soviet aggression 
n Afghanistan speak for themselves. The 
soviet Union stands condemned in the 

if the world. Yet it persists in 
:rying to mask its aggression by casting 
the blame on others. 

Moscow claims it intervened in 
Afghanistan at the request of a former 
regime in response to some undefined ex- 
ternal threat to that country. This was, of 
course, the same regime whose leader 

was murdered when Soviet troops 
assaulted and subdued the Afghan state 
on December 29, last year. In the dec- 
laration of May 14, issued by the Soviet- 
controlled authorities in Kabul, Moscow 
argued that peace can be restored only 
through agreements between the Kabul 
regime and the neighboring states of 
Pakistan and Iran whereby these States 
and others would, in effect, accept the 
illegal military occupation and guarantee 
an end to the Afghan resistance. While 
continuing to support these unacceptable 
proposals, the Soviets have shown no in- 
terest in the initiative of the Islamic Con- 
ference or other proposals for a just poli- 
tical settlement that would restore 
genuine freedom and independence to 

Moscow's claims that some external 
threat to Afghanistan justified its inva- 
sion and that an independent government 
requested its assistance are simply un- 
acceptable. Moreover, I wish to empha- 
size that the charges of the representa- 
tive of the Soviet Union [Oleg A. 
Troyanovsky] and Mr. Dost [Shah 
Mohammed Dost, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Democratic Republic of Afghan- 
istan] during this debate that the Afghan 
resistance is dependent on the United 
States and other nations are cynical fab- 
rications unworthy of further comment. 
The world knows that the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan to suppress an in- 
digenous Islamic insurgency which had 
long been struggling against an unpopu- 
lar regime. The world also knows that 
this resistance movement is an expres- 
sion of the powerful nationalism of the 
Afghan people, and that the Kabul re- 
gime is a fiction manufactured in Moscow 
and marketed by force of Soviet arms. 

The real threat to Afghanistan is the 
presence of 85,000 Soviet troops who 
have illegally invaded and occupied that 
country in gross violation of international 
law. The Soviet Union is locked in conflict 
with the Afghan people. The cost of this 
conflict is mounting, most of all for the 
Afghan people, but for others as well. 
For the Soviet Union, the cost is heavy — 
international condemnation, increased 
isolation, and the burden of a futile and 
seemingly endless war. For the other na- 
tions of Southwest Asia, security and 
well being are endangered while Soviet 
forces remain in Afghanistan. The use of 

force by the Soviet Union against a non- 
aligned neighbor with whom it has a 
treaty of friendship means that every 
nation is less secure. 

Yet the will of Afghans to resist is 
legendary. In the troubled times of lit 11, 
the Grand National Council or Loya Jir- 
gah met to reaffirm Afghan neutrality. 
The council adopted these concluding 
woi'ds in their resolution of November <i. 

The Afghan nation has at no time been 
under any obligation to a foreign government , 
nor will she ever be. The nation has always 
been free, and will also in the future maintain 
its tree and independent existence. By the 
help of God, the people of Afghanistan are 
unanimously prepared to live a life of honor by 
defending their rights with all their material 
and spiritual forces, even to the point of shed- 
ding the last drop of blood. 

These words ring even louder today than 
then, for we are now witness to this same 
stubborn defense of honor and national 

Need For Just Settlement 

Members of the United Nations have an 
obligation to find a solution to this im- 
passe in accordance with the principles of 
the U.N. Charter. The draft resolution 
we are now considering offers a construc- 
tive approach. Yet some delegations have 
attempted to characterize support for 
this resolution as an "unfriendly act." 
The real "unfriendly act" was the inva- 
sion of Afghanistan. This resolution de- 
serves the support of every member of 
this body. It has three elements which 
are essential for a solution, and the 
United States is firmly committed to 

• The immediate withdrawal of for- 
eign troops from Afghanistan; 

• The right of the Afghans to self- 
determination, free from outside inter- 
vention; and 

• The need for a peaceful solution of 
the problem based on the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and the nonaligned 
character of Afghanistan. 

The resolution also addresses the 
tragedy of the Afghan refugees with an 
appeal for continued relief aid and a solu- 
tion that will enable them to return to 
their homes. The flood of refugees — now 
more than 1.2 million in Pakistan and 

anuary 1981 


United Nations 

several hundred thousand elsewhere — 
represents one-tenth of the population of 
Afghanistan. Their flight is further 
dramatic evidence of the upheaval and 
suffering the Soviet invasion has caused. 

Finally, this draft resolution goes a 
step beyond that of January 14 by ex- 
pressing hope that the Secretary General 
will appoint a special representative with 
a view to promoting a political solution in 
accordance with the provisions of this re- 

In the past, the Soviet Union has 
shown no willingness to discuss a political 
settlement except on the basis of formu- 
las of its own which ignore the need for 
prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
Such formulations which essentially seek 
to preserve the present Kabul regime are 
no solution to the plight of Afghanistan. 
They offer neither peace nor freedom for 
the Afghan people. Nor do they offer any 
prospect for meeting the security in- 
terests of that region or the rest of the 
world, or indeed, of the Soviet Union. 

In contrast, the approach of the 
draft resolution we are now considering 
offers a new opportunity for Moscow to 
change its course and meet its interna- 
tional obligations. It points the way to- 
ward a genuinely independent nonaligned 
and neutral Afghanistan, free of foreign 
troops and foreign intervention and with 
a government acceptable to the Afghan 
people. Such an outcome would deliver 
Afghanistan from its ordeal. And it 
would pose no threat to the legitimate in- 
terests of the Soviet Union in the secu- 
rity of its border. The United States sup- 
ports a political settlement based on 
these principles. 

None of us can rest until a just peace 
in Afghanistan is achieved. The Afghan- 
istan crisis must remain at the top of 
this organization's agenda until this 
grave source of international tension is 
removed. If all of us, including the Soviet 
Union, can summon the necessary will 
and courage, such a settlement for 
Afghanistan can be accomplished on the 
basis of the principles of the draft resolu- 
tion we are now considering. We must — 
all of us — commit ourselves to this goal. 


The General Assembly, 

Having considered the item entitled "The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security", 

Recalling its resolution ES-6/2 of 14 Janu- 
ary 1980 adopted at the sixth emergency spe- 
cial session, 

Reaffirming the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
obligation of all States to refrain in their inter- 
national relations from the threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial in- 
tegrity and political independence of any 

Reaffirming further the inalienable right 
of all peoples to determine their own form of 
government and to choose their own economic, 
political and social system free from outside in- 
tervention, subversion, coercion or constraint 
of any kind whatsoever, 

Gravely concerned at the continuing for- 
eign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in 
contravention of the above principles, and its 
serious implications for international peace and 

Deeply concerned at the increasing out- 
flow of refugees from Afghanistan, 

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a 
political solution of the grave situation in re- 
spect of Afghanistan, 

Recognizing the importance of the con- 
tinuing efforts and initiatives of the Organiza- 
tion of the Islamic Conference for a political 
solution of the situation in respect of Afghanis- 

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political in- 
dependence and non-aligned character of 
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution 
of the problem; 

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo- 
ple to determine their own form of govern- 
ment and to choose their economic, political 
and social system free from outside interven- 
tion, subversion, coercion or constraint of any 
kind whatsoever; 

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of 
the foreign troops from Afghanistan; 

4. Also calls upon all parties concerned to 
work for the urgent achievement of a political 
solution and the creation of the necessary con- 
ditions which would enable the Afghan ref- 
ugees to return voluntarily to their homes in 
safety and honour; 

5. Appeals to all States and national and 
international organizations to extend human- 
itarian relief assistance, with a view to alle- 
viating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in 

co-ordination with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees; 

6. Expre88e8 its appreciation of the 
efforts of the Secretary-General in the search 
for a solution to the problem and hopes that he 
will continue to extend assistance, including 
the appointment of a special representative, 
with a view to promoting a political solution in 
accordance with the provisions of the present 
resolution and the exploration of securing 
appropriate guarantees for non-use of force or 
threat of use of force against the political inde- 
pendence, sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and security of all neighbouring States, on the 
basis of mutual guarantees and strict non- 
interference in each other's internal affairs and 
with full regard for the principles of the Char- 
ter of the United Nations; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to 
keep Member States and the Security Council 
concurrently informed on the progress to- 
wards the implementation of the present reso- 
lution and to submit to Member States a 
report on the situation at the earliest appropri- 
ate opportunity; 

8. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item enti- 
tled "The situation in Afghanistan and its im- 
plications for international peace and 

1 USUN press release 150. 

2 Adopted on November 20 by a vote 
of 111 to 22, with 12 abstentions. ■ 




10th General Assembly of the OAS 

Following arc the President's and 
• tary's addresses on Novem- 
ber v.>. 1980, before the tOth General 

'he Organization of 
American States • OAS) held in 
Washington, D.C., November 19-26. 


I speak to you today for the fifth time in 
m important forum in this hall and, de- 
■pite considerable efforts to the contrary, 
I'm afraid also for the last time as Presi- 
dent of the United States. I want to say 
how grateful I am for the privilege of 
working with all of you and the leaders of 
your nations. And I want to take a few- 
minutes to assess what we have done 
together and to describe my own hopes 
for the future. 

On my first visit to the Organization 
of American States, in April of 1977, I 
said that no single policy, no single slogan 
could encompass a region as diverse as 
(VS. I spoke instead of certain princi- 
ples, a belief in nonintervention and in 
the sovereignty of nations, a determina- 
tion to work for human rights and for 
democracy, a common commitment to 
deal with global economic issues and to 
resolve regional political disputes. These 
principles have helped the United States 
make its contribution to the new and 
more balanced relationships that are 
emerging in our hemisphere. 

After 4 years of practical experience, 
I'm more convinced than ever that the fu- 
ture we desire lies in recognizing yearn- 
ings that are common to individuals and 
to nations alike. As individuals the peo- 
ples of the Americas yearn for basic hu- 
man rights. They desire personal liberty 
to be free from torture and arbitrary 
arrest; to participate in making the basic 
decisions that shape their own future; to 
have adequate food, health care, and 
education. And as part of the global 
community, every nation of the Americas 
has a desire and a right to help shape the 
future, not only of our own hemisphere 
but. indeed, the entire world. 

Some would ignore or resist these 
treasured rights — the rights of indi- . 
viduals and the rights of nations. But the 
future lies with those who cherish them 
and who are willing to defend them. Let 
me speak briefly of the last 4 years. 

Many here assisted in the negotia- 
tion and the ratification of the Panama 

Canal treaties. These treaties and their 

far-reaching impact will endure. They 
will endure because they are based on 
the mutual trust and the mutual respect 
that have been carefully, and sometimes 
painfully, forged by the people of a small 
nation and the people of a large nation. 
They will endure because they serve the 
interests of all who rely on the Panama 
Canal. They will endure because they 
epitomize the broadest possible commit- 
ment of my country to a new and a better 
relationship with the developing nations 
of the world. They will endure because 
the treaties serve the cause of peace. 

Last month El Salvador and Hon- 
duras served the cause of harmony and 
progress resolving their decades-old bor- 
der dispute. These two countries, work- 
ing with former President Bustamante of 
Peru and with their own Secretary 
General, have earned the admiration and 
respect of all those who love peace. 

The treaty of Tlatelolco, when com- 
pleted, will forever ban nuclear weapons 
from Latin America. I'm proud to have 
signed protocol one of this treaty on be- 
half of the United States of America. It's 
imperative that the remaining nations of 
our hemisphere put aside their hesitation 
and join in this vital commitment to ban 
the spread of nuclear weapons and to set 
an example for other nations in other re- 
gions of the world. 

In Nicaragua many of us have been 
working together to help that country 
heal its wounds. It's in the interest of all 
who care about freedom to help the 
Nicaraguan people chart a pluralistic 
course that ends bloodshed, respects hu- 
man rights, and furthers democracy. 

El Salvador continues to struggle 
against terrorists on the right who seek 
to restore an old tyranny and terrorists 
on the left who seek to create a new one. 
That struggle of theirs is ours as well. 
Their path, the peaceful path of stability 
and moderation, is precarious, but it's 
the only path that can lead to both liberty 
and justice. We must insist upon a strict 
policy of nonintervention as the people 
of these two nations design their own 

For too long, the United States 
seemed wedded to the status quo — even 
when that meant a continuation of pov- 
erty, social injustice, and even political 
repression. That attitude betrayed my 

nation's dynamism and our faith and con- 
fidence in the future and that, thank God, 
has now been changed. We understand 
and support the necessity of peaceful and 
moderate political progress in Central 
America and elsewhere in this hemis- 

Your governments, throughout the 
hemisphere, have also worked to improve 
the prospects for economic development. 
We've strengthened the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the World Bank. 
We've reduced trade barriers by expand- 
ing generalized tariff preferences and 
eliminating the discriminatory provision 
against Venezuela and Ecuador. We've 
worked to stablize commodity prices by a 
Common Fund and individual commodity 
agreements on sugar and coffee and 
cocoa. Regional cooperation has been in- 
vigorated — in the Andean pact, with the 
Caribbean group, and, most dramatically, 
with Venezuelan-Mexican assistance for 
the Caribbean basin. Through my own 
personal participation, and through the 
influence of my country, w r e have worked 
to strengthen and to expand the benefi- 
cial influence of this Organization of 
American States. 

Progress on Human Rights 

As all of you know, the cause that has 
been closest to my own heart is the cause 
of human rights. I'm convinced that a 
new conscience has been awakened. That 
conscience serves a concept of human 
rights that is not unique to any country, 
nor even just to this hemisphere, but is 
universal. In this hemisphere, since 1977, 
13 countries have ratified the embodi- 
ment of that concept — the American Con- 
vention on Human Rights. This has 
brought the convention into force and has 
created an inter- American court to judge 
human rights violations. In addition, the 
Inter- American Commission on Human 
Rights is more effective today than it 
was 4 years ago. It deserves our 
strongest continuing moral and financial 

Today, no government in this hemis- 
phere can expect silent assent from its 
neighbors if it tramples the rights of its 
own citizens. The costs of repression 
have increased but so have the benefits 
of respecting human rights. I pray that 
this progress will continue, although I 


Western Hemisphere 

know from experience that progress is 
not always easy as we defend human 

Some claim that Jimmy Carter ele- 
vated human rights and democracy on 
the inter- American agenda and that the 
agenda will change when I leave my 
office. They are wrong. Hemispheric sup- 
port for human rights is a historic move- 
ment — a movement that has been recog- 
nized this year in the Nobel peace prize. 
I take pride in being part of that move- 
ment. The cause of human rights will be 
all the stronger if it remains at the 
service of humanity, rather than at the 
service of ideological or partisan ends, 
and if it condemns both terrorism and 

In the phrase "human rights," the 
"rights" are important. The "human" is 
very important. As a citizen of the Amer- 
icas, I'm deeply encouraged by the trend 
toward greater democratization. I'm 
heartened that in many countries, 
thousands of people who were political 
prisoners just 4 years ago are now free. 
Those who see a contradiction between 
our security and our humanitarian in- 
terests forget that the basis for a secure 
and a stable society is the bond of trust 
between a government and its own 

The future of our hemisphere is not 
to be found in authoritarianism that 
wears the mask of common consent nor 
totalitarianism that wears the mask of 
justice. Instead, let us find our future in 
the human face of democracy — the hu- 
man voice of individual liberty and the 
human hand of economic development. If 
we build on the best of what we have be- 
gun, we can see a better time at the end 
of this decade. We can see a time when 
longstanding disputes like Belize, Bo- 
livian access to the sea, and the Beagle 
Channel dispute between Argentina and 
Chile have been settled in a spirit of 
cooperation and justice. We can see a 
time when^the treaty of Tlatelolco has 
come into force and other regions have 
followed the lead of Latin America in 
banning nuclear weapons. We can see a 
time when human rights are no longer 
threatened by the violence of either gov- 
ernments or terrorists and when every 
government responds to the will of its 
people, expressed through democratic in- 
stitutions. We can see a time when na- 
tions have cooperated, in the OAS and 
elsewhere, to develop just and fair ways 

of dealing with the migration of people, a 
time when no nation disregards the im- 
migration laws of its neighbor and many 
nations offer a haven to the few who still 
need such a place to dwell. And we can 
see a time when today's aspirations for 
greater economic development and coop- 
eration have become living realities 
through common action inspired by this 
body and its experts. 

Let me conclude on a personal note. 
My interest in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and in human rights and in 
democracy did not begin 4 years ago. 
And my interest will not end on January 
the 20th, next year. I will continue to 
speak out for the universal ideals which 
are embodied in our hearts and in the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
I will continue to work with you — my 
friends — to make this hemisphere and 
the world more just, more secure, and 
more free. 


I'm delighted to join you in this historic 
forum — the world's first and oldest con- 
tinuing regional association — and to 
underscore the remarks which President 
Carter made this morning. About one 
fact, I have no illusions: My country's re- 
cent election changes greatly the atmos- 
phere in which you and I meet. We in the 
United States have an unpleasant 
metaphor for political officials who are on 
their way out of office: We call them 
"lame ducks." And I have observed, in 
more than two decades of political life, 
that people find it difficult to hear the call 
of the lame duck. 

I do not intend to let this deter me 
today. Two decades in public life have 
taught me another lesson as well: that 
certain issues, certain realities, persist 
no matter what Administration is in 
office. The agenda that confronts you and 
me and our fellow citizens in this hemis- 
phere is chosen by us only in part; for the 
most part, it is determined by a combina- 
tion of long-term national interests and 
pressing current events. 

Today I want to talk with you about 
certain great issues that were with us be- 
fore this Administration took office and 
that will just as certainly shape the 
course of our relations in the future. I 
want to stress — as President Carter 
stressed this morning — the essential con- 
tinuing U.S. policy. 

The Changed Environment 

What is most obvious as we gather today 
is the profoundly changed environment in 
which our relations are conducted. Presi- 
dent Carter touched this morning upon 
many of the significant and welcome 
changes which have marked the past 4 
years: the Panama Canal treaties, the 
Latin American nuclear-weapons-free 
zone, the work of the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission. I would add 
to that list the emergence of independent 
states in the Caribbean, the vigorous 
spread of industrialization, the rise of 
several Spanish-speaking republics and of 
Brazil as major world forces. 

All these developments have intro- 
duced new balance into inter- American 
affairs. They underscore that your coun- 
tries are gaining real power to contribute 
to regional development and that we re- 
spect and welcome your contributions. 
And these developments, taken together, 
can be the foundation for improved coop- 
eration among us all in the future. Sev- 
eral hopeful trends are already visible. 

• Subregional integration has be- 
come a key focus for both growth and 
broader cooperation — from Central 
America to the Andean group and from 
the Caribbean to the River Plate Basin. 

• Important initiatives have been 
launched by Mexico and Venezuela joint- 
ly, and separately by Trinidad and 
Tobago, to supply energy to their neigh- 

Yet this is only the beginning. Dur- 
ing the next two decades — the last years 
of the 20th century — our successors will 
face changes even more sweeping than 
those we have witnessed over the past 20 
years. The economic growth of Latin 
America over the past two decades has 
been impressive, and this is only the be- 
ginning. The potential for the rest of the 
century is just as promising. In fact, the 
Global 2000 Report to the President, re- 
cently prepared under the auspices of our 
government, projects that Latin America 
will be the fastest growing part of the 
world as we near the year 2000. This sug- 
gests that better regional approaches to 
development will be particularly impor- 
tant to our future cooperation. 

Today, I want to emphasize the 
thought that better cooperation for de- 
velopment will depend largely on our 
ability to live by three fundamental prin- 
ciples that strongly influence the climate 
for cooperation: the prinicples of support 


Western Hemisphere 

or human rights; of nonintervention and 
■ollective security; and of peaceful settle- 
nent of disputes. 

himan Rights 

jet me emphasize, as strongly as I know 
iow, what President Carter said this 
norning: Support for human rights — eco- 
lomic and political, as well as individual, 
ights — is not a matter of transitory poli- 
ical emphasis for the United States; it is 
ngrained in our national life. The most 
onsistent thread of belief in our history 
s the belief that governments should be 
he peoples' servant, not their master, 
•or this simple but fundamental reason, I 
hink it is safe to assert that the United 
>tates will continue to work to strengthen 
ind increase respect for human rights as 
i fundamental norm of international 

All of us can be justifiably proud of 
mr hemisphere's recent progress in this 
irea. Those who would ignore, deny, or 
ibuse individual rights are in retreat, 
rhe Inter- American Human Rights Com- 
nission deserves our special salute. Its 
locuments and studies have begun to 
>rovide an invaluable and dispassionate 
>asis for our joint consideration. 

The collective rededication of the 
Americas to human rights is a major 
■eason I look to the future of our region 
*ith optimism. Societies where basic hu- 
nan rights are respected are more stable 
ind more productive, more confident and 
nore creative. They make better friends 
ind stronger allies. So I would assert 
hat support for human rights is both a 
werequisite for future cooperation and 
)rogress between us and a motive force 
oward success in all our mutual efforts. 


rhe second fundamental principle for 
;ooperation in the hemisphere is the prin- 
:iple of nonintervention. Effective inter- 
lational cooperation, particularly among 
states as richly varied as those of this 
lemisphere, is possible only if the rights 
)f states are recognized. The very exist- 
ence of this organization is due to men 
ike Baltasar Brum and Carlos Saavedra 
Lamas, jurists whose wisdom helped de- 
velop the principle of nonintervention by 
)ne state in the internal affairs of 

This principle is fundamental. As our 
hemisphere has become more politically 
diverse, differences of outlook have 

sometimes contributed to tensions among 
states. But our growing acceptance of 
political pluralism, both within and 
among countries, has proved important 
toward reducing such tensions. 

We have explicitly committed ourselves 
through the Rio treaty to undertake col- 
lective action against the most blatant 
form of intervention — armed aggression. 
Other forms of intervention, however, 
can be just as damaging to national inde- 
pendence. The external provision of 
weapons, military training, or safehavens 
to armed insurgents is an insidious form 
of intervention — one all the more trou- 
bling for its indirection. Our regional 
organization needs to examine this press- 
ing problem and devise ways to help the 
member states stop it. 

Peaceful Settlement 

Development has few enemies greater 
than fratricidal conflict. Peacemaking 
efforts are the third key to the future de- 
velopment of our countries. For our part, 
the United States is irrevocably commit- 
ted to the peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes. Over the last 2 years, the Panama 
Canal treaties have become a symbol of 
that commitment. The United States has 
made clear its willingness to deal with all 
nations, large and small, on a basis of 
mutual respect. Yesterday, in this hall, 
we honored a similar contribution to 
peace and development — the treaty of 
peace between El Salvador and Hon- 
duras. In both cases, this organization 
deserves major credit for helping to 
bring the concerned parties together in 

But even as we celebrate these for- 
ward steps, many other potentially dis- 
ruptive territorial disputes remain unset- 
tled in the hemisphere. Settling them 
peacefully must be a high priority con- 
cern for us all and for this organization in 

The principle of peaceful settlement 
of disputes could also be applied to cer- 
tain other problems. President Carter 
this morning reaffirmed our country's 
commitment to the goal of the treaty of 
Tlatelolco, which calls for Latin America 
to be kept free of nuclear weapons. This 
treaty could serve as a precedent for 
similar arrangements to limit the dangers 
of conventional military technology. 

We are convinced that balanced re- 
straints on conventional weapons, 
whether negotiated regionally or 
subregionally, could reduce tensions, en- 
hance the security of nations, and reaf- 
firm our mutual commitment to peaceful 

Cooperation for Development 

Can we build a future of regional coop- 
eration for economic development, based 
on fidelity to these fundamental princi- 
ples? Let us be candid: The only honest 
answer possible is "perhaps." The dream 
of cooperative economic development is 
at once our hemisphere's brightest prom- 
ise and the area of our greatest dis- 

The OAS has contributed signifi- 
cantly to international law, to the 
Western Hemisphere's unique record of 
peacekeeping, and to our recent progress 
in strengthening support for human 
rights. But the plain truth is that we 
have done far too little through the OAS 
to capitalize on our joint potential for eco- 
nomic progress. 

The moral imperative for action is 
clear, for ours is a hemisphere still 
marked by major inequalities among and 
within countries. Our basic principles 
simply cannot be fulfilled without more 
effective cooperation for economic de- 
velopment. And the practical imperative 
is as compelling as the moral one: Our 
combined efforts could dramatically im- 
prove the lives of all our citizens. 

Yet too often, we have allowed our 
economic debates to focus almost exclu- 
sively on questions that divide us, losing 
sight of those vast and equally vital areas 
in which we are in agreement. The pro- 
posed special general assembly on de- 
velopment offers an opportunity to re- 
direct regional thinking along construc- 
tive lines. This assembly should be held 
as soon as adequate preparations can be 
made. The "wise men's report," prepared 
for the joint working group, identifies 
many key areas where our cooperation 
can be strengthened. 

We believe it is a good starting point. 
We are prepared to help wholeheartedly 
in developing and pursuing specific pro- 
grams for the good of all our peoples. We 


also hope that, by concentrating on ques- 
tions where early progress is possible, 
the special general assembly will build a 
foundation for cooperation on more diffi- 
cult issues as well. 


I would like to touch on a house- 
keeping item which ties into my 
opening remarks about the changed en- 
vironment. I refer to the need to mod- 
ernize the system of financing that was 
developed for this organization more than 
30 years ago. The system should reflect 
the emerging new balances in the hemis- 
phere. As a former legislator, I know the 
difficulties of negotiating financing 
arrangements. I know all too well the 
disputes and delays that can come with 
the process. The differences that sepa- 
rate on this issue are not so great. For 
the good of our organization, I urge that 
we delay no longer in reaching agree- 
ment on this issue. 

In a valedictory statement like this 
one, I am not in a position to advance 
concrete new proposals. But I am freer 
to speak frankly. The days when one 
country could pretend to lead alone are 
gone; no country is now so strong that it 
can either dominate or ignore its neigh- 
bors. But if dominance by one power is 
undesirable, so is confusion among many. 
We have learned, sometimes painfully, 
how to coexist. Let us now learn how to 
cooperate more broadly and 

1 Text from White House press 
release of Nov. 19, 1980. 

2 Press release 325 of Nov. 19, 
1980. ■ 

Current Actions 


Aviation, Civil 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
Convention on International Civil Avi- 
ation (TI AS 1591) [concerning lease, 
charter and interchange]. Done at 
Montreal Oct. 6, 1980. Enters into force 
on the date on which the 98th instrument 
of ratification is deposited by a party 
to ICAO. 

Convention for the suppression of unlaw- 
ful acts against the safety of civil avi- 
ation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. 
Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. 
TIAS 7570. 

Accession deposited : Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, Aug. 13, 1980.1 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production, and stockpiling 
of bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
weapons and on their destruction. Done 
at Washington, London and Moscow 
Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force 
Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062. 
Accession deposited : Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, June 20, 1980. 


International coffee agreement 1976, with 

annexes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975. 

Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 

1976, definitively Aug. 1, 1977. 

TIAS 8683. 

Accession deposited : Philippines, Oct. 14, 


Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common 
Fund for Commodities, with schedule. 
Done at Geneva June 27, 1980. Open for 
signature at U.N. Headquarters in 
New York Oct. 1, 1980, until 1 year after 
the date of its entry into force. Enters 
into force upon receipt by the depository 
of instruments of ratification, accept- 
ance or approval from at least 90 states, 
providing certain requirements have 
been fulfilled. 

Signatures : Ecuador, Oct. 3, 1980; U.S., 
Nov. 5, 1980. 


Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973 on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 
8249) . Done at Bonn June 22, 1979. 2 
Acceptance deposited : U.S., Oct. 23, 1980. 


International convention for safe con- 
tainers (CSC) , with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force 
Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. 
TIAS 9037. 
Accession deposited : China, Sept. 23, 


Cultural Relations 

Constitution of the U.N. Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 
Concluded at London Nov. 16, 1945. 
Entered into force Nov. 4, 1946. 
TIAS 1580. 

Signatures : Maldives, Mar. 23, 1979; 
St. Lucia, Mar. 6, 1980; Tonga, Sept. 29, 
1980; Zimbabwe, Sept. 22, 1980. 
Acceptances deposited : Maldives, July 18, 
1980; St. Lucia, Mar. 6, 1980; Tonga, 
Sept. 29, 1980; Zimbabwe, Sept. 22, 1980. 

Agreement on the importation of edu- 
cational, scientific, and cultural materials, 
with protocol. Done at Lake Success 
Nov. 22, 1950; entered into force May 21, 
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 2, 1966. 
TIAS 6129. 

Ratification deposited : Syria, Sept. 16, 


Customs convention on the international 

transport of goods under cover of TIR 

carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva 

Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 


Accession deposited : Canada, Oct. 21, 


Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic rela- 
tions. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. 
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the 
U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited : Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, Oct. 29, 1980. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military 
or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done 
at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into 
force Oct. 5, 1978. 3 

Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea, 
Oct. 28, 1980. 


Agreement establishing the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development. 
Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered 
into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765. 
Accession deposited : Saint Lucia, Oct. 9, 

Human Rights 

International covenant on economic, 
social, and cultural rights. Adopted at 



Sow York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into 

force Jan. .'>. 1976. ■ 

Signature: Kampuchea, Oct. IT. 1980. 

International covenant on civil and 
political rights. Adopted at New York 
lee. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 

Signature : Kampuchea, Oct. 17, 1980. 

Optional protocol to the international 
■ovenant on civil and political rights. 
Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. "J.'!, 1976. :i 
Vcccssiqii deposited : Trinidad and 
r obago. Nov. 14, 1980. 

ludicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence 

ibroad in civil or commercial matters. 

Dene at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. 

Entered into force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 


Extended to : Cayman Islands, Sept. 16, 


Lead Lines 

Amendments to the international con- 
tention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). 
Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979. 2 
Acceptances deposited : China, Aug. 1, 
1980; France, May 12, 1980; Denmark, 
May 22, 1980; Morocco, Sept. 25, 1980; 
Seychelles, Oct. 1, 1980; U.K., Sept. 22, 

Amendments to the international con- 
tention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331), 
relating to amendments to the conven- 
tion. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975. 2 
Acceptances deposited : China, Aug. 1, 
1980; Seychelles, Oct. 1, 1980. 

Amendments to the international con- 
vention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). 
Done at London Oct. 12, 1971. 2 
Acceptances deposited : China, Aug. 1, 
1980; Seychelles, Oct. 1, 1980. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention on the 

Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 

Organization, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 

'>28. r >. 6490. 8606). Adopted at London 

Nov. 15, 1979. 2 

Acceptances deposited : Australia, Nov. 

17, 1980; Bulgaria, Oct. 21, 1980. 

Amendments to the convention on the 

Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 

Organization, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 

6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 

Nov. 17, 1977.2 

Acceptance deposited : Egypt, Nov. 18, 


Convention on facilitation of inter- 
national maritime traffic, with annex. 
Done at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered 
into force Mar. 5, 1967; for the U.S. 
May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Acceptance deposited : Senegal, Oct. 17, 

International convention on standards of 

training, certification, and watchkeeping 
for seafarers, 1978. Done at London 
July 7, 197S.- 
Accessions deposited : Egypt, Sept. 22, 

1980; Spain, Oct. 21, 1980. 

Inteinational convention on maritime 
search and rescue, 1979, with annex. 
Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, I979. a 
■Signature : China, Sept. 11, 1980."' 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention for limiting the manufacture 
and regulating the distribution of nar- 
cotic drugs, with protocol of signature. 
Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered 
into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543. 

Protocol amending the agreements, con- 
ventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs 
concluded at The Hague on Jan. 23, 1912, 
at Geneva on Feb. 11, 1925, and Feb. 19, 
1925, and July 13, 1931, at Bangkok on 
Nov. 27, 1931, and at Geneva June 26, 
1936, with annex. Done at Lake Success, 
New York Dec. 11, 1946. Entered into 
force Dec. 11, 1946; for the U.S. Aug. 12, 

1947. TIAS 1671. 

Protocol bringing under international 
control drugs outside the scope of the 
convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting 
the manufacture and regulating the dis- 
tribution of narcotic drugs, as amended 
by the protocol signed at Lake Success 
on Dec. 11, 1946. Done at Paris Nov. 19, 

1948. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1949; 
for the U.S. Sept. 11, 1950. TIAS 2308. 

Protocol for limiting and regulating the 
cultivation of the poppy plant, the pro- 
duction of, international and wholesale 
trade in, and use of opium. Done at 
New York June 23, 1953. Entered into 
force Mar. 8, 1963. TIAS 5273. 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. 
Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. 
Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the 
U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 
Notification of succession : Papua New 
Guinea, Oct. 28, 1980. 

Protocol amending the single convention 
on narcotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). 
Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered 
into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 

Convention on psychotropic substances. 
Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered 
into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. 
July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725. 
Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea, 
Oct. 28, 1980. 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 

nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 

Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.2 

Ratification deposited : Sweden, Aug. 1, 


Signatures : Canada, Sept. 23, 1980; 

Morocco, July 25, 1980; Poland, Aug. 6, 


Patents, Microorganisms 

Budapest treaty on the international 
recognition of the deposit of micro- 
organisms for the purposes of patent 
procedure, with regulations. Done at 
Budapest, Apr. 28, 1977. Entered into 
force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768. 
Ratifications deposited : F.R.G., Oct. 20, 
1980; U.K., Sept. 29, 1980. 


Protocol of 1978 relating to the inter- 
national convention for the prevention of 
pollution from ships, 1973. Done at 
London Feb. 17, 1978. 2 
Ratification deposited : Liberia, Oct. 28, 

Accession deposited : Tunisia, Oct. 10, 

Protocol relating to intervention on the 
high seas in cases of pollution by sub- 
stances other than oil. Done at London 
Nov. 2, 1973.2 

Ratification deposited : Netherlands, 
Sept. 10, 1980.G 

Convention on the prevention of marine 
pollution by dumping of wastes and other 
matter, with annexes. Done at London, 
Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington 
Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 
1975. TIAS 8165. 

Accession deposited : Suriname, Nov. 12, 

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 
1972 on the prevention of marine pollu- 
tion by dumping of wastes and other 
matter (TIAS 8165). Adopted at London 
Oct. 12, 1978. 2 

Acceptances deposited : Japan, Oct. 15, 
1980; Sweden, May 16, 1980; U.S., 
Oct. 24, 1980. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability 
for oil pollution damage. Done at Brus- 
sels, Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975. 11 

Ratification deposited : Finland, Oct. 1980. 
International convention on the establish- 
ment of an international fund for com- 
pensation for oil pollution damage. Done 
at Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into 
force Oct. 16, 1978. :: 

Ratification deposited : Finland, Oct. 10, 

International convention for the preven- 
tion of pollution of the sea by oil, with 
annexes, as amended (TIAS 6109, 8505) . 
Done at London May 12, 1954. TIAS 4900. 
Extended to : Bermuda as from Dec. 1, 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
tions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of international 



armed conflicts (Protocol I) , with an- 
nexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978." 
Ratification deposited : Finland, Aug. 7, 
Accessio n deposited : Bangladesh, Sept. 8, 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
tions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of noninternational 
armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at 
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978.3 
Ratification deposited : Finland, Aug. 7, 


Accession dep osited : Bangladesh, Sept. 8, 



Protocol relating to the status of refu- 
gees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. 
Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the 
U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited : Jamaica, Oct. 30, 


International natural rubber agreement, 
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 23, 

Approval deposited : Czechoslovakia, 
Sept. 17, 1980. 

Notification of provisional application : 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Oct. 3, 1980; 
Brazil, Oct. 1, 1980; Canada, Nov. 7, 
1980; EEC, Sept. 29, 1980; Finland, 
Nov. 11, 1980; France, F.R.G., Nether- 
lands, Norway, Sept. 30, 1980; U.S.S.R., 
Nov. 5, 1980; U.K., Sept. 26, 1980; U.S., 
Oct. 23, 1980. 

Ratification deposited : China, Sept. 15, 
1980; Denmark, Sweden, Sept. 30, 1980; 
Ireland, Sept 29, 1980. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplace- 
ment of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction on the 
seabed and the ocean floor, and in the 
subsoil thereof. Dons at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered 
into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Accession deposited : Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, June 20, 1980.' 


Treaty on principles governing the activi- 
f states in the exploration and use of 
outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. En- 
tered int., force Oct. 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. 
Accession deposited : Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, June 20, 1980. 


International sugar agreement, 1977, 
with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 
1977. Entered into force provisionally 
Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980. 
TIAS 9664. 

Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Oct. 20, 


Partial revision of the radio regulations 
( Geneva, 1959) , as revised, relating to the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service, with 
annexes and final protocol. Done at 
Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force 
Sept. 1, 1979; for the U.S. Oct. 22, 1980, 
except for the frequency allotment plan 
for the aeronautical mobile (R) service 
which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 

Approval deposited : Denmark, Sept. 1, 


International convention against the tak- 
ing of hostages. Adopted at New York 
Dec. 17, 1979. 2 

Signatures : Finland, Oct. 29, 1980; 
Uganda, Nov. 10, 1980. 
Ratifications deposited : Lesotho, Nov. 5, 
1980; Mauritius, Oct. 17, 1980. 


Agreement on technical barriers to trade. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616. 
Acceptances : Hungary, Apr. 23, 1980; 
Japan Apr. 25, 1980; Republic of Korea, 
Sept. 3, 1980; Singapore, June 3, 1980; 
Spain, May 9, 1980 s ; Yugoslavia, 
Sept. 16, 1980.« 

Ratification deposited : Austria, May 28, 

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done 

at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into 

force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620. 

Acceptances : Japan, Apr. 25, 1980; 

Romania, June 25, 1980. 

Ratification deposited : Austria, June 23, 


International dairy arrangement. Done at 
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623. 
Acceptance : Uruguay, July 18, 1980. 
Ratification deposited : Austria, May 28, 

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701. 
Acceptances : Romania, June 25, 1980; 
Uruguay, June 16, 1980; Yugoslavia, 
Sept. 16, 1980.-" 

Ratification deposited : Austria, May 28, 

Agreement on implementation of arti- 
cle VII of the General Agreement on 

Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation;. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enters 
into force Jan. 1, 1981. 
Acceptances : Austria, Dec. 17, 1979; 
Canada, Dec. 17, 1979'; EEC, Dec. 17, 
1979; Finland, Dec. 17, 1979''; Hungary, 
July 18, 1980; India, July 11, 19807.">; 
Japan, Dec. 17, 1979; Norway, Dec. 17, 
1979 '■'; Romania, June 25, 1980; Spain, 
May 9, 1980 ; 'i"; Sweden, Dec. 17, 19799; 
Switzerland, Dec. 17, 1979; U.K., Dec. 17, 
1979 'I; U.S., Dec. 17, 1979*. 
Acceptance deposited : Japan, Apr. 25, 


Protocol to the agreement on implementa- 
tion of article VII o* the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1981. 

Acceptances : Austria, May 17, 1980°; 
EEC, July 29, 1980; Finland, Dec. 17, 
1979 '•'; Hungary, July 18, 1980; India, 
July 11, 1980"i"; Japan, Apr. 25, 1980; 
Norway, Dec. 17, 1979°; Romania, 
June 25, 1980; Spain, May 9, 19809; 
Sweden, Dec. 17, 1979 ! »; Switzerland, 
Dec. 17, 1979 '•'; U.K., Sept. 17, 1980H12; 
U.S., May 28, 1980 9. 

Agreement on implementation of arti- 
cle VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (antidumping code). 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9650. 
Acceptances : Austria, Dec. 17, 1979''. 
Brazil, Dec. 28, 1979; Canada, Dec. 17, 
1979; Czechoslovakia, July 29, 1980; 
EEC, Dec. 17, 1979; Finland, Dec. 17, 
1979; Hungary, Apr. 23, 1980; India, 
July 11, 19801"; Japan, Dec. 17, 1979; 
Norway, Dec. 17, 1979; Romania, June 25, 
1980; Spain, May 9, 1980"; Sweden, 
Dec. 17, 1979; Switzerland, Dec. 17, 1979; 
U.K., Dec. 17, 1979H.13; U.S., Dec. 17, 
1979; Yugoslavia, Sept. 16, 1980.9 
Acceptances deposited : Brazil, May 5, 
1980; Japan, Apr. 25, 1980; Norway, 
Dec. 28, 1979. 

Ratifications deposited : Austria, May 28, 
1980; Finland, Mar. 13, 1980; Sweden, 
Dec. 20, 1979. 

Agreement on interpretation and applica- 
tion of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(subsidies and countervailing duties). 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619. 
Acceptances : Austria, Dec. 17, 1979; 
Brazil, Dec. 28, 1979 10 ; Canada, Dec. 17, 
1979; Chile, Oct. 25, 1979 «; EEC, 
Dec. 17, 1979; Finland, Dec. 17, 1979; 
India, July 11, 1980; Japan, Dec. 17, 
1979; Republic of Korea, June 10, 1980; 
Norway, Dec. 17, 1979; Pakistan, Apr. 30, 
1980; Sweden, Dec. 17, 1979; Switzerland, 
Dec. 17, 1979; U.K., Dec. 17, 1979 ni' ! ; 
U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; Uruguay, Dec. 31, 
1979"; Yugoslavia, Sept. 16, 1980.9 
Acceptances deposited : Japan, Apr. 25, 
1980; Norway, Dec. 28, 1979. 


Department of State Bulletin 


R atifications deposited : Austria, May 28, 
980; Finland. Mar. 13, 1980; Sweden, 
20, 1979. 

Lgreement on import licensing proce- 
uns. Done at Geneva Apr. l'_', 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. 
IAS 9788. 

icceptances : Argentina, Dec. 17, 1979'-'; 
ustralia. r'eb. 25, 1980; Austria, Dec. 17, 
W9; Canada. Doc. 17. 1979; Chile, Oct. 2.".. 

; EEC, Dec. 17, 1979; Finland, 
>ec. 17. 1979; Hungary, Jan. 21. 1980; 
ndia. July 11, 1980; Japan, Dec. 17, 
179; New Zealand, Dec. 17, 1979; Nor- 
,av. Dec. 17. 1979; Romania, June 25, 
HO; South Africa, Dec. 18, 1979; Swe- 
at, Dec. 17, 1979; Switzerland, Dec. 17, 

U.K., Dec. 17, 1979H i:: ; U.S., 
tec. 17. 1979: Yugoslavia, Sept. 16, 1980 '■>. 
icceptances deposited : Japan, Apr. 25, 
980; Norway. Dec. 28, 1979. 
Ratifications deposited : Austria, May 28, 
980; Finland, Mar. 13, 1980; Sweden, 
tab 20, 1979. 

nited Nations 

"onvention on the privileges and immuni- 
ies of the U.N. Done at New York 
'eb. 13, 1946. Entered into force for the 
J.S. Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 

->ion deposited : F.R.G., Nov. 5, 1980. 


,'onstitution of the U.N. Industrial Devel- 
pment Organization, with annexes, 
adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.- 
iignature : Iran, Nov. 12, 1980. 

titrations deposited : Bangladesh, 
Cov. 5. 1980; Indonesia, Nov. 10, 1980. 


■'ood aid convention, 1980 (part of the 

nternational wheat agreement, 1971, as 

xtended CTIAS 7144)). Done at Wash- 

ngton Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force 

irovisionally July 1, 1980; entered into 

orce definitively for the U.S. Nov. 11, 


nstrument of ratification signed by the 

'resident : Nov. 11, 1980. 

Ratification deposited : U.S., Nov. 11, 


'rotocol modifying and further extending 
he wheat trade convention (part of the 
nternational wheat agreement), 1971 
TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 
^pr. 25, 1979. Entered into force provi- 
ionally for the U.S. with respect to cer- 
ain parts June 23, 1979, with respect to 
ither parts July 1, 1979; entered into 
brce definitively for the U.S. Nov. 11, 

nstrument of ratification signed by the 
'resident : Nov. 11. 1980. 
•i .tification deposited : U.S., Nov. 11, 


Convention on the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination against women. 
Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.'- 
Rat i ['nations deposited : Barbados, 
Oct. 16, 1980; China, Nov. 4, 1980. 
Signatures : El Salvador, Nov. 14, 1980; 
Kampuchea, Oct. 17, 1980. 

Convention on the political rights of 
women. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. 
Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the 
U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289. 

Ratification deposited : Nigeria, Nov. 17, 


Constitution of the World Health Organi- 
zation. Done at New York July 22, 1946. 
Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the 
U.S. June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808. 
Acceptance deposited : Saint Lucia, 
Nov. 11, 1980. 



Convention for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the prevention of fiscal eva- 
sion with respect to taxes on income, with 
exchange of notes. Signed at Dacca Oct. 6, 
1980. Enters into force upon the exchange 
of instruments of ratification. 


Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 17, 1977, relating to equal access to 
ocean carriage of government-controlled 
cargoes (TIAS 8981), with agreed min- 
utes. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington and Rio de Janiero Oct. 30, 
1980. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1980. 


Agreement extending the agreement of 
May 14, 1971, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 7125, 8247) , regarding a joint 
program in the field of experimental re- 
mote sensing from satellites and aircraft. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington Oct. 20 and Nov. 6, 1980. Entered 
into force Nov. 6, 1980; effective May 14, 

Protocol amending the convention of 
Mar. 2, 1953, for the preservation of the 
halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific 
Ocean and Bering Sea (TIAS 2900). 
Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979. 
Entered into force Oct. 15, 1980. 
TIAS 9855. 

Proclaimed by the President : Nov. 11, 

Protocol to amend the convention for the 
protection, preservation, and extension of 
the sockeye salmon fisheries in the Fraser 
River System of May 26, 1930, as 
amended (50 Stat. 1355, TIAS 3867). 

Signed at Washington Feb. 24, 1977. En- 
t ired into force Oct. 16, 1980. TIAS 9854. 
Proclaimed by the President : Nov. 11, 


Agreement on grain trade, with ex- 
changes of letters. Signed at Beijing 
Oct. 22, 1980. Enters into force Jan. 1, 

Parcel post agreement, with detailed 
regulations. Signed at Washington, Oct. 9, 
1980. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1980. 

International express mail agreement, 
with detailed regulations. Signed at 
Washington Oct. 9, 1980. Entered into 
force Oct. 9, 1980. 


Naturalization convention. Signed at 
Copenhagen July 20, 1872. Entered into 
force Mar. 14, 1873. 17 Stat. 941. 
Notification of termination : U.S., Oct. 3, 
1980; effective Oct. 3, 1981. 


Protocol relating to the air transport 
agreement of Mar. 29, 1949 (TIAS 1945), 
with exchange of letters. Signed at Wash- 
ington May 12, 1980. 
Entered into force : Dec. 7, 1980. 

Memorandum of understanding for the 
development of a cooperative program in 
the sciences, with annex. Signed at Hel- 
sinki Aug. 27, 1980. Entered into force 
Aug. 27, 1980. TIAS 9848. 


Convention for the avoidance of double 

taxation and the prevention of evasion in 

the cases of taxes on estates, inheritances, 

and income. Signed at Paris Oct. 18, 1946. 

Entered into force Oct. 17, 1949. TIAS 


Terminated : Oct. 1, 1980. 

Protocol modifying the convention of 
Oct. 18, 1946 (TIAS 1982), for the avoid- 
ance of double taxation and the preven- 
tion of evasion in the cases of taxes on 
estates and inheritances. Signed at Wash- 
ington May 17, 1948. TIAS 1982. 
Terminate d: Oct. 1, 1980. 

Convention supplementing the convention 
of July 25, 1939 (59 Stat. 893) and 
Oct. 18, 1946 (TIAS 1982), relating to the 
avoidance of double taxation as modified 
and supplemented by the protocol of 
May 17, 1948 (TIAS 1982). Signed at 
Washington June 22, 1956. Entered into 
force June 13, 1957. TIAS 3844. 
Terminated : Oct. 1, 1980. 

Agreement relating to cooperation with 
respect to research and development ac- 
tivities in the field of civil aviation. Signed 

lanuary 1981 




at Washington and Paris July 10, 1980. 
Entered into force July 10, 1980. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement relating to the taking of evi- 
dence. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Bonn Oct. 17, 1979, and Feb. 1, 1980. 
Entered into force Feb. 1, 1980. 

Agreement on cooperation in coal lique- 
faction using the SRC-II process. Signed 
Oct. 5, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 5, 

Protocol relating to the agreement of 
Oct. 5, 1979, on cooperation in coal lique- 
faction using the SRC-II process. Signed 
at Washington July 31, 1980. Entered 
into force July 31, 1980. 


Agreement extending certain provisions 
of the agreement of June 8, 1960, as 
amended and extended (TIAS 4557, 6124, 
7001) for cooperation concerning civil 
uses of atomic energy, and requiring 
IAEA safeguards with respect to all 
peaceful nuclear activities in Indonesia. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta 
Sept. 16 and 19, 1980. Entered into force 
Sept. 19, 1980. 

International Hydrographic Bureau 

Agreement relating to a procedure for 
United States income tax reimbursement. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Wash- 
ington and Monaco Aug. 27 and Oct. 16, 
1980. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1980. 


Agreement on cooperation in coal lique- 
faction using the SRC-II process. Signed 
at Washington July 31, 1980. Entered 
into force July 31, 1980. 

Memorandum of consultations on provi- 
sional measures relating to air transport 
services. Signed at Tokyo Sept. 20, 1980. 
Entered into force Sept. 20, 1980. 


Cooperative agreement to assist the Gov- 
ernment of Mexico in combating the Medi- 
terranean fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed 
at Mexico and Washington Aug. 26 and 
Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force 
Sept. 17, 1980. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 25, 1980 (TIAS 9772) relating to 
additional cooperative arrangements to 
curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 10, 


Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of July 17, 1979 (TIAS 9618), 
establishing a Provisional Commission on 
Educational and Cultural Exchange. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Rabat 
Sept. 24, 1980. Entered into force 
Sept. 24, 1980. 


Loan agreement for the reconstruction 
program loan. Signed at Managua 
Oct. 17, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 17, 


Agreement for scientific and technological 
cooperation. Signed at Lagos Sept. 22, 
1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980. 
Memorandum of understanding on envi- 
ronmental protection. Signed at Lagos 
Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force 
Sept. 22, 1980. 


Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore 
Oil Port. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Mar. 21 and 24, 1980. En- 
tered into force Mar. 24, 1980. 
Superseded by agreement of Aug. 15 and 
Oct. 10, 1980. 


Agreement for scientific and technical 
cooperation. Signed at Dakar Sept. 30, 
1980. Enters into force upon notification 
of each government to the other that the 
constitutional formalities in force in each 
country have been accomplished. 


Naturalization convention and protocol. 
Signed at Stockholm May 26, 1869. En- 
tered into force June 14, 1871. 17 Stat. 

Notification of termination : United 
States, Oct. 3, 1980; effective Oct. 3, 1981. 

World Intellectual Property Organization 

Agreement with the U.S. relating to coop- 
eration in the promotion of industrial 
property protection. Signed at Geneva 
Sept. 26, 1980. Entered into force 
Sept. 26, 1980. 


Agreement relating to the reciprocal 
granting of authorization to permit 
licensed amateur radio operators who are 
citizens of either country to operate their 
stations in the other country. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Belgrade Oct. 31 and 
Nov. 11, 1980. Entered into force Nov. 11, 


Memorandum of understanding on coop- 
eration in the field of agricultural science 
and technology. Signed at Salisbury 
Sept. 25, 1980. Entered into force 
Sept. 25, 1980. 

Agreement for scientific and technical 
cooperation. Signed at Salisbury Sept. 25, 
1980. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1980. 

1 With statement. 

2 Not in force. 

:: Not in force for the U.S. 
4 Effective in respect of Bermuda and 
Hong Kong. 

3 Subject to approval. 

(i Effective in respect of the Nether- 
lands Antilles. 

7 With reservation (s). 

s Subject to ratification or approval. 

!) Subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval. 

10 With declaration (s) . 

11 In respect of the territories for 
which it has international responsibility 
except for: Antigua, Bermuda, Brunei, 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St. Kitts- 
Nevis, Sovereign Base Areas, Cyprus. 

12 Accepted in respect to Hong Kong 
May 12, 1980. 

13 Exception extended to British 
Virgin Islands. 

14 Ad referendum. ■ 

November 1980 

Events pertaining to Iran may be 
found on page 28. 

November 4 

U.S. holds national elections. Repub- 
lican Party candidate Ronald W. Reagan 
wins the Presidential election, replacing 
Jimmy Carter of the Democratic Party. 

November 5 

U.S. contributes $250,000 to U.N. 
World Assembly on the Elderly which is 
to be held August 1982. 

Ambassador McHenry signs the Com- 
mon Fund for Commodities Agreement on 
behalf of the U.S. 

November 11 

The Madrid followup meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) opens in Madrid with 
former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell 
as chairman of the U.S. delegation and 
Max M. Kampelman as cochairman. 

November 14 

Government of Guinea-Bissau is 
overthrown in a coup d'etat led by its 
Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira. 

Iran lifts restrictions on foreign re- 



lorters who wish to cover the Iran-Iraq 

\t>\ ember 17 

Semiannual U.S. -European Com- 
nunity (EC) high-level consultations are 
leld at Department of State Novem- 
>er 17-18. Under Secretary for Economic 
UTairs Richard N. Cooper and Director 
Sonera] for External Relations of the 
\immission of the European Communi- 
ng Sir Roy Denman lead U.S. and EC 
(■legations, respectively. 

Deposit of Honduras-El Salvador 
Peace Treaty in OAS ceremony. 

No\ ember 19 

10th General Assembly of the Orga- 
lization of American States (OAS) is 
leld in Washington, D.C. Novem- 
ber i;>-26. 

By a vote of 111 to 22, with 12 ab- 
stentions, U.N. General Assembly repeats 
its call for the Soviet Union to withdraw 
iroops from Afghanistan. 

No\ ember 23 

Miami Conference on Caribbean 
Trade, Investment, and Development is 
held November 23-25 in Florida. U.S. 
is represented by Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs, William G. 
Bowdler, and Counselor Rozanne L. 

High-level foreign participation is 
represented by Costa Rican President 
Carazo; Prime Ministers Seaga, of 
Jamaica; Adams, of Barbados; Charles, 
of Dominica; Vice President Alfara, of 
Costa Rica; and a number of Minister- 
level representatives from the Caribbean 

November 24 

U.S.-Venezuela exchange instru- 
ments of ratification of the Maritime 
Boundary Treaty. 

N^ ember 25 

The Government of Upper Volta is 
overthrown in a military coup d'etat led 
by Col. Saye Zerbo, a former foreign 
minister and the commander of armed 
forces in Ouagadougou. 

November 29 

Secretary Muskie makes official visit 
to Mexico, November 29-December 1 to 
review work of U.S. -Mexico Consultative 

November 30 

Uruguay holds plebiscite on new 
constitution proposed by ruling military. 
Proposed count was rejected by 
approximately 55' c of voters. ■ 




11 1 


10 31 

312 10/31 



11 2 
11 3 

Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from 
the Office of Press Relations. Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 


Muskie: news conference 
U.S. -Gabon sign Inter- 
country Agreement. 

Oceans and Interna- 
tional, Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs 
Advisory Committee, 
Nov. 10. 

Muskie : interview on 
"Issues and Answers." 

Shipping Coordinating 
Committee (SCC), 
Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working 
group on radiocom- 
munication, Nov. 20. 

SCC, SOLAS, working 
group on ship design 
and equipment, 
Nov. 20. 

Muskie: question-and- 
answer session with 
radio station WOR. 

Thomas D. Boyatt sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Colombia (biographic 

Muskie: interview for 
National Public 
Radio, Oct. 31. 

Advisory Committee on 
International Invest- 
ment, Technology, and 
Development, working 
group on international 
data flows, Dec. 3. 

U.S.-Socialist Republic 
of Romania sign tex- 
tile agreement, Sept. 3 
and Nov. 3. 

U.S. -Micronesia initial a 
compact of free asso- 

International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), study group 
l,Dec. 10. 

CCIR, study group 4, 
Dec. 17. 

U.S.-Socialist Republic 
of Romania amend 
bilateral textile 

Muskie: remarks before 
the General Assembly 
of the OAS. 


11 21 

-315 11/3 

*316 10/29 

'317 11/5 

*318 11/7 

*319 11/17 

*320 11/17 

321 11/17 

-322 11/17 


327 11/21 

»328 n/25 

*329 11/25 

330 11/25 

|331 11/26 

Jamaican Prime Minis- 
ter Edward Seaga 

gives keynote address 
at the M iami Confer- 
ence on Caribbean 

Trade, Investment, 
and Development, Key 
Biscayne, Nov. 23-25. 

U.S.-Venezuela exchange 
instruments of ratifi- 
cation of Maritime 
Boundary Treaty. 

CCIR, study group 2, 
Dec. 12. 

Advisory Committee on 
International Invest- 
ment, Technology, and 
Development, working 
group on accounting 
standards and U.N./ 
OECD investment 
undertakings, Dec. 15. 

Advisory Committee on 
International Invest- 
ment, Technology, and 
Development, working 
group on transborder 
data flows, Dec. 2. 

Status of the World's 
Nations , 1980 , Depart- 
ment of State publica- 
tion 8735, released. 

* Not printed in the Bulletin. 
f Held for a later issue. ■ 


Press releases may be obtained from 
the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations, 799 United Nations 
Plaza, New York N.Y. 10017. 


Ambassador McCall re- 
turns from the Carib- 

Statement on Puerto 

Muskie: Jerusalem, Secu- 
rity Council. 

U.S. delegation to 11th 
Special Session on De- 

McHenry: Zimbabwe 
mbership, General As- 













325 11/19 

January 1981 



January 1981 
/ol. 81, No. 2046 

Afghanistan. General Assembly 
Votes on Afghanistan Situation 
(McHenry, text of resolu- 
tion) 30 


Lfrica and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1 

Chronology, November 1980 40 


kSEAN-U.S. Dialogue (joint press 

statement) 12 

ipanese Relations in the 
1980s (Holbrooke) 14 

hina. U.S. -China Sign Grain 
Agreement (White House state- 
ment) 13 

'ommodities. U.S. -China Sign Grain 
Agreement (White House state- 
ment) 13 

'undress. International Narcotics 

ntrol in the 1980s (Falco) ... 29 

>epartment and Foreign Service 

foreign Service Act, 1980 (Carter) 11 
rt History of the U.S. Depart- 
ment of State, 1781-1981 Si 


Africa and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1 

U3EAN-U.S. Dialogue (joint press 

statement) 12 

Securing a Safer Future (Muskie). 3 

"S -Japanese Relations in the 
1980s ( Holbrooke) 14 


Securing a Safer Future (Muskie) . 3 
srael Oil Agreement (Carter, 
Modai, text of agreement, 
memorandum of agreement, De- 
partment fact sheet) 24 

.S.- Japanese Relations in the 1980s 
(Holbrooke) 14 


rhronology, November 1980 40 

Strengthening the CSCE Process 

(Bell) 18 

Human Rights 

Africa and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1 

General Assembly Votes on Afghan- 
istan Situation (McHenry, text 
of resolution) 30 

Human Rights and International 

Law (Derian) 21 

Refugees: The U.S. Response (Mus- 
kie) 5 

Southern Africa: Four Years Later 

(Moose) 8 

Strengthening the CSCE Process 

(Bell) 18 

10th General Assembly of the OAS 

(Carter, Muskie) 33 

Indonesia. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

(joint press statement) 12 

International Organizations and 


Chronology, November 1980 40 

Strengthening the CSCE Process 

(Bell) 18 


Iran Chronology, November 1980 . . 28 

U.S. Hostages in Iran (Muskie) ... 25 

Israel. U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement 
(Carter, Modai, text of agree- 
ment, memorandum of agree- 
ment, Department fact sheet).. 24 

Japan. U.S. -Japanese Relations in 

the 1980s (Holbrooke) 14 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Chronology, November 1980 40 

10th General Assembly of the OAS 

(Carter, Muskie) 33 

Madrid. Strengthening the CSCE 

Process (Bell) 18 

Malaysia. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

(joint press statement) 12 

Middle East. Chronology, Novem- 
ber 1980 40 

Narcotics. International Narcotics 

Control in the 1980s (Falco) ... 29 


Africa and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1 

Southern Africa : Four Years Later 

(Moose) 8 

Nuclear Policy. Securing a Safer 

Future (Muskie) 3 

Organization of American States. 
10th General Assembly of the 
OAS (Carter, Muskie) 33 

Petroleum. U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement 
(Carter, Modai, text of agree- 
ment, memorandum of agree- 
ment, Department fact sheet).. 24 

Philippines. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

( joint press statement) 12 

Poland. Poland (Carter, White 

House statement) 20 

Population. Securing a Safer Future 

(Muskie) 3 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Service Act, 1980 11 

Poland (Carter. White House state- 
ment) 20 

U.S. -China Sign Grain Agreement 

(White House statement) 13 

U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement (('alter. 
Modai, text of agreement, 
memorandum of agreement, De- 
partment fact sheet) 24 

Publications 42 

Refugees. Refugees: The U.S. Re- 
sponse (Muskie) 5 

Security Assistance 

Securing a Safer Future (Muskie) 3 

U.S. -Japanese Relations in the 

1980s (Holbrooke) 11 

Singapore. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

(joint press statement) 12 

South Africa. Southern Africa: 

Four Years Later (Moose) .... 8 

Thailand. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

(joint press statement) 12 


Current Actions 36 

Human Rights and International 

Law (Derian) 21 

U.S. -China Sign Grain Agreement 

(White House statement) .... 13 

U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement (Carter, 
Modai, text of agreement, 
memorandum of agreement, De- 
partment fact sheet) 24 

United Nations. General Assembly 
Votes on Afghanistan Situation 
(McHenry, text of resolution). 30 


Africa and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1 

Southern Africa: Four Years Later 

(Moose) 8 

Name Index 

Bell, Griffin B 18 

Carter, President 11,20,24,33 

Derian, Patricia M 21 

Falco, Mathea 29 

Holbrooke, Richard C 14 

McHenry, Donald F 30 

Modai, Yitzhak 24 

Moose, Richard M 8 

Muskie, Secretary 5. 13, 25, 33 

Trask, David F SI 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 


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ily Record of Unipgjjjgjates Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2047 

m * 2 1981 

'*** -~T~ mi IBii-iiinn 

February 1981 

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Departmen 1 




ji "'"'"''If If ^ • 


^e Official Monthly Record of Unijggjgtates Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2047 

m * 2 1981 

Department at State 


Volume 81 / Number 2047 / February 1981 

Cover Photo: 

Ronald Wilson Reagan takes the oath 
of office as the 40th President of 
the United States on January 20, 1981 
Chief Justice Warren Burger (right) 
administers the oath while 
Mrs. Reagan and 
Senator Mark Hatfield 
witness the event. 

( White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick ) 

The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Acting Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

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the publication of this periodical is 
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1 Agreement on the Release of the American Hostages (Remarks by U.S. Of- 

ficials, Documentation on the Commitments and the Settlement of 

5 Iran Chronology, December 1980 

9 Iran Chronology, January 1981 

21 List of American Hostages 

The President 

22 President Carter's Farewell 
Address to the Nation 

The Secretary 



Resources for a Credible For- 
eign Policy (Secretary Muskie) 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed 
on "Meet the Press" (Ex- 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed 
on the "MacNeil/Lehrer 


31 Proposed Chad-Libya Merger 
(Department Statement) 




U.S.-Canada Technical Meeting 

on Dioxin (Joint Statement) 
Air Pollution Legislation 

East Asia 

33 Two Years of U.S.-China Rela- 
tions (Chronology) 

43 Orderly Departure Program for 

Vietnamese (Department 


44 U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy in 

the Western Hemisphere 
(Ernest B. Johnston, Jr.) 

46 Trade With the Soviet Union 

(President Carter's Letter to 
Senator Jackson) 


47 Energy: Continuing Crisis 

(Deane R. Hinton) 


50 North Atlantic Council Meets in 
Brussels (Final Communique, 
Declaration, Minutes Extracts) 

52 22d Report on Cyprus (Message 

to the Congress) 

53 President Meets With Chan- 

cellor Schmidt (White House 

Human Rights 

53 Convention on Elimination of 

Discrimination Against 
Women Sent to Senate 
(Message to the Senate) 

54 Bill of Rights Day, Human 

Rights Day and Week, 1980 

Middle East 



Western Sahara Dispute (Harold 

H. Saunders) 
U.S., Israel Settle Claim on 

U.S.S. Liberty (Department 



56 Law of the Sea (George H. 

South Asia 

59 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 

(President Carter) 

United Nations 

60 The United Nations and U.S. 

Policy (Richard L. McCall) 
62 U.S. Participation in the U.N., 
1979 (Message to the Con- 
64 World Court Hears U.S. Argu- 
ment on Transfer of WHO 
Regional Office (Stephen M. 

Western Hemisphere 

68 El Salvador (Department 


70 Current Actions 


72 December 1980 

Press Releases 

72 Department of State 


SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

The Inaugural Address of President Reagan 

Secretary-Designate Haig Appears Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

Secretary Haig's News Conference of January 28 

At a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on January 27, 1981, President Reagan 
officially welcomes 53 Americans who had been held hostage in Iran. 


Agreement on the Release 
of the American Hostages 

Following are announcements by President Carter and Secretary Muskie on 
the release of the 52 American hostages from Iran; two declarations of the 
Algerian Government initialed in Algiers by Deputy Secretary Christopher con- 
cerning the commitments made by the Governments of Iran and the United States 
and the settlement of claims; undertakings of the Governments of Iran and the 
United States with respect to the declaration; the escrow agreement; two 
statements of adherence by President Carter; ten Executive orders; President 
Carter's message to the Congress; the technical arrangement between the Central 
Bank of Algeria and the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York; a special briefing by former Secretary Muskie, former Treasury Secretary 
G. William Miller, and former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti; and remarks 
by President Reagan and L. Bruce Laingen, 



JAN. 19, 1981, 4:56 AM (EST), 


The President: I know you've been up all 
night with me and I appreciate that very 

We have now reached an agreement 
with Iran which will result, I believe, in 
the freedom of our American hostages. 
The last documents have now been signed 
in Algiers following the signing of the 
documents in Iran which will result in 
this agreement. We still have a few 
documents to sign before the money is ac- 
tually transferred and the hostages are 

The essence of the agreement is that 
following the release of our hostages then 
we will unfreeze and transfer to the Ira- 
nians a major part of the assets which 
were frozen by me when the Iranians 
seized our embassy compound and took 
our hostages. 

We have also reached complete 
agreement on the arbitration procedures 
between ourselves and Iran with the help 
of the Algerians which will resolve the 
claims that exist between residents of our 
nation and Iran and vice-versa. 

I particularly want to express my 
public thanks, as I have already done pri- 
vately, to the Algerians, to their Presi- 
dent, their Foreign Minister, Ben Yahia, 
and to the three-man negotiating teams 
who have done such a superb job in fair 
and equitable arbitration between our- 
selves and the officials of Iran. We don't 
yet know exactly how fast this procedure 
will go. We are prepared to move as 

rapidly as possible. All the preparations 
have been completed pending the final 
documents being signed. 

I will have more to say to you when 
our American hostages are actually free. 
In the meantime, Jody Powell will stay in 
close touch with developments, working 
with the Secretary of State, the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, my legal counsel, 
Lloyd Cutler; I'm talking frequently with 
Warren Christopher in Algiers and Jody 
Powell will keep you informed about de- 
velopments. Thank you very much. 

Q. How do you feel personally 
about having the hostages out before 
you leave office? 

The President: I'll wait until the 
hostages are released and then I'll have 
another statement to make. 

JAN. 19, 1981 2 

Tb My Colleagues in the Foreign Service 

The long and anguishing ordeal of our col- 
leagues held captive in Iran is almost 

They will soon be free. They will 
soon be home. 

They will be released on terms en- 
tirely consistent with our national honor. 

But our celebration of their release is 
muted by the suffering that has been so 
bravely endured. 

This has been a time of terrible trial 
— not only for our people held captive and 
their families, but for their friends and 
colleagues throughout this building and 

The unrelenting and selfless efforts 
of so many of you have finally achieved 
success. I congratulate and thank you for 
these efforts. And I commend the For- 
eign Service as a whole for its dedication 
and discipline throughout this period. 
Your caring, your efforts, your wise ad- 
vice have once again demonstrated the 
high standards of professionalism in a 
Service the nation is so fortunate to have. 

Edmund S. Muskie 

JAN. 19, 1981 2 


The Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria, having been re- 
quested by the Governments of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the United States of 
America to serve as an intermediary in seek- 
ing a mutually acceptable resolution of the 
crisis in their relations arising out of the de- 
tention of the 52 United States nationals in 
Iran, has consulted extensively with the two 
governments as to the commitments which 
each is willing to make in order to resolve the 
crisis within the framework of the four points 
stated in the resolution of November 2, 1980, 
of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran. 
On the basis of formal adherences received 
from Iran and the United States, the Govern- 
ment of Algeria now declares that the follow- 
ing interdependent commitments have been 
made by the two governments: 

February 1981 



The undertakings reflected in this Decla- 
ration are based on the following general prin- 

A. Within the framework of and pursuant 
to the provisions of the two Declarations of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, the United States will 
restore the financial position of Iran, in so far 
as possible, to that which existed prior to 
November 14, 1979. In this context, the United 
States commits itself to ensure the mobility 
and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its 
jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9. 

B. It is the purpose of both parties, 
within the framework of and pursuant to the 
provisions of the two Declarations of the Gov- 
ernment of the Democratic and Popular Re- 
public of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as 
between the Government of each party and 
the nationals of the other, and to bring about 
the settlement and termination of all such 
claims through binding arbitration. Through 
the procedures provided in the Declaration, re- 
lating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, 
the United States agrees to terminate all legal 
proceedings in United States courts involving 
claims of United States persons and insti- 
tutions against Iran and its state enterprises, 
to nullify all attachments and judgments ob- 
tained therein, to prohibit all further litigation 
based on such claims, and to bring about the 
termination of such claims through binding 

Point I: Non-intervention in Iranian Affairs 

1. The United States pledges that it is and 
from now on will be the policy of the United 
States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
politically or militarily, in Iran's internal af- 

Points II and III: Return of Iranian Assets 
and Settlement^ of U.S. Claims 

2. Iran and the United States (hereinafter 
"the parties") will immediately select a mutu- 
ally agreeable central bank (hereinafter "the 
Central Bank") to act, under the instructions 
of the Government of Algeria and the Central 
Bank of Algeria (hereinafter "the Algerian 
Central Bank") as depositary of the escrow and 
security funds hereinafter prescribed and will 
promptly enter into depositary arrangements 
with the Central Bank in accordance with the 
terms of this declaration. All funds placed in 
escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this 
declaration shall be held in an account in the 
name of the Algerian Central Bank. Certain 
procedures for implementing the obligations 
set forth in this Declaration and in the Decla- 
ration of the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of Algeria concerning the settlement of claims 
by the Government of the United States and 

• eminent of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (hereinafter "the Claims Settlement 
Agreement") an- separately set forth in cer- 
tain Undertaking.- of the Government of the 

United States of America and the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to 
the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria. 

3. The depositary arrangements shall 
provide that, in the event that the Govern- 
ment of Algeria certifies to the Algerian Cen- 
tral Bank that the 52 U.S. nationals have 
safely departed from Iran, the Algerian Cen- 
tral Bank will thereupon instruct the Central 
Bank to transfer immediately all monies or 
other assets in escrow with the Central Bank 
pursuant to this declaration, provided that at 
any time prior to the making of such certifica- 
tion by the Government of Algeria, each of the 
two parties, Iran and the United States, shall 
have the right on seventy-two hours notice to 
terminate its commitments under this declara- 

If such notice is given by the United 
States and the foregoing certification is made 
by the Government of Algeria within the 
seventy-two hour period of notice, the Alge- 
rian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the 
Central Bank to transfer such monies and as- 
sets. If the seventy-two hour period of notice 
by the United States expires without such a 
certification having been made, or if the notice 
of termination is delivered by Iran, the Alge- 
rian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the 
Central Bank to return all such monies and as- 
sets to the United States, and thereafter the 
commitments reflected in this declaration shall 
be of no further force and effect. 


4. Commencing upon completion of the 
requisite escrow arrangements with the Cen- 
tral Bank, the United States will bring about 
the transfer to the Central Bank of all gold 
bullion which is owned by Iran and which is in 
the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, together with all other Iranian as- 
sets (or the cash equivalent thereof) in the 
custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow 
until such time as their transfer or return is 
required by Paragraph 3 above. 


5. Commencing upon the completion of the 
requisite escrow arrangements with the Cen- 
tral Bank, the United States will bring about 
the transfer to the Central Bank, to the ac- 
count of the Algerian Central Bank, of all Ira- 
nian deposits and securities which on or after 
November 14, 1979, stood upon the books of 
overseas banking offices of U.S. banks, to- 
gether with interest thereon through Decem- 
ber 31, 1980, to be held by the Central Bank, to 
the account of the Algerian Central Bank, in 
escrow until such time as their transfer or re- 
turn is required in accordance with Paragraph 
3 of this Declaration. 


6. Commencing with the adherence by 
Iran and the United States to this declaration 
and the claims settlement agreement attached 
hereto, and following the conclusion of ar- 
rangements with the Central Bank for the es- 
tablishment of the interest-bearing security 
account specified in that agreement and Para- 
graph 7 below, which arrangements will be 
concluded within 30 days from the date of this 
Declaration, the United States will act to 
bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, 
within six months from such date, of all Ira- 
nian deposits and securities in U.S. banking 
institutions in the United States, together 
with interest thereon, to be held by the Cen- 
tral Bank in escrow until such time as their 
transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3. 

7. As funds are received by the Central 
Bank pursuant to Paragraph 6 above, the 
Algerian Central Bank shall direct the Central 
Bank to (1) transfer one-half of each such re- 
ceipt to Iran and (2) place the other half in a 
special interest-bearing security account in the 
Central Bank, until the balance in the security 
account has reached the level of $1 billion. 
After the $1 billion balance has been achieved, 
the Algerian Central Bank shall direct all 
funds received pursuant to Paragraph 6 to be 
transferred to Iran. All funds in the security 
account are to be used for the sole purpose of 
securing the payment of, and paying, claims 
against Iran in accordance with the claims 
settlement agreement. Whenever the Central 
Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the bal- 
ance in the security account has fallen below 
$500 million, Iran shall promptly make new 
deposits sufficient to maintain a minimum bal- 
ance of $500 million in the account. The ac- 
count shall be so maintained until the Presi- 
dent of the Arbitral Tribunal established pur- 
suant to the claims settlement agreement has 
certified to the Central Bank of Algeria that 
all arbitral awards against Iran have been 
satisfied in accordance with the claims settle- 
ment agreement, at which point any amount 
remaining in the security account shall be 
transferred to Iran. 


8. Commencing with the adherence of Iran 
and the United States to this declaration and 
the attached claims settlement agreement and 
the conclusion of arrangements for the estab- 
lishment of the security account, which ar- 
rangements will be concluded within 30 days 
from the date of this Declaration, the United 
States will act to bring about the transfer to 
the Central Bank of all Iranian financial assets 
(meaning funds or securities) which are located 
in the United States and abroad, apart from 
those assets referred to in Paragraph 5 and 6 
above, to be held by the Central Bank in es- 
crow until their transfer or return is required 
by Paragraph 3 above. 

Department of State Bulletin 


9. Commencing with the adherence by 
Iran and the United States to this declaration 
and the attached claims settlement agreement 
and the making by the Government of Algeria 
of the certification described in Paragraph 3 
above, the United States will arrange, subject 
to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior 
to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran 
of all Iranian properties which are located in 
the United States and abroad and which are 
not within the scope of the preceding para- 


10. Upon the making by the Government 
of Algeria of the certification described in 
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will re- 
voke all trade sanctions which were directed 
against Iran in the period November 4, 1979, 
to date. 

11. Upon the making by the Government 
of Algeria of the certification described in 
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 
promptly withdraw all claims now pending 
against Iran before the International Court of 
Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude 
the prosecution against Iran of any pending or 
future claim of the United States or a United 
States national arising out of events occurring 
before the date of this declaration related to 

( A) the seizure of the 52 United States nation- 
als on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent 
detention, (C) injury to United States prop- 
erty or property of the United States nationals 
within the United States Embassy compound 
in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and (D) in- 
jury to the United States nationals or their 
property as a result of popular movements in 
the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
which were not an act of the Government of 
Iran. The United States will also bar and pre- 
clude the prosecution against Iran in the 
courts of the United States of any pending or 
future claim asserted by persons other than 
the United States nationals arising out of the 
events specified in the preceding sentence. 

Point IV: Return of the Assets of the Family 
of the Former Shah 

12. Upon the making by the Government 
of Algeria of the certification described in 
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 
freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property 
and assets in the United States within the con- 
trol of the estate of the former Shah or of any 
close relative of the former Shah served as a 
defendant in U.S. litigation brought by Iran to 
recover such property and assets as belonging 
to Iran. As to any such defendant, including 
the estate of the former Shah, the freeze order 
will remain in effect until such litigation is fi- 
nally terminated. Violation of the freeze order 
shall be subject to the civil and criminal penal- 
ties prescribed by U.S. law. 

13. Upon the making by the Government 
of Algeria of the certification described in 
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 

order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to 
report to the U.S. Treasury within 30 days, for 
transmission to Iran, all information known to 
them, as of November 3, 1979, and as of the 
date of the order, with respect to the property 
and assets referred to in Paragraph 12. Viola- 
tion of the requirement will be subject to the 
civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. 

14. Upon the making by the Government 
of Algeria of the certification described in 
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 
make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts, 
that in any litigation of the kind described in 
Paragraph 12 above the claims of Iran should 
not be considered legally barred either by 
sovereign immunity principles or by the act of 
state doctrine and that Iranian decrees and 
judgments relating to such assets should be 
enforced by such courts in accordance with 
United States law. 

15. As to any judgment of a U.S. court 
which calls for the transfer of any property or 
assets to Iran, the United States hereby 
guarantees the enforcement of the final judg- 
ment to the extent that the property or assets 
exist within the United States. 

16. If any dispute arises between the par- 
ties as to whether the United States has ful- 
filled any obligation imposed upon it by Para- 
graphs 12-15, inclusive, Iran may submit the 
dispute to binding arbitration by the tribunal 
established by, and in accordance with the pro- 
visions of, the claims settlement agreement. If 
the tribunal determines that Iran has suffered 
a loss as a result of a failure by the United 
States to fulfill such obligation, it shall make 
an appropriate award in favor of Iran which 
may be enforced by Iran in the courts of any 
nation in accordance with its laws. 


17. If any other dispute arises between 
the parties as to the interpretation or per- 
formance of any provision of this declaration, 
either party may submit the dispute to binding 
arbitration by the tribunal established by, and 
in accordance with the provisions of, the claims 
settlement agreement. Any decision of the tri- 
bunal with respect to such dispute, including 
any award of damages to compensate for a loss 
resulting from a breach of this declaration or 
the claims settlement agreement, may be en- 
forced by the prevailing party in the courts of 
any nation in accordance with its laws. 

Initialed on January 19, 1981 

by Warren M. Christopher 

Deputy Secretary of State 

of the Government of the United States 

By virtue of the powers vested in him by his 

Government as deposited with the 

Government of Algeria 


The Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria, on the basis of 
formal notice of adherence received from the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the Government of the United States of 
America, now declares that Iran and the 
United States have agreed as follows: 


Iran and the United States will promote 
the settlement of the claims described in Arti- 
cle II by the parties directly concerned. Any 
such claims not settled within six months from 
the date of entry into force of this agreement 
shall be submitted to binding third-party arbi- 
tration in accordance with the terms of this 
agreement. The aforementioned six months' 
period may be extended once by three months 
at the request of either party. 


1. An International Arbitral Tribunal (the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby 
established for the purpose of deciding claims 
of nationals of the United States against Iran 
and claims of nationals of Iran against the 
United States, and any counterclaim which 
arises out of the same contract, transaction or 
occurrence that constitutes the subject matter 
of that national's claim, if such claims and 
counterclaims are outstanding on the date of 
this agreement, whether or not filed with any 
court, and arise out of debts, contracts (includ- 
ing transactions which are the subject of let- 
ters of credit or bank guarantees), expropria- 
tions or other measures affecting property 
rights, excluding claims described in Para- 
graph 11 of the Declaration of the Government 
of Algeria of January 19, 1981, and claims aris- 
ing out of the actions of the United States in 
response to the conduct described in such 
paragraph, and excluding claims arising under 
a binding contract between the parties specifi- 
cally providing that any disputes thereunder 
shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the com- 
petent Iranian courts in response to the Majlis 

2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdic- 
tion over official claims of the United States 
and Iran against each other arising out of con- 
tractual arrangements between them for the 
purchase and sale of goods and services. 

3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as 
specified in Paragraphs 16-17 of the Declara- 
tion of the Government of Algeria of January 
19, 1981 over any dispute as to the interpreta- 
tion or performance of any provision of that 

February 1981 



1. The Tribunal shall consist of nine mem- 
bers or such larger multiple of three as Iran 
and the United States may agree are neces- 
sary to conduct its business expeditiously. 
Within ninety days after the entry into force of 
this agreement, each government shall appoint 
one-third of the members. Within thirty days 
after their appointment, the members so ap- 
pointed shall by mutual agreement select the 
remaining third of the members and appoint 
one of the remaining third President of the 
Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the full 
Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the 
Tribunal as the President shall determine. 
Each such panel shall be composed by the 
President and shall consist of one member ap- 
pointed by each of the three methods set forth 

2. Members of the Tribunal shall be ap- 
pointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its 
business in accordance with the arbitration 
rules of the United Nations Commission on In- 
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except 
to the extent modified by the parties or by the 
Tribunal to ensure that this agreement can be 
carried out. The UNCITRAL rules for ap- 
pointing members of three-member Tribunals 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appoint- 
ment of the Tribunal. 

3. Claims of nationals of the United 
States and Iran that are within the scope of 
this agreement shall be presented to the Tri- 
bunal either by claimants themselves, or, in 
the case of claims of less than $250,000, by the 
Government of such national. 

4. No claim may be filed with the Tribu- 
nal more than one year after the entry into 
force of this agreement or six months after the 
date the President is appointed, whichever is 
later. These deadlines do not apply to the pro- 
cedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17 
of the Declaration of the Government of 
Algeria of January 19, 1981. 


1. All decisions and awards of the Tribu- 
nal shall be final and binding. 

2. The President of the Tribunal shall cer- 
tify, as prescribed in Paragraph 7 of the Decla- 
ration of the Government of Algeria of January 
19, 1981, when all arbitral awards under this 
agreement have been satisfied. 

3. Any award which the Tribunal may 
render against either government shall be en- 
forceable against such government in the 
courts of any nation in accordance with its 


The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the 
basis of respect for law, applying such choice of 
law rules and principles of commercial and in- 
ternational law as the Tribunal determines to 
b<- applicable, taking into account relevant 

usages of the trade, contract provisions and 
changed circumstances. 


1. The seat of the Tribunal shall be The 
Hague, The Netherlands, or any other place 
agreed by Iran and the United States. 

2. Each government shall designate an 
agent at the seat of the Tribunal to represent 
it to the Tribunal and to receive notices or 
other communications directed to it or to its 
nationals, agencies, instrumentalities, or en- 
tities in connection with proceedings before the 

3. The expenses of the Tribunal shall be 
borne equally by the two governments. 

4. Any question concerning the interpre- 
tation or application of this agreement shall be 
decided by the Tribunal upon the request of 
either Iran or the United States. 


For the purposes of this agreement: 

1. A "national" of Iran or of the United 
States, as the case may be, means (a) a natural 
person who is a citizen of Iran or the United 
States; and (b) a corporation or other legal en- 
tity which is organized under the laws of Iran 
or the United States or any of its states or ter- 
ritories, the District of Columbia or the Com- 
monwealth of Puerto Rico, if, collectively, nat- 
ural persons who are citizens of such country 
hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in such 
corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per 
cent or more of its capital stock. 

2. "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the 
United States, as the case may be, means 
claims owned continuously, from the date on 
which the claim arose to the date on which this 
agreement enters into force, by nationals of 
that state, including claims that are owned in- 
directly by such nationals through ownership 
of capital stock or other proprietary interests 
in juridical persons, provided that the owner- 
ship interests of such nationals, collectively, 
were sufficient at the time the claim arose to 
control the corporation or other entity, and 
provided, further, that the corporation or 
other entity is not itself entitled to bring a 
claim under the terms of this agreement. 
Claims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall, 
as of the date of filing of such claims with the 
Tribunal, be considered excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the 
United States, or of any other court. 

3. "Iran" means the Government of Iran, 
any political subdivision of Iran, and any 
agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by 
the Government of Iran or any political sub- 
division thereof. 

4. The "United States" means the Gov- 
ernment of the United States, any political 
subdivision of the United States, any agency, 
instrumentality or entity controlled by the 
Government of the United States or any politi- 
cal subdivision thereof. 


This agreement shall enter into force 
when the Government of Algeria has received 
from both Iran and the United States a notifi- 
cation of adherence to the agreement. 

Initialed on January 19, 1981 

by Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State 
of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his 
Government as deposited with the Govern- 
ment of Algeria 

JAN. 19, 1981 3 









1. At such time as the Algerian Central Bank 
notifies the Governments of Algeria, Iran, and 
the United States that it has been notified by 
the Central Bank that the Central Bank has 
received for deposit in dollar, gold bullion, and 
securities accounts in the name of the Algerian 
Central Bank, as escrow agent, cash and other 
funds, 1,632,917.779 ounces of gold (valued by 
the parties for this purpose at $0.9397 billion), 
and securities (at face value) in the aggregate 
amount of $7,955 billion, Iran shall immedi- 
ately bring about the safe departure of the 52 
U.S. nationals detained in Iran. Upon the mak- 
ing by the Government of Algeria of the cer- 
tification described in Paragraph 3 of the Dec- 
laration, the Algerian Central Bank will issue 
the instructions required by the following 

2. Iran having affirmed its intention to 
pay all its debts and those of its controlled in- 
stitutions, the Algerian Central Bank acting 
pursuant to Paragraph 1 above will issue the 
following instructions to the Central Bank: 

(A) To transfer $3,667 billion to the Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank of New York to pay the un- 
paid principal of and interest through Decem- 
ber 31, 1980 on (1) all loans and credits made by 
a syndicate of banking institutions, of which a 
U.S. banking institution is a member, to the 
Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumen- 
talities or controlled entities, and (2) all loans 
and credits made by such a syndicate which 
are guaranteed by the Government of Iran or 
any of its agencies, instrumentalities or con- 
trolled entities. 

Department of State Bulletin 


(B) To retain $1,418 billion in the escrow 
account for the purpose of paying the unpaid 
principal of the interest owing, if any, on the 
loans and credits referred to in Paragraph (A) 
after application of the $3,667 billion and on all 
other indebtedness held by United States 
banking institutions of, or guaranteed by, the 
Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumen- 
talities or controlled entities not previously 
paid and for the purpose of paying disputed 
amounts of deposits, assets, and interests, if 
any. owing on Iranian deposits in U.S. banking 
institutions. Bank Markazi and the appropriate 
United States banking institutions shall 
promptly meet in an effort to agree upon the 
amounts owing. 

In the event of such agreement, the Bank 
Markazi and the appropriate banking institu- 
tion shall certify the amount owing to the Cen- 
tral Bank of Algeria which shall instruct the 

Bank of England to credit such amount to the 
account, as appropriate, of the Bank Markazi 
or of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
in order to permit payment to the appropriate 
banking institution. In the event that within 30 
days any U.S. banking institution and the 
Bank Markazi are unable to agree upon the 
amounts owed, either party may refer such 
dispute to binding arbitration by such interna- 
tional arbitration panel as the parties may 
agree, or failing such agreement within 30 ad- 
ditional days after such reference, by the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The pre- 
siding officer of such panel or tribunal shall 
certify to the Central Bank of Algeria the 
amount, if any, determined by it to be owed, 
whereupon the Central Bank of Algeria shall 
instruct the Bank of England to credit such 
amount to the account of the Bank Markazi or 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 

order to permit payment to the appropriate 
banking institution. After all disputes are re- 
solved either by agreement or by arbitration 
award and appropriate payment has been 
made, the balance of the funds referred to in 
this Paragraph (B) shall be paid to Bank 

(C) To transfer immediately to, or upon 
the order of, the Bank Markazi all assets in the 
escrow account in excess of the amounts re- 
ferred to in Paragraphs (A) and (B). 

Initialed on January 19, 1981 

by Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State 
of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his 
Government as deposited with the Govern- 
ment of Algeria 

Iran Chronology, 
December 1980 

December 1 

Deputy Secretary Christopher, accom- 
panied by the same delegation that went to 
Algiers with him on Nov. 10-11, departs for 
Algiers to meet with Foreign Minister 
Mohammed Benyahia and to brief Algerian in- 
termediaries thoroughly on the "clarifications" 
that Iran requested on the original U.S. 
response to its conditions for release of 

December 2 

U.S. reply to Iran clarifying U.S. posi- 
tion on release of the hostages is delivered 
to Algerian intermediaries. 

December 4 

Through Algerian intermediaries, U.S. 
asks Iran to speed up discussions on releas- 
ing hostages to avoid delays if the crisis is 
not resolved before the inauguration. The 
U.S. also emphasizes to Iranian officials that 
President-elect Reagan supports the U.S. 
position, and the Iranians must understand 
that if the issue is not settled by January 20, 
more time will be needed to resolve the 
crisis because the new Administration will 
have to select new negotiators and review 
current policy. 

December 11 

In Beirut, a leftist newspaper, As Safir, 
reports that the hostages would be released 
on Christmas day; however, the head of the 
Iranian hostage commission denies the 

December 13 

In Alexandria, Virginia, State Depart- 
ment officials brief hostages' families on 
negotiations with Iran. Deputy Secretary 
Christopher informs them that negotiations, 
through the intermediaries, are hampered by 
language problems. 

December 15 

Bani-Sadr emphasizes that the fate of 
the hostages rests on the U.S. unfreezing 
Iranian assets held in U.S. banks. 

December 16 

Khomeini approves Iran's "final answer" 
on conditions for releasing hostages. In 
Washington, U.S. officials caution against ex- 
pecting any quick solution to the problem. 

December 18 

Iran's new terms for release of hostages 
are delivered to Algerian intermediaries. 

December 19 

In exchange for freeing the hostages 
Iran's new terms demand that the U.S.: 

• Deposit Iranian funds frozen by 
President Carter in the Algerian Central 
Bank; and 

• Return property owned by the late 
Shah and his family. 

December 20 

U.S. views Iran's conditions as unaccept- 

December 21 

Iran demands $24 billion in "guarantees" 
from the U.S. for recovery of its frozen 
assets and the late Shah's wealth. 

December 22 

Speaker of Iran's Parliament states 
hostages will be put on trial if the $24 billion 
demand is not met. 

December 25 

For the second year, the hostages at- 
tend makeshift Christmas services. Mon- 
signor Annibale Bungnini, the Papal Nuncio 
in Iran, helps officiate at the services. 

Iranian TV broadcasts a brief film of the 
services but plans to release a longer film to 
distribute by satellite to American TV net- 
works on which hostages are said to send 
greetings to families and messages to U.S. 

December 26 

Algerian Ambassador to Tehran, Abdel- 
karim Gheraieb, visits the 52 hostages and 
finds them "all in good health and the condi- 
tions of their present existence satisfactory." 

CBS and Cable News Network televise 
remarks of 20 of the 52 hostages made on 
Christmas day in Iran. 

Iranian authorities release film of 15 
more hostages raising the number shown to 
41. Iranian officials state that the remaining 
11 not appearing chose not to do so. 

Algerian delegation arrives in 

Secretary Muskie meets with Algerian 
intermediaries to discuss keeping the in- 
direct negotiations with Iran open. Inter- 
mediaries encourage Carter Administration 
to keep negotiations going. 

December 28 

After Iran publicizes portions of recent 
exchanges, the U.S. publicizes formal pro- 
posals sent to Iran over the last 2 months. 
Proposals and supporting material contained 
in three separate documents — one on 
November 11 and two on December 3 — are 

December 29 

U.S. releases response to Iranian Nov. 2 

U.S. tells Iran that its "basic position" 
will not change despite Iran's demand for 
financial guarantees in advance of freeing 
the hostages. 

December 30 

U.S. gives Algerians a "reformulation" 
of proposals giving Iran an opportunity to 
end the crisis during the Carter Administra- 

December 31 

Algerian intermediaries depart U.S. for 
Algiers. ■ 


JAN. 19, 1981 3 

This Escrow Agreement is among the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the 
"FED") acting as fiscal agent of the United 
States, Bank Markazi Iran, as an interested 
party, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie act- 
ing as Escrow Agent. 

This Agreement is made to implement the 
relevant provisions of the Declaration of the 
Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981 (the 
"Declaration"). These provisions concern the 
establishment of escrow arrangements for Ira- 
nian property tied to the release of United 
States nationals being held in Iran. 

1. In accordance with the obligations set 
forth in paragraph 4 of the Declaration, and 
commencing upon the entry into force of this 
Agreement, the Government of the United 
States will cause the FED to: 

(A) Sell, at a price which is the average 
for the middle of the market, bid and ask 
prices for the three business days prior to the 
sale, all U.S. Government securities in its 
custody or control as of the date of sale, which 
are owned by the Government of Iran, or its 
agencies, instrumentalities or controlled en- 
tities; and 

(B) Transfer to the Bank of England as 
depositary for credit to accounts on its books in 
the name of the Banque Centrale dAlgerie, as 
Escrow Agent under this Agreement, all secu- 
rities (other than the aforementioned U.S. 
Government securities), funds (including the 
proceeds from the sale of the aforementioned 
U.S. Government securities), and gold bullion 
of not less than the same fineness and quality 
as that originally deposited by the Govern- 
ment of Iran, or its agencies, instrumentalities 
or controlled entities, which are in the custody 
or control of the FED and owned by the Gov- 
ernment of Iran, or its agencies, instrumen- 
talities or controlled entities as of the date of 
such transfer. 

When the FED transfers the above Ira- 
nian property to the Bank of England, the 
FED will promptly send to the Banque Cen- 
trale d'Algerie a document containing all in- 
formation necessary to identify that Iranian 
property (type, source, character as principal 
or interest). 

Specific details relating to securities, 
funds and gold bullion to be transferred by the 
FED under this paragraph 1 are attached as 
Appendix A. 

2. Pursuant to the obligations set forth in 
paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the Declaration, the 
Government of the United States will cause 
Iranian deposits and securities in foreign 
branches and offices of United States banks, 
Iranian deposits and securities in domestic 
branches and offices of United States banks, 
and other Iranian assets (meaning funds or se- 
curities) held by persons or institutions subject 

jurisdiction of the United States, to be 
(erred to the FED, as fiscal agent of the 
at* , and then by the FED to the 
Bank of England for credit to the account on 

its books opened in the name of the Banque 
Centrale dAlgerie as Escrow Agent under this 
Agreement (the Iranian securities, funds and 
gold bullion mentioned in paragraph 1 above 
and deposits, securities and funds mentioned 
in this paragraph 2 are referred to collectively 
as "Iranian property"). 

3. Insofar as Iranian property is received 
by the Bank of England from the FED in ac- 
cordance with this Agreement, the Iranian 
property will be held by the Bank of England 
in the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie 
as Escrow Agent as follows: 

• The securities will be held in one or 
more securities custody accounts at the Bank 
of England in the name of the Banque Centrale 
d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this Agree- 

• The deposits and funds will be held in 
one or more dollar accounts opened at the 
Bank of England in the name of Banque Cen- 
trale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this 
Agreement. These deposits and funds will bear 
interest at rates prevailing in money markets 
outside the United States. 

• The gold bullion will be held in a gold 
bullion custody account at the Bank of Eng- 
land, in the name of the Banque Centrale 
d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this Agree- 

• It will be understood that the Banque 
Centrale d'Algerie shall have no liability for 
any reduction in the value of the securities, 
bullion, and monies held in its name as Escrow 
Agent at the Bank of England under the pro- 
visions of this Agreement. 

4. (a) As soon as the Algerian Govern- 
ment certifies in writing to the Banque Cen- 
trale d'Algerie that all 52 United States na- 
tionals identified in the list given by the 
United States Government to the Algerian 
Government in November, 1980, now being 
held in Iran, have safely departed from Iran, 
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie will immedi- 
ately give the instructions to the Bank of Eng- 
land specifically contemplated by the pro- 
visions of the Declaration and the Undertak- 
ings of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran with respect to the Declara- 
tion of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria, which are made 
part of this Agreement. The contracting par- 
ties resolve to work in good faith to resolve 
any difficulty that could arise in the course of 
implementing this Agreement. 

(b) In the event that 

(i) either the Government of Iran or 
the Government of the United States notifies 
the Government of Algeria in writing that it 
has given notice to terminate its commitments 
under the Declaration referred to above, and 

(ii) a period of 72 hours elapses after 
the receipt by the Government of Algeria of 
such notice, during which period the Banque 
Centrale d'Algerie has not given the Bank of 
England the instruction described in subpara- 
graph (a) above, the Banque Centrale 

d'Algerie will immediately give the instruc- 
tions to the Bank of England specifically con- 
templated by the provisions of the Declaration 
and the Undertakings of the Government of 
the United States of America and the Gov- 
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran with 
respect to the Declaration of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 

(c) If the certificate by the Government 
of Algeria referred to in subparagraph (a) has 
been given before the United States Govern- 
ment has effectively terminated its commit- 
ment under the Declaration, the Iranian prop- 
erty shall be transferred as provided in sub- 
paragraph (a) of this paragraph 4. 

(d) The funds and deposits held by the 
Bank of England under this Agreement will 
earn interest at rates prevailing in money 
markets outside the United States after their 
transfer to the account of the Banque Centrale 
d'Algerie, as Escrow Agent, with the Bank of 
England, and such interest will be included as 
part of the Iranian property for the purposes of 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph 4. 

5. On the date of the signing of this 
Agreement by the four parties hereto, the 
Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the FED will 
enter into a Technical Arrangement with the 
Bank of England to implement the provisions 
of this Agreement. 

Pursuant to that Technical Arrangement 
between the FED, the Bank of England and 
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, the FED shall 
reimburse the Bank of England for losses and 
expenses as provided in paragraph 10 thereof. 
The FED will not charge the Banque Centrale 
d'Algerie for any expenses or disbursements 
related to the implementation of this Agree- 

6. This Agreement will become effective 
as soon as it has been signed by the four par- 
ties to it and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie 
and the FED have entered into the Technical 
Arrangement with the Bank of England re- 
ferred to in paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 

7. Throughout its duration, this Agree- 
ment may be amended, canceled, or revoked 
only with the written concurrence of all four of 
the signatory parties. 

8. Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
considered as constituting, in whole or in part, 
a waiver of any immunity to which the Banque 
Centrale d'Algerie is entitled. 

9. A French language version of this 
Agreement will be prepared as soon as prac- 
ticable. The English and French versions will 
be equally authentic and of equal value. 

10. This Agreement may be executed in 
counterparts, each of which constitutes an 

In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto 
have signed this Agreement on January 20, 


Warren M. Christopher 

Department of State Bulletin 






Ernest T Patkikis 




Lakhdar Benouataf 


Securities, Gold Bullion, and Funds to be trans- 
ferred by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 

International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development Securities $35 million (face value) 
Gold Bullion 1,632,917.746 fine ounces of gold, 
good delivery, London bars of a 
fineness of 995 parts per 1,000 or 
Funds Approximately $1.38 billion 

JAN. 19, 1981 4 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, I hereby agree and adhere, on behalf 
of the United States of America, to the pro- 
visions of two Declarations that are being 
issued today by the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
relating to (1) the resolution of the current 
crisis between the United States and Iran 
arising out of the detention of the fifty-two 
United States nationals, and (2) the settle- 
ment of claims between the United States 
and Iran. The two Declarations shall consti- 
tute international agreements legally binding 
upon the United States and Iran upon the 
execution of an equivalent statement of 
agreement and adherence by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the delivery of both 
statements to the Government of the Demo- 
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 

Jimmy Carter 

By the authority vested in me as Presi- 
dent by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, I hereby agree and adhere, on 
behalf of the United States of America, to 
the provisions of the Undertakings of the 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria. These Undertakings 
shall constitute an international agreement 

legally binding upon the United States and 
Iran upon the execution of an equivalent 
statement of agreement and adherence by 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the delivery 
of both statements to the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 

Jimmy Carter 

JAN. 19, 1981* 

Direction Relating to Establishment of 
Escrow Accounts 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu- 
sual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy and economy of the 
United States upon which I based my decla- 
rations of national emergency in Executive 
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and 
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 
1980, in order to implement agreements with 
the Government of Iran, as reflected in 
Declarations of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the 
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being 
held as hostages and to the resolution of 
claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized to enter into, and to license, 
authorize, direct, and compel any appro- 
priate official and/or the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the 
United States, to enter into escrow or 
related agreements with a foreign central 
bank and with the Central Bank of Algeria 
under which certain money and other assets, 
as and when directed by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall be credited by the foreign 
central bank to an escrow account on its 
books in the name of the Central Bank of 
Algeria, for transfer to the Government of 
Iran if and when the Central Bank of Algeria 
receives from the Government of Algeria a 
certification that the 52 U.S. diplomats and 
nationals being held hostage in Iran have 
safely departed from Iran. Such agreements 
shall include other parties and terms as 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury 
to be appropriate to carry out the purposes 
of this Order. 

1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized to license, authorize, direct, and 
compel the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, as fiscal agent of the United States, to 

receive certain money and other assets in 
which Iran or its agencies, instrumentalities, 
or controlled entities have an interest and to 
hold or transfer such money and other 
assets, and any interest earned thereon, in 
such a manner as he deems necessary to ful- 
fill the rights and obligations of the United 
States under the Declaration of the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic and Popular Repub- 
lic of Algeria dated January 19, 1981, and 
the escrow and related agreements described 
in paragraph 1-101 of this Order. Such 
money and other assets may be held in inter- 
est-bearing form and where possible shall be 
invested with or through the entity holding 
the money or asset on the effective date of 
this Order. 

1-103. Compliance with this Executive 
Order, any other Executive Order licensing, 
authorizing, directing or compelling the 
transfer of the assets referred to in para- 
graphs 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order, or any 
regulations, instructions, or directions issued 
thereunder shall to the extent thereof be a 
full acquittance and discharge for all pur- 
poses of the obligation of the person making 
the same. No person shall be held liable in 
any court for or with respect to anything 
done or omitted in good faith in connection 
with the administration of, or pursuant to 
and in reliance on, such orders, regulations, 
instructions, or directions. 

1-104. The Attorney General shall seek 
to intervene in any litigation within the 
United States which arises out of this Order 
and shall, among other things, defend the 
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, 
each of its provisions. 

1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-106. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Direction to Transfer Iranian Government 


By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu- 
sual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy and economy of the 
United States upon which I based by decla- 
rations of national emergency in Executive 
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and 
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 
1980, in order to implement agreements with 
the Government of Iran, as reflected in 
Declarations of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 

February 1981 


dated January 19, 1981, relating to the 
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being 
held as hostages and to the resolution of 
claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran and in which Iran and the United 
States instruct and require that the assets 
described in this order shall be transferred 
as set forth below by the holders of such 
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the ef- 
fective date of this Order: 

1-101. The Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York is licensed, authorized, directed, 
and compelled to transfer to accounts at the 
Bank of England, and subsequently to trans- 
fer to accounts at the Bank of England estab- 
lished pursuant to an escrow agreement ap- 
proved by the Secretary of the Treasury, all 
gold bullion, and other assets (or the equiva- 
lent thereof) in its custody, of the Govern- 
ment of Iran, or its agencies, instrumental- 
ities or controlled entities. Such transfers 
shall be executed when and in the manner 
directed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
The Secretary of the Treasury is also author- 
ized to license, authorize, direct, and compel 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
engage in whatever further transactions he 
deems appropriate and consistent with the 
purposes of this Order, including any trans- 
actions related to the return of such bullion 
and other assets pursuant to the escrow 

1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations 
for acquiring or exercising any right, power, 
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or 
otherwise, including the license contained in 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, with respect to the properties 
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are 
revoked and withdrawn. 

(b) All rights, powers, and privileges 
relating to the properties described in Sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive 
from any attachment, injunction, other like 
proceedings or process, or other action in 
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at 
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and 
privileges of the Government of Iran and its 
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled 
entities, whether acquired by court order or 
otherwise, are nullified, and all persons 
claiming any such right, power, or privilege 
are hereafter barred from exercising the same. 

(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States are prohibited from 
acquiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege, whether by court order or other- 
wise, with respect to the properties (and any 
income earned thereon) referred to in Sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order. 

1-103. Compliance with this Order, any 
other Executive Order licensing, authorizing, 
directing, or compelling the transfer of the 
assets described in section 1-101 of this 
Order, or any regulations, instructions, or 
'iir'-i-tions issued thereunder shall to the ex- 

tent thereof be a full acquittance and dis- 
charge for all purposes of the obligation of 
the person making the same. No person shall 
be held liable in any court for or with respect 
to anything done or omitted in good faith in 
connection with the administration of, or 
pursuant to and in reliance on, such orders, 
regulations, instructions, or directions. 

1-104. The Attorney General shall seek 
to intervene in any litigation within the 
United States which arises out of this Order 
and shall, among other things, defend the 
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, 
each of its provisions. 

1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-106. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Direction to Transfer Iranian Government 
Assets Overseas 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu- 
sual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy and economy of the 
United States upon which I based my decla- 
rations of national emergency in Executive 
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and 
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 
1980, in order to implement agreements with 
the Government of Iran, as reflected in 
Declarations of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the 
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being 
held as hostages and to the resolution of 
claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran and in which Iran and the United 
States instruct and require that the assets 
described in this Order shall be transferred 
as set forth below by the holders of such 
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. Any branch or office of a United 
States bank or subsidiary thereof, which 
branch or office is located outside the terri- 
tory of the United States and which on or 
after 8:10 a.m. E.S.T. on November 14, 1979 

(a) has been or is in possession of funds or 
securities legally or beneficially owned by 
the Government of Iran or its agencies, 
instrumentalities, or controlled entities, or 

(b) has carried or is carrying on its books 
deposits standing to the credit of or bene- 
ficially owned by such Government, agen- 

cies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities, 
is licensed, authorized, directed, and com- 
pelled to transfer such funds, securities, and 
deposits, including interest from November 
14, 1979, at commercially reasonable rates, 
to the account of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York at the Bank of England, to be 
held or transferred as directed by the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury. The Secretary of the 
Treasury shall determine when the transfers 
required by this section shall take place. The 
funds, securities and deposits described in 
this section shall be further transferred as 
provided for in the Declaration of the Gov- 
ernment of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria and its Annex. 

1-102. Any banking institution subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States that 
has executed a set-off on or after November 
14, 1979, at 8:10 a.m. E.S.T against Iranian 
funds, securities, or deposits referred to in 
section 1-101 is hereby licensed, authorized, 
directed, and compelled to cancel such set-off 
and to transfer all funds, securities, and 
deposits which have been subject to such 
set-off, including interest from November 14, 
1979, at commercially reasonable rates, pur- 
suant to the provisions of section 1-101 of 
this Order. 

1-103. If the funds, securities, and 
deposits described in section 1-101 are not 
promptly transferred to the control of the 
Government of Iran, such funds, securities, 
and deposits shall be returned to the bank- 
ing institutions holding them on the effective 
date of this Order and the set-offs described 
in section 1-102 shall be in force as if this 
Order had not been issued and the status of 
all such funds, securities, deposits and set- 
offs shall be status quo ante. 

1-104. (a) All licenses and authorizations 
for acquiring or exercising any right, power, 
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or 
otherwise, including the license contained in 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, with respect to the properties 
described in sections 1-101 and 1-102 of this 
Order are revoked and withdrawn. 

(b) All rights, powers, and privileges 
relating to the properties described in sec- 
tions 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order and 
which derive from any attachment, injunc- 
tion, other like proceedings or process, or 
other action in any litigation after November 
14, 1979, at 8:10 a.m. E.S.T., including those 
derived from Section 535.504 of the Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations, other than 
rights, powers, and privileges of the Govern- 
ment of Iran and its agencies, instrumen- 
talities, and controlled entities, whether 
acquired by court order or otherwise, are 
nullified, and all persons claiming any such 
right, power, or privilege are hereafter 
barred from exercising the same. 

(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States are prohibited from ac- 
quiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege, whether by court order or other- 
wise, with respect to the properties (and any 
income earned thereon) referred to in sec- 
tions 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order. 

Department of State Bulletin 


1-105. Compliance with this Order, any 
other Executive Order licensing, authorizing, 
directing, or compelling the transfer of the 
assets described in sections 1-101 and 1102 
of this Order, or any regulations, instruc- 
tions, or directions issued thereunder shall 
to the extent thereof be a full acquittance 
and discharge for all purposes of the obliga- 
tion of the person making the same. No per- 
son shall be held liable in any court for or 
with respect to anything done or omitted in 
good faith in connection with the administra- 
tion of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, 
such orders, regulations, instructions, or 

1-106. The Attorney General shall seek 
to intervene in any litigation within the 
United States which arises out of this Order 
and shall, among other things, defend the 
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, 
each of its provisions. 

1-107. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-108. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Direction to Transfer Iranian Government 
Assets Held by Domestic Banks 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unusu- 
al and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy and economy of the 
United States upon which I based my decla- 
rations of national emergency in Executive 
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and 
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 
1980. in order to implement agreements with 
the Government of Iran, as reflected in 
Declarations of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the 
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals 
being held as hostages and to the resolution 
of claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran and in which Iran and the United 
States instruct and require that the assets 
described in this Order shall be transferred 
as set forth below by the holders of such 
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. Any branch or office of a banking 
institution subject to the jurisdiction of the 

Iran Chronology, 
January 1981 

January 2 

After 4 days of talks in Washington, 
Algerians deliver latest U.S. proposals to 

January 3 

In Tehran, Algerian delegation meets 
with Iranian officials to discuss latest U.S. 

January 4 

A report out of Tehran states that three 
of the hostages — L. Bruce Laingen, Charge 
d' Affaires, Victor L. Tomseth, a political of- 
ficer, and Michael Howland, a State Depart- 
ment security officer — have been transferred 
from the Foreign Ministry in Tehran to a 
secret location. 

January 6 

Khomeini gives approval of Algerian 
assistance in efforts to release hostages. 

January 7 

Deputy Secretary Christopher departs 
for Algiers to discuss the status of the nego- 
tiations with the Algerian delegation. 

January 8 

President-elect Reagan states that he 
could honor any agreement with Iran made 
by President Carter but also says he 
reserves the right to draw up new proposals 
if the crisis is not settled by Jan. 20. 

January 9 

Deputy Secretary Christopher extends 
his stay in Algeria because of questions 
raised by Iranians about U.S. proposals. 

January 12 

Two bills are introduced by the Iranian 
Parliament as "emergency" legislation to 
speed up an agreement with the U.S. One 
bill would authorize third-party arbitration 
of claims against Iranian assets and the 
other would "nationalize" the late Shah's 

January 13 

Parliament postpones voting on two 

January 14 

Parliament approves the bill permitting 
third-party arbitration of claims on Iranian 

January 15 

Chief Iranian negotiator, Behzad 
Nabavi, Iran's Minister of State for Execu- 
tive Affairs, warns the U.S. that if Iran's 
'unencumbered frozen assets" are not 
deposited in Algerian banks by Friday, close 
of business, negotiations would stop. 

January 16 

In the event an agreement is made, 
President Carter takes two major steps: 

• He orders an exchange transaction 
of over $900 millon worth of gold with Brit- 
ain for eventual transfer to Iran; and 

• He orders the sale of Iranian-owned 
treasury securities in the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank so that the money can be 
transferred to Iran. 

Nabavi withdraws his earlier statement 
and declares that there is "no obstacle" to 
concluding an agreement. 

A team of legal and financial experts- 
five Americans and three British — meet in 
Algiers in an effort to resolve remaining 

January 17 

Twelve major U.S. banks reportedly 
agree that if Tehran agrees to repay a por- 
tion of the debts owed them immediately and 
to settle the rest later, they would drop 

At Iran's request, Algeria sends a team 
of physicians to visit hostages to confirm 
their good health. 

January 18 

U.S. and Iran sign final documents 
agreeing on central issues and issue a final 
declaration for release of the hostages. 

January 19 

Freedom of hostages is delayed by 
objections raised by Iranians over an "appen- 
dix" that U.S. bankers reportedly added to 
the hostage release agreement. 

January 20 

After 444 days in captivity, hostages are 

Two Algerian airliners take them to 
Algiers where they are met by Deputy 
Secretary Christopher, Algerian Foreign 
Minister Benyahia, and U.S. Ambassador to 
Algeria Ulric Haynes, Jr. After a welcoming 
ceremony, the hostages are transferred to 
U.S. Air Force planes which take them to 
Frankfurt, West Germany, where they board 
busses which take them to a military 
hospital in Weisbaden. 

January 25 

Air Force plane — "Freedom One" — ar- 
rives at Stewart International Airport, New- 
burgh, New York, carrying the 52 former 
hostages. The Americans are greeted by 
their families and, after a 70-minute bus ride, 
arrive at West Point Military Academy. 

January 27 

The 53 former hostages, including 
Richard Queen who was released by the Ira- 
nian revolutionaries in July 1980, arrive in 
Washington, D.C., where they are greeted, 
in an official ceremony, by President Reagan, 
other U.S. officials, and government em- 
ployees on the South Lawn of the White 
House. ■ 

February 1981 


United States, which branch or office is 
located within the United States and is, on 
the effective date, either (a) in possession of 
funds or securities legally or beneficially 
owned by the Government of Iran or its 
agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled 
entities, or (b) carrying on its books deposits 
standing to the credit of or beneficially owned 
by such Government, agencies, instrumental- 
ities, or controlled entities, is licensed, 
authorized, directed and compelled to 
transfer such funds, securities, and deposits, 
including interest from November 14, 1979, 
at commercially reasonable rates, to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be 
held or transferred as directed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 

1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations 
for acquiring or exercising any right, power, 
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or 
otherwise, including the license contained in 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, with respect to the properties 
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are 
revoked and withdrawn. 

(b) All rights, powers, and privileges 
relating to the properties described in Sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive 
from any attachment, injunction, other like 
proceedings or process, or other action in 
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at 
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and 
privileges of the Government of Iran and its 
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled 
entities, whether acquired by court order or 
otherwise, are nullified, and all persons 
claiming any such right, power, or privilege 
are hereafter barred from exercising the same. 

(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States are prohibited from 
acquiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege whether by court order or other- 
wise, with respect to the properties (and any 
income earned thereon) referred to in Sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order. 

1-103. Compliance with this Order, any 
other Executive Order licensing, authorizing, 
directing or compelling the transfer of the 
assets described in Section 1-101 of this 
Order, or any regulations, instructions, or 
directions issued thereunder shall to the ex- 
tent thereof be a full acquittance and dis- 
charge for all purposes of the obligation of 
the person making the same. No person shall 
be held liable in any court for or with 
respect to anything done or omitted in good 
faith in connection with the administration 
of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, such 
orders, regulations, instructions, or directions. 

1-104. The Attorney General shall seek 
to intervene in any litigation within the 
United States which arises out of this Order 
and shall, among other things, defend the 
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, 
each of its provisions. 

1 - 105. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 

national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-106. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Direction to Transfer Iranian Government 
Financial Assets Held by Non-Banking 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy and economy 
of the United States upon which I based my 
declarations of national emergency in Exec- 
utive Order 12170, issued November 14, 
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued 
April 17, 1980, in order to implement 
agreements with the Government of Iran, as 
reflected in Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to 
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals 
being held as hostages and to the resolution 
of claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran and in which Iran and the United 
States instruct and require that the assets 
described in this Order shall be transferred 
as set forth below by the holders of such 
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. Any person subject to the juris- 
diction of the United States which is not a 
banking institution and is on the effective 
date in possession or control of funds or 
securities of Iran or its agencies, instrumen- 
talities, or controlled entities is licensed, 
authorized, directed and compelled to trans- 
fer such funds or securities to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to be held or 
transferred as directed by the Secretary of 
the Treasury. 

1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations 
for acquiring or exercising any right, power, 
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or 
otherwise, including the license contained in 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, with respect to the properties 
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are 
revoked and withdrawn. 

(b) All rights, powers, and privileges 
relating to the properties described in sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive 
from any attachment, injunction, other like 
proceedings or process, or other action in 
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at 
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and 
privileges of the Government of Iran and its 

agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled 
entities, whether acquired by court order or 
otherwise, are nullified, and all persons 
claiming any such right, power, or privilege 
are hereafter barred from exercising the same. 

(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States are prohibited from 
acquiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege, whether by court order or other- 
wise, with respect to the properties (and any 
income earned thereon) referred to in Sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order. 

1-103. Compliance with this Executive 
Order, any other Executive Order licensing, 
authorizing, directing or compelling the 
transfer of the assets described in paragraph 
1-101 of this Order, or any regulations, 
instructions, or directions issued thereunder 
shall to the extent thereof be a full acquit- 
tance and discharge for all purposes of the 
obligation of the person making the same. 
No person shall be held liable in any court 
for or with respect to anything done or 
omitted in good faith in connection with the 
administration of, or pursuant to and in reli- 
ance on, such orders, regulations, instruc- 
tions, or directions. 

1-104. The Attorney General shall seek 
to intervene in any litigation within the 
United States which arises out of this Order 
and shall, among other things, defend the 
legality of and all actions taken pursuant to, 
each of its provisions. 

1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-106. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Direction to Transfer Certain Iranian 
Government Assets 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the na- 
tional security, foreign policy and economy 
of the United States upon which I based my 
declarations of national emergency in Exec- 
utive Order 12170, issued November 14, 
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued 
April 17, 1980, in order to implement agree- 
ments with the Government of Iran, as 
reflected in Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to 
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals 
being held as hostages and to the resolution 
of claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran and in which Iran and the United 


Department of State Bulletin 


States instruct and require that the assets 
described in this Order shall be transferred 
as set forth below by the holders of such 
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. All persons subject to the juris- 
diction of the United States in possession or 
control of properties, not including funds and 
securities, owned by Iran or its agencies, 
instrumentalities, or controlled entities are 
licensed, authorized, directed and compelled 
to transfer such properties, as directed after 
the effective date of this Order by the Gov- 
ernment of Iran, acting through its authorized 
agent. Except where specifically stated, this 
license, authorization, and direction does not 
relieve persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States from existing legal require- 
ments other than those based upon the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act. 

1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations 
for acquiring or exercising any right, power, 
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or 
otherwise, including the license contained in 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, with respect to the properties 
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are 
revoked and withdrawn. 

(b) All rights, powers, and privileges 
relating to the properties described in sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive 
from any attachment, injunction, other like 
proceedings or process, or other action in 
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at 
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from 
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and 
privileges of the Government of Iran and its 
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled 
entities, whether acquired by court order or 
otherwise, are nullified, and all persons 
claiming any such right, power, or privilege 
are hereafter barred from exercising the same. 

(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States are prohibited from 
acquiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege, whether by court order or other- 
wise, with respect to the properties (and any 
income earned thereon) referred to in Sec- 
tion 1-101 of this Order. 

1-103. Compliance with this Executive 
Order, any other Executive Order licensing, 
authorizing, directing or compelling the 
transfer of the assets described in paragraph 
1-101 of this Order, or any regulations, 
instructions, or directions issued thereunder 
shall to the extent thereof be a full acquit- 
tance and discharge for all purposes of the 
obligation of the person making the same. 
No person shall be held liable in any court 
for or with respect to anything done or 
omitted in good faith in connection with the 
administration of, or pursuant to and in reli- 
ance on, such orders, regulations, instruc- 
tions, or directions. 

1-104. The Attorney General shall seek 
to intervene in any litigation within the 
United States which arises out of this Order 
and shall, among other things, defend the 
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, 
each of its provisions. 

1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-106. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Revocation of Prohibitions Against 
Transactions Involving Iran 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy and economy 
of the United States upon which I based my 
declarations of national emergency in Exec- 
utive Order 12170, issued November 14, 
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued 
April 17, 1980, in order to implement agree- 
ments with the Government of Iran, as 
reflected in Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to 
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals 
being held as hostages and to the resolution 
of claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. The prohibitions contained in 
Executive Order 12205 of April 7, 1980, and 
Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, and 
Proclamation 4702 of November 12, 1979, are 
hereby revoked. 

1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
pose of this Order. 

1-103. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Non-Prosecution of Claims of Hostages 

and for Actions at the United States Embassy 

and Elsewhere 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the na- 
tional security, foreign policy and economy 

of the United States upon which I based my 
declarations of national emergency in Ex- 
ecutive Order 12170, issued November 14, 
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued 
April 17, 1980, in order to implement 
agreements with the Government of Iran, as 
reflected in Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to 
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals 
being held as hostages and to the resolution 
of claims of United States nationals against 
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza- 
tion of relations between the United States 
and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the 
effective date of this Order: 

1-101. The Secretary of the Treasury 
shall promulgate regulations: (a) prohibiting 
any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction from 
prosecuting in any court within the United 
States or elsewhere any claim against the 
Government of Iran arising out of events 
occurring before the date of this Order 
relating to (1) the seizure of the hostages on 
November 4, 1979, (2) their subsequent 
detention, (3) injury to United States prop- 
erty or property of United States nationals 
within the United States Embassy compound 
in Tehran after November 3, 1979, or (4) in- 
jury to United States nationals or their prop- 
erty as a result of popular movements in the 
course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
which were not an act of the Government of 
Iran; (b) prohibiting any person not a U.S. 
national from prosecuting any such claim in 
any court within the United States; (c) order- 
ing the termination of any previously insti- 
tuted judicial proceedings based upon such 
claims; and (d) prohibiting the enforcement 
of any judicial order issued in the course of 
such proceedings. 

1-102. The Attorney General of the 
United States is authorized and directed, 
immediately upon the issuance of regulations 
in accordance with Section 1-101, to take all 
appropriate measures to notify all appro- 
priate courts of the existence of this Order 
and implementing regulations and the result- 
ing termination of litigation. 

1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
pose of this Order. 

1-104. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

Restrictions on the Transfer of Property of 
the Former Shah of Iran 

By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States, including Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 
22 of the United States Code, and Section 
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu- 



sual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy and economy of the 
United States upon which I based my decla- 
rations of national emergency in Executive 
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and 
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 
1980, in order to implement agreements with 
the Government of Iran, as reflected in 
Declarations of the Government of Demo- 
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria dated 
January 19, 1981, relating to the release of 
U.S. diplomats and nationals being held as 
hostages and to the resolution of claims of 
United States nationals against Iran, and to 
begin the process of normalization of rela- 
tions between the United States and Iran, it 
is hereby ordered that as of the effective 
date of this Order 

1-101. For the purpose of protecting the 
rights of litigants in courts within the United 
States, all property and assets located in the 
United States within the control of the es- 
tate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former 
Shah of Iran, or any close relative of the 
former Shah served as a defendant in litiga- 
tion in such courts brought by Iran seeking 
the return of property alleged to belong to 
Iran, is hereby blocked as to each such 
estate or person until all such litigation 
against such estate or person is finally 

1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized and directed (a) to promulgate 
regulations requiring all persons who are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States and who, as of November 3, 1979, or 
as of this date, have actual or constructive 
possession of property of the kind described 
in Section 1-101, or knowledge of such pos- 
session by others, to report such possession 
or knowledge thereof, to the Secretary of 
the Treasury in accordance with such regula- 
tions and (b) to make available to the Gov- 
ernment of Iran or its designated agents all 
identifying information derived from such 
reports to the fullest extent permitted by 
law. Such reports shall be required as to all 
individuals described in 1-101 and shall be 
required to be filed within 30 day« after 
publication of a notice in the Federal 

1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized and directed (a) to require all 
agencies within the Executive Branch of the 
United States Government to deliver to the 
Secretary all official financial books and 
records which serve to identify any property 
of the kind described in Section 1-101 of this 
Order, and (b) to make available to the Gov- 
ernment of Iran or its designated agents all 
identifying information derived from such 
books and records to the fullest extent per- 
mitted by law. 

1-104. The Attorney General of the 
United States having advised the President 
of his opinion that no claim on behalf of the 
Government of Iran for the recovery of prop- 
erty of the kind described in Section 1-101 
of this Order should be considered legally 
barred either by sovereign immunity prin- 
'•iplps or by the act of state doctrine, the 

Attorney General is authorized and directed 
to prepare, and upon the request of counsel 
representing the Government of Iran to pre- 
sent to the appropriate court or courts 
within the United States, suggestions of 
interest reflecting that such is the position 
of the United States, and that it is also the 
position of the United States that Iranian de- 
crees and judgments relating to the assets of 
the former Shah and the persons described 
in Section 1-101 should be enforced by such 
courts in accordance with United States law. 

1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to exercise all func- 
tions vested in the President by the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur- 
poses of this Order. 

1-106. This Order shall be effective 

Jimmy Carter 

President's Commission on 
Hostage Compensation 

By the authority vested in me by the Consti- 
tution and statutes of the United States of 
America, and as President of the United 
States of America, in accordance with the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), it is hereby 
ordered as follows: 

1-1. Establishment. 

1-101. There is established the Presi- 
dent's Commission on Hostage Compensa- 
tion, hereinafter referred to as the Commis- 
sion, which shall be composed of not more 
than nine members who shall be appointed 
by the President. 

1-102. The President shall designate a 
Chairman from among the members. 

1-2. Functions. 

1-201. The Commission shall study and 
analyze, and make recommendations to the 
President on, the question whether the 
United States should provide financial com- 
pensation to United States nationals who 
have been held in captivity outside the 
United States, either (1) by or with the 
approval of a foreign government, or (2) by 
reason of their status as employees of the 
United States Government or as dependents 
of such employees. 

1-202. The Commission shall submit a 
report to the President ninety days after the 
date of this Order. The report shall contain 
the Commission's recommendations as to 
whether legislation to deal with the fore- 
going compensation issue is appropriate and, 
if so, as to what such legislation should pro- 
vide. The report shall specifically contain the 
Commission's recommendations concerning 
the compensation of United States nationals 
held hostage in Iran on and after November 
4, 1979. 

1-203. In analyzing the foregoing issues 
the Commission shall consider all factors 
which it may consider relevant, including the 

prior practice with respect to governmental 
compensation, both by the United States 
Government and by foreign governments, of 
persons held in captivity abroad. 

1-204. In the performance of its func- 
tions the Commission shall specifically ad- 
dress the following issues: 

(a) whether any legislation authorizing 
compensation should set forth specific legis- 
lative standards, or whether the standards 
by which to award compensation should be 
administratively developed; 

(b) whether any standards developed 
either legislatively or administratively 
should be applied uniformly to civilian and 
military government employees, dependents 
of such employees, and private citizens, or 
whether separate criteria should be devel- 
oped for these or other categories; 

(c) whether an existing administrative 
body should determine amounts of compensa- 
tion, or whether a new body should be estab- 
lished for this purpose; and 

(d) whether compensation should be paid 
for injuries suffered by members of families 
of persons who have been held in captivity. 

1-3. Administrative Provisions. 

1-301. In performing its functions the 
Commission shall conduct such studies, 
reviews, and inquiries as may be necessary. 
In addition to conducting open meetings in 
accordance with the Federal Advisory Com- 
mittee Act, the Commission shall conduct 
public hearings to identify critical issues and 
possible solutions related to compensation. 

1-302. The Commission is authorized to 
request from any Executive agency such 
information that may be deemed necessary 
to carry out its functions under this Order. 
Each Executive agency shall, to the extent 
permitted by law, furnish such information 
to the Commission in the performance of its 
functions under this Order. 

1-303. Each member of the Commission 
who is not otherwise employed in the Fed- 
eral Government may receive, to the extent 
permitted by law, compensation for each day 
he or she is engaged in the work of the Com- 
mission at a rate not to exceed the maximum 
daily rate now or hereafter prescribed by 
law for GS-18 of the General Schedule, and 
may also receive transportation and travel 
expenses, including per diem in lieu of sub- 
sistance, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5702 
and 5703). 

1-304. All necessary administrative staff 
services, support, facilities, and expenses of 
the Commission shall, to the extent per- 
mitted by law, be furnished by the Depart- 
ment of State. 

1-4. General Provisions. 

1-401. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of any other Executive Order, the functions 
of the President under the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), 
except that of reporting annually to the Con- 
gress, which are applicable to the Commis- 
sion, shall be performed by the Secretary of 


Department of State Bulletin 


State in accordance with guidelines and pro- 
cedures established by the Administrator of 
General Services. 

1-402. The Commission shall terminate 
thirty days after submitting its report. 

Jimmy Carter 

I W. 19. 1981 3 

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of the Interna- 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 
U.S.C. 1703. I hereby report to the Congress 
that I have today exercised the authority 
granted by this Act to take certain measures 
with respect to property of the Government 
of Iran and its controlled entities and instru- 

1. On November 14, 1979, 1 took the 
step of blocking certain property and inter- 
ests in property of the Government of Iran 
and its controlled entities and instrumental- 
ities. This action was taken in response to a 
series of aggressive actions by Iran, includ- 
ing the attack on the United States Embassy 
in Tehran, the holding of U.S. citizens and 
diplomats as hostages, and threats to with- 
draw assets from United States banks, and 
otherwise seek to harm the economic and 
political interests of the United States. Sub- 
sequently, on April 7, 1980, and April 17, 
1980, I took further action restricting 
various kinds of transactions with Iran by 
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. 

2. Agreement has now been reached 
with Iran concerning the release of the hos- 
tages and the settlement of claims of U.S. 
nationals against Iran. Among other things 
this agreement involves the payment by Iran 
of approximately $3.67 billion to pay off prin- 
cipal and interest outstanding on syndicated 
loan agreements in which a U.S. bank is a 
party. This includes making all necessary 
payments to the foreign members of these 
syndicates. An additional $1,418 billion shall 
remain available to pay all other loans as 
soon as any disputes as to the amounts in- 
volved are settled and to pay additional 
interest to banks upon agreement or arbitra- 
tion with Iran. In addition, there will be 
established an international tribunal to 
adjudicate various disputed claims by U.S. 
nationals against Iran; and the deposit of $1 
billion by Iran from previously blocked 
assets as released, which will be available 
for payments of awards against Iran. Iran 
has committed itself to replenish this fund as 
necessary. This tribunal, among other things, 
will also hear certain disputes between 
Iranian nationals and the United States Gov- 
ernment and contractual disputes between 
Iran and the United States. 

In connection with this agreement, and 
to begin the process of normalization of rela- 
tions between the two countries, I have 
issued and will issue, a series of Orders. 

3. First, I have signed an Executive 
Order authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to enter into or to direct the Fed- 

eral Reserve Bank of New York to enter into 
escrow and depositary agreements with the 
Bank of England. 

Under these agreements, assets in the 
escrow account will be returned to the con- 
trol of Iran upon the safe departure of the 
United States hostages from Iran. I have 
also by this Order instructed the Federal Re- 
serve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of 
the United States, to receive other blocked 
Iranian assets, and, as further directed by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, to transfer 
these assets to the escrow account. 

4. Second, I have signed an Executive 
Order directing the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to transfer to its account at the 
Bank of England and then to the escrow ac- 
count referred to in the preceding para- 
graph, the assets of the Government of Iran, 
both transfers to take place as and when 
directed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 

In order to assure that this transaction 
can be executed, and having considered the 
claims settlement agreement described above, 
I have exercised my authority to nullify, and 
barred the exercise of, all rights, powers or 
privileges acquired by anyone; I have revoked 
all licenses and authorizations for acquiring 
any rights, powers, or privileges; and I have 
prohibited anyone from acquiring or exercis- 
ing any right, power, or privileges, all with 
respect to these properties of Iran. These 
prohibitions and nullifications apply to 
rights, powers, or privileges whether ac- 
quired by court order, attachment, or other- 
wise. I have also prohibited any attachment 
or other like proceeding or process affecting 
these properties. 

5. Third, I have signed an Executive 
Order which directs branches and offices of 
United States banks located outside the 
United States to transfer all Iranian govern- 
ment funds, deposits and securities held by 
them on their books on or after November 
14, 1979 at 8:10 a.m. EST to the account of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at 
the Bank of England in London. These assets 
will be transferred to the account of the Cen- 
tral Bank of Algeria, as escrow agent. The 
transfer is to include interest from the date 
of the blocking order at commercially reason- 
able rates. In addition, any banking institu- 
tion that has executed a set-off subsequent to 
the date of the blocking order against Iranian 
deposits covered by this order is directed to 
cancel the set-off and to transfer the funds 
that had been subject to the set-off in the 
same manner as the other overseas deposits. 

This Order also provides for the revoca- 
tion of licenses and the nullifications and 
bars described in paragraph 4 of this report. 

6. Fourth, I will have signed an Execu- 
tive Order directing American banks located 
within the United States which hold Iranian 
deposits to transfer those deposits, including 
interest from the date of entry of the block- 
ing order at commercially reasonable rates, 
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
to be held or transferred as directed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. Half of these 
funds will be transferred to Iran and the 
other half (up to a maximum of $1 billion) 

will be placed in a security account as pro- 
vided in the Declaration and the Claims Set- 
tlement Agreement that are part of the 
agreement we have reached with Iran. This 
fund will be maintained at a $500 million 
level until the claims program is concluded. 
While these transfers should take place as 
soon as possible, I have been advised that 
court actions may delay it. This Order also 
provides for the revocation of licenses and 
the nullifications and bars described in para- 
graph 4 of this report. 

7. Fifth, I have signed an Executive 
Order directing the transfer to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York by non-banking 
institutions of funds and securities held by 
them for the Government of Iran, to be held 
or transferred as directed by the Secretary 
of the Treasury. This transfer will be accom- 
plished at approximately the same time as 
that described in paragraph 6. 

This Order also provides for the revoca- 
tion of licenses and the nullifications and 
bars described in paragraph 4 of this report. 

8. Sixth, I will sign, upon release of the 
hostages, an Executive Order directing any 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States who is in possession or control 
of properties owned by Iran, not including 
funds and securities, to transfer the prop- 
erty as directed by the Government of Iran 
acting through its authorized agent. The 
Order recites that it does not relieve persons 
subject to it from existing legal require- 
ments other than those based on the Interna- 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act. This 
Order does not apply to contingent liabil- 
ities. This Order also provides for the revo- 
cation of licenses and the nullifications and 
bars described in paragraph 4 of this report. 

9. Seventh, I will sign, upon release of 
the hostages, an Executive Order revoking 
prohibitions previously imposed against 
transactions involving Iran. The Executive 
Order revokes prohibitions contained in 
Executive Order No. 12205 of April 7, 1980; 
and Executive Order No. 12211 of April 17, 
1980; and the amendments contained in Proc- 
lamation No. 4702 of November 12, 1979. The 
two Executive Orders limited trade and 
financial transactions involving Iran and 
travel to Iran. The proclamation restricted 
oil imports. In revoking these sanctions I 
have no intention of superseding other exist- 
ing controls relating to exports including the 
Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
Administration Act. 

10. Eighth, I will sign, upon release of 
the hostages, an Executive Order providing 
for the waiver of certain claims against Iran. 
The Order directs that the Secretary of the 
Treasury shall promulgate regulations: (a) 
prohibiting any person subject to U.S. juris- 
diction from prosecuting in any court within 
the United States or elsewhere any claim 
against the Government of Iran arising out 
of events occurring before the date of this 
Order arising out: (1) the seizure of the hos- 
tages on November 4, 1979; (2) their subse- 
quent detention; (3) injury to the United 
States property or property of United States 
nationals within the United States Embassy 

Jbruary 1981 



compound in Tehran after November 1979; 
(4) or injury to United States nationals or 
their property as a result of popular move- 
ments in the course of the Islamic Revolu- 
tion in Iran which were not an act of the 
Government of Iran; (b) prohibiting any per- 
son not a U.S. national from prosecuting any 
such claim in any court within the United 
States; (c) ordering the termination of any 
previously instituted judicial proceedings 
based upon such claims; and (d) prohibiting 
the enforcement of any judicial order issued 
in the course of such proceedings. 

The Order also authorizes and directs 
the Attorney General of the United States 
immediately upon the issuance of such a 
Treasury regulation to notify all appropriate 
courts of the existence of the Executive 
Order and implementing regulations and the 
resulting termination of relevant litigation. 
At the same time, I will create a commission 
to make recommendations on the issue of 
compensation for those who have been held 
as hostages. 

11. Finally, I will sign, upon release of 
the hostages, an Executive Order invoking 
the blocking powers of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act to prevent 
the transfer of property located in the 
United States and controlled by the estate of 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah 
or Iran, or by any close relative of the 
former Shah served as a defendant in litiga- 
tion in the United States courts brought by 
Iran seeking the return of property alleged 
to belong to Iran. This Order will remain 
effective as to each person until litigation 
concerning such person or estate is termi- 
nated. The Order also requires reports from 
private citizens and Federal agencies con- 
cerning this property so that information can 
be made available to the Government of Iran 
about this property. 

The Order would further direct the At- 
torney General to assert in appropriate courts 
that claims of Iran for recovery of this prop- 
erty are not barred by principles of sovereign 
immunity or the act of state doctrine. 

12. In addition to these actions taken 
pursuant to the International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act, other relevant stat- 
utes, and my powers under the Constitution, 
I will take the steps necessary to withdraw 
all claims now pending against Iran before 
the International Court of Justice. Copies of 
the Executive Orders are attached. 

Jimmy Carter 

JAN. 20, 1981 3 











This Technical Arrangement is made between 
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie (hereinafter re- 
ferred to as the "Escrow Agent") as Escrow 
Agent, the Governor and Company of the 
Bank of England (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Bank"), and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York as fiscal agent of the United States 
(hereinafter referred to as the"FED"). 

1. The Bank is hereby appointed to hold, 
invest and distribute, in accordance with the 
terms of this Technical Arrangement, such of 
the funds and other property (as identified by 
the FED on its sole responsibility at the time 
of transfer) as may be transferred to them by 
the FED and such other funds or property 
representing such funds and other property as 
may from time to time be held by the Bank on 
such accounts or invested by the Bank pur- 
suant to paragraph 4 hereof (all of which funds 
and property are collectively referred to as the 
"Escrow Fund"). The Bank shall act as a de- 
positary and shall hold and invest the Escrow 
Fund in accordance with the arrangements de- 
scribed herein until such time as the Escrow 
Fund shall have been distributed as provided 
in paragraph 7 below. 

2. The Bank will open in the name of the 
Escrow Agent the following accounts: 

(A) Two securities custody accounts, 
Securities Custody Account No. 1 and Securi- 
ties Custody Account No. 2 (the "Securities 
Custody Accounts"); 

(B) Three accounts denominated in US 
dollars, "Dollar Account No. 1", "Dollar Ac- 
count No. 2" and "Dollar Account No. 3" (the 
"Dollar Accounts"); 

(C) A gold bullion custody account (the 
"Bullion Account") and shall credit the securi- 
ties to Securities Custody Account No. 1, the 
dollar deposits to Dollar Account No. 1 and the 
gold bullion to the Bullion Account when trans- 
ferred to the Bank by the FED for deposit on 
such accounts, and shall provide the Escrow 
Agent with a general description of the funds 
and other property so transferred. 

3. The Bank shall 

(A) Hold the securities for the time 
being in the Securities Custody Accounts in 
accordance with the provisions of this Ar- 

(B) Hold the gold bullion for the time 
being in the Bullion Account in accordance 
with the provisions of this Arrangement; and 

(C) Hold the funds for the time being in 
the Dollar Accounts on a call basis, so as to 
ensure the liquidity of those funds, and in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of this Arrange- 

4. (a) The Bank shall make a good faith 
effort under the circumstances to invest and 
reinvest outside the United States the funds 
on the Dollar Accounts at market rates with 
such banks and in such manner as the Bank 
may determine and will pay by way of interest 
on the funds on those Dollar Accounts sums 
equivalent to those received by them, subject 
nevertheless to the deduction from Dollar Ac- 
count No. 2 of sums equivalent to the amounts 
of their reasonable costs, charges and expenses 
in respect to the maintenance and operation of 
Dollar Account No. 2. 

(b) Any interest received on the securi- 
ties in the Securities Custody Account No. 1 
shall be credited to Dollar Account No. 1 and 
any interest received on the Securities 
Custody Account No. 2 shall be credited to 
Dollar Account No. 3. 

5. The Bank shall invest all monies repre- 
senting interest paid in respect of any part of 
the Escrow Fund in the same manner as any 
funds for the time being on deposit on the Dol- 
lar Accounts. 

6. The Bank shall not have or incur any 
liability by reason of any diminution in value of 
the securities or gold bullion for the time being 
held by them in the name of the Escrow Agent 
on the Securities Custody Accounts and the 
Bullion Account, respectively. 

Similarly, the Escrow Agent shall not 
have or incur any liability by reason of any di- 
minution in value of the securities or gold bul- 
lion for the time being held in its name by the 
Bank on the Securities Custody Accounts and 
the Bullion Account respectively. Moreover, 
the Escrow Agent shall not have or incur any 
liability for any loss arising from investment of 
the funds held for the Escrow Agent on the 
Dollar Accounts. 

In addition, the Escrow Agent shall not 
bear nor be liable for any expenses, charges, 
costs or fees of any kind incurred by the Bank 
or the FED in performance of their duties 
under this Arrangement. 

7. In the performance of their duties 
under this Arrangement, the Bank shall not 
exercise any discretion designed to favour one 
of the parties to this Arrangement and shall 
act only on the instructions of the Escrow 

(a) Provided that no previous instruc- 
tion has been received under subparagraph (b) 
below, upon receipt of instructions from the 
Escrow Agent to do so, in the form provided in 
paragraph 8 below, the Bank shall immediately 
transfer the funds then held on Dollar Account 
No. 1 as follows: 

(i) U.S. Dollars 3,667,000,000 to the 
FED, subject to the FED's sole direction; 

(ii) U.S. Dollars 1,418,000,000 to Dol- 
lar Account No. 2; and 

(iii) the balance to an account of Bank 
Markazi Iran opened at the Bank, subject to 
Bank Markazi Iran's sole direction 


Department of State Bulletin 


and transfer the securities ami bullion then 
held in the Securities Custody Account No. 1 
and the Bullion Account respectively to the ac- 
count of Bank Marina Iran at the Bank, sub- 
ject to Bank Markazi Iran's sole direction. 

(b) Provided that no previous instruc- 
tion has been received under subparagraph (a) 
above, upon receipt of instructions from the 
Escrow Agent to do so, in the form provided in 
paragraph 8 below, the Bank shall immediately 
transfer the Escrow Fund to the account of the 
FED at the Bank, subject to the FED's sole 
direction, and close all the Accounts opened 
under paragraph 2 of this Arrangement. 

(c) Any funds or securities received by 
the Bank from the FED for deposit on any of 
the accounts described in paragraph 2 of this 
Arrangement, other than Dollar Account No. 
2, after receipt and execution by the Bank of 
the instructions referred to in subparagraph 
la) above, shall be credited in accordance with 
the instructions of the Escrow Agent in the 
form provided in paragraph 8 below, to the ac- 
count of Bank Markazi Iran at the Bank, sub- 
ject to Bank Markazi Iran's sole direction, and 
to Dollar Account No. 3 and Securities 
Custody Account No. 2 at the Bank in the 
name of the Escrow Agent. 

Not later than 30 days after the date 
hereof the Escrow Agent shall instruct the 
Bank to transfer the funds and securities in 
these accounts to such bank as the Escrow 
Agent shall direct, for the account of the Ban- 
que Centrale d'Algerie. 

(d) Upon receipt by the Bank of instruc- 
tions from the Escrow Agent to do so in the 
form provided in paragraph 8 below, the Bank 
shall, as soon as practicable thereafter 

(i) transfer such amount as may be 
specified in the instructions from Dollar Ac- 
count No. 2 to the FED, subject to the FED's 
sole direction, if sufficient funds then remain 
on Dollar Account No. 2 to make such transfer; 

(ii) transfer the remaining funds on 
Dollar Account No. 2 to the account of Bank 
Markazi Iran at the Bank, subject to Bank 
Markazi Iran's sole direction, and close Dollar 
Account No. 2. 

(e) The Escrow Agent shall not be en- 
titled to give the Bank any instruction other 
than described in this paragraph 7, and the 
Bank shall be entitled and bound to rely on any 
instruction falling within this paragraph 7 
without further inquiry, and any transfer by 
the Bank in accordance with any instructions 
given to them under this paragraph 7 shall 
constitute a good discharge to the Bank. 

8. (a) The Bank and the Escrow Agent 
will exchange telegraphic keys which will per- 
mit the reciprocal validation of messages and 
payment and transfer orders; however, the in- 
structions set forth in paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b) 
shall be in writing, shall be transmitted by 
hand either 

(i) to the Bank or 

(ii) to the Deputy Governor of the 
Bank for and on behalf of the Bank at the 
British Embassy at Algiers 

and shall be authenticated as provided in sub- 
paragraph (b) below. In the event that a tele- 
graphic test is challenged, the Bank and the 
Escrow Agent agree to contact each other by 
telex or other appropriate means as rapidly as 
possible, in order to obtain confirmation of the 
authenticity of the transmission. 

(b) The Bank and the Escrow Agent 
shall provide each other with a list, which will 
be revised whenever necessary, of the names 
of the persons authorised to execute any writ- 
ten notice or instruction required or permitted 
under this Arrangement and identify the 
signatures of such designated persons; all such 
notices or instructions to the Bank shall be ef- 
fective on receipt by the Bank; the Bank shall 
not be obliged to act on any such notice or in- 
struction unless properly so authorised, au- 
thenticated and delivered in the manner re- 
quired by this paragraph. 

9. Except as provided in paragraph 8 (a) 
above, any advices, written notices, or in- 
structions permitted or required by this Ar- 
rangement shall be given to the parties hereto 
at the respective addresses shown below: 

(i) To the Bank at: 

Threadneedle Street 
London EC2R 8AH 

ATTENTION: D.H.F. Somerset 
J.G. Drake 
W.B. Moule 

(ii) To the FED at: 

33 Liberty Street 

New- York, New- York 10045 

ATTENTION: H. David Willey 
George Ryan 

(iii) To the Escrow Agent at: 

8 Boulevard Zirout Youcef 
Algiers, Algeria 

ATTENTION: Mr. Mohamed 
Mr. Bachir Sail 
Mr. Mohand Kirat 
Mr. Lakhdar 

10. The FED shall indemnify and hold the 
Bank harmless against and shall reimburse the 
Bank for any loss or expense that they may 
incur by reason of their acts or omissions 
under or in connection with this Arrangement, 
except for 

(A) Any loss or expense resulting from 
their own negligence or wilful misconduct and 

(B) Any loss arising from investment of 
the funds held for the Escrow Agent on Dollar 
Accounts No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3. 

11. The Bank may rely and shall be pro- 
tected in acting on any instrument, instruc- 
tion, notice or direction given by the Escrow 
Agent in accordance with paragraph 7 reason- 
ably believed by them to be genuine and to 
have been signed or dispatched by the appro- 
priate person or persons. 

12. The Bank shall not be liable for any act 
or omission unless such act or omission in- 
volves negligence or wilful misconduct on the 
part of the Bank. This paragraph 12 does not 
apply to any loss arising from investment of 
the funds held for the Escrow Agent on the 
Dollar Accounts. 

13. (a) The Bank shall advise the Escrow 
Agent by telex as soon as reasonably practica- 
ble thereafter of all changes in balances, de- 
posits, interest earned and withdrawals on the 
six accounts opened and maintained by the 
Bank for the Escrow Agent as provided in 
paragraph 2 of this Arrangement. 

(b) The Bank shall provide the FED by 
telex with a list of all debits and credits to the 
six accounts referred to in subparagraph (a) 

14. The Bank and the FED accept that the 
Escrow Agent is a central bank, whose prop- 
erty is normally entitled to the full immunities 
of a central bank under the State Immunity 
Act of 1978 of the United Kingdom. Nothing in 
this Arrangement shall be considered as con- 
stituting, in whole or in part, a waiver of any 
immunity to which they are entitled. 

15. Nothing herein shall require the Bank 
to violate the laws of England or any court 
order thereunder; the Bank confirms that none 
of the provisions of this Arrangement is in vio- 
lation of the laws of England. 

16. The provisions hereof may not be 
modified or changed except by an instrument 
in writing duly executed by or on behalf of the 
Escrow Agent, the Bank and the FED. 

17. This Arrangement is written in Eng- 
lish and French texts but, in the event of any 
conflict between the two texts, the English 
text shall prevail. 

18. The arrangements described herein 
shall be governed by and construed in accord- 
ance with the laws of England. 

Dated 20th of January 1981 


by Mohamed Bessekhouad 
Lakhdar Benouataf 


by C. W. McMahon 
D.H.F. Somerset 





by Ernest T. Patrikis 



JAN. 20, 1981 

Mr. Muskie. Now that the principal ob- 
ject of the efforts that have been under- 
way for the last 14 months has been 
achieved and consummated, it is impor- 
tant that you and, through you, the 
American people understand the agree- 
ments which have made that possible. I 
know you've all been curious about the 
facts that we hope we can make available 
to you this afternoon. I have appreciated 
your patience when I and others have re- 
sisted giving you some of this informa- 
tion, but now is the time for the Ameri- 
can people to get the whole story and this 
briefing this afternoon is designed to 
move us toward that objective as well. 

And so if I may, I will briefly outline 
the nature of the agreements which led to 
the release of the hostages today. We and 
the Iranian Government have given the 
Algerian Government interdependent 
commitments for a resolution of the hos- 
tage crisis. These commitments are in ac- 
cord with the objectives we stated at the 
outset of this crisis — the safe return of 
our people on terms consistent with our 
national honor and interests. 

A guiding principle in negotiating 
the agreement has been to return matters 
insofar as possible to where they stood 
before the hostages were seized — that is, 
to return property owned by Iran at the 
same time that our people are released, 
while protecting legitimate U.S. claim- 

Let me emphasize that the assets 
that will be returned are Iranian property 
in the custody of persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction here and abroad. These as- 
sets were blocked by the President on 
November 14, 1979, shortly after the 
takeover of our Embassy. After careful 
and thorough evaluation of all relevant 
factors, the terms of the arrangement 
were determined to be fair and techni- 
cally feasible. 

The first step in the implementation 
process called for a number of categories 
of Iranian assets to be transferred to an 
escrow account with the Bank of England 
in the name of the Algerian Central 

The Government of Iran then had to 
certify to the Algerian Central Bank that 
the f>2 hostages had safely departed Iran. 
Only when it had been done so could the 
Algerian Central Hank release a certain 
port ion of these assets to Iran. These 
have now been taken. 

One category of the assets of which I 
am speaking included those Iranian secu- 
rities in the custody of the Federal Re- 
serve Bank in New York. 

Another category of Iranian assets 
comprised those assets in foreign 
branches of U.S. banks. These funds with 
interest, including more than 1.6 million 
ounces of gold, total just under $8 billion. 

Of these funds, $3.7 billion will be 
used to prepay the bank loans, and $1.4 
billion will remain in escrow until any 
disputed bank loans and interest are 
sorted out. Most of the claims of these 
American banks are thus immediately 
settled, and other claims are 100% pro- 
tected with the amounts in escrow. 

Finally, Iranian assets in domestic 
branches of U.S. banks and all other Ira- 
nian assets located in the U.S. or abroad 
in the custody of persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction will be transferred to the se- 
curity account. 

Mr. Miller. Will be unblocked. 

Mr. Muskie. Yes. They'll be un- 

Mr. Miller. They'll be unblocked and 
used partially for Iran and partially for a 
security account. 

Mr. Muskie. There may be an addi- 
tional $1 to $2 billion or so in other assets. 
In the context of the release of these as- 
sets, Iran is committed to resolve certain 
claims by U.S. nationals under an agreed 
claims settlement procedure involving an 
international arbitration tribunal estab- 
lished by the agreement. 

By Executive order, the President 
ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to 
license the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to effect the transfer of those assets 
in the Fed's custody. That transfer had to 
be completed before the hostages could 
be released. 

The United States will lift import 
and export sanctions under the agree- 
ment once the hostages are released. 
These sanctions have imposed real costs 
on Iran in terms of greatly curtailed eco- 
nomic activity and substantial diplomatic 
isolation. The sanctions weighed increas- 
ingly heavily on Iran the longer the hos- 
tages were held. 

An additional aspect of the agree- 
ment concerns the assets that may be lo- 
cated here of the former Shah and his 
family. The initial Iranian demand for the 
immediate return of the Shah's property 
was unacceptable as a matter of principle 
and law, and we've consistently rejected 
that demand. 

We have, however, undertaken to 
block the transfer from the United States 
of any properties belonging to the Shah's 
estate that may be located here, and to 
inform the U.S. courts of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment position that claims by Iran 
seeking recovery of the Shah's assets are 
not legally barred here by sovereign im- 
munity or by the act of state doctrine. 

I would like to reiterate our deep ap- 
preciation for the assistance of the Alge- 
rian intermediaries throughout these dif- 
ficult weeks. They have carried out their 
responsibilities in a comprehensive and 
thoroughly professional manner. We are 
in Algeria's debt, and its assistance will 
be long remembered by those of us who 
have been associated with their efforts 
and by the American people. 

I would like to go to Bill Miller now 
and Ben Civiletti, both of whom, with 
their people, have been of enormous as- 
sistance with the legal and technical as- 
pects of these agreements. 

Mr. Miller. Thank you, Secretary 
Muskie. Let me just call attention again 
to the principles that Secretary Muskie 
outlined. I won't repeat them, but they're 
important to remember — not only the re- 
lease of the assets, but insofar as possi- 
ble, getting back to the condition that 
existed before the taking of hostages and 
the freezing of assets. 

Now, with the principles in mind, I 
would like to just explain a little more of 
how this works so that you will have a 
little better understanding. 

Secretary Muskie mentioned the 
categories of assets that have been 
blocked, and I will just call again to your 
attention that there were three main 
categories from our point of planning. 

• One were the assets that were held 
in the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. That, of course, is the central bank 
of the United States and, therefore, those 
assets really are under government con- 
trol and have a different category of im- 
portance than one held by private par- 

• The second category would be the 
deposits held in branches of U.S. banks 
outside the United States. These funds 
are held in the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany and are subject to the laws 
and circumstances of those countries, and 
they again can be treated differently from 
other assets. 

• The third general category would 
be all the other assets held by or under 
the control of U.S. nationals or persons in 
the United States itself. This not only in- 


Department of State Bulletin 


eluded bank deposits but it would also in- 
clude other financial assets — other prop- 
erties — that were the properties of the 
Government of Iran or its instrumen- 

The two that we could deal with in 
the principle of trying to unblock the as- 
sets at the time the hostages were re- 
leased, the two we could deal with most 
readily were the first two — the assets 
held in the Federal Reserve and those lo- 
cated overseas. So, for that reason, we 
eventually arrived at the solution setting 
up an arrangement to transfer those as- 
sets into escrow in the Bank of England 
in the account of the Central Bank of 
Algeria so that they would be marshaled 
and ready to be used and released for the 
purposes intended at such time as the 
hostages were out of Iran. 

If the hostages were not released, 
then those funds would be turned back to 
where they came from and we'd be back 
where we were, so no harm would have 
been done. We would not have, in any 
way, lost control. We were protected in 
that regard. On the other hand, if the 
hostages were certified to be free, then 
we lost control and the distribution of the 
escrow fund was agreed to. Of course, 
that happy event did in fact come about. 

And so today, having marshaled the 
assets in the escrow account last night, 
we were able to have a certificate from 
the Central Bank of Algeria that the hos- 
tages were free, and so the funds were 

Let me again run over the figures of 
the funds going into escrow, and what 
happens to them when they come out so 
you will understand that a little better. 
Secretary Muskie used the figure of about 
$8 billion. Let me be a little more precise. 
The escrow became effective only if it 
could be certified that not less than 
$7,955 billion were in escrow. That was 
required for the transaction to work. Ac- 
tually, this morning the Bank of England 
was able to certify that $7,977 billion of 
assets were in the account, and so it ob- 
viously met the condition. 

The assets in the account consisted 
of about $5.5 billion of deposits and inter- 
est on deposits in U.S. bank branches 
abroad. Those were, in a very compli- 
cated transaction, moved into the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York account and 
then moved into an account of the Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank of New York in the 
Bank of England, and then moved into 

In addition, the Federal Reserve it- 
self had held, as I mentioned, assets of 
Iran. Those that were represented by se- 

curities and cash items came to about $1.4 
billion. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
held gold that belonged to the Govern- 
ment of Iran, and as Secretary Muskie 
pointed out, that was something over 1.6 
million ounces of gold, which were valued 
lor this purpose, on a fixed valuation 
date, at about $940 million. 

Then there were miscellaneous as- 
sets coming from custody accounts and 
securities that added up to the balance 
and the total came to $7,977 billion. Once 
that was certified and that certification 
was passed in Algiers by the Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of England to the 
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of 
Algeria, the process started whereby all 
of the governments involved were 
notified of that, and the Iranian Govern- 
ment undertook then to start the process 
of releasing the hostages. 

When the announcement was made 
that the hostages had crossed the frontier 
and were out of Iranian territory, then 
the distribution of these assets began. 
That is under way — I think is actually 
substantially completed. 

The first fund I mentioned, to re- 
peat, is that about $3.7 billion was re- 
turned to the Federal Reserve to be 
applied to pay off syndicated loans in 
which U.S. banks were participating, in- 
cluding interest up to a settlement date. 
That, we understand and we expect, will 
pay off all those syndicated loans, so they 
will be completely paid off. 

The $1.4 billion will remain in the es- 
crow account, and it will be used, under 
binding arbitration, first under opportu- 
nities to negotiate bilaterally and to come 
to settlement but, if not settled under 
binding arbitration, to pay for any addi- 
tional bank loans that are not syndicated, 
or any disputes on the amounts of them, 
or any disputes on the amount of interest 
due. The balance in the fund, if you take 
the $3.7 and $1.4 — whatever is left over 
— has been transferred to Iran free and 
clear. It is now in their hands. 

Let's turn to the third category of 
assets, those in the United States. These 
will be unblocked, and in due course on a 
much slower process, because they are 
much more complicated to gain control 
and transfer of those assets — at a much 
slower pace — they, too, will be handled 
under explicit instructions. As they are 
made available, they will, through bank- 
ing arrangements, end up in going 50% to 
the Government of Iran and 50% into a 
security account until that security ac- 
count reaches $1 billion. Once it reaches 
$1 billion, all other released assets go to 
the Government of Iran. 

Then there is an international claims 
settlement agreement, which will provide 
for binding arbitration under an interna- 
tional tribunal, the settlement claims of 
American interests against Iran, and that 
$1 billion will be used to pay those claims. 
And the Government of Iran has a com- 
mitment to maintain that security ac- 
count at a minimum balance of $500 mil- 
lion, so as claims are paid, if a claim 
should reduce the balance below $500 mil- 
lion, the Government of Iran will re- 
plenish it, so that there will be security 
for those claims. 

That, I think, gives you a little bet- 
ter understanding of the mechanism by 
which this works. Obviously, this was a 
complicated transaction — perhaps the 
largest transfer of funds of private inter- 
ests ever accomplished — and therefore 
did have its complications and its periods 
of perilous exposure to the fragility of the 
whole mechanism of marshaling and 
transferring assets. 

I would be happy, of course, to ex- 
pand upon this and other aspects, but I 
want merely, before I end my remarks, to 
express my particular appreciation — not 
only to Secretary Muskie and Warren 
Christopher, who have done such a mag- 
nificent job, the whole Department of 
State, and all the other departments of 
the government. But in my own Depart- 
ment of the Treasury, I have to say that I 
don't believe this transaction could have 
been completed without the dedicated 
work over endless time by Deputy Secre- 
tary of the Treasury Robert Carswell and 
by Assistant Secretary Richard Davis. 
They have just worked so intensely on 
this. I could name many others. 

We also appreciate the tremendous 
cooperation we have received from the 
Federal Reserve Bank in New York and 
the Federal Reserve system and from all 
the banks and their attorneys and repre- 
sentatives. You may have heard during 
the process of this that there was per- 
ceived to be some difficulty with U.S. 
banks. Let me assure you that was not 
true. We did not comment at the time be- 
cause it was too delicate a matter for us 
to try to intervene. 

The banks have participated and 
rendered full cooperation. They tried for 
a long time to work out, in secret negoti- 
ations, a settlement of their overseas de- 
posits and claims with the Iranians 
through the use of both U.S. attorneys 
and European attorneys. We tried to 
combine that negotiation at one time with 
a program to release the hostages. That 
did not succeed. We eventually came to 
this scheme; and once we moved to this 
scheme, their cooperation was absolute. 

February 1981 



Not only in weeks and months be- 
fore, but starting last Friday, there was 
around-the-clock — and I mean continu- 
ously around-the-clock — involvement 
with banks and attorneys in Algiers, in 
London, in New York, and in Washington 
working this very complicated transac- 
tion. The only people who benefited most 
perhaps was AT&T [American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co.] because we had open 
telephone lines that ran up some bills. 

I do want to say that it was a mag- 
nificent performance by everyone on our 
side, and I'm indeed very proud to have 
been even a small part of it. 

Mr. Muskie. Thank you, Bill. I 
would like to add my words of commen- 
dation to all of those who participated, 
not only everyone at this table but almost 
countless others on both sides of the At- 
lantic who contributed to this. It is an in- 
credible picture of the stamina, determi- 
nation, patience, and ingenuity that can 
be applied to a problem of this complex- 
ity. I've been proud to be part of it, and I 
thank all of my colleagues. 

Q. Mr. Muskie, you talk of the 
basic principle of returning the situa- 
tion to the status as it was when the 
hostages were seized. At that time we 
had diplomatic relations with Iran, we 
had a limited military supply relation- 
ship, we gave visas fairly freely, and 
Americans were allowed to travel in 
Iran. The President, under certain acts, 
changed all that in the course of the 
past 14 months. Are any of those ac- 
tions going to be undone? 

Mr. Muskie. I suspect that those 
matters will have to be dealt with as time 
unfolds. The principle to which I referred 
applied to the release of the hostages and 
restoring our financial arrangements to 
what they were before the hostages were 
seized, not to all of the aspects of diplo- 
matic recognition and normal trade and 
so on. Obviously, the nonintervention 
agreement which the Iranian side insisted 
upon will impact upon some of those 
points that you raised. That's there wish, 
and as far as we're concerned, we were 
willing to sign that. Our relationship will 
have to develop in the future as both 
countries may see it in their interest to 

Mr. Miller. I hope you will note in 
the Secretary's comments, though, that 

Mictions, the explicit sanctions were 

Mr. Muskie. Yes. 

Q. Mr. Civiletti, could you explain 
how, legally, the United States goes 
about blocking all claims like actions 
and so forth against Iran, and how it 
goes about freezing all the assets of the 
Shah, his estate, and so forth, and 
whether there are potential constitu- 
tional problems to that? 

Mr. Civiletti. There undoubtedly will 
be litigation about those issues. We ex- 
pect to file papers in some of the out- 
standing cases either late tonight or to- 
morrow morning indicating a statement 
of interest, laying out before the court 
the actions that have been taken and the 
legal authorities under which those ac- 
tions have been taken. 

Essentially, the authority for all the 
actions that have been taken arise both 
from the Constitution and the President's 
powers under the Constitution and from 
statutory sources, particularly the Inter- 
national Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, the Hostage Act, and the President's 
constitutional powers with regard to the 
conduct of foreign affairs, with regard to 
recognition of foreign powers, and with 
regard to the exercise of these powers 
under these statutes. 

Each of the Executive orders that 
have been issued — and there are about 10 
of them altogether — are exercised under 
these acts. It's the circumstance where 
there is a confluence, where the Presi- 
dent's powers are at their greatest when 
he is exercising power under both the 
Constitution and under specific statutes. 
What we've done in effect is, in most in- 
stances, with a few rare exceptions, pro- 
vide by this settlement for an alternative 
means by which the interests of claimants 
have either been taken care of, as have 
been indicated by some payments which 
are already being made, or by the U.S.- 
Iran claims tribunal procedure with 
agreements with regard to the mainte- 
nance of the fund of $500 million. I hope 
that partially answers your question. 

Q. Are you saying that under this 
International Emergency Powers Act 
the President has the power to block 
any suits and so forth? 

Mr. Civiletti. Yes. When he blocked 
the assets, a subsequent Executive order 
allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to 
promulgate regulations permitting the fil- 
ing of suits, reserving the power to with- 
draw that authorization; and the statute 
itself gives the President the power to 
make null and void any interests in prop- 
erty which are subject to the emergency 
which gave rise to the exercise of the 
power. And, as I mentioned, the Presi- 
dent has acted here under the confluence 

of not only that statute but the Hostage 
Act, as well as his constitutional powers 
with regard to the settlement of interna- 
tional claims and disputes. 

Q. In the question of other assets, 
how much in military spares is left? 
How much has been subsumed by the 
U.S. military forces? 

Mr. Muskie. I don't have an inven- 
tory available to me of that material. The 
issue of military equipment and supplies 
in the pipeline before November 4, 1979, 
was not directly addressed in the negoti- 
ations. You will not see it in any of the 
documents, and so it is not a current 

Q. Mr. Miller, can you tell us what 
the certain undertakings of the Gov- 
ernments of the United States and Iran 
are that are referred to in the declara- 
tion that was issued yesterday. 

Mr. Miller. Those are mainly the fi- 
nancial aspects that I've described. 

Mr. Muskie. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. The undertakings to how 
we accomplished all this in the financial 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us 
how the shape of this deal emerged — 
when, what were the initiatives? What 
were the final points that had to be re- 
solved and when were they resolved? 

Mr. Muskie. Well, that's a long story 
and I will try to give you a brief outline. 

It all started, I gather, when I ad- 
dressed a letter to the then newly 
selected Prime Minister — Mr. Rajai — in 
which I indicated the need from our per- 
spective of undertaking in some way to 
resolve our differences and, as I think I 
used the phrase, "mutually perceived 
grievances." I think that was in late Au- 

In September, Khomeini laid down 
four points as a basis for settlement. It's 
the same four points basically that this 
agreement is built upon. We did not know 
how authoritative it was or whether it 
was the totality, and those four points ex- 
cluded some points that Iranians had in- 
sisted upon prior to that time. We were 
curious about that and we undertook to 
pursue those questions through the vari- 
ous channels that we were using at that 
time and since. And we began to address 
ourselves to the possibilities of meeting 
the four points. 

When one reads the four points liter- 
ally, they obviously called, in light of the 
facts we've given you here today, upon us 
to do things that we were not in a posi- 
tion to do. 


Department of State Bulletin 


So we undertook, with the help of so 
many people, to shape any response that 
would be within the framework of the 
four points laid down by him at that time. 
We pursued those through channels in- 
volving Iranians, and not those who were 
ultimately the decision-makers in Iran 
but others who were also, so far as we 
could see, in a position to evaluate the 
position of Iran in this situation. Secre- 
tary Miller has already indicated one of 
the approaches to this problem that we 
pursued until, I think it was, last week. 

Iran's final proposal in the last week 
or 10 days changed the framework. We 
saw almost immediately that it was a bet- 
ter one, and we proceeded to pick it up. 
It was not inconsistent with what we had 
put in place in terms of the resources or 
the assets that we could transfer; it 
shifted the method for handling it, and 
that's how we came down. 

It's much more complicated than 
that; I couldn't possibly give you every 

I'd like to pay some tributes to some 
specific people who haven't been men- 
tioned, if I might. Lloyd Cutler, General 
Counsel to the White House, who was 
just superb in the quality of the legal ad- 
vice and the practical judgment which he 
brought to this. Warren Christopher — 
well, the whole country know r s his abili- 
ties and his qualities of leadership in ne- 
gotiation. He was the team leader and did 
a tremendous job of putting all these 
things together. 

There are so many others — I know 
I'm leaving out names. I'd like to attest 
to Bob Carswell's contribution and Rich 
Davis and everybody else here. It's been 
a tremendous effort. 

And when the full story is told — and 
I don't know that you want it all at once 
— the line was a pretty straight one from 
September down to today, pretty 
straight. The framework w r as there. The 
details w-ere difficult to put together — 
finding ways of freeing assets, dealing 
with claims, finding ways to put in Iran's 
hands sufficient assets to make the 
settlement proposal attractive. 

All of the prospects for doing this 
improved with the onset of the Iran-Iraq 
war, for obvious reasons: the pressures 
that that generated for Iran economically 
and in other ways. So, although we found 
so many obstacles along the way that 
have been frustrating, including the last 
48-72 hours, at the same time events and 
pressures of one kind or another also fell 
our way to enable us to move to this 

Thank you all very much for your pa- 
tience through this ordeal. I've been 
amazed, may I say, at the quality and the 
accuracy of the press coverage of the last 
48 hours in terms of facts that we thought 
•• e had pretty much excluded you from. 
[Laughter.] You have a way. Thank you. 

JAN. 27, 1981 5 

President Reagan 

Welcome to the Ambassadors of our 
friends in neighboring countries who are 
here today. And I can think of no better 
way to let you know how Nancy and I 
feel about your presence here today than 
to say on behalf of us, of the Vice Presi- 
dent and Barbara, the Senators, the 
Members of Congress, the members of 
the Cabinet, and all of our fellow citizens, 
these simple words: Welcome home. 

You are home, and believe me, you're 
welcome. If my remarks were a sermon, 
my text would be lines from the 126th 
Psalm, "We were like those who dreamed. 
Now our mouth is filled with laughter 
and our tongue with shouts of joy. The 
Lord has done great things for us. We are 
glad." You've come home to a people who 
for 444 days suffered the pain of your im- 
prisonment, prayed for your safety, and 
most importantly, shared your determina- 
tion that the spirit of free men and 
women is not a fit subject for barter. 

You've represented under great 
stress the highest traditions of public 
service. Your conduct is symbolic of the 
millions of professional diplomats, mili- 
tary personnel, and others who have ren- 
dered service to their country. 

We're now aware of the conditions 
under which you were imprisoned. 
Though now is not the time to review 
every abhorrent detail of your cruel con- 
finement, believe me, we know what 
happened. Truth may be a rare commod- 
ity today in Iran; it's alive and well in 

By no choice of your own, you've en- 
tered the ranks of those who throughout 
our history have undergone the ordeal of 
imprisonment: the crew of the Pueblo, 
the prisoners in two World Wars and in 
Korea and Vietnam. And like those 
others, you are special to us. You fulfilled 
your duty as you saw it, and now like the 
others, thank God you're home, and our 
hearts are full of gratitude. 

I'm told that Sergeant Lopez here 
put up a sign in his cell, a sign that nor- 
mally would have been torn down by 
those guards. But this one was written in 
Spanish, and his guards didn't know that 
"Viva la roja, bianco, y azul" means 
"Long live the red, white, and blue." 
They may not understand what that 
means in Iran, but we do, Sergeant 
Lopez, and you've filled our hearts with 
pride. Muchas Gracias. 

Two days ago, Nancy and I met with 
your families here at the White House. 
We know that you were lonely during 
that dreadful period of captivity, but you 
were never alone. Your wives and chil- 
dren, your mothers and dads, your 
brothers and sisters were so full of 
prayers and love for you that whether 
you were conscious of it or not, it must 
have sustained you during some of the 
worst times. No power on Earth could 
prevent them from doing that. Their 
courage, endurance, and strength were of 
heroic measure, and they're admired by 
all of us. 

But to get down now to more mun- 
dane things, in case you have a question 
about your personal futures, you'll prob- 
ably have less time to rest than you'd 
like. While you were on your way to 
Germany, I signed a hiring freeze in the 
Federal Government. In other words, we 
need you, your country needs you, and 
your bosses are panting to have you back 
on the job. 

Now, I'll not be so foolish as to say 
forget what you've been through; you 
never will. But turn the page and look 
ahead, and do so knowing that for all who 
served their country, whether in the For- 
eign Service, the military, or as private 
citizens, freedom is indivisible. Your free- 
dom and your individual dignity are much 
cherished. Those henceforth in the repre- 
sentation of this Nation will be accorded 
every means of protection that America 
can offer. 

Let terrorists be aware that when 
the rules of international behavior are 
violated, our policy will be one of swift 
and effective retribution. We hear it said 
that we live in an era of limit to our pow- 
ers. Well, let it also be understood, there 
are limits to our patience. 

Now, I'm sure that you'll want to 
know that with us here today are families 
of the eight heroic men who gave their 
lives in the attempt to effect your rescue. 
"Greater glory hath no man than that he 
lay down his life for another." And with 
us also are Colonel Beckwith and some of 
the men who did return from that mis- 



sion. We ask God's special healing for 
those who suffered wounds and His com- 
fort to those who lost loved ones. To 
them, to you, and to your families, again, 
welcome from all America and thank you 
for making us proud to be Americans. 

And now, ladies and gentlemen, I call 
on, to speak for this wonderful group of 
returnees, Bruce Laingen, Charge d' Af- 
faires in Tehran. Mr. Laingen. 

Mr. Laingen 

Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, members of 
the Cabinet, Vice President and Mrs. 
Bush — I think I've got that out of order 
of priority in protocol terms — members 
of the Diplomatic Corps who are here, 
and all you beautiful people out there: 

I'm not sure I'm capable of this after 
that emotionally draining but beautiful 
experience that all of us have just had on 
the streets of this magnificent city, Mr. 
President. I hope you were watching TV, 
because I don't think any of us Americans 
have ever seen anything quite like it, 
quite so spontaneous, quite so beautiful in 
terms of the best qualities of our people. 
And we are deeply grateful for it. 

Mr. President, our flight to freedom 
is now complete: thanks to the prayers 
and good-will of countless millions of 
people, not just in this country but all 
around the world; the assistance of those 
many countries and governments who 
understood the values and principles that 
were at stake in this crisis; and the love 
and affection of our countrymen from all 
those tens of thousands out there on the 
streets today, to that lady that we saw 
standing on a hillside as we came in from 
Andrews, all alone, with no sign, no one 
around her, holding her hand to her heart 
— the enveloping love and affection of 
smalltown America of the kind we wit- 
nessed in that wonderful 2-day stop in 
New York State, West Point and its envi- 
rons; and last, but not least, on this flight 
to freedom, the United States Air Force 
on Freedom I. 

Mr. President, I give you now 52 
Americans, supplemented by a 53d today, 
Richard Queen sitting over here, over- 
joyed in reunion with our families, the 
real heroes in this crisis; 53 Americans, 
proud to rejoin their professional col- 
leagues who had made their flight to 
freedom earlier — our 6 colleagues who 
came here with the great cooperation and 
friendship of our Canadian friends, and 
our 13 who came earlier. I give you now 
53 Americans, proud, as I said earlier to- 
day, to record their undying respect and 
affection for the families of those brave 
ei^ht men who gave their lives so that we 

L. Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S. diplomat released from Iran, is welcomed to the White House 
by Mrs. Reagan while President Reagan and Vice President Bush look on. Thomas L. Ahem, 
another released American, is behind Mr. Laingen. 

might be free, 53 of us proud today, this 
afternoon, and also to see and to meet 
with some of those families and Colonel 
Beckwith and some of those who came 
back. Fifty-three Americans who will al- 
ways have a love affair with this country 
and who join with you in a prayer of 
thanksgiving for the way in which this 
crisis has strengthened the spirit and re- 
silience and strength that is the mark of a 
truly free society. 

Mr. President, we've seen a lot of 
signs along the road, here and up in New 
York. They are marvelous signs, as is the 
spirit and enthusiasm that accompanies 
this, what we've been calling "a celebra- 
tion of freedom." They are signs that 
have not been ordered. They are spon- 
taneous, sincere signs that reflect the 
true feelings of the hearts of those who 
hold them, even those, I suppose, like 
"IRS welcomes you" [laughter] which we 
saw today as we came into town, and an- 
other one that said, "Government work- 
ers welcome you back to work." Well, 
we're ready. 

There was another sign that said, 
and I think that says it as well as any as 
far as we're concerned: "The best things 
in life are free." But even better than 
that was a sign that we saw as we left 
West Point today along a superhighway 
up there that someone had hastily put 
out: "And the world will be better for 

this." We pray, Mr. President, that this 
will be so. 

Mr. President, in very simple words 
that come from the hearts of all of us; it is 
good to be back. Thank you, America, 
and God bless all of you. Thank you very 

President Reagan 

Thank you. This is a flag in this case 
bearing your name, and it is a symbol I 
will give to you now, because all the 
others, you will each receive one when 
we get inside the building. Each one of 
you will have a flag symbolic of the 53 
that are here in your honor. 

And now — I think now a fit ending 
for all of this would be for all of us to par- 
ticipate in singing "God Bless America." 
[The audience sang "God Bless Ameri- 

1 Text from White House press release 
of Jan. 19, 1981. 

2 Made available to the press by Depart- 
ment spokesman John Trattner. 

3 Made available to the press by acting 
Department spokesman William J. Dyess on 
Feb. 2. 

'Text from White House press release 
of Jan. 20. 

5 Remarks from White House press 
release of Jan. 27. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


American Hostages in 

Following is a list of the Americans 
who were held hostage in Iran. Fifty- 
two were held from November k, 1979, 
to January 20, 1981 (U4 days); the 
others were released as noted. 

1. Thomas L. Ahem 
Political Section 

2. Clair Barnes 
Communications Section 

3. William F. Belk 
Communications Section 

4. Robert Blucker 
Commercial Section 

5. Donald J. Cooke 
Consular Section 

6. William J. Daugherty 
Political Section 

7. Robert A. Engelmann 
LCDR, U.S. Navy 
Defense Liaison Office 

8. William A. Gallegos 
Sgt.. USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

9. Bruce W. German 
Administrative Section 

10. Duane L. Gillette 
POl, U.S. Navy 
Defense Attache Office 

11. Alan B. Golacinski 
Security Section 

12. John E. Graves 

13. Kathy J. Gross* 

14. Joseph M. Hall 
WOl, U.S. Army 
Defense Attache Office 

15. Kevin J. Hermening 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

16. Donald R. Hohman 
Sp. 6, U.S. Army 
Medical Corpsman 

17. Leland J. Holland 
COL, U.S. Army 
Defense Attache Office 

18. Michael H. Howland 
Security Section 

19. James 0. Hughes* 
S/Sgt., U.S. Air Force 
Administrative Specialist 

20. Lillian Johnson* 

21. Charles Jones, Jr. 
Communications Section 

22. Malcolm Kalp 
Economic/Commercial Section 

23. William Keough 
School Superintendent 

24. Moorhead Kennedy 
Economic Section 

25. Steven W. Kirtley 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

26. Kathryn L. Koob 

27. Frederick Kupke 
Communications Section 

28. L. Bruce Laingen 
Charge d' Affaires 

29. Steven M. Lauterbach 
General Services Officer 

30. Gary E. Lee 

General Services Officer 

31. Paul E. Lewis 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

32. John W. Limbert 
Political Section 

33. James M. Lopez 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

34. Ladell Maples* 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

35. John D. McKeel 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

36. Michael J. Metrinko 
Political Section 

37. Jerry J. Miele 
Communications Section 

38. Michael E. Moeller 
S/Sgt., USMC 

NCO in charge of Marine Security 

39. Elisabeth Montagne* 

40. Bert C. Moore 
Administrative Section 

41. Richard H. Morefield 
Consular Section 

42. Paul M. Needham 
CAPT, U.S. Air Force 

Logistics Plans and Programs Officer 

43. Robert Ode 
Consular Section 

44. Gregory A. Persinger 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

45. Jerry Plotkin 

46. William E. Quarles* 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

47. Richard I. Queen** 
Consular Section 

48. Regis Magan 
MSG, U.S. Army 
Military Liaison Office 

49. Neal T. Robinson* 
CAPT, U.S. Air Force 
Plans Officer 

50. David M. Roeder 
LTC, U.S. Air Force 
Defense Attache Office 

51. Lloyd A. Rollins* 
General Services Officer 

52. Barry M. Rosen 

53. William B. Royer, Jr. 

54. Thomas E. Schaefer 
COL, U.S. Air Force 
Defense and Air Attache 

55. Charles W. Scott 
COL, U.S. Army 

Chief, Military Liaison Office 

56. Don A. Sharer 
CDR, U.S. Navy 
Defense Liaison Office 

57. Rodney V. Sickman 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

58. Joseph Subic 
SSG, U.S. Army 
Defense Attache Office 

59. Elizabeth A. Swift 
Political Section 

60. Terri L. Tedford* 

61. Victor L. Tomseth 
Political Section 

62. Joseph E. Vincent* 
MSG, U.S. Air Force 

U.S. Military Assistance Group 

63. David R. Walker* 
Sgt., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

64. Joan Walsh* 

65. Philip R. Ward 
Communications Section 

66. Wesley Williams* 
Cpl., USMC 

Marine Security Guard 

♦Released Nov. 18 - 20, 1979. 
•♦Released July 10, 1980. 

Note: When Iranian militants took over the 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 
1979, six Americans managed to elude cap- 
ture; they sought and were granted refuge in 
the .Canadian Embassy. They left Iran on 
January 29, 1980, posing as Canadian diplo- 
mats and carrying Canadian passports with 
forged Iranian visas. Those Americans were 
Robert G. Anders, Mark J. Lijek, Cora 
Amburn Lijek, Joseph D. Stafford, and 
Kathleen F. Stafford, all consular officers, 
and H. Lee Schatz, an agricultural 
specialist. ■ 

February 1981 



President Carter's Farewell 
Address to the Nation 

President Carter's farewell ad- 
dress was broadcast live on January lh, 

In a few days I will lay down my official 
responsibilities in this office to take up 
once more the only title in our democ- 
racy superior to that of President — the 
title of citizen. Of Vice President Mon- 
dale, my Cabinet, and the hundreds of 
others who have served with me during 
the last 4 years, I wish to say now 
publicly what I have said in private: I 
thank them for the dedication and com- 
petence they have brought to the serv- 
ice of our country. 

But I owe my deepest thanks to 
you — to the American people — because 
you gave me this extraordinary oppor- 
tunity to serve. We've faced great 
challenges together, and we know that 
future problems will also be difficult, 
but I am now more convinced than ever 
that the United States, better than any 
other country, can meet successfully 
whatever the future might bring. These 
last 4 years have made me more certain 
than ever of the inner strength of our 
country, the unchanging value of our 
principles and ideals, the stability of 
our political system, the ingenuity and 
the decency of our people. 

Tonight I would like first to say a 
few words about this most special of- 
fice—the Presidency of the United 
States. This is at once the most power- 
ful office in the world and among the 
most severely constrained by law and 
custom. The President is given a broad 
responsibility to lead but cannot do so 
without the support and consent of the 
people, expressed formally through the 
Congress and informally in many ways 
through a whole range of public and 
private institutions. This is as it should 

Within our system of government 
every American has a right and a duty 
to help shape the future course of the 
United States. Thoughtful criticism and 
close scrutiny of all government offi- 
cials by the press and the public are an 
important part of our democratic soci- 
ety. Now, as in the past, only the 
understanding and involvement of the 
people through full and open debate can 

help to avoid serious mistakes and 
assure the continued dignity and safety 
of the nation. 

Today we are asking our political 
system to do things of which the Found- 
ing Fathers never dreamed. The govern- 
ment they designed for a few hundred 
thousand people now serves a nation of 
almost 230 million people. Their small 
coastal republic now spans beyond a 
continent, and we also now have the 
responsibility to help lead much of the 
world through difficult times to a 
secure and prosperous future. 

Today, as people have become ever 
more doubtful of the ability of the 
government to deal with our problems, 
we are increasingly drawn to single- 
issue groups and special interest orga- 
nizations to insure that whatever else 
happens, our own personal views and 
our own private interests are pro- 
tected. This is a disturbing factor in 
American political life. It tends to 
distort our purposes, because the na- 
tional interest is not always the sum of 
all our single or special interests. We 
are all Americans together, and we 
must not forget that the common good 
is our common interest and our indi- 
vidual responsibility. 

Because of the fragmented pres- 
sures of these special interests, it's 
very important that the office of the 
President be a strong one and that its 
constitutional authority be preserved. 
The President is the only elected of- 
ficial charged with the primary respon 
sibility of representing all the people. 
In the moments of decision, after the 
different and conflicting views have all 
been aired, it's the President who then 
must speak to the nation and for the 

I understand after 4 years in this 
office, as few others can, how formida- 
ble is the task the new President-elect 
is about to undertake, and to the very 
limits of conscience and conviction, I 
pledge to support him in that task. I 
wish him success and Godspeed. I know 
from experience that Presidents have 
to face major issues that are controver- 
sial, broad in scope, and which do not 
arouse the natural support of a political 

For a few minutes now, I want to 
lay aside my role as leader of one na- 
tion, and speak to you as a fellow 
citizen of the world about three 
issues — three difficult issues — the 
threat of nuclear destruction, our 
stewardship of the physical resources of 
our planet, and the preeminence of the 
basic rights of human beings. 

Threat of Nuclear Destruction 

It's now been 35 years since the first 
atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. The 
great majority of the world's people 
cannot remember a time when the 
nuclear shadow did not hang over the 
Earth. Our minds have adjusted to it, 
as after a time our eyes adjust to the 

Yet the risk of a nuclear conflagra- 
tion has not lessened. It has not 
happened yet, thank God, but that can 
give us little comfort for it only has to 
happen once. 

The danger is becoming greater. 
As the arsenals of the superpowers 
grow in size and sophistication and as 
other governments — perhaps even in 
the future dozens of governments — 
acquire these weapons, it may only be a 
matter of time before madness, 
desperation, greed, or miscalculation let 
loose this terrible force. 

In an all-out nuclear war, more 
destructive power than in all of World 
War II would be unleashed every 
second during the long afternoon it 
would take for all the bombs and 
missiles to fall. A World War II every 
second — more people killed in the first 
few hours than in all the wars of 
history together. The survivors, if any, 
would live in despair amid the poisoned 
ruins of a civilization that had commit- 
ted suicide. 

National weakness, real or per- 
ceived, can tempt aggression and thus 
cause war. That's why the United 
States can never neglect its military 
strength. We must and we will remain 
strong. But with equal determination, 
the United States and all countries 
must find ways to control and to reduce 
the horrifying danger that is posed by 
the enormous world stockpiles of 
nuclear arms. 

This has been a concern of every 
American president since the moment 
we first saw what these weapons could 
do. Our leaders will require our under- 
standing and our support as they grap- 
ple with this difficult but crucial 
challenge. There is no disagreement on 
the goals or the basic approach to con- 


Department of State Bulletin 

The President 

trolling this enormous force. The 
answer lies not just in the attitudes or 
the actions of world leaders but in the 
concern and the demands of all of us as 
we continue our struggle to preserve 
the peace. 

Nuclear weapons are an expression 
of one side of our human character. But 
there is another side. The same rocket 
technology that delivers nuclear war- 
heads has also taken us peacefully into 
space. From that perspective, we see 
our Earth as it really is — a small, 
fragile, and beautiful blue globe, the 
only home we have. We see no barriers 
of race or religion or country. We see 
the essential unity of our species and 
our planet. And with faith and common 
sense, that bright vision will ultimately 

Protecting the Earth's Resources 

Another major challenge, therefore, is 
to protect the quality of this world 
within which we live. The shadows that 
fall across the future are cast not only 
by the kinds of weapons we have built 
but by the kind of world we will either 
nourish or neglect. There are real and 
growing dangers to our simple and 
most precious possessions — the air we 
breathe, the water we drink, and the 
land which sustains us. The rapid deple- 
tion of irreplaceable minerals, the 
erosion of topsoil, the destruction of 
beauty, the blight of pollution, the 
demands of increasing billions of peo- 
ple, all combine to create problems 
which are easy to observe and predict 
but difficult to resolve. If we do not act, 
the world of the year 2000 will be much 
less able to sustain life than it is now. 
But there is no reason for despair. 
Acknowledging the physical realities of 
our planet does not mean a dismal 
future of endless sacrifice. In fact, 
acknowledging these realities is the 
first step in dealing with them. We can 
meet the resource problems of the 
world — water, food, minerals, farm- 
lands, forests, overpopulation, pollu- 
tion—if we tackle them with courage 
and foresight. 

Protecting Basic Human Rights 

I've just been talking about forces of 
potential destruction that mankind has 
developed and how we might control 
them. It's equally important that we 
remember the beneficial forces that we 
have evolved over the ages and how to 
hold fast to them. One of those con- 
structive forces is the enhancement of 

individual human freedoms through the 
strengthening of democracy and the 
fight against deprivation, torture, ter- 
rorism, and the persecution of people 
throughout the world. The struggle for 
human rights overrides all differences 
of color or nation or language. Those 
who hunger for freedom, who thirst for 
human dignity, and who suffer for the 
sake of justice, they are the patriots of 
this cause. 

I believe with all my heart that 
America must always stand for these 
basic human rights at home and abroad. 
That is both our history and our 

America did not invent human 
rights. In a very real sense, it's the 
other way around. Human rights in- 
vented America. Ours was the first na- 
tion in the history of the world to be 
founded explicitly on such an idea. Our 
social and political progress has been 
based on one fundamental principle — 
the value and importance of the indi- 
vidual. The fundamental force that 
unites us is not kinship or place of 
origin or religious preference. The love 
of liberty is the common blood that 
flows in our American veins. 

The battle for human rights, at 
home and abroad, is far from over. We 
should never be surprised nor dis- 
couraged because the impact of our ef- 
forts has had and will always have 
varied results. Rather we should take 
pride that the ideals which gave birth 
to our nation still inspire the hopes of 
oppressed people around the world. We 
have no cause for self-righteousness or 
complacency, but we have every reason 
to persevere, both within our own coun- 
try and beyond our borders. 

If we are to serve as a beacon for 
human rights, we must continue to 
perfect here at home the rights and the 
values which we espouse around the 
world — a decent education for our chil- 
dren, adequate medical care for all 
Americans, an end to discrimination 
against minorities and women, a job for 
all those able to work, and freedom 
from injustice and religious intolerance. 

We live in a time of transition, an 
uneasy era which is likely to endure for 
the rest of this century. It will be a 
period of tensions, both within nations 
and between nations; of competition for 
scarce resources; of social, political, and 
economic stresses and strains. During 
this period we may be tempted to aban- 
don some of the time-honored principles 
and commitments which have been 
proven during the difficult times of past 
generations. We must never yield to 

this temptation. Our American values 
are not luxuries but necessities — not 
the salt in our bread but the bread 
itself. Our common vision of a free and 
just society is our greatest source of 
cohesion at home and strength abroad 
— greater even than the bounty of our 
material blessings. 

Remember these words: "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident; that all 
men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these 
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. . . ." 

This vision still grips the imagina- 
tion of the world. But we know that 
democracy is always an unfinished crea- 
tion. Each generation must renew its 
foundations. Each generation must 
rediscover the meaning of this hallowed 
vision in the light of its own modern 
challenges. For this generation — ours — 
life is nuclear survival; liberty is human 
rights; the pursuit of happiness is a 
planet whose resources are devoted to 
the physical and spiritual nourishment 
of its inhabitants. 

During the next few days I will 
work hard to make sure that the transi- 
tion from myself to the next President 
is a good one, that the American people 
are served well. And I will continue as 
I have the last 14 months to work hard 
and to pray for the lives and the well- 
being of the American hostages held in 
Iran. I can't predict yet what will 
happen, but I hope you will join me in 
my constant prayer for their freedom. 

As I return home to the South 
where I was born and raised, I look for- 
ward to the opportunity to reflect and 
further to assess, I hope with accuracy, 
the circumstances of our times. I intend 
to give our new President my support, 
and I intend to work as a citizen, as I 
have worked here in this office as 
President, for the values this nation 
was founded to secure. Again, from the 
bottom of my heart, I want to express 
to you the gratitude I feel. Thank you, 
fellow citizens, and farewell. 

! Text from White House press 
release. ■ 

President Carter submitted his last 
State of the Union message to the Con- 
gress on January 16, 1981, the text of 
which is printed in the Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of 
January 20, 1981. 

: ebruary 1981 



Resources for a Credible 
Foreign Policy 

Address before the American 
Foreign Policy Association and the 
World Affairs Council on January 15, 
1981. 1 

I am departing an office I received with 
surprise, held with satisfaction, and re- 
linquish with regret. I have been privi- 
leged to serve a nation I love, under a 
President for whom I have the deepest 
respect. He has labored with extraordi- 
nary effort and caring for our nation and 
for our ideals. I think history will look 
kindly upon his legacy and such 
achievements as the Camp David ac- 
cords, the normalization of relations with 
China, peace in Zimbabwe, the 
strengthening of American defenses. 

And one of my central concerns is an 
issue on which I worked as a member of 
the Senate, but which has been with me 
literally every single day, indeed every 
hour, of my time as Secretary of State. 

The issue is this: Will America sup- 
port the foreign policy this country needs 
with the resources a credible policy re- 
quires? Will we provide the funds neces- 
sary to support our diplomacy and our 
vital interests in the world, or will we 
shortchange them? 

To people with an interest in foreign 
policy this is a perennial problem. The 
Department of State and the foreign as- 
sistance agencies face special obstacles. 
We can never match the domestic con- 
stituencies of other parts of the govern- 
ment in the competition for Federal 

But I suggest that the foreign policy 
resource problem is now passing beyond 
that condition of routine annual struggle. 
It is steadily worsening. It is, in my view, 
a gathering crisis. And it is a threat not 
only to the global influence of the United 
States but to the security and well-being 
of all the American people. The crisis 
ahead lies at the intersection of several 
critical trends. 

Diffusion of Power 

A first trend is the diffusion of authority 
— of power — in the world. Principally as 
a result of decolonialization, the Earth 
now holds nearly three times as many 

■•reign nations as it did at the end of 
the Second World War. There are more 
than 100 new countries. 

As a statistic that is easy enough to 
grasp. We have a much harder time 
grasping the new realities it entails. For 
example, in the United Nations, and in 
many of its related bodies, the majority 
of votes now are cast by countries that 
didn't exist when the institution was 
formed. The balance of power in global 
institutions has shifted — not toward any 
competing superpower but toward the 
developing world. 

For all of their diversity, nearly all of 
those new nations share at least one pas- 
sion — for their sovereignty and national 
integrity. They are uniquely wary of out- 
side manipulation or control. We have 
seen the dark side of this reality in the 
lawless behavior of Iran. But there are 
also positive manifestations of the same 
trend — the resistance of the nationalists 
in Afghanistan, for example, and the 
overwhelming vote in the United Nations 
to condemn the Soviet invasion of that 

But whatever the effect in individual 
cases, the broad international truth is 
that power has been widely dispersed. 
An American diplomacy that can effec- 
tively protect and advance our interests 
in such a world requires, more than ever 
before, a diverse and skilled Foreign Ser- 
vice as well as a fully funded foreign as- 
sistance program. 

U.S. Stake in Developing Countries 

A second trend is our own growing stake 
in those developing countries. Today they 
are the fastest growing markets for 
American exports. Already they buy 
more from us than Japan and the Euro- 
pean Common Market combined. Those 
sales to developing countries account for 
more than 2 million American jobs. They 
supply us with materials we cannot do 
without — not only oil but tin, bauxite, 
rubber, and a long list of others. 

We also need their cooperation. 
World institutions control hundreds of 
matters affecting our lives — from the al- 
location of radio frequencies to proce- 
dures for harvesting the seas and mining 
their floors. Such global issues as popula- 
tion growth and nuclear proliferation 
touch our own daily lives in profound and 
persistent ways. And we have growing 
security interests in developing coun- 
tries. For example, an effective response 
to Soviet ambitions in the Indian Ocean/ 

Persian Gulf region requires access to 
military facilities on the scene. 

So for all of these reasons — eco- 
nomic, political, security — good relations 
with developing countries are not some- 
thing we concede; they are something we 

Soviet Ambition 

A third trend is one I have alluded to al- 
ready — the ambition of the Soviet Union 
to extend its influence in the developing 
world. It is, of course, no revelation that 
the Soviets believe their system should 
be installed elsewhere and ultimately 
everywhere. That aspiration increasingly 
is backed up with a growing capacity to 
project military power far beyond their 
borders. A little over a year ago we saw a 
grim new step in Afghanistan — a direct 
Soviet invasion designed to transform a 
nonaligned country into a new satellite 

Obviously we must never neglect the 
direct Soviet threat to the United States 
and the other industrial democracies. But 
the Soviets' most promising opportunities 
lie in the developing world through ex- 
ploitation of disorder. Our diplomacy — if 
it is wise — and our resources — if they are 
generous — can promote order by helping 
other governments meet the aspirations 
of their people for economic, political, and 
social justice. 

Worsening Economy of Third World 

Unfortunately, a fourth trend brightens 
Soviet prospects there — and that is the 
worsening economic plight of most Third 
World nations. The barriers to develop- 
ment have grown steadily higher in re- 
cent years. Populations have multiplied; 
debts have swollen; energy prices have 
soared; available resources have dwin- 
dled. And the future looks worse. In the 
past year a series of authoritative reports 
— by the World Bank, by the Brandt 
Commission, by the President's world 
hunger commission, by agencies of our 
own government in the "Global 2000" re- 
port — have all foreseen in the coming de- 
cades a world with huge concentrations of 
desperate people. 

Right now by far the greatest disabl- 
ing factor is oil. It is a stunning fact that 
oil prices have roughly tripled in just 2 
years — from $12.80 per barrel at the end 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Secretary 

of 1978 to some $35 now. Those increases 
have inflicted real pain here. Each round 
of higher costs further shocks our econ- 
omy and fuels our inflation. 

But if they have harmed us, those 
price hikes have ripped through Third 
World economies like a tornado, leaving 
economic devastation in their wake. Na- 
tional treasuries are draining dry. In the 
year just past, the bills to be paid by 
non-OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] developing coun- 
tries for imported oil and interest and ex- 
ternal debt alone have been some three 
times what they received in aid. 

The poorest lands are the hardest 
hit. Countries like Bangladesh, Liberia, 
the Sudan, and Uganda have little access 
to credit, so the trade-off is direct: Every 
dollar more paid for oil immediately 
means a dollar less to invest in productive 
enterprise. In the resulting economic 
crunch, funds reserved for investment 
often must be diverted on a crisis basis 
for such necessities as food. 

In any nation, these are precisely 
the conditions that invite turmoil. It is 
not only the lesson, it is the litany of his- 
tory that human misery is the enemy of 
order. Driven by the energy emergency, 
many governments are forced toward 
economic decisions that could mean their 
downfall. As this process continues, the 
lure of radicalism will become stronger; 
each day those who preach violence and 
hatred of the West will find more 
adherents in the developing world. 

The OPEC countries have yet to rec- 
ognize the profound dangers they create 
for themselves in pressing this trend. If 
their wealth is to have practical value, 
they have a stake in the economic health 
and stability of others. And obviously 
they, too, depend upon a stable world. 

Shrinkage in U.S. Response 

Finally, there is a fifth trend — not only a 
stagnation but a shrinkage in our af- 
firmative response to these dangers. 
There are those who see these first four 
trends and see only their military implica- 
tions. Certainly we need to help our 
friends build their strength. And we must 
be sufficiently armed ourselves to help 
deter and defeat aggression. That is why 
the current Administration has sponsored 
major real increases in military outlays. 

But arms alone are an insufficient 
answer to the challenges I have de- 
scribed. In a world of crushing human 
needs — among nations stirred by 
nationalism with global problems deman- 
ding cooperative answers — we need still 
more than a mighty arsenal. 

And what has been our response? We 
begin with a national indifference to our 
diplomatic structure. The quality and ca- 
pacity of our professional Foreign Service 
is a decisive factor in our relations with 
other countries. Everyone knows and 
sympathizes with the plight of our hos- 
tages in Tehran and most people have not 
forgotten the other terrorist and mob at- 
tacks to which our diplomats have been 
subject in recent years. What is not so 
well known is our failure to maintain and 
sustain our essential diplomatic re- 

As we move further into the 1980s, it 
is clear that all elements of our national 
security need full support, and diplomacy 
is the front line of any lasting security. 
We must be well prepared militarily, but 
we must also do all we can to achieve our 
national goals without resort to force, and 
that, in a word, is the business of diplo- 

Given the complexities of the world 
of the 1980s and 1990s, it is also clear that 
we need to understand still better the as- 
pirations and interests of people in the 
rest of the world and other people need to 
understand still better our aspirations 
and interests. The consequences of mis- 
understanding are much greater than 
they were in the past. Making sure gov- 
ernments interpret each other's actions 
and words correctly is also the essential 
business of diplomacy. 

If diplomacy is to be effective, then 
we must continue to have individuals who 
represent the best in America serving in 
our professional Foreign Service. Yet, the 
Department of State has the same 
number of people as it had in 1960 when 
we dealt with 66 fewer nations and prob- 
lems that were significantly less complex. 
Despite mounting needs to understand 
this world still better, we have 18% fewer 
political officer positions than in 1960. 
That is not only a sorry picture, but a 
scary one, in the light of our global re- 

The same short-sighted, stingy ap- 
proach has limited also our foreign assist- 
ance programs. These are the programs 
that provide backing for our daily diplo- 
macy even as they address the longer 
term economic and social sources of 
human suffering and political instability. 
Foreign aid, and particularly economic 
development aid, can be a favorite target 
on Capitol Hill. Often, those who are 
most vocal against aid programs are also 
the loudest in declaring their opposition 
to communism. They insist upon a goal 
we share even as they dismantle the 
means we need to pursue it. 

The Congress has failed, for 2 years 
straight, to even pass our foreign aid 
legislation. We operate year to year on 
continuing resolutions, with funding 
based on levels of prior years. And in real 
terms the amounts are shrinking. We 
rank 14th among the world's major 
donors of assistance. For assistance pro- 
grams that are directly related to our 
own security and prosperity, we provide 
roughly one-fifth of 1% of our gross na- 
tional product. In real terms our eco- 
nomic aid today is actually less than it 
was 10 years ago. Our security assistance 
is nearly one-fourth less than it was in 

But all of this still is only prologue. 
Budget trends suggest that a tighter 
pinch could be coming. The relatively 
"uncontrollable" parts of the Federal 
budget — social security, trust funds, and 
the like — are taking up even higher pro- 
portions of government spending. The 
remainder, now less than one-fourth of 
the budget, must cover national defense, 
all other international programs including 
foreign aid, and all the discretionary 
domestic programs as well. 

Now if we project past trends into 
the future — and factor in the increases in 
defense already planned, let alone any 
further growth the Reagan Administra- 
tion might want — we find this: By 1985 
the total of funds left for international af- 
fairs and these domestic programs will be 
slashed nearly in half. It takes little imag- 
ination to forecast the resultant pressures 
on the State Department and foreign as- 
sistance budgets. That is why I say what 
we know now as an annual struggle is, in 
fact, a gathering crisis. If unmet, it could 
dramatically alter our role in the world. 

That crisis can be averted. But it will 
require political will on the part of our 
leaders and a new awareness on the part 
of the American people. It must begin 
with a recognition of this central reality: 
We can no longer afford to act as if for- 
eign aid were charity and as if diplomacy 
were a diversion. They are as vital to our 
long-run security as defense — as essen- 
tial to the well-being of the American 

In short, we have a fundamental 
choice we can no longer postpone. We 
must either raise our investments signifi- 
cantly or lower our expectations for the 
future. We cannot produce the foreign 
policy results our people expect with the 
dwindling resources we seem prepared to 
apply. If we continue to address surging 
international challenges with a shrinking 
commitment, then we ought to begin 
planning for an ineffectual, defensive, and 
perilous future. 

February 1981 


The Secretary 

America's Potential 

I have great confidence in America's po- 
tential. Our values are more relevant to 
the world than ever before. Our military 
strength is growing. Our dedication to 
the sovereignty of nations is squarely in 
line with the aspirations of developing 
countries. Despite all the setbacks, our 
economic system — our technology, the 
miracle of our agriculture, our innovation 
— remain a source of international 
strength, in contrast to the faltering of 
state-managed systems. 

And I have confidence in the Ameri- 
can people — in their capacity to grasp 
what is at stake when they are told the 
truth about what must be done to sup- 
port forward-looking foreign policies. 

The response of our people and our 
political leadership to this challenge will 
importantly determine the kind of world 
our children will inherit — whether it is 
hospitable or hostile to our values; 
whether we are fully engaged in the in- 
ternational system or excluding our- 
selves from it; whether Americans feel 
secure or surrounded. In the next few 
years, the choice must be made. For all of 
our sakes, I hope we choose wisely. 

'Press release 12. 

Secretary Muskie 
Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 

Secretary Muskie was interviewed 
on NBC's "Meet the Press" on Decem- 
ber 21, 1980, by Bill Monroe, NBC 
News (moderator and executive pro- 
ducer); Karen Elliot House, Wall Street 
Journal; Carl Rowan, Chicago Sun 
Times; and Marvin Kalb, NBC News. 1 

Q. What is your assessment of the latest 
conditions from Iran for the return of 
the 52 American hostages and the options 
they make available to this country? 

A. We regard the response as 
unreasonable and as requiring of us 
actions beyond the power of the Presi- 
dent to take. 

Expecting, on the basis of this 
morning's news, that I'd be asked to 
react to what they have done, I would 
like to make clear that what I say 
about the subject on this program is 
not an official response; it's an official 
reaction to the extent that I'm in a 
position to respond to your questions. 
The second point I'd like to make is 
that it is official in the sense that I've 
discussed this subject with the Presi- 
dent today, and what I have to say 
represents the reaction of the Admin- 

Finally, in order to put this whole 
subject of negotiations between Iran 
and the United States in the proper 
context, what we are discussing is not 
the usual kind of negotiation between 
mutually agreed parties. What we are 
talking about is negotiating the release 
of hostages that were illegally taken 
over a year ago, who are being illegally 
held today — a taking that has been con- 
demned by the World Court, condemned 
by the United Nations, and condemned 
by nations all over this planet. It's that 
illegal holding that we are seeking to 
correct. I think that these points are 
important points to be reminded of as 
we begin whatever discussions we may 
have today. 

Q. Are the difficulties now posed by 
Iran so severe, in your judgment, that 
the Administration would consider, in 
effect, suspending negotiations at this 

point and leaving the resolution of the 
matter up to the incoming Reagan 

A. No, indeed. We continue to 
work at what we think is a high-prior- 
ity goal, and that is the release of the 
hostages. The Iranians previously have 
made requests that we could not meet. 
Nevertheless, we continue to use the 
private channel, through the Algerian 
Government, in an attempt to persuade 
them to our position. 

What we have tried to do is make 
a goodwill effort, a good faith effort, to 
examine what we can do to restore 
their frozen assets within the legal 
authority of the President of the United 
States. And we will continue to do that. 

Q. Are you saying that the Adminis- 
tration will present a detailed response 
to Iran's latest terms? 

A. The nature of the response is, of 
course, still under study. We've had 
this response which, as you now know 
from the public prints, is quite long, 
extensive, and complicated, and which 
also requires an understanding of the 
Iranian use of concepts before we can 
respond. So the nature of our response 
is not yet decided, but the nature of 
this reaction is clear. 

Q. You seem to be implying that 
you will respond again in some fashion, 
whatever the details, and that you won't 
simply say, "This is as far as we can go. 
You know what it is. Take it or leave it. 
If you don't like it, deal with the next 
Administration." Is that what you mean 
to imply? 

A. What I mean to say is that a 
part of this frustrating and, at times, 
agonizing effort is to make clear to the 
Iranians through a third party — which 
complicates the task — the limits beyond 
which the President cannot legally go. 
It is not always clear whether that mes- 
sage has gotten through or whether 
they accept it. 

This is not the first time that they 
have suggested items that would re- 
quire us to go beyond the President's 
legal authority. This comes at a time 
when we were under the impression 
that they understood those limits. 

Q. How do you expect them to re- 
lease the hostages if they are not given 
something of a nature that they can pass 
off politically to their own people? I 
mean, we're saying we want the hostages 
back because they were illegally taken, 
and you can't have the money until the 
hostages are back. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Secretary 

A. They have a responsibility for 
leadership and accountability in their 
own political system just as I do in our 
system, and just as our President does 
in our system. The President cannot 
politically, let alone legally, exceed his 
own powers in dealing with their re- 
quests. They must understand that. So 
they have to decide first, are they go- 
ing to respond to world opinion, which 
has judged that they have taken an ille- 
gal act and which has had an impact 
upon their own country economically in 
terms of isolation from the world com- 
munity, in terms of denial of access to 
markets that they would find useful 
now, in terms of impacting on an un- 
stable political situation in their own 
country, and in terms of threats on 
their own borders. 

They've paid a cost for this illegal 
taking, and an increasing number of 
them have made it clear that they 
understand that their own national 
interests would be better served if the 
hostage issue were behind them. They 
have said that publicly. So if it is in 
their country's interest to solve this 
problem, then they have an obligation, 
as leaders in that country, to take the 
necessary decision. 

Q. But they have, for a year, thumbed 
their noses at world opinion. We have 
Radio Tehran saying that, if you don't 
accept what you have called unreason- 
able, the Christmas trees here will be 
unlit next year, meaning the hostages 
will still be there. Would you give me 
your candid assessment as to whether 
you think there can be, ever, a nego- 
tiated settlement? 

A. There will have to be a nego- 
tiated settlement unless they take the 
other step — which they have given no 
indication at all they are willing to take 
— to release the hostages without condi- 
tion. That is what they ought to do, 
given the fact that they did an illegal 
act over a year ago. 

With respect to their public rhet- 
oric, I have found that, like politicians 
everywhere, their public statements 
made for domestic consumption may 
not necessarily disclose what may be 
possible through appropriate negotia- 
tions. It requires patience, it involves 
frustration, but you have to press it. 
You have to press it because I don't 
believe that country or any other coun- 
try can persist in the kind of illegal 
action they have taken and not pay a 
penalty as a member of the community 
of nations. 

Q. A lot of us sitting on the outside 
see a situation where it appears you've 
done everything that you can possibly 
do, and you're still left with a situation 
where the United States has to accept 
something close to abject capitulation to 
kidnappers and that we may be at the 
point where nothing is left but military 
action. Are we close to that point? 

A. No, I would not say so. We've 
had a previous experience in the case of 
North Korea, a hostage situation, in- 
volving roughly the same number of 
people. They were held for 11 months 
and were eventually released. I think 
that these hostages will eventually be 
released. I don't believe that the Ira- 
nians can escape the costs that they are 
now paying for holding the hostages. 
Inevitably, at some point, they will 
make the decision that they must make. 

Q. You are aware that there are 
some mumblings out there in America 
that the honor of the United States is 
more important than the lives of 52 hos- 
tages and that, at some time, this gov- 
ernment is going to have to say, "The 52 
don't matter that much. We're going to 
have to do what we have to do." Do you 
think, having given priority to saving the 
hostages all these months, that the United 
States can ever make that hard decision? 

A. I don't think the two are that 
separable. I think that to permit them 
to jeopardize the safety and the lives of 
the hostages would be counter to our 
national interest and our national 
honor. I don't think you can separate 
the two. They are one problem. 

Q. Are you ruling out the use of 
American military force by this Adminis- 
tration to resolve this problem? 

A. We tried a form of that in the 
rescue effort which failed. That effort 
did not succeed and, in addition, making 
the effort, I think, prolonged the agony 
of the problem. 

It is not easy, if one looks at a map 
of Iran, to consider military options 
unless one were to consider options 
with consequences that need to be care- 
fully weighed for our other national 
interests before making it. An auto- 
matic military response is not an easy 
thing to devise or an easy thing to exe- 
cute or one that one easily contem- 
plates when one considers other national 
interests that might be impacted. But 
the President has made clear for a year 
that we will hold Iran accountable for 
the safety of the hostages, whatever 
that implies in the circumstances that 
may arise. 

I don't think it is helpful to try to 
hypothesize what circumstances may 
arise. At this point, in our negotiations 
with Iran, we are within reach, if they 
could but see it, of a solution to the 
problem which would eliminate any 
such possibility, which would make pos- 
sible the return of the hostages, and 
which would make possible the begin- 
nings of a meaningful process of bring- 
ing Iran back into the community of na- 
tions in a dignified, responsible way. 
They've got to do that; they've got to 
face it at some point. 

Q. You just said "within reach." If you 
had to project now "within reach" mean- 
ing weeks, months, do we have to wait 
for the next Administration to come in? 

A. When I say "within reach," I 
don't mean on the basis of the most re- 
cent exchange between us that I see it 
happening. It's certainly not going to 
happen by Christmas, and it would be 
very difficult to make it happen within 
the time left to this Administration. 

Q. Difficult? 

A. Very difficult. It all depends on 
the extent to which the Iranian reply is 
a negotiating tactic or whether it is in 
fact a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal. 

Q. Are you beginning to suspect 
that it might be a case of old-fashioned 
ransom being asked of the United States? 

A. What they've asked for is unrea- 
sonable, and it would require us to do 
things that we cannot do legally. That 
is the best way to describe it at this 
point. You know, they do some of these 
things that they are asking of us by 
just a flick of their fingers. 

Q. Would the United States consider 
sending billions of dollars to Algeria — 
one figure mentioned today is $23 or $24 
billion — as a guarantee against the even- 
tual return of the Iranian assets frozen 
in this country and the Shah's wealth? 

A. No. The President does not 
have the power to do that or the 
authority to do it. And let me put that 
in perspective, if I may. Iran placed in 
the hands of persons and institutions in 
the United States and other countries 
deposits totaling billions of dollars. 
They did that long before the hostages 
were taken. They took the risks attend- 
ant upon that. The U.S. Government 
had no responsibility with respect to 
those deposits. We don't guarantee 
those deposits. When they did that, 
they assumed certain risks. 


The Secretary 

As a result of their taking of the 
hostages, their business arrangements 
with the various institutions involved in 
those deposits were interrupted. The 
result of all that was to produce a lot of 
litigation, a lot of claims, a lot of suits; 
but they took those risks. Now they ask 
us to make cash guarantees for the pur- 
pose of assuring them against loss 
resulting from those risks, if they mate- 
rialize in the form of losses. That's not 
our responsibility. 

May I say, also, that at the begin- 
ning of these negotiations, we pursued, 
apparently with their understanding 
and their agreement, two principles: 
One, that we would do everything we 
could, insofar as we could legally, to 
restore our financial arrangements to 
their status prior to November 14, a 
year ago. Two principles are involved: 
the status quo as of that time and what 
we could do legally. The status quo as 
of that time was, with respect to these 
frozen assets, that they had placed 
these assets on deposit in Western 
institutions and with persons in the 
West and in the United States. 

We are willing and have offered 
ways to do that. There are some assets 
that could be made available to them 
almost immediately. Others are subject 
to claims that have to be resolved in 
one way or another. We have offered to 
join with them in establishing an inter- 
national claims settling procedure and 
offered to pursue that procedure with 
them in every way possible that we could 
legally in order to resolve those claims. 

It would require actions on their 
part, reestablishing their banking rela- 
tions, for example, and others. There 
are precedents for this sort of approach 
to it. Now, because that process couldn't 
conceivably be completed before the 
end of the President's term and before 
the return of the hostages, they ask us 
for these cash guarantees. Well, that is 
asking for something different than the 
status quo in November of 1979. 

Q. Two weeks ago we were told that 
a Soviet invasion of Poland was immi- 
nent, or virtually imminent. Has that 
problem eased up? 

A. There has been a certain stabil- 
ity, I think, which has developed as a 
result of the ceremonial activities in 
Gdansk and the other Baltic cities. 
There was some fear that those might 
produce instability, even violence, but 
they were conducted with calm and 
with dignity. The church, the unions, 
and the government were all repre- 
sented, and every effort was made by 

those three institutions in the Polish 
community to insure that those activ- 
ities would be conducted in a way that 
was dignified and calm. 

Having passed that potential explo- 
sive point, there has been a certain 
stability. But the Polish situation is still 
difficult; the economic situation is still 
difficult and, to some extent, inhibits 
the liberalization movement, or the "re- 
newal process," as the Poles call it, that 
has been taking place with respect to 
the unions. So in those terms, the situa- 
tion is somewhat easier than it seemed 
to be a couple of weeks ago. 

Q. But there is no sign that the 
Soviets are withdrawing their troops or 
are stepping down their readiness? 

A. Their readiness is still there. 

Q. The Peoples Republic of China 
has issued a state-of-the-world review in 
which they warn that the United States 
and other nations had better get together 
to halt Soviet military expansion or face 
the choice of either abject surrender or 
world war. Do you share this grim out- 
look with regard to Soviet intentions? 

A. The Soviet Union has posed 
serious problems for us, for themselves, 
for the West, including China. Never- 
theless, I think the situation is not irre- 
mediable. It all depends on where the 
Soviets go from here to there. I put it 
this way: One of the most serious chal- 
lenges facing us is the continuing chal- 
lenge of reading Soviet intentions. 

With respect to Afghanistan, they 
have paid some heavy costs, costs that 
have, in visible ways, restrained them. 
With respect to Poland, they have per- 
mitted the situation there to go beyond 
limits which they previously considered 
tolerable so, obviously, they have exer- 
cised restraint there. 

Q. What about Iran, can you tell us 
what Soviet behavior has been there? 
Have they done anything to try to help 
bring the Iranian leaders to their senses, 
as you might put it? 

A. With respect to the hostage 

Q. That's correct. 

A. Not to my knowledge. 

Q. Have you seen any evidence that 
they've tried to keep this dispute going? 

A. I don't think, recently. There 
was a time when their propaganda broad- 
casts, radio broadcasts, we thought, had 
the effect of inflaming opinion in Iran 
against the United States. 

Q. You seemed to be suggesting 
earlier that the hostages may not be 
released until the Reagan Administra- 
tion comes in. Would you recommend 
that President Reagan continue to nego- 
tiate for the release of the hostages — in 
effect, two Administrations being held 
hostage to the same problem? 

A. What he does with respect to 
the problem will depend upon, I sup- 
pose, what the situation is on January 
20. We try to keep him and his advisers 
informed, and now that we have a Sec- 
retary of State-designate, we are in a 
better position to keep him informed. 

We are trying to solve the problem 
before he comes on so that he won't 
have this on his plate with other 
problems that will be on his plate. But 
whatever he may find expedient to do 
at that time will depend upon the 

Press release 352. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Secretary 

Interview on the 

Secretary Muskie's interview for 
the Public Broadcasting System's 
"MacNeil/Lehrer Report" with Robert 
MacNeil and Jim Lehrer on January 6, 

Q. Iran's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali 
Rajai today consulted the Ayatollah 
Khomeini on the latest stage in the 
hostage negotiations, but what precisely 
transpired is unclear. Afterward Rajai 
spoke to Iranian television, and there are 
two versions of what he said. 

According to one. the Ayatollah said 
the government could accept guarantees 
by the Algerian intermediaries to solve 
the hostage problem. The other version 
uses the word "undertakings" instead of 
guarantees. Before the Algerians return- 
ed to Iran last week with the latest 
American counterproposals, some Ira- 
nians said they would accept whatever 
guarantees satisfied the Algerians. 

Meanwhile, the whereabouts of the 
hostages themselves are again in doubt. 
On Saturday, the three hostages held 
all along at the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
were forced to move to an unknown 
destination. Today, an unidentified Ad- 
ministration official in Washington said 
some of them may be in jail. Tonight, 
the Administration view of the hostage 
situation and other matters. Secretary 
of State Edmund Muskie is with Jim 
Lehrer in Washington. 

Q. First, on the hostages them- 
selves. Do we know now that some of 
them are in jail? 

A. No, we do not. I don't know the 
source of the report to which Robert 
just referred. We don't know where the 
three are. The Government of Iran 
justified the move on the grounds that 
all the hostages are now under govern- 
ment control; that they wanted to bring 
them all together, wherever they are — 
that is, an appropriate place. This is the 
only explanation we have. 

Q. There had even been state- 
ments — oh, 10 days ago, I think — from 
[Department of State spokesman] John 
Trattner about the possibility that 
some of the hostages were now in jail. 
There's no new development on it? We 
have no new information about that, 
though, is that correct? 

A. No. The latest information we 
have about the other 49 is the news 
that we were given by the Algerian 
delegation. And that was all very posi- 
tive. They saw all 52 hostages, spent 
some 7Vz hours with them, talking to 
groups of them in their rooms or 
quarters; accepting letters from them 
to the people back here, and to the 
families back here, in the States; and 
taking pictures of all of those who were 
interested in having pictures taken. I 
think there's only one who did not. So 
they had that much time to observe the 
hostages, and their impression was that 
they were in good physical health. 

Q. The explanation, you said, that 
the Iranians had given for taking the 
three out of the Foreign Ministry 
was — do you buy that explanation — 
that the government has now taken 
control of the hostages? 

A. In dealing with Iranians, I'm 
always interested in as many facts as I 
can get. One does not necessarily get a 
consistent version of what has hap- 
pened or why. Our access to informa- 
tion is not perfect. The Swiss, of 
course, are our protective government 
in Tehran, representing our interests, 
and they are in almost daily contact 
with the Government of Iran. They give 
us the best information they can, and 
we rely on them to give us information. 
And there are other governments that 
are useful channels to information. But 
at this point we don't know where the 
three have been taken, but we are pur- 
suing that question. 

Q. Is there anything important in 
these reported remarks of the Ayatollah 
to the Prime Minister today that I just 
quoted? Is there some significance that 
you can read into that? 

A. There is an additional report 
that you ought to have. Ambassador 
Gheraib, one of the Algerian delegation, 
also had a press conference subsequent 
to the ones to which you refer and 
made it clear that Algeria's only role is 
as intermediary. So whatever Khomeini 
said, it was not an accurate description 
of the Algerian role and certainly not a 
description that satisfied the Algerians. 

Q. So that speculation that the 
Algerians might be performing some- 
thing like the Camp David role of try- 
ing to come up with a parcel, a 
package, that brings both sides 
together, they are not doing that. 

A. I think the most accurate way 
to describe their role — and I've used 
this description before — is that of a 
positive intermediary. Now, what do I 
mean by the word "positive"? 

When they come to the United 
States to get our response, they do 
more than accept the document. They 
also ask questions about the document, 
undertaking to anticipate the questions 
that Iranians may put to them so that 
they can deliver the document with a 
rather full understanding on their own 
part of the document's significance and 
meaning. And they do that in reverse 
when they receive the Iranian response 
to our documents. 

So they have been very helpful and 
very impressive in that respect, but 
they are no more than intermediaries. 

Q. Last week, before they went 
back, one of the spokesmen in Iran — 
the man who's in charge of negotia- 
tions, Mr. Nabavi — said that they were 
prepared to hear a U.S. counter offer. 
Are you hopeful that what you have 
now sent back with the Algerians will 
produce a positive response in Iran? Do 
you have some hope of that? 

A. Long ago I dismissed hope as a 
useful emotion in these frustrating 
talks. I don't even describe them as 
"negotiations." But one never knows, 
given the political power struggle that 
is going on in Iran today — and it seems 
to have developed into one of those 
more abrasive kinds of struggles, more 
public than it has been for some time — 
one never knows when someone in Iran 
is in a position to make a decision and 
to make a decision favorable to our pro- 
posals and to the hostages. 

And the second point I would make 
is that, notwithstanding the positive 
role that the Algerians have played in 
conveying not only our documents but 
an explanation of them, it has been 
very difficult to convey to the Iranians 
precisely what the limitations are on 
our authority, on the President's 
authority, in a way that's credible to 
them. They're suspicious of us anyway. 
So we think that by patiently and per- 
sistently making our points, our limita- 
tions, reformulating our proposals in ac- 
cordance with the questions that they 
raise, that we might at some point 
strike a formulation that gets a favor- 
able response. Time is obviously run- 
ning out; we're aware of that, and we 
hope they are. 

February 1981 


The Secretary 

Q. Have you asked the Algerians 
to emphasize that point to the Iranians, 
that time is running out? 

A. Oh, indeed, and it wasn't 
necessary for us to emphasize it. 
They're quite aware of it, too. 

Q. They can look at the calendar 
as well. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Is there any indication at this 
point as to when this next Iranian 
response to our counterproposals is go- 
ing to be received here in the United 

A. No, there isn't. I think that Ra- 
jai is scheduled to hold another press 
conference tomorrow. He had one today 
and gave us no response. 

Q. It must be terribly frustrating 
for you to have to get information from 
a press conference every day or so. 

A. Now it doesn't seem to me that 
you take your profession seriously 
enough. Aren't press conferences sup- 
posed to be informative? 

Q. [Laughing] All right. Yes, sir. 

A. But you're absolutely right. 
And, like so many politicians in this 
country, as well as in Iran, they often 
say things in public that are not neces- 
sarily a clue to what their thinking is or 
what they may be planning to do. 

Q. Have the statements by Presi- 
dent-elect Reagan, particularly those 
characterizing the Iranians as bar- 
barians, have they been helpful or hurt- 
ful to the negotiations or the discus- 
sions — whatever you want to call them? 

A. That's hard to measure. Cer- 
tainly it struck a chord over in Iran and 
some very vigorous reactions. But he 
has, of course, made it clear to them 
that they can't expect a better deal in a 
Reagan Administration than they can 
get from the Carter Administration, 
and to that extent perhaps it's useful. 

Q. What do you make of all this 
talk in the last several days — and it's 
just talk, as I understand it— but the 
suggestion that some people are going 
to make to President-elect Reagan that 
what he ought to do is ask the Con- 
gress to declare war on Iran. Does that 
sound like a good idea to you? 

A. If we do that, we risk turning 
away from one of our two objectives. 
Our two objectives from the beginning 
of this Administration have been, first, 

the hostages' safety and speedy 
return — the word "speedy" has to be 
dropped now — and, secondly, to do so 
consistent with national honor. 

Once we go to these other alter- 
natives, there is a risk. There are risks 
even in our present strategy, so it may 
be that another look at those options 
would be in order. But the fact that one 
looks at options doesn't necessarily 
mean that one is looking seriously at 
one option or another. And I think a 
new administration would, as I think 
Vice President-elect Bush put it, ex- 
amine the problem from ground zero. 

When you do that, you look at a lot 
of options that you won't necessarily 
consider seriously, and I don't think it 
would be useful for me to prejudge 
options that may not be considered 

Q. Why is it in the Iranian interest 
to solve this before the Carter Adminis- 
tration leaves? 

A. It seems logical to me, even in 
terms of their own interest, that they 
should have solved it long ago. But our 
logic doesn't seem to run parallel with 
Iranian logic. 

Q. You mentioned national honor a 
moment ago. We've rejected the $24 
billion deposit demand. We have of- 
fered, as I understand, something like 
$6 billion. Why is our offer of $6 billion 
consistent with national honor and their 
demand for $24 billion not acceptable as 
consistent with national honor? 

A. The principles on which we 
have been negotiating— two important 
principles; one, if they will undo what 
they did — that is, seize the hostages — 
we would do everything we can within 
the limits of the President's authority 
to undo what we did in retaliation. The 
$6 billion figure, which doesn't come 
from the State Department or any offi- 
cial source — and I'm not going to use 
any numbers — but the number that has 
been used is that the assets frozen at 
the time the hostages were seized 
amounted to about $8 billion. Any sum 
in excess of that would do more than 
restore our financial relationship to the 
status quo ante. That's the first princi- 

The second principle is that if and 
when this exchange of actions is taken, 
they must be taken simultaneously — 
that is, so that we are sure of getting 
the hostages back for taking our action 
and so that they are sure of getting 
their assets back. 

The complicating factor in all of 
this is that subsequent to the freezing 
of the assets, a great number of suits 
arising out of business and banking ar- 
rangements that the Iranians had 
entered into before the seizure of the 
hostages changed. Banks offset loans 
against assets; people with claims 
against Iran filed suit and made attach- 
ments. That's the complicating factor. 

One cannot just arbitrarily wipe 
out the rights of those people to a 
judicial settlement of their claims. 
That's the complicating factor; and it is 
the amount of those claims, which is 
very hard to measure, that complicates 
the net numbers to which you referred. 
There's nothing like $24 billion in Ira- 
nian assets involved in all of this. 

Q. So is it wrong to think of this 
as a negotiation like a labor negotiation 
where they start with a high demand 
and then there's a lower offer and 
gradually the two sides come together 

A. I don't see it in that fashion at 
all. Recall that I said the principle is to 
restore each other's position to what it 
was. Given the fact that a year irre- 
vocably changes those positions to some 
extent, you can't give the hostages back 
that wasted year; and, in the case of 
the assets, these attachments have com- 
plicated the Iranians' claim to their 
assets. So you can't put them back. 

And so you're dealing with fixed 
items. You can't negotiate down the 
claims. What we've offered to do is to 
create an international claims settle- 
ment procedure — which would substi- 
tute for the judicial process — to make 
judgments as to the validity of claims 
and to arrange for their settlement. 

In order to wipe the slate clean at 
some point, Iran has said that it is will- 
ing to pay its just debts. But, beyond 
that, it is not willing to concede against 
its own assets. So the numbers are not 
really that flexible. 

Q. It sounds as though there's not 
much more room for maneuver. 

A. To answer that question ade- 
quately would require that I go into the 
matter more extensively than I think 
would be helpful. 

Q. On a scale of 1 to 10, what do 
you think the chances are of the 
hostage situation being resolved by the 
deadline, January 16? 

A. That method of measuring is 
useful in the United States but not in 


Department of State Bulletin 


Proposed Chad- 
Libya Merger 

JAN. 9, 1981 1 

We are very concerned about reports 
coming from Tripoli that Libya and 
Chad plan to work toward a merger of 
their two states. Without trying to in- 
tervene in Chad's internal affairs, we 
must note that it appears the entire 
National Union Transition Government 
(GUNT) has not been consulted about 
this proposal. 

Our policy has been clear from the 
beginning. We support the provisions of 
the Lagos accord and the Lagos com- 
munique. The United States has also 
long been attached to the principle of 
noninterference by one state in the in- 
ternal affairs of another. 

Most of Africa has expressed a 
great concern in recent days over 
Libya's blatant behavior. We share this 
concern and want to work with the Af- 
rican states to assure Chad's national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

^ead to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman John Trattner. 

Q. You won't play my game, then? 

A. No. 

Q. [Laughing] Okay. Moving on to 
another major problem of Iran, which is 
its war with Iraq. Yesterday Iran an- 
nounced that it had launched a major 
counteroffensive against Iraq. Is that 
real, as best you can tell? 

A. I know what Iranian reports say 
about it. What they claim to have been 
involved in is Iraqi casualties in the 
hundreds. In terms of World War II, 
that's not a major offensive, but in 
terms of this war, that is a sizable loss. 
And they claim this victory. 

Reports out of Iraq these days, or 
this morning — and I've been caught up 
in other things all day — made no refer- 
ence to such an offensive. So all we 
have is the Iranian report, and Bani- 
Sadr, who's in charge of the military 
operation, made that report to Kho- 
meini and received a note of congratu- 
lations. That's the evidence that there 
was such an offensive. 

The war has bogged down — it's the 
rainy season there now — into sort of a 
war of attrition at a very low pace. At 
this point neither country seems to be 

in a position to achieve a quick victory 
over the other. It looks like a long, 
dragged out process which is taking its 
toll on both countries economically. 
They've lost a sizable portion of their 
oil revenues. 

In the case of Iran, the sanctions, 
which were imposed as a result of the 
hostage issue, are denying it access to 
markets that otherwise would enable it 
to improve its ability to sustain the war 
effort. But Iraq, also, is suffering 
economic damage. So it looks now as 
though the war has settled down for 
the long term. 

Whether or not at some point both 
parties will be receptive to the termina- 
tion of hostilities, a cease-fire, 
withdrawal from territories, negotia- 
tions, I think that is the objective 
toward which we ought to address our 
efforts with other countries in the 
Security Council. 

Q. But it doesn't look like that's on 
the immediate horizon, right? 

A. No, it does not. 

Q. Let me move on to another part 
of the world — Poland. Is the immediate 
threat of Soviet intervention there pretty 
well subsided for now? 

A. Let me describe it as accurately 
as I can on the basis of the information 
that we have. There has been some 
reduction in Soviet military activity, 
but their state of readiness is still at 
the high level that it achieved in 
December. So they're in a position, 
militarily, to move on fairly short 

Internally, the tension level seems 
to have been reduced somewhat, but 
there are some difficult points ahead of 
us. There's the question of work-free 
Saturdays, for example. There's the 
question of the union for the farmers. 
And down the road further there's a 
scheduled congress of the party in 

There is a very difficult economic 
situation which could trigger political 
reactions and then counterreactions 
from the government and maybe con- 
ceivably from the Soviet Union. So it's 
going to be a very delicate, sensitive, 
and potentially volatile situation for 
some time. 

Q. In El Salvador as of last week, 
six Americans have recently been killed 
there — Americans who were working 
there, privately or under government 
auspices. Is there anything that requires 

changing American policy or that can be 
done to stop this loss of American life 

A. First of all, one must under- 
stand the basic situation. We have two 
forces contending for control in El Sal- 
vador: the right, made up of those who 
occupy the privileged position in the 
economy of the country traditionally; 
and the disadvantaged and dispossessed 
who seek to achieve a government 
that's more sensitive to their needs and 
their aspirations. There are those in 
both groups inclined to violence, and 
they both succeeded to the extent that 
last year there were 9,000 lives lost 

The government is made up of a 
junta with military representation; a 
president, who is a civilian and a 
member of the Christian Democratic 
Party which is seeking to establish a 
moderate government and has pledged 
itself to reforms, land reform, which is 
perhaps the most important and signifi- 
cant and key reform proposal and which 
led to the deaths of the two Americans 
who were just killed and a very signifi- 
cant El Salvadoran political figure, Mr. 
Viera [Jose Rodolfo Viera, President of 
El Salvador's Institute for Agrarian 
Transformation], who was sensitive to 
the needs of the poor and the disad- 

The land reform program is the ob- 
ject of the displeasure of both the left 
and the right. The privileged people 
who have owned the land and, in effect, 
dominated the economy see land reform 
as a threat to their privileged position. 
The left sees land reform as a reform 
which frustrates the kind of change 
that they would like to initiate through 
violence and overthrow. So land reform 
and reforms of this kind that are spon- 
sored by the government are attacked 
and resisted from both ends of the spec- 

Mr. Hammer, who was one of the 
Americans killed, regrettably, in this 
recently was in charge of the land 
reform program. He had enemies on 
both sides. The question is, from which 
side of the political spectrum did the at- 
tack come? President Duarte and the 
Defense Minister responded quickly to 
protests of our charge [d'affaires], and 
they're pressing for an investigation. 

But the problem is how to get the 
moderate center established and credi- 
ble and how to build support for them, 
given these pressures from the left and 
the right. And people get caught in the 

i February 1981 



middle, whether they're Americans or 
anyone else, treading on dangerous 

Q. Finally, to your favorite subject, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. As you know, in 
the past week both U.N. Ambassador 
Donald McHenry and former State 
Department spokesman Hodding Carter 
have gone after him. McHenry said, for 
instance, that Brzezinski spoke out pub- 
licly when he shouldn't have and has 
been sending mixed signals around the 
world on U.S. foreign policy. Is that 

A. Let me put it this way. This 
subject has been discussed now in just 
about every — well, I won't say every 
but many interview programs which 
I've been on. 

Q. We're looking for something 
fresh. [Laughter] 

A. I have nothing fresh to say. I've 
tackled the subject from the institu- 
tional point of view — the respective 
role of the National Security Council 
and the State Department — and I've 
made those views known and clear. I 
don't think it's useful, nor am I inclined, 
to get involved in a personality contest 
with Zbig. Zbig and I are good friends, 
we get along fine, I find him congenial, 
and I see no reason at this point to 

Q. But McHenry wasn't a personal- 
ity thing. McHenry was talking about— 
he's the U.N. Ambassador of the United 
States — sending mixed signals on foreign 
policy. He didn't attack him personally. 
Hodding Carter's statement is a little dif- 

A. Let me put it in institutional 
terms. What Don McHenry had to say 
could have been said when Henry Kis- 
singer was National Security Adviser; 
it could have been said in previous Ad- 
ministrations when the National Secu- 
rity Adviser was given a public voice. 
That's a problem. It's the President's 
choice as to whether or not that's what 
he wants. 

Q. And President Carter clearly 
made that choice. 

A. He clearly did, and he saw ad- 
vantages in it for him. Zbig says that 
an activist President— that is, a foreign 
policy activist President — will give his 
National Security Adviser automati- 
cally more visibility, which is a legiti- 
mate point of view. 

Q. David Broder, in a column in The 
Washington Post recently said that you 
offered your successor-designate, Alex- 
ander Haig, four rules. 

A. Don't call them rules; I don't. 

Q. No press secretary for the Secu- 
rity Adviser; no press briefings or TV ap- 
pearances; no contacts with foreign 
governments; and for him to do his job 
and not the State Department's. Is that 
an accurate reflection of what you think 
the rules ought to be? 

A. That wasn't put in the diplo- 
matic way that I've learned to say 
things, or tried to, in the last 6 months. 

Q. But structurally you think that 
would help. 

A. I think that those four points 
highlight the point that I made a mo- 
ment ago. The President, under the 
Constitution, makes foreign policy; he's 
got greater powers there than he does 
in domestic policy. 

Secondly, he ought to have a 
Secretary of State in whom he has con- 
fidence as his delegated voice. 

That's the arrangement, and that 
should be the arrangement. To the ex- 
tent that someone else — whether it's 
the National Security Adviser or the 
Secretary of Defense — articulates 
foreign policy, then to that extent you 
send mixed signals, or at least risk it. 

^ress release 2 of Jan. 7, 1981. 

Technical Meeting 
on Dioxin 

DEC. 19, 1980 1 

At the invitation of the Department of 
State, U.S. and Canadian officials and 
health and environmental scientists met 
in Washington December 19, 1980, to 
discuss recent findings regarding 
2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin) in the Great 
Lakes and to develop an effective re- 
sponse to the problem. The Canadian 
delegation was led by the Department 
of External Affairs and included ex- 
perts from the Ministries of Health and 
Welfare, Environment Canada, Fisher- 
ies and Oceans, and the Province of 
Ontario. The U.S. delegation, led by the 
Department of State, included experts 
from the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Departments of Health and 
Human Services, Interior, and the Vet- 
erans Administration. Government spe- 
cialists from the States of New York 
and Michigan also took part. 

Canadian scientists presented the 
results of a recent Environment Canada 
study which revealed the presence of 
2,3,7,8-TCDD in Great Lakes herring 
gull eggs. The discovery of 2,3,7,8- 
TCDD in the Great Lakes Basin, 
through recent advances in analytical 
technology, shows that the compound 
has been present in declining quantities 
in the eggs over the past decade. Other 
scientific findings from both govern- 
ments on 2,3,7,8-TCDD and concerns 
related to health and environment were 
compared and discussed. 

As a result, Canada and the United 
States will be exchanging information 
and cooperating in an effort to: 

• Identify sources of 2,3,7,8-TCDD 
in the Great Lakes, with particular 
attention being paid to sources related 
to 2,4,5-trichlorophenol production; it 
was reported that this material is no 
longer being produced in the Great 
Lakes Basin; 

• Review the presence of 2,3,7,8- 
TCDD in fish, with emphasis on analyt- 
ical methodology, human exposure, and 
evaluation of potential health hazards, 
and establish mechanisms to deal with 
these issues; 

• Investigate the way that 2,3,7,8- 
TCDD is transported through and af- 
fects the environment; and 


Department of State Bulletin 


• Formulate plans for coordinated 

In addition to these immediate ac- 
tions, the governments also plan to pre- 
sent to an international conference on 
dioxins, tentatively scheduled in Wash- 
ington in October 1981, the results of 
the work accomplished. 

Agencies of the governments will 
continue to forward information on 
2,3,7,8-TCDD to the International Joint 
Commission which, through its Great 
Lakes Water Quality Board and Science 
Advisory Board, is already considering 
this issue. 

'Press release 351 of Dec. 19, 1980. 

Air Pollution 

U.S. Federal agencies are examining 
the terms of recent Canadian legislation 
dealing with air pollution which may af- 
fect the United States. By unanimous 
action on December 16 the Canadian 
House of Commons adopted a measure 
which would enable the Canadian Fed- 
eral Government to take action in in- 
stances where there is reason to 
believe that Canadian emission sources 
contribute to air pollution in another 
country. The Canadian law is similar in 
purpose to Section 115 of the U.S. 
Clean Air Act. That section provides 
for action by the U.S. Federal Govern- 
ment to initiate revision of State imple- 
mentation plans on air quality in those 
cases where there is reason to believe 
that pollution from U.S. sources endan- 
gers public health or welfare in a for- 
eign country, so long as that country 
provides "essentially the same rights" 
to the United States. 

In the coming period the U.S. Gov- 
ernment will consider whether the 
Canadian legislation provides the reci- 
procity required under Section 115. 
Canada's action, taken in the context of 
the Memorandum of Intent on trans- 
boundary air pollution signed by Secre- 
tary Muskie and the Canadian Environ- 
ment Minister on August 5, 1980, is a 
positive step toward closer cooperation 
in dealing with transboundary air pollu- 
tion issues. 

Press release 355 of Dec. 4, 1980. 

Two Years of 
U.S. -China 

The United States and the People's Re- 
public of China established diplomatic 
relations on January 1, 1979. Since then, 
the U.S. and Chinese Governments have 
cooperated in the rapid reconstruction of 
normal relations in virtually every field. 
The Office of Chinese Affairs in the 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Af- 
fairs has compiled the following chronol- 
ogy for the benefit of students, scholars, 
and the interested public. 


January 1 

On the basis of the joint communique and 
separate statements issued on December 
15, 1978, the U.S. and the People's Re- 
public of China (P.R.C.) extend mutual 
recognition and establish diplomatic rela- 
tions. U.S. simultaneously withdraws 
recognition and breaks diplomatic rela- 
tions with Taipei. U.S. gives notice to the 
Taiwan authorities that it is exercising its 
right under Article X of the March 3, 
1955, "Mutual Defense Treaty between 
the United States of America and the 
Republic of China" to terminate that 
treaty effective January 1, 1980. While 
the treaty remains in force, the U.S. will 
impose a 1-year moratorium on new 
commitments for U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan, although previous commitments 
for arms deliveries will be honored. 

Chinese officials attending the third ses- 
sion of the fifth National People's Con- 
gress (NPC) declare that China will re- 
spect the "status quo on Taiwan ... in 
settling the question of reunification"; 
that "all military confrontation should be 
ended" between the government of China 
and the Taiwan authorities; that both 
sides should reestablish postal and trans- 
portation links and develop bilateral 

January 2 

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping tells U.S. 
congressional group, led by Representa- 
tive Thomas L. Ashley (Ohio), that 
reunification of Taiwan with the rest of 
China will be peaceful. 

January 3-14 

Senator Sam Nunn (Georgia) leads a del- 
egation of the Pacific Study Group of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee to 

January 9 

In conversation with Senator Nunn and 
Senate group, Vice Premier Deng tells 
delegation that Taiwan need not disarm 
after reunification; calls for bigger U.S. 
naval presence in Pacific and greater 
Southeast Asian defense cooperation. 

January 11 

Chinese Government drops tariffs on im- 
ports from Taiwan. 

January 16 

American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is 
registered as a private, nonprofit corpo- 
ration in the District of Columbia. 

January 22-26 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Trade Affairs William Bar- 
raclough, chief U.S. textile negotiator 
Michael Smith, and chief of China Tex- 
tiles Import-Export Corporation Han 
Fangyu lead preliminary consultations on 
textile trade in Washington. 

January 26 

President Carter formally transmits to 
Congress a draft bill to implement the 
U.S. -China joint communique and to em- 
power the AIT to manage unofficial rela- 
tions with the people on Taiwan. 

January 28- 
February 5 

Vice Premier Deng, Vice Premier Fang 
Yi, and Foreign Minister Huang Hua 
visit the U.S. In Washington they meet 
for talks with President Carter, Secretary 
of State Cyrus R. Vance, and leading 
members of the Senate and House of 
Representatives. Vice Premier Deng and 
entourage then visit Atlanta, where they 
tour Ford Motor Company; Houston, 
where they visit NASA facilities and 
Hughes Tool Company; and Seattle, 
where they tour Boeing's 747 plant. 

January 31 

Vice Premier Deng reiterates, in a U.S. 
television interview, that China will make 
all attempts to bring about reunification 
with Taiwan by peaceful means. 

President Carter and Vice Premier Deng 
preside at a ceremony at which a series of 
agreements are signed. These agree- 
ments commit both sides to facilitate the 
reunification of families and establish 

February 1981 


East Asia 

rules to govern problems of those who 
claim dual nationality, establish a Joint 
Commission on Scientific and Technologi- 
cal Cooperation, promote collaboration in 
the field of high energy physics, and en- 
courage cultural exchange and coopera- 
tion between the two countries. Sepa- 
rately, the two sides agree to establish a 
Joint Economic Committee. 

February 1 

"Joint press communique" issued in which 
the U.S. and China agree to facilitate the 
accreditation of resident journalists and 
undertake to conclude trade, aviation, 
and shipping agreements. 

February 12-24 

Representative Les AuCoin (Oregon) 
leads State trade delegation to China. 

February 15 

Taiwan agrees to the establishment of a 
nongovernmental organization, the Coor- 
dination Council for North American Af- 
fairs (CCNAA), to carry out unofficial re- 
lations with the people of the U.S. 

February 17 

Representative AuCoin and his delega- 
tion meet with Bank of China Deputy 
Manager Jin Deqin and other Bank of 
China officials; discuss the claims settle- 
ment question and the possibility of 
Export-Import Bank loans to China. 

State Department responds to Chinese 
intervention in Vietnam by calling for 
"immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops from Cambodia (Kampuchea) and 
Chinese troops from Vietnam." 

February 24-28 

Governor Jay Hammond (Alaska) leads 
trade mission to China; Hammond is the 
first U.S. governor to visit China follow- 
ing normalization. 

February 24- 
March 4 

Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael 
Blumenthal visits China and meets with 
Premier Hua Guofeng, Vice Premier 
Deng, and other senior Chinese officials. 

February 26 

Following hearings before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate 
(82 to 9) confirms U.S. Liaison Office 
chief Leonard Woodcock as the first U.S. 
Ambassador to the P.R.C. 

February 26- 
March 2 

Minister of Metallurgical Industries Tang 
Ke visits U.S.; meets with Secretary of 
Commerce Juanita Kreps. 

February 28 

Embassy of the formerly recognized 
Chinese Government (Taipei) officially 
closes in Washington, as does the Ameri- 
can Embassy at Taipei. 

March 1 

U.S. and China formally establish diplo- 
matic relations at the ambassadorial level 
as Embassies open at Beijing and Wash- 
ington. Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin 
presents his credentials to President 
Carter in Washington. 

March 2 

Secretary Blumenthal and Minister of Fi- 
nance Zhang Jingfu initial a claims 
settlement agreement which provides for 
payment by China of $80.5 million in 
settlement of $196 million in property 
claims of U.S. nationals and the release 
by the U.S., by October 1, 1979, of ap- 
proximately $80.5 million in Chinese as- 
sets frozen during the Korean war. 

March 7 

Ambassador Woodcock presents his cre- 
dentials to Ulanhu, Vice Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the NPC, in Bei- 
jing, thus completing the establishment 
of ambassadorial relations between the 
U.S. and China. 

March 8-18 

Governor Richard Thornburg (Pennsyl- 
vania) leads trade mission to China. 

March 13 

U.S. Senate and House of Representa- 
tives pass separate bills on U.S. non- 
governmental relations with Taiwan. 

March 15-24 

Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Dale 
Hathaway leads a U.S. Department of 
Agriculture delegation to China. Repre- 
sentative Bill Alexander (Arkansas) ac- 
companies the delegation. 

March 16 

Chinese Government formally protests 
congressional amendments to the Taiwan 
Relations Act, charging that the legisla- 
tion contravenes the principles of nor- 
malization recorded in the joint com- 

March 24-31 

House Ways and Means Committee dele- 
gation, led by Representative Al Ullman 
(Oregon), visits China; meets with Vice 
Premier Deng. 

March 27 

House backs Senate-House compromise 

on the Taiwan Relations Act (339 to 50). 

March 28 

Senate approves Taiwan Relations Act 
(85 to 4). 

April 3 

China delays signing the "claims-assets" 
settlement in protest of legislative action 
on Taiwan Relations Act. 

April 10 

President Carter signs the Taiwan Rela- 
tions Act (Public Law 96-8), stating that 
he will implement it in a manner consist- 
ent with U.S. commitments under the 
joint communique. 

AIT formally opens in Taipei. 

April 12-20 

Textile negotiator Smith, and chief of 
China Textiles Import-Export Corpora- 
tion Han Fangyu, lead the first round of 
textile negotiations in Beijing. 

April 13-19 

Representative Jack Brooks (Texas), 
Chairman of the Committee on Govern- 
ment Operations, leads a congressional 
delegation to China. 

April 14-17 

Representative William Nichols (Ala- 
bama) visits Beijing in connection with 
U.S. -China textile negotiations. 

April 14-21 

Representative Melvin Price (Illinois), 
Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, leads congressional delega- 
tion to China; meets with Vice Premier 
Deng and Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) Wu Xiuquan. 

April 15-20 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee del- 
egation, headed by Senators Frank 
Church (Idaho) and Jacob Javits (New 
York), visits China. A group of north- 
western business representatives accom- 
panies delegation. 

April 16 

Vice President of the Academy of Social 
Sciences Huan Xiang leads delegation to 


Department of State Bulletin 

East Asia 

Washington for meetings with the U.S. 
Committee on Scholarly Communication 

April 17-28 

Vice Minister of Communications Peng 
Deqing leads delegation to Seattle to at- 
tend ceremonies marking the first call of 
a Chinese ship at a U.S. seaport. 

April 18 

Representative Brooks' delegation meets 
with Vice Premier Deng. 

April 19 

Vice Premier Deng tells Senator Church 
and his delegation that the Taiwan Rela- 
tions Act undermines the normalization of 
U.S. -China relations and comes close to 
nullifying it. 

April 21-24 

Representative Augustus Hawkins (Cali- 
fornia) leads delegation of the House 
Education and Labor Committee to 

April 22 

Representative Hawkins and his delega- 
tion meet with Vice Premier Li Xiannian; 
discusses China's major economic prob- 
lems and the importance of good relations 
among China, Japan, and the Western al- 
liance in preventing world war. 

April 23 

Representative Hawkins and his delega- 
tion meet with Deputy Director of the 
State Bureau of Labor Wang Jiong. 

April 24- 

Director of the National Bureau of Stand- 
ards International Affairs Division Ed- 
ward Brady leads delegation to China. 

April 30 

All U.S. forces and military installations 
are withdrawn from Taiwan. 

May 4-15 

Secretary of Commerce Kreps leads dele- 
gation to China; first round of U.S. -China 
negotiations on a maritime agreement is 
held in Beijing. 

May 7 

Secretary Kreps and Minister of Foreign 
Trade Li Qiang attend ceremonies in Bei- 
jing for the signing of four protocols 
covering atmospheric sciences, marine 
and fisheries sciences metrology and 
standards, and the management of scien- 
tific and technological information. 

May 7 

Secretary Kreps and Minister of Finance 
Zhang Jingfu formally sign the long- 
sought "claims-assets" agreement ini- 
tialed during Secretary Blumenthal's 
March visit. 

May 10 

Secretary Kreps and Minister Li sign 
agreement designed to facilitate trade 
exhibitions for American and Chinese 

May 14 

Secretary Kreps and Minister Li initial 
bilateral trade agreement. 

May 19- 
June 3 

U.S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) delegation, led 
by Administrator Robert Frosch, arrives 
in Beijing to implement the Sino-U.S. 
scientific and technical cooperation 

May 21 

NASA delegation meets Vice Premier Yu 

May 21-30 

Textile negotiator Smith and chief of 
China Textiles Import-Export Corpora- 
tion Han Fangyu lead the second round 
of U.S. -China textile negotiations in 

May 22-29 

U.S. postal delegation, led by Postmaster 
General William Bolger, visits China. 

May 25 

U.S. postal delegation and Chinese 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica- 
tions sign a memorandum of understand- 
ing which provides for direct exchange of 
letters and post items, establishment of 
an express mail service between U.S. and 
Chinese cities, exchange of information 
on postal technology, and settlement of 
outstanding postal accounts dating back 
to 1949. 

May 26- 

U.S. Special Trade Representative 
Robert S. Strauss leads governmental 
and business delegation to China; holds 
textile negotiations with the Chinese in 
attempt to reach a compromise agree- 
ment; promotes U.S. -China business con- 

May 28- 
June 10 

Vice Premier in charge of the State Eco- 
nomic Commission Kang Shien visits 
U.S. and meets in Washington with Pres- 
ident Carter, Secretary of Energy James 
Schlesinger, and other senior U.S. offi- 
cials to discuss energy cooperation and oil 

May 30 

Special Trade Representative Strauss 
ends textile talks with the Chinese with- 
out agreement. 

May 31 

U.S. quotas are unilaterally imposed on 
five categories of Chinese textile im- 

June 1 

Chinese officials accompanying Vice 
Premier Kang in the U.S. announce the 
beginning of negotiations with nine of the 
largest U.S. -based oil companies for 
seismic surveys in the South China Sea, 
which could lead to major U.S. involve- 
ment in Chinese offshore oil exploration. 

June 3-7 

Governor John Dalton (Virginia) leads 
delegation to China. 

June 4- 

Chief of the Office of Energy Resources 
of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), C. 
D. Masters, leads USGS petroleum (June 
4-July 1) and remote sensing (June 4-28) 
delegations to China; groups visit China's 
Scientific Research Institute for Petro- 
leum Exploration and Development. 

June 5-6 

M. J. Terman of the USGS Office of In- 
ternational Geography and Director of 
China's State Bureau of Geology (SBG) 
Sun Daguang meet in Beijing to discuss 
future USGS-SBG scientific cooperation. 

June 6 

Senate passes a nonbinding resolution 
that "approval of the U.S. Senate is re- 
quired to terminate any Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the United States and 
another nation." The resolution is related 
to a Federal judge's decision earlier that 
day to dismiss a suit brought by 25 mem- 
bers of Congress against the President's 
decision to terminate the U.S. Mutual 
Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 

June 6-9 

Five American USGS remote sensing 
delegation geologists visit the Chaidamu 

: ebruary 1981 


East Asia 

Basin in western China. They are the 
first known foreigners to learn the cur- 
rent status of geological research and 
petroleum exploration in this area. 

June 11-25 

Office of Earthquake Studies chief 
Robert Wesson leads USGS delegation to 
China as part of the U.S. -China coopera- 
tive earthquake program; group meets 
with China's State Seismological Bureau 

June 16-29 

National Committee for U.S. -China Rela- 
tions sponsors U.S. Conference of 
Mayors delegation to China. 

June 19 

Mayoral delegation meets with Vice 
Premier Li; discuss Sino-American eco- 
nomic relations. 

June 22-30 

Secretary of Health, Education and Wel- 
fare Joseph Califano visits China. 

June 22 

Secretary Califano and Chinese Minister 
of Health Qian Xinzhong sign protocol on 
Cooperation in the Science and Technol- 
ogy of Medicine and Public Health. 

Secretary Califano meets with Vice Pre- 
miers Fang Yi and Chen Muhua. 

June 23 

Secretary Califano signs a memorandum 
of understanding covering U.S. -China 
educational exchange programs, provid- 
ing for the exchange of about 50 persons 
from both countries. 

June 23- 
July 13 

Ambassador to the U.N. Conference on 
Science and Technology for Development 
(UNCSTD) Theodore Hesburgh leads 
delegation to China; delegation studies 
the role of traditional and modern science 
and technology in China's development. 

June 24 

Secretary Califano discusses U.S. -China 
educational exchange with Vice Premier 
Li Xiannian. 

June 25 

UNCSTD delegation meets with Vice 
Minister in Charge of the State Commis- 
sion for Science and Technology Jiang 
Ming and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Huang Hua. 

June 26 

UNCSTD delegation meets with State 
Economic Commission Deputy Director 
Guo Futao and Vice Premier Fang Yi. 

June 28 

Mayoral delegation meets with 
Guangdong Revolutionary Committee 
Chairman Yang Shangkun. 

July 2-13 

Ohio State trade delegation, headed by 
Governor James Rhodes, visits China. 

July 6 

Governor Rhodes and delegation meet 
with Vice Premier Yu Qiuli. 

July 7 

Ambassador Woodcock and Minister of 
Foreign Trade Li Qiang sign 3-year 
U.S. -China trade agreement in Beijing, 
by which the two countries accord each 
other most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff 
treatment and agree to other measures to 
promote bilateral trade and economic in- 

July 10-24 

Minister of Finance Zhang Jingfu visits 

July 11 

Minister Zhang and Treasury Secretary 
Blumenthal open talks in Washington. 

August 7 

Senator Henry Jackson (Washington) ar- 
rives in China for 18-day visit. 

August 10-28 

Governor John Carlin (Kansas) leads 
State trade mission to China. 

August 14 

Chinese officials and Pan American World 
Airways sign agreement concerning char- 
ter flights between San Francisco and 

U.S. determines that China is a "friendly 
country" for the purposes of Section 607a 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
thus permitting U.S. Government agen- 
cies to furnish services and commodities 
to China on a reimbursement basis. 

August 15-22 

Representative Harley O. Staggers (West 
Virginia) leads a House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee delegation 
to China. 

August 24 

Senator Jackson tells the press in Beijing 
that Chinese leaders told him further 

delay in MFN status would adversely af- 
fect U.S. -China relations. 

August 25- 
September 1 

Vice President Mondale leads delegation 
to China. 

August 26 

Vice President Mondale says U.S. -China 
trade agreement will be submitted to 
Congress by November 1. 

August 27 

In a nationally televised address to the 
students and faculty of Beijing Univer- 
sity, Vice President Mondale says the 
U.S. is ready to grant China $2 billion in 
Export-Import Bank trade credits over 
the next 2-5 years and states that a 
weakened or isolated China would not be 
in U.S. interest. 

August 28 

Vice President Mondale signs agreements 
with China to expand cultural relations 
and promote cooperation in hydroelectric 
power and related water resource man- 

August 31 

Vice President Mondale formally opens 
the American Consulate General at 
Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong Prov- 

Chinese Government agrees to negotiate 
a civil aviation agreement with the U.S. 
Vice President Mondale indicates that the 
Carter Administration will terminate and 
replace with an unofficial arrangement 
the Nanking agreement of 1946, which 
regulates civil air transport between the 
U.S. and Taiwan, but purports to grant 
U.S. carriers landing rights on the China 

Treasury Department allows the first 
U.S. Government checks to be sent to 
China since 1949. 

September 9-21 

Governor of Anhui Province, Wan Li, vis- 
its U.S. as guest of Governor Harry 
Hughes (Maryland). 

September 15- 
October 5 

Minister of Agricultural Machinery Yang 
Ligong leads delegation to U.S. 

September 16-23 

Governor Dixy Lee Ray (Washington) 
leads delegation to China; meets with 
Vice Premier Deng and other senior 
Chinese officials. 


Department of State Bulletin 


The Inaugural Address 
of President Reagan 

Ronald Reagan was sworn in as 
the UOth President of the United States 
on the west side of the Capitol on 
January 20, 1981. Following is the text 
of his inaugural address. 1 

To a few of us here today, this is a 
solemn and most momentous occasion. 
And yet in the history of our nation, it 
is a commonplace occurrence. The or- 
derly transfer of authority, as called for 
in the Constitution, routinely takes 
place as it has for almost two centuries, 
and few of us stop to think how unique 
we really are. In the eyes of many in 
the world, this every-4-year ceremony 
we accept as normal is nothing less 
than a miracle. Mr. President, I want 
our fellow citizens to know how much 
you did to carry on this tradition. By 
your gracious cooperation in the transi- 
tion process, you have shown a watch- 
ing world that we are a united people, 
pledged to maintaining a political sys- 
tem which guarantees individual liberty 
to a greater degree than any other. 
And I thank you and your people for all 
your help in maintaining the continuity 
which is the bulwark of our republic. 

The business of our nation goes 
forward. These United States are con- 
fronted with an economic affliction of 
great proportions. We suffer from the 
longest, and one of the worst, sustained 
inflations in our national history. It 
distorts our economic decisions, penal- 
izes thrift, and crushes the struggling 
young and the fixed-income elderly 
alike. It threatens to shatter the lives 
of millions of our people. Idle industries 
have cast workers into unemployment, 
human misery, and personal indignity. 
Those who do work are denied a fair 
return for their labor by a tax system 
which penalizes successful achievement 
and keeps us from maintaining full pro- 

But great as our tax burden is, it 
has not kept pace with public spending. 
For decades we have piled deficit upon 
deficit, mortgaging our future and our 
children's future for the temporary con- 
venience of the present. To continue 
this long trend is to guarantee tremend- 

ous social, cultural, political, and 
economic upheavals. You and I as indi- 
viduals can, by following, live beyond 
our means but for only a limited period 
of time. Why then should we think that 
collectively, as a nation, we're not 
bound by that same limitation? We 
must act today in order to preserve 
tomorrow. And let there be no mis- 
understanding—we're going to begin to 
act beginning today. 

The economic ills we suffer have 
come upon us over several decades. 
They will not go away in days, weeks, 
or months, but they will go away. They 
will go away because we, as Americans, 
have the capacity now, as we've had in 
the past, to do whatever needs to be 
done to preserve this last and greatest 
bastion of freedom. In this present 
crisis, government is not the solution to 
our problem; government is the prob- 

From time to time we've been 
tempted to believe that society has 
become too complex to be managed by 
self-rule, that government by an elite 

we're sick; professionals, industrialists, 
shopkeepers, clerks, cabbies, and truck 
drivers. They are, in short, we the 
people — this breed called Americans. 

For this Administration's objective 
will be a healthy, vigorous, growing 
economy that provides equal opportuni- 
ties for all Americans with no barriers 
born of bigotry or discrimination. Put- 
ting America back to work means put- 
ting all Americans back to work; ending 
inflation means freeing all Americans 
from the terror of runaway living costs. 
All must share in the productive work 
of this new beginning, and all must 
share in the bounty of a revived 
economy. With the idealism and fair 
play, which are the core of our system 
and our strength, we can have a strong 
and prosperous America at peace with 
itself and the world. 

So as we begin, let us take inven- 
tory. We are a nation that has a 
government, not the other way around. 
And this makes us special among the 
nations of the Earth. Our government 
has no power except that granted it by 

To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our 
historic ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment. We will 
match loyalty with loyalty. 

group is superior — the government for, 
by, and of the people. But if no one 
among us is capable of governing him- 
self, then who among us has the capac- 
ity to govern someone else? All of us 
together, in and out of government, 
must bear the burden. The solutions we 
seek must be equitable with no one 
group singled out to pay a higher price. 
We hear much of special-interest 
groups. But our concern must be for a 
special-interest group that has been too 
long neglected. It knows no sectional 
boundaries or ethnic or racial divisions, 
and it crosses political party lines. It is 
made up of men and women who raise 
our food, patrol our streets, man our 
mines and factories, teach our children, 
keep our homes, and heal us when 

the people. It is time to check and 
reverse the growth of government 
which shows signs of having grown 
beyond the consent of the governed. It 
is my intention to curb the size and in- 
fluence of the Federal establishment 
and to demand recognition of the dis- 
tinction between the powers granted to 
the Federal Government and those 
reserved to the States or to the people. 
All of us need to be reminded that the 
Federal Government did not create the 
States; the States created the Federal 

Now so there will be no misunder- 
standing, it's not my intention to do 
away with government. It is, rather, to 
make it work— work with us, not over 
us; to stand by our side, not ride on our 

February 1981 


backs. Government can and must pro- 
vide opportunity, not smother it; foster 
productivity, not stifle it. If we look to 
the answer as to why, for so many 
years, we achieved so much, prospered 
as no other people on Earth, it was 
because here, in this land, we unleashed 
the energy and individual genius of 
man to a greater extent than has ever 
been done before. Freedom and the 
dignity of the individual have been 
more available and assured here than in 
any other place on Earth. The price for 
this freedom at times has been high, 
but we have never been unwilling to 
pay that price. 

It is no coincidence that our 
present troubles parallel, and are pro- 
portionate to, the intervention and 
intrusion in our lives that result from 
unnecessary and excessive growth of 
government. It is time for us to realize 
that we are too great a nation to limit 

land. Your dreams, your hopes, your 
goals are going to be the dreams, the 
hopes, and the goals of this Adminis- 
tration, so help me God. 

We shall reflect the compassion 
that is so much a part of your makeup. 
How can we love our country and not 
love our countrymen? And loving them, 
reach out a hand when they fall, heal 
them when they're sick, and provide op- 
portunity to make them self-sufficient 
so they will be equal in fact and not 
just in theory. 

Can we solve the problems con- 
fronting us? Well, the answer is an 
unequivocal and emphatic yes. To para- 
phrase Winston Churchill: I did not 
take the oath I've just taken with the 
intention of presiding over the dissolu- 
tion of the world's strongest economy. 
In the days ahead, I will propose 
removing the roadblocks which have 
slowed our economy and reduced pro- 

. . . peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate 
for it, sacrifice for it; ice will not surrender for it, now or ever. 

ourselves to small dreams. We're not, 
as some would have us believe, doomed 
to an inevitable decline. I do not believe 
in a fate that will fall on us no matter 
what we do. I do believe in a fate that 
will fall on us if we do nothing. 

So with all the creative energy at 
our command, let us begin an era of 
national renewal. Let us renew our 
determination, our courage, and our 
strength, and let us renew our faith and 
our hope. We have earned every right 
to dream heroic dreams. Those who say 
that we're in a time when there are no 
heroes, they just don't know where to 
look. You can see heroes every day go- 
ing in and out of factory gates; others, 
a handful in number, produce enough 
food to feed all of us and then the world 
beyond. You meet heroes across a 
counter and on both sides of that 
counter. They are entrepreneurs, with 
faith in themselves and faith in an idea, 
who create new jobs, new wealth, and 
opportunity. They are individuals and 
families who pay taxes, support the 
government, and whose voluntary gifts 
support church, charity, culture, art, 
and education. Their patriotism is quiet 
but deep; their values sustain our na- 
tional life. 

Now I have used the words "they" 
and "their" in speaking of those heroes; 
I could say "you" and "your" because 
I'm addressing the heroes of whom I 
speak — you, the citizens of this blessed 

ductivity. Steps will be taken aimed at 
restoring the balance between the 
various levels of government. Progress 
may be slow — measured in inches and 
feet, not miles — but we will progress. 
It is time to reawaken this industrial 
giant, to get government back within 
its means, and to lighten our punitive 
tax burden. And these will be our first 
priorities, and on these principles there 
will be no compromise. 

On the eve of our struggle for inde- 
pendence, a man who might have been 
one of the greatest among the Founding 
Fathers, Dr. Joseph Warren, president 
of the Massachusetts Congress, said to 
his fellow Americans: "Our country is in 
danger, but not to be despaired of . . . . 
On you depend the fortunes of America. 
You are to decide the important ques- 
tions on which rest the happiness and 
liberty of millions yet unborn. Act wor- 
thy of yourselves." Well, I believe we, 
the Americans of today, are ready to 
act worthy of ourselves, ready to do 
what must be done to insure happiness 
and liberty for ourselves, our children, 
and our children's children. 

And as we renew ourselves, here 
in our own land, we will be seen as hav- 
ing greater strength throughout the 
world. We will again be the exemplar of 
freedom and the beacon of hope for 
those who do not now have freedom. To 
those neighbors and allies who share 

our freedom, we will strengthen our 
historic ties and assure them of our 
support and firm commitment. We will 
match loyalty with loyalty. We will 
strive for mutually beneficial relations. 
We will not use our friendship to im- 
pose on their sovereignty, for our own 
sovereignty is not for sale. 

As for the enemies of freedom, 
those who are potential adversaries, 
they will be reminded that peace is the 
highest aspiration of the American peo- 
ple. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice 
for it; we will not surrender for it, now 
or ever. Our forbearance should never 
be misunderstood. Our reluctance for 
conflict should not be misjudged as a 
failure of will. But if action is required 
to preserve our national security, we 
will act. We will maintain sufficient 
strength to prevail, if need be. Knowing 
that if we do so, we have the best 
chance of never having to use that 
strength. Above all, we must realize 
that no arsenal or no weapon in the 
arsenals of the world is so formidable 
as the will and moral courage of free 
men and women. It is a weapon our 
adversaries in today's world do not 
have. It is a weapon that we as Ameri- 
cans do have. Let that be understood 
by those who practice terrorism and 
prey upon their neighbors. 

I'm told that tens of thousands of 
prayer meetings are being held on this 
day. For that I'm deeply grateful. We 
are a nation under God. And I believe 
God intended for us to be free. It would 
be fitting and good, I think, if on each 
inaugural day in future years, it should 
be declared a day of prayer. 

This is the first time in our history 
that this ceremony has been held, as 
you've been told, on this west front of 
the Capitol. Standing here, one faces a 
magnificent vista, opening up on this 
city's special beauty and history. At the 
end of this open mall, are those shrines 
to the giants on whose shoulders we 
stand. Directly in front of me, the 
monument to a monumental man, 
George Washington, father of our coun- 
try, a man of humility who came to 
greatness reluctantly. He led America 
out of revolutionary victory into infant 
nationhood. Off to one side, the stately 
memorial to Thomas Jefferson. The 
Declaration of Independence flames 
with his eloquence. And then, beyond 
the Reflecting Pool, the dignified col- 
umns of the Lincoln Memorial. Who- 
ever would understand in his heart the 
meaning of America will find it in the 
life of Abraham Lincoln. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Beyond those monuments to 
heroism is the Potomac River and on 
the far shore, the sloping hills of 
Arlington National Cemetery, with its 
row upon row of simple white markers 
bearing crosses or Stars of David. They 
add up to only a tiny fraction of the 
price that has been paid for our 
freedom. Each one of those markers is 
a monument to the kind of hero I spoke 
of earlier. Their lives ended in places 
called Belleau Wood, the Argonne, 
Omaha Beach, Salerno, and halfway 
around the world on Guadalcanal, 
Tarawa, Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin 
Reservoir, and in 100 rice paddies and 
jungles of a place called Vietnam. 

Under one such marker, lies a 
young man, Martin Treptow, who left 
his job in a small-town barber shop in 
1917 to go to France with the famed 
Rainbow Division. There on the west- 
ern front, he was killed trying to carry 
a message between battalions under 
heavy artillery fire. We're told that on 
his body was found a diary. On the fly- 
leaf, under the heading "My Pledge," he 
had written these words: "America 
must win this war. Therefore, I will 
work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will 
endure, I will fight cheerfully and do 
my utmost as if the issue of the whole 
struggle depended on me alone." 

The crisis we are facing today does 
not require of us the kind of sacrifice 
that Martin Treptow and so many thou- 
sands of others were called upon to 
make. It does require, however, our 
best effort and our willingness to 
believe in ourselves and to believe in 
our capacity to perform great deeds. To 
believe that together, with God's help, 
we can and will resolve the problems 
which now confront us. And after all, 
why shouldn't we believe that? We are 
Americans. God bless you. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 26, 1981. 


Secretary-Designate Haig 

Appears Before 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

Opening statement by Secretary- 
designate Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 
before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on January 9, 1981. 1 

I am pleased to appear before this distin- 
guished committee as the nominee of 
President-elect Ronald Reagan to be Sec- 
retary of State. I am prepared to answer 
any questions you may have concerning 
my qualifications for this office, my views 
on foreign policy, and my service to my 
country during the past three decades. 

There could be no more critical time 
at which to assume the post of Secretary 
of State, and I am honored that the 
President-elect has chosen me as his des- 
ignate. Over the past 200 years, the 
United States has stood as a beacon of 
liberty for the world. We have demon- 
strated that freedom and justice can 
thrive in a democratic society. We have, in 
this century, been often called to shed our 
blood for the nations of the free world; 
and in an ingenious and generous plan de- 
signed by a great Army general and Sec- 
retary of State, George C. Marshall, we 
helped, after the most devastating war in 
history, rebuild Europe and strengthen 

Our record in this century is not per- 
fect, but it should be a source of great 
pride. Our successes were founded on a 
firm commitment to our ideals combined 
with a sense of the realities of human na- 
ture and international politics. It is that 
combination that we must bring to bear 
in the decade ahead. If we do, I believe 
that America and its people will stand 
once again as an example for the peoples 
of the world and merit the highest judg- 
ment of history. 

Our ideals must be reconciled with 
the reality we face. The United States 
must pursue its vision of justice in an im- 
perfect and constantly changing world — 
full of peril but also full of opportunity. 
The world does not stand still for our 
elections, important as they are. Complex 
issues already crowd our foreign policy 
agenda. The earlier the Reagan Adminis- 
tration articulates its approach to these 
issues, the better served the nations of 
the world and the people of our own na- 
tion will be. 

It would be premature here to set 
forth definitive policies or offer detailed 

programs. Both tasks require analysis 
and thoughtful consideration by the 
President-elect and his advisers. But 
President-elect Reagan and I firmly be- 
lieve that American foreign policy should 
have some permanent bedrock. The 
United States has been most effective in 
the world arena when the solid founda- 
tions of its foreign policy have been rec- 
ognized and understood — by our own 
people and by the nations with which we 
must deal. 

The Present Global Environment 

Every generation views its own perils as 
unprecedented. Even so, there is now 
widespread agreement that the years 
immediately ahead will be unusually 
dangerous. Evidence of that danger is 

• In Europe, still the fulcrum of the 
East- West balance, Soviet military power 
once again casts an ominous shadow over 
the efforts of an East European people to 
assert fundamental freedoms of associa- 
tion and expression. 

• In the Middle East, an uneasy 
peace continues to be punctuated by raid 
and reprisal, with each such sequence 
threatening renewed and wider conflict. 

• At the head of the Persian Gulf, 
war between Iran and Iraq threatens the 
very lifeblood of many national 
economies. Iran itself, once a major force 
for regional stability, lurches from dem- 
onstration to demonstration in a state of 
near anarchy. Meanwhile, not far to the 
east, 85,000 Soviet troops brutalize Af- 
ghanistan in the first major post- World 
War II employment of Soviet troops out- 
side the area the Soviets have heretofore 
considered their sphere of influence. 

• In Asia, sworn enemies face one 
another along a 5,000-mile arc from Thai- 
land to the Manchurian frontier. On the 
Korean Peninsula, only a fragile truce 
persists nearly 30 years after the formal 
cessation of Korean hostilities. 

• In Africa, Southeast Asia, Central 
America, and the Caribbean, turmoil and 
violence stunt national development and 
invite terrorism from within and adven- 
turism from without, as millions of human 
beings starve and thousands of new refu- 
gees seek shelter each day. 

February 1981 


It is no wonder the 1980s have been 
called a decade of crisis. Yet it is precisely 
that sort of appraisal which I believe we 
must reject. The very term "crisis" im- 
plies that events are out of control and 
that our nation can only react. 

But the task of statesmanship is not 
simply to react to events. Those I just 
described are merely the current 
symptoms of more fundamental world 
problems. The task of statesmanship is to 
master these problems and thus minimize 
the necessity for ricocheting from crisis 
to crisis. 

Today we face a world in which 
power in a variety of forms has become 
diffused among over 150 nations. Adjust- 
ment of relations with and among so 
many separate governments would be dif- 
ficult enough, even were all equally re- 
sponsible and equally committed to stabil- 
ity and peace. But many are willing to 
foment instability and violence to achieve 
their objectives. That reality alone should 
argue for better coordination of policies 
among the free nations. As I have under- 
scored more than once to our allies in 
Europe, artificial operating boundaries 
self-imposed in a simpler era are increas- 
ingly irrelevant to today's needs to formu- 
late and pursue policies together. 

But the diffusion of power and its re- 
sulting instability are not the only argu- 
ments for concerted allied action. Our col- 
lective vulnerability to international un- 
rest is matched by a socioeconomic chal- 
lenge that we all share. The growing in- 
terdependence of our economies and our 
continued reliance on foreign sources for 
energy and raw materials have stripped 
the West of the independent and collec- 
tive resilience which once allowed one na- 
tion's economic strength to bolster an- 
other's momentary weakness. 

The significance of the economic chal- 
lenges we face cannot be overempha- 
sized. The potential for worldwide 
boom-or-bust is not unrelated to the dif- 
fusion of power among so many nations. 
Indeed, the decline in world oil supplies 
resulting from the war between Iran and 
Iraq is stark testimony that instability 
may be most likely precisely where its ef- 
fect on world economies promises to be 
most debilitating. 

Much of the fragmentation of power 
has occurred in the so-called Third World 
— a misleading term if ever there was 
one. If one thing has become abundantly 
clear in the last decade or so, it is that 
the commonality of condition, purpose — 
and by extension, U.S. foreign policy — 
implied by the term "Third World" is a 
myth, and a dangerous one at that. 

Recent American foreign policy has 
suffered from the misperception which 
lumps together nations as diverse as 
Brazil and Libya, Indonesia and South 
Yemen, Cuba and Kuwait; and which has 
too frequently produced attempts to cut 
the national pattern to fit the foreign pol- 
icy cloth. This failure to tailor policy to 
the individual circumstances of develop- 
ing nations has frequently aggravated the 
very internal stresses which Western pol- 
icy should seek instead to diminish. Our 
difficulties in this regard have hardly 
been lessened by our propensity to apply 
to these emerging states Western stand- 
ards which resolutely ignore vast differ- 
ences in their social cultures, political de- 
velopment, economic vitality, and internal 
and external security. 

These fundamental problems — the 
diffusion of power, the interdependence of 
the allied community, and the failure to 
recognize the variety among the so-called 
Third World nations — are made the more 
intractable by what is perhaps the central 
strategic phenomenon of the post-World 
War II era: the transformation of Soviet 
military power from a continental and 
largely defensive land army to a global of- 
fensive army, navy, and air force fully ca- 
pable of supporting an imperial foreign 
policy. Considered in conjunction with the 
episodic nature of the West's military re- 
sponse, this tremendous accumulation of 
armed might has produced perhaps the 
most complete reversal of global power 
relationships ever seen in a period of rel- 
ative peace. Today the threat of Soviet 
military intervention colors attempts to 
achieve international civility. Unchecked, 
the growth of Soviet military power must 
eventually paralyze Western policy al- 

These, then, are fundamental prob- 
lems which challenge American foreign 
policy and the future of the democracies 
generally. To say that is not to diminish 
the importance of other Western goals — 
the eradication of hunger, poverty, and 
disease; the expansion of the free flow of 
people, goods, and ideas; the spread of 
social justice; and through these and simi- 
lar efforts, the improvement of the 
human condition. It is simply to recognize 
that these desirable and critical objec- 
tives are impossible to achieve in an in- 
ternational environment dominated by 
violence, terrorism, and threat. 

The United States has a clear choice. 
We can continue, if we wish, to react to 
events as they occur — serially, unselec- 
tively, and, increasingly in the final anal- 
ysis, unilaterally. One lesson of Afghani- 
stan is certainly that few symptomatic 
crises are capable of effectively rallying 

the collective energies of the free world. 
We may wish it were otherwise, but wish- 
ing will not make it so. 

Alternatively, we can confront the 
fundamental issues I have discussed. We 
can seek actively to shape events and, in 
the process, attempt to forge consensus 
among like-minded peoples. Such a con- 
sensus will enable us to deal with the 
more fundamental tasks I have outlined 
— the management of Soviet power; the 
reestablishment of an orderly interna- 
tional economic climate; the economic and 
political maturation of developing nations 
to the benefit of their peoples; and the 
achievement of a reasonable standard of 
international civility. Acting alone, each 
of these tasks is beyond even our power; 
acting together, all are within the capac- 
ity of free nations. 

I do not mean to belittle the diffi- 
culties. They are formidable. But our col- 
lective capacity to meet them is also for- 
midable. The challenge of American for- 
eign policy in the 1980s is to marshal that 

America's Challenges for the 1980s 

If we are to succeed in this effort, the 
conduct of American foreign policy must 
be characterized above all by three qual- 

First, we must act with consistency. 
Specific issues may furnish the occasion 
for action, but they cannot constitute the 
sole basis for policy. Once we accept that 
the specific issues facing us today are 
merely surface manifestations of more 
fundamental problems, it must also be 
clear that effective policy cannot be 
created anew daily, informed solely by 
the immediate need. To do so risks mis- 
perception by our adversaries, loss of 
confidence by our allies, and confusion 
among our own people. U.S. policy has 
been most effective — in Europe and the 
Middle East, for example — where con- 
sistent U.S. interests have been consist- 
ently pursued. 

Second, we must behave reliably. 
American power and prestige should not 
be lightly committed; but once made, a 
commitment must be honored. Our 
friends cannot be expected to share in the 
burdens and risks of collective action if 
they cannot count on the word of the 
United States. Our adversaries cannot be 
expected to exercise prudence if they 
perceive our resolve to be hostage to the 
exigencies of the moment. Those whose 
posture toward us remains to be deter- 
mined cannot be expected to decide in 
favor of friendship if they cannot confi- 
dently assess the benefits of association 

Department of State Bulletin 

with us. To be perceived as unreliable is, 
therefore, to become virtually irrelevant 
as an influence for stability and peace and 
to leave the international arena to the 
mercy of those who do not share our 
commitment to either. 

Finally, and in some ways most im- 
portant, American foreign policy must 
demonstrate balance, both in our ap- 
proach to individual issues and in the or- 
chestration of policy generally. By bal- 
ance, I mean recognizing that complex is- 
sues invariably require us to weigh, and 
somehow reconcile, a variety of 
pressures, often competing. 

• I believe that equitable and verifi- 
able arms control contributes to security. 
But restraint in the growth and prolifera- 
tion of armaments will not be achieved by 
policies which increase the very insecuri- 
ties that promote arms competition. 

• Domestic economic stability will 
not be enhanced by the establishment of 
short-sighted, economic barriers which 
undermine the multilateral cooperation 
essential to the prosperity of all. 

• The assurance of basic human 
liberties will not be improved by replac- 
ing friendly governments which incom- 
pletely satisfy our standards of democ- 
racy with hostile ones which are even less 

• And our commitment to peace will 
not be furthered by abdicating the right 
to exercise military power to only the 
most ruthless members of the interna- 
tional community. 

Balance must also be struck in the 
orchestration of policy generally: in our 
selection of the issues we choose to ad- 
dress; in the priority we accord them; and 
in understanding the relationship of in- 
dividual issues, one to another, and each 
to our broad policy objectives. This form 
of balance has become known as linkage, 
and the President-elect has publicly 
stated his commitment to it. 

No mystical profession of faith is in- 
volved here. In a system ever more in- 
terdependent in every sense, issues and 
the policies which attempt to deal with 
them are linked, whatever our prefer- 
ences. That does not mean that every ne- 
gotiation must be a prisoner of the daily 
headlines; it does mean that specific rela- 
tionships cannot be established in isola- 
tion from the climate in which they must 
be maintained. 

Establishing a Foreign Policy 

Consistency, reliability, balance. These 
three attributes are essential, not be- 
cause they guarantee a successful foreign 
policy — nothing can do that — but because 
their absence guarantees an unsuccessful 
one. Unfortunately, as De Tocqueville 
pointed out long ago, these are precisely 
the qualities which a democracy finds 
most difficult to muster. This inherent dif- 
ficulty has been complicated in the past 
decade by the breakdown of foreign pol- 
icy bipartisanship and by the develop- 
ment of unnecessary division between 
Congress and the executive branch, and 
among the executive departments 

Our urgent task is to reestablish an 
effective foreign policy consensus. To do 
so, I believe three conditions must be 

First, the constitutional and tradi- 
tional responsibility of the President for 
the conduct of foreign affairs must be 
reaffirmed. The U.S. Government must 
speak to other nations with a single voice. 
To say that is in no sense to argue for 
curtailing discussion or debate. On the 
contrary, I believe both are essential. But 
the authoritative voice must be the Pres- 
ident's. The President needs a single in- 
dividual to serve as the general manager 
of American diplomacy. President-elect 
Reagan believes that the Secretary of 
State should play this role. As Secretary 
of State, I would function as a member of 
the President's team but one with clear 
responsibility for formulating and con- 
ducting foreign policy and for explaining 
it to the Congress, the public, and the 
world at large. The Assistant to the Pres- 
ident for National Security Affairs would 
fill a staff role for the President. 

Second, an effective partnership 
must be restored with the Congress. By 
partnership, I do not mean occasional 
retrospective reporting. I mean active 
consultation, exchange of ideas and pro- 
posals in a timely manner, in an atmos- 
phere of mutual respect, trust, and confi- 
dence, recognizing the special role of the 
Senate. The Congress can hardly be ex- 
pected to allow the President the discre- 
tion he requires unless it is comfortable 
with the purposes toward which, and lim- 
its within which, that discretion will be 
exercised. The Constitution demands it, 
and good sense urges it. In turn, Con- 
gress must do its part. In a partnership, 
both sides must behave responsibly. 

Finally, the most consistent articula- 
tion of policy is wasted if the profession- 
als who must execute it are divorced from 


its formulation and if their experience 
and skill are usurped in the name of con- 
fidentiality, haste, or political sensitivity. 
The career personnel of the State De- 
partment and the Foreign Service are an 
unmatched intellectual resource, and they 
will be around long after the President 
and the Secretary of State are gone. If 
the United States is to act consistently 
and reliably in the world arena, it must 
use its career professionals. Their effec- 
tive participation in policymaking is 

I have outlined what I consider to be 
the essential challenges, qualities, and 
requirements of a sound American for- 
eign policy. In closing, let me speak to our 
resources, which are considerable. 

Although we have economic prob- 
lems, we still possess the largest and 
strongest economy on Earth. It is within 
our power to revitalize our productive 
base, maintain and expand our agricul- 
tural strength, regain commercial com- 
petitiveness, and reduce our dependency 
on foreign sources of energy and other 
raw materials. No American foreign pol- 
icy can succeed from a base of economic 

Our alliances enable us to draw on 
the strengths and the wisdom of some of 
the world's greatest nations. Yet our al- 
liances must be tended and adapted to 
new problems not visualized by their 
creators. In the process, we must bear in 
mind that the essence of any alliance is its 
core of shared commitment and endeavor. 
In the 1980s, we should not let ourselves 
become preoccupied with debates over 
who is doing more; the challenges we face 
will require more from all of us. 

We possess a full range of the in- 
struments of effective statecraft: a diplo- 
matic corps second to none; economic and 
military assistance programs; a variety of 
sophisticated cultural and informational 
resources; and, of course, military power 
which no potential adversary can afford 
to ignore. These instruments provide the 
United States with unrivaled capacity to 
influence the course of international 
events. Their maintenance or neglect will 
declare American intentions far more 
clearly than any rhetoric. 

But I believe our greatest strength is 
the strength of our values and political 
institutions. These have been tested in 
recent years. But they have survived. As 
we survey the world, reflect on its prob- 
lems, and recognize its dangers, we must 
accept the fact that, like it or not, we are 
a nation of trustees — trustees for the 
values of freedom and justice that have 
inspired mankind for thousands of years. 

■ «% - 


February 1981 



i i 



/ ■ 


■ _ 


1 '" 

~ J^H 

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., takes the oath of of- 
fice as Secretary of State on January 22, 
1981, at the White House while Mrs. Haig 
holds the Bible. Robert Linder (right), acting 
director of White House operations and a 
notary public, administers the oath. 

The Secretary of 

Following his election on November 4, 
1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan 
nominated Mr. Haig to be his Secretary 
of State. He was subsequently con- 
firmed by the Senate and was sworn in 
as the 59th Secretary of State on 
January 22, 1981. 

Secretary Haig graduated from the 
U.S. Military Academy in 1947, was 
commissioned a second lieutenant in the 
Army, and advanced through a variety 
of military assignments, including ser- 

The Secretary of State of the United 
States has a responsibility second only to 
that of the President himself to insure 
that this trusteeship is managed wisely 
and well. I approach this responsibility in 
full recognition of the gravity of our task, 
with confidence that we will succeed, and 
with the knowledge that working closely 
with this committee and the Congress is a 
key to our success. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will bf published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent ofDocu- 
, ernmenl Printing Office, 

Washington, D.C. ZD402. ■ 

vice in Japan, Korea, Europe, and Viet- 
nam. He pursued graduate studies in 
business administration at Columbia 
University (1954-55) and received a 
Master's degree in international rela- 
tions from Georgetown University 

He served in the Pentagon from 
1962 to 1965, where his positions in- 
cluded Military Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army and Deputy 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense. He served in Vietnam in 1966 
and 1967, receiving the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 

In January 1969, he was assigned 
as senior military adviser to Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, then Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for National Security Affairs, and 
18 months later he became the Deputy 
Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs. He was promoted to 
full general in 1972. During his 4 years 
in the White House ending in 1973, he 
made 14 trips to Southeast Asia as the 
personal emissary of the President, in- 
cluding negotiating the Vietnam cease- 
fire and the return of U.S. prisoners of 
war. In addition, he coordinated prepa- 
rations for President Nixon's historic 
visit to China. 

Mr. Haig was serving as Army 
Vice Chief of Staff when President 
Nixon appointed him in May 1973 to 
rebuild the White House staff. 
Although this was to be a temporary 
position, the President subsequently 
named him White House chief of staff, 
and he retired from the military after 
26 years of active service. 

He served in the White House un- 
til October 1974, when President Ford 

recalled him to active duty as Com- 
mander in Chief, U.S. European Com- 
mand. Two months later, Mr. Haig was 
also appointed Supreme Military Com- 
mander in Europe. In that position, he 
was responsible for the integrated 
military forces of the 13 member na- 
tions of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). He resigned his 
post effective June 30, 1979, and retired 
from the Army. 

Secretary Haig was elected presi- 
dent and chief operating officer of 
United Technologies and a member of 
its board of directors on December 21, 
1979, where he served until assuming 
his present position. 

He is a life member of the Navy 
League and the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the United States. Secretary 
Haig is a recipient of an honorary law 
degree from Niagara University and 
honorary doctor of laws degrees from 
Boston College, St. Anselm's College, 
the University of Utah, Western State 
School of Law, and Loyola College, 

He was born December 2, 1924, in 
Philadelphia, attended St. Joseph's 
Preparatory School there, and gradu- 
ated from Lower Merion High School in 
Ardmore, Pennsylvania. 

Secretary Haig is the recipient of 
the following honors: Charles Evans 
Hughes Gold Medal Award of the Na- 
tional Conference of Christians and 
Jews; Dwight D. Eisenhower Distin- 
guished Service Award and Citation of 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the 
United States; Hap Arnold Award of 
the U.S. Air Force Association; James 
Forrestal Award of the National Securi- 
ty Industrial Association; David Sarnoff 
Award of the Armed Forces Communi- 
cations and Electronics Association; 
William Penn Award of the Penn Club 
of Philadelphia; Hall of Heroes Gold 
Medallion of the Chapel of the Four 
Chaplains; and the Bob Hope Four-Star 
Civilian Award from Valley Forge 
Military Academy and Junior College. 

Among his many military decora- 
tions, Secretary Haig holds the Dis- 
tinguished Service Cross; the Defense 
Distinguished Service Medal with Oak 
Leaf Cluster; the Silver Star with Oak 
Leaf Cluster; the Distinguished Flying 
Cross with Oak Leaf Clusters; and the 
Purple Heart. He has received the 
highest awards from the Governments 
of Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and Portugal. 

Press release 28 of Feb. 1, 1981. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Haig's News Conference 
>f January 28 


think it's the Judaeo-Christian Bible 
hat says the universe was created in 7 
ays and that even provided a day of 
est. I tell you, it's been a very humbling 
reek for me, and I feel very, very human. 

As you know, this is the end of our 
irst week in this Administration. It's 
>een an extremely busy one. It's involved 
or me those all-too-short confirmation 
learings on the Hill [laughter]; it's in- 
olved efforts to put in place a number of 
mr key team players down through and 
ncluding assistant-secretary level. I want 
'ou to know I've done that in all but two 
^sistant-secretary billets of about 30 in- 
olved, to say something or nothing 
,bout my personal staff and the Secre- 
ariat of the Department of State itself on 
he 7th floor. 

It's been somewhat of an experience 

discover firsthand the delays in bu- 
■eaucratic obstacles associated with the 
ilearance process, but I want you to 
enow that I anticipate that each and 
jvery one of my nominees — my nominees 
—will ultimately be approved and hope- 
fully confirmed in consultation with the 
Congress where appropriate. 

It's also been a very busy week in a 
sureaucratic sense and I think I leave the 
week's experience again with an even en- 
lanced appreciation for the role of the 
professional in this Department, because 
they're the ones that have to carry the 
burden during periods of transition, our 
in-place pros. They're the ones who have 
enabled me this week to establish inter- 
departmental working groups in every 
region of departmental activity and in a 
number of key and urgent functional 
areas. I'm very pleased that this has been 
accomplished, primarily as a result of the 
team that was in place, when I came 
here, of professionals, with the help of an 
additional number of augmentees that I 
brought with me from the transition 

It has been a busy week also be- 
cause, as you know, today we have our 
first official state visitor, Prime Minister 
Seaga from Jamaica. We have meetings 
scheduled next week with the President 
of Korea, to be followed by King Juan 
Carlos of Spain, and, of course, the Prime 
Minister of Great Britain, Mrs. Thatcher. 

1 will be meeting Friday with the Cana- 

dian Foreign Minister here in the De- 
partment, and there are a number of 
other meetings scheduled with European 
foreign ministers. The first, of course, is 
Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet of 

In addition to that, we found our- 
selves engrossed immediately and instan- 
taneously with the problem of the return 
of our hostages, and I'm happy to say in 
hindsight, reflecting upon the events of 
this past weekend and this week and yes- 
terday especially, that those events were 
carried out with what I consider to be the 
ultimate of appropriateness. 

There has been some controversy 
this week about the so-called "agree- 
ments" which brought our hostages back 
to our shores at long last. I think it's im- 
portant that those who analyze and as- 
sess the pros and cons of these agree- 
ments, which were arrived at under the 
most unprecedented and unusual condi- 
tions in our history, be recognized to be 
perhaps the most complex series of inter- 
national agreements that I have been ex- 
posed to: four agreements, ten Execu- 
tive orders, all requiring a host and array 
of regulations to implement. 

I'm not an international lawyer, and 
I'm not even a domestic lawyer — al- 
though I've had a great deal of recent ex- 
perience — and I can tell you that analyz- 
ing and assessing the obligations of both 
sides with respect to these accords, 
agreements, Executive orders, is going 
to take a great deal of time and effort by 
the most experienced of legal minds. 

I would anticipate, and I reiterate, 
that the U.S. Government will fulfill its 
obligations in accordance with both inter- 
national law and the accepted norms of 
domestic legal practice. The process is 
underway and has been underway within 
the executive branch by those depart- 
ments which are particularly expert in 
reviewing all of these obligations. And 
ultimately, of course, there will be 
assessments made with respect to how 
the other side also adheres to the 
obligations it has incurred in these 

I would like to get out front with re- 
spect to one or two issues in these ac- 
cords. There has been speculation as to 
whether or not these accords provide for 
the resumption of the provision of mili- 

tary equipment to the Government of 
Iran, either that equipment previously 
purchased and contracted for, or perhaps 
additional equipment. Let me state 
categorically today, there will be no mili- 
tary equipment provided to the Govern- 
ment of Iran, either under earlier obliga- 
tions and contractual arrangements or as 
yet unstated requests. There were no 
discussions about the provision of arma- 
ments by the previous Administration as 
it completed the accords in those anguish- 
ing last hours. 

Secondly, as you know, one of the 
Executive orders signed by President 
Carter relieved the obligation for the 
sanctions in trade. We have, in that re- 
gard, issued a warning or an advisory, if 
you will, about the undesirability of 
travel of American citizens to Iran; and, 
until further deliberations are made with 
respect to future commercial arrange- 
ments, it's my view that the most careful 
caution should be applied by American 
firms, large and small. 

Having said all of these things, it's 
your turn to have at me. I want to con- 
clude by emphasizing that I hope in the 
period ahead to meet regularly here with 
this diplomatic press corps. It's a press 
corps that enjoys the reputation of being 
the sharpest and the meanest I know, and 
I welcome that because I think the kind 
of dialogue we will have here should be 
both enlightened and specific and perti- 
nent. I welcome your questions. 

Q. Can you tell us whether the 
Reagan Administration is considering 
taking retaliation against Iran for tak- 
ing of the hostages and its treatment of 
them? And, if so, what measures are 
being considered, such as the reimposi- 
tion of the trade embargo? 

A. First, let me, early on in our 
dialogue, suggest that experience has 
taught me that speculation about future 
actions of that kind — contingency plan- 
ning — in a public forum is frequently 
self-defeating because it ends up creating 
the kind of controversies that deprive one 
of the ability to do anything in the second 
place. So I'm going to avoid it. 

I would emphasize again that the 
period ahead is going to clearly demon- 
strate the nature and character of the 
Iranian regime's post-hostage return at- 

February 1981 


titude, there are additional American 
hostages in Iran — one with a clear citi- 
zenship connotation — and a host of other 
incurred obligations which make that 
question a little premature in the context 
of my answer. 

Q. Along that same line, however, 
but on a more general scale. Yesterday 
the President, in welcoming the hos- 
tages, talked of swift and effective 
retribution in case of future incidents 
involving terrorism. Can you supply us 
with any idea of the guidelines on that 
retribution? For example, will there be 
retribution in cases which do not in- 
volve another government? In other 
words, a free-lance terrorist, if you 

A. I said, I think to somebody last 
night, that was consciously ambiguous, 
that statement. Consciously ambiguous in 
the sense that any terrorist government 
or terrorist movement that is contemplat- 
ing such actions I think knows clearly 
what we are speaking of. 

As you parse it out in the context of 
individuals or separatist movements or 
independence movements, of course, the 
problem is substantially different and the 
restraints and the ability to apply re- 
taliatory action is sometimes not only 
constrained but uncertain. So I caveat it 
that way. 

Q. Could you give us your criteria 
for resuming arms control negotiations 
with the Soviet Union? 

A. This is a question upon which 
there's been a great deal of speculation 
and some questions to me in my confir- 
mation hearings. I think President Rea- 
gan has stated repeatedly that the 
United States cannot contemplate negoti- 
ations or ratifications of arms control 
agreements exclusive of consideration of 
the conduct and the activities of the 
Soviet Union outside the sphere of arms 
control. That's the shorthand for linkage. 

I don't think it would be appropriate 
for me today, in the context of future 
strategic arms limitations talks, to clarify 
further precisely how that principle will 
be applied. But clearly, that principle will 
be applied. 

Q. Perhaps in relation to that, 
could you give us your judgment of de- 
velopments within the past week or so 
in Poland — whether Soviet forces re- 
main in the state of readiness that were 
described a month ago by the Carter 
Administration — and what your sense 
i* at this point of the immediate future 
and Soviet action perhaps? 

A. First let me clarify one prospect 
of your premised question. I think, fol- 
lowing those early days in December 
when the state of readiness was some- 
what heightened, there has been some- 
what of a decline. That is not to suggest 
that Soviet forces and other Eastern 
European forces are not postured in such 
a way that they could react very, very 
quickly in Poland. 

As you know, in early December, the 
North Atlantic Council of the NATO al- 
liance suggested in very clear language 
that any Soviet intervention in Poland 
would have the gravest consequence in 
the context of ongoing East-West rela- 
tions and that those consequences would 
be longstanding in time. I know of noth- 
ing today that would cause this Adminis- 
tration or this State Department to de- 
part from the strong affirmation of that 

Q. On Poland. I understand that 
the Polish Government has indicated, 
at some level at least informally, that 
they do still wish to request a massive 
aid program from the United States. 
What is your inclination in terms of 
economic assistance? 

A. As you know, substantial assist- 
ance has already been provided in terms 
of loans for foodstuffs. I think it's impor- 
tant that we all recognize that the pro- 
vision of either credits or cash or eco- 
nomic assistance to Poland today is not 
the answer to the problem. 

We find a situation in which just debt 
servicing alone consumes half of the 
available assets. The problem involves 
internal reform within the Polish State, 
and it is up to the Polish Government and 
Polish authorities to work this out. That 
notwithstanding, we continue to feel a 
very important and sensitive sympathy 
for the people of Poland and their current 
plight, and we are considering what fur- 
ther steps could be taken. 

Q. There has been a number of 
press reports this week about steps, or 
alleged steps, that you've taken to as- 
sert your predominance over the for- 
eign policy bureaucracy. Could you — 

A. I was discussing that just the 
other day as the President was taking his 
first shower in the White House. 

Q. Could you give us your concept, 
or what the agreed concept is, between 
yourself and the President of how the 
National Security Council [NSC] will 
operate vis-a-vis the State Depart- 
ment so there is some clear sense of 
over what it is you are asserting 

A. I noticed there has been a 
number of dope stories along the airways 
on this subject. Let me assure you, most 
of those I have read, including the most 
recent, are totally without basis in fact. 
Early on I brought some drafts which I 
had discussed and coordinated with 
Richard Allen to Mr. Meese [Richard V. 
Allen, Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs; Edwin Meese, 
III, Counselor to the President], with Mr. 
Allen, with a view toward starting out 
with a straw man. This is not an experi- 
ence I haven't been through before, and 
we have been in the process of coordinat- 
ing this draft with the Secretary of De- 
fense, who has a very keen interest, of 
course, and I would anticipate very 
shortly those drafts will be published in 
the form of Presidential directives which 
will implement a framework, if you will, 
in general for the conduct of national se- 
curity policymaking plus day-to-day op- 
erational matters. 

In that context, when I accepted this 
position, I was assured by President 
Reagan personally that I will be his chief 
administrator, if you will, and I use the 
term "vicar" — and those of you who want 
to go back to the 1948 through 1951 Jack- 
son subcommittee hearings on this sub- 
ject will discover what that term "vicar" 
meant — for the formulation, the conduct, 
and the articulation of American foreign 

I intend that the President's mandate 
to me be carried out, and I am confident 
that it will be. 

Q. Let me just follow that up. How 
do you perceive the NSC, then, operat- 
ing? As primarily resolving disputes be- 
tween this building and the Pentagon? 

A. I perceive that the inter- 
departmental mechanisms will prepare 
for the National Security Council, as con- 
stituted by the act and the amendments 
of 1949 and whatever changes President 
Reagan may care to apply to that compo- 
sition, to present options for decisions by 
the President within the forum of the Na- 
tional Security Council. 

Department of State Bulletin 


Q. I wonder what your plans are 
for opening up contact, not only with 
the Soviet Union but with the key coun- 
tries in the Middle East. Do you have 
any travel plans to go either to Moscow 
or to Israel or Egypt or to Saudi 

A. I think it's a little too soon for me 
with respect to East-West, the U.S.- 
Soviet, to predict when there will be 
either meetings by myself or, more im- 
portantly, by President Reagan. There 
are a number of issues extant on the hori- 
zon today which I think need clarification 
before a constructive high-level dialogue 
would be justified. 

On the other hand, having said that, 
it's essential that we maintain day-to-day 
and hourly communications with the 
Soviet Union. We're doing that through 
our regularly established diplomatic 
channels, and I intend to continue to 
exercise it. I've already on several key is- 

With respect to the Middle East in 
general, I have no finite plans for my own 
:ravel there, but I do anticipate — as you 
(now, we have a spring round in Europe; 
»e have a number of watch pots, not the 
east of which was already touched upon 
lere, Poland, which could justify earlier 

I look forward to visiting this hemis- 
phere, Africa, the Middle East, and, of 
:ourse, Asia and Europe as well. 

Q. A few moments ago you talked 
ibout the President's statement yester- 
lay at the White House, being framed 
conspicuously ambiguous, and then you 
ivent on to talk — 

A. No. Consciously. 

Q. Consciously ambiguous. 

A. It was conspicuously appropriate. 

Q. And you went on to say, so that, 
the words you used "terrorist organiza- 
tions or terrorist governments would 
take heed." The phrase "terrorist gov- 
ernment" I don't think has any prece- 
dent, does it? And my question is, has 
there been discussion in the State De- 
partment and the top level of the Ad- 
ministration of being able to brand 
governments like Iran terrorist gov- 
ernments with both diplomatic and 
economic consequences that would flow 
from that branding? 

A. Of course, there have been such 
discussions, and they go on right now. 

Q. Could you amplify it? 

A. I think that is the criteria for a 
government that sponsors or undertakes 
or participates in terrorist activities. 
That is a nice handle to put on it — a ter- 
rorist government. And, as you know, 
there are public laws today passed by the 
Congress which prohibit the provision of 
armaments to terrorist governments. 

So this is not a new term in Washing- 
ton, and I think it's been applied some- 
times in a very generous way and some- 
times perhaps a less than generous way. 

Q. In terms of your reference ear- 
lier to your policy toward the shipment 
of arms to Iran, my recollection is that 
the earlier Administration had taken 
the position that that which was in the 
pipeline, that which Iran had bought 
and paid for before the seizure of the 
hostages, would be considered part of 
the frozen assets; and, therefore, would 
be released. 

Now you seem to be deliberately 
changing that policy. Do I understand 
that correctly? How much do you 
understand is involved? 

A. The figures are not really quite 
clear, if you're talking FMS [foreign mili- 
tary sales] cases, and we're trying to dig 
that out, and it's taking some work. But 
it does not mean that the arms them- 
selves have to be provided. If, in the ul- 
timate conclusion of this thing, we feel 
the obligations incurred should be ful- 
filled, they will be fulfilled in my book by 
selling those arms and providing the cash 
to Iran. Selling them elsewhere. Some of 
them have already been sold, incidentally. 

Q. The Carter Administration had 
the policy of abiding by the conditions 
and terms of SALT II even though it 
was not ratified and said — and he said 
he hoped and expected the Soviet Union 
would do the same thing. Is that the 
policy of the Reagan Administration as 

A. We are in the process of review- 
ing this obligation which President Car- 
ter assumed in the context of our new re- 
sponsibilities and ongoing Soviet ac- 
tivities around the globe. We would cer- 
tainly hope that, in the period between 
now and the time a decision is made or a 
policy is adopted — and this involves not 
only Soviet conduct worldwide, it in- 
volves the national security interests of 
the American people as we look at SALT 
II and SALT I and the potential future 
defense needs of this country. But I 

would hope that in the meantime, the 
Soviets would do nothing to exacerbate 
the kind of mutual restraint both sides 
should pursue. 

Q. Including SALT II? 

A. The Soviets, I leave that up to 
the Soviets to talk to, and they have re- 
cently, as I think you know. 

Q. As you know, there has been 
talk this week about the Middle East 
policy. First of all, how much can you 
tell us about that? How do you recon- 
cile the State Department's definition 
of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] with President Reagan's 
definition? Do you expect to see the 
time when the Reagan Administration 
might talk to the PLO, and do you ex- 
pect the Reagan Administration to ever 
recognize Jerusalem as the capital of 

A. Let me take that mind-bogglingly 
extensive sermon, which it would take, 
and compress it into several responses. 
First, President Reagan has stated — 
every American President since 1975 has 
stated — that we will neither recognize 
nor negotiate with the PLO for so long as 
they refuse to recognize the right of the 
State of Israel to exist, for so long as 
they refuse to accept the provisions of 
242 and the other U.N. resolution. And 
having said that, I think that's a suffi- 
cient answer for a large portion of it. 

With respect to Jerusalem as an en- 
tity, for 30 years, I think, the United 
States has felt that this is a matter that 
has international implications, and it 
should be a city that is not divided by 
barbed wire or imposed unilateral 
restraints. We don't welcome unilateral 
action that would make this kind of an in- 
ternational consensus impossible. It is the 
seat, after all, of three of our world's 
greatest religions — Islam, Christianity, 
and Judaism — and we would hope that 
ultimately, those hopes that we have had 
for Jerusalem will be realized with pa- 
tient participation by all the parties in- 

Q. On Afghanistan, [French Presi- 
dent] Giscard d'Estaing has suggested a 
conference to discuss nonintervention 
in Afghanistan as opposed to the status 
of Afghanistan. Do you regard this as a 
promising approach? 

My second question concerns the 
grain embargo. Mr. Block [John R. 
Block, Secretary of Agriculture] today 
said he urged and desired it be lifted 
immediately. I wonder what your views 
are on that. 

February 1981 


A. First, with respect to yesterday's 
initiative by President Giscard, of course, 
we welcome any proposal that would bear 
fruit and result in the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. We were in- 
formed of the French initiative before the 
fact. We have gone back with a number of 
questions seeking broadening and en- 
lightening information about how this 
would be handled, especially in the con- 
text of other intitiatives that are under 
way under the auspices of the United Na- 
tions. But in general, this is the kind of 
thing that we do welcome, and we would 
hope that it could proceed as a unifying, 
allied effort, and would also, as President 
Giscard suggested, include the views of 
the Islamic countries, who have taken 
some initiatives in this area. 

Your second question was — 

Q. — concerning the grain em- 

A. The grain embargo. That was 
Freudian — I didn't want to answer. We 
have an interdepartmental review under 
way on this subject, the results of which 
have not been arrived at. In general, I 
would hope that in the future, we would 
not adopt sanctions against the Soviet 
Union or anyone else that would selec- 
tively punish one segment of the Ameri- 
can domestic economy. But we are there 
today, and it's not so simple as it might 
sound if you are a representative of our 
agricultural sector. 

Q. Would you please give us your 
comment on the meeting between Pres- 
ident Reagan and President Chun Doo 
Hwan of South Korea, and also give us 
your general policy toward North 
Korea. I understand that the U.S. Gov- 
ernment proposed three-way talks with 
North Korea in 1979. 

A. I have not proposed any talks. I 
do not anticipate any until there has been 
a thorough review of the desirability of 
such talks, and they will be conducted 
against a backdrop of North Korean per- 
formance, conduct, and demeanor with 
respect to the desirability of and the hope 
for progress. 

As you know, the Korean President 
will be visiting Washington next week. 
He has already, I believe, arrived on the 
West Coast. Somebody suggested, "Was 
this a deal for Mr. Kim?" [Mr. Kim Da 
Jung, political opposition leader] There 
were no deals — no deals — despite again 

peculation to the contrary. 
But we are very pleased to have the Ko- 
rean President visit the United States as 

4 our first official visitors. It is not a 
state visit, but it is an official visit. 

Q. What is the significance of the 

A. I think it is vitally important. For 
the period since the end of World War II, 
with the enhanced rejuvenation in the 
early 1950s, Korea has been a friend, 
partner, and intimate participant in 
Western security relationships. Because 
of some static in a recent period, it's im- 
portant that we clarify the air. I would 
not want anyone to suggest, as some 
have, that this is politically motivated be- 
cause of upcoming elections in South 
Korea. Not at all. The American tie, if 
you will, is not an issue in these elections. 

Q. Traditionally, it has been con- 
sidered that you, North America, and 
the Soviet Union keep their own areas 
of influence all over the world. How 
can this be understood now that the 
Soviet Union has extended its presence 
to Latin America and Afghanistan? 
What element would North America 
consider to maintain the strategic 
interests of your country in Latin 

A. I'm glad I asked you. I don't 
think my own past expressions on this 
subject need too much clarification before 
this group. I think it's clear that we have 
been witnessing an unprecedented — at 
least in character and scope — risk-taking 
mode on the part of the Soviet Union, not 
just in this hemisphere but in Africa as 
well. We have seen in that process the 
exploitation of the Cuban proxy, and I can 
assure you that this is the subject of ut- 
most concern to this Administration, it is 
a subject which will be high on the prior- 
ity of our national security and foreign 
policy agenda. 

I would suggest also that an addi- 
tional subject related intimately to this, 
in the conduct of Soviet activity and in 
terms of training, funding, and equip- 
ping, is international terrorism. Interna- 
tional terrorism will take the place of 
human rights, our concern, because it is 
the ultimate of abuse of human rights. 
And it's time that it be addressed with 
greater clarity and greater effectiveness 
by Western nations and the United States 
as well. 

Q. May I follow that up? In that 
context, we have just had the Libyans 
move into Chad, and now apparently 
beyond doubt, Cuban activity in El Sal- 
vador. What does your Administration 
intend to do about either of those? 

A. We're looking very, very carefully 
at the recent Libyan incursion into Chad 
and the implications of that incursion, not 

only to Chad and the people of Chad, but 
to the surrounding states as well. We 
view it as a grave turn of events. I'll 
leave it there. 

Q. Can I follow that up? Did you 
mean to say that you were not in- 
terested in human rights perse in non- 
Communist areas? I'm not sure what 
you meant by terrorism by Communist 
countries should replace concern about 
human rights. 

A. I'm talking about in functional, 
priority areas. It's been my view that 
human rights is an essential and funda- 
mental aspect of American foreign policy 
and domestic policy, and as such, when 
you remove it from the main stream of 
fundamental policymaking and give it an 
extraordinary role in organizational 
terms, you frequently result in distor- 
tions that probably put in jeopardy the 
well-meaning objective you seek to 
achieve. So I would like to see some or- 
ganizational change in the period ahead — 
no deemphasis, a change in priorities. 

The greatest problem to me in the 
human rights area today is the area of 
rampant international terrorism — on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain. And as 
one looks at the menu of those who have 
been most disturbed by it, it's surprising 
that the Soviet Union itself has been vic- 
timized by it. But be that as it may, they 
today are involved in conscious policies, 
in programs, if you will, which foster, 
support, and expand this activity, which 
is hemorrhaging in many respects 
throughout the world today. 

Q. Can I just follow my own ques- 
tion? Does that mean organizationally, 
you will be trying to drop the kind of 
human rights input that went into for- 
eign military sales? 

A. I would anticipate that each and 
every regional policy director in this De- 
partment will have human rights high on 
his agenda in his across-the-board assimi- 
lation and assessment of what is in the 
vital interests of the American people 
and this country. 

Q. This country has just gone 
through a great celebration of the re- 
turn of the hostages from Iran. I really 
have two questions about it: First, do 
you yourself have any lessons which 
you have drawn from this 14-month- 
long ordeal of this government and 
people? And secondly, is it a proper in- 
ference, as some have drawn, that the 
swift and effective retribution would 
necessarily mean some downgrading 
for the concern of the personal safety 

Department of State Bulletin 


of those who may be involved in some 
future hostage-taking episode? 

A. No, not at all, to answer the last 
part of your question first. Not at all — 
precisely the opposite. And I would sug- 
gest that you talk to the hostages about 
this, some of our former prisoners of war 
who have been, let's say, caught up in this 

With respect to my own observa- 
tions, I've been here a week. I, of course, 
sat as a private citizen in the private sec- 
tor, and anguished as I think all of us did 
with this situation. I would have some 
immediate observations of a general na- 
ture, but I prefer to hold up on those. 
We've got a number of people worried 
about the issue. There is some congres- 
sional interest in it. We're going to partic- 
ipate with them to the degree they wish 
to explore it. But I prefer to defer on that 
at this time. 

Q. In view of your decision yester- 
day to recall Ambassador White from 
EI Salvador, can you tell us whether or 
not you made a decision that he is to be 
retained? And secondly, also in view of 
your commitment to human rights, 
whether or not you will be considering 
abandoning aid to El Salvador? 

A. You mean the aid that was re- 
cently just modified by the Carter Ad- 

Q. Yes. 

A. No, I don't anticipate any termi- 
nation in the aid to El Salvador based on 
the recommendations of our Ambassador 
and our own assessement of the reforms 
that have been under way by the gov- 
ernment there. As a matter of fact, it 
may go just the other way. 

I have asked Ambassador White 
back for consultation — and I don't make 
it a habit of consulting with preconceived 

Q. When and how do you intend to 
proceed with peace talks between Israel 
and Egypt, and does the Administration 
intend to invite to the United States 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin, and when? 

A. I don't think I would want to in- 
ject any sense of urgency in our view of 
this matter. We have and continue to sup- 
port the Camp David accords and the 
peace process that was launched under 
those accords, and we will continue to 
abide by that in consultation with the 
parties, not only the signatories but those 
with a direct interest in the outcome. And 
I think that's enough for now. We're in 

the process of reviewing the situation. In 
that process, we perhaps will come up 
with a timetable that makes some sense, 
but I need to have some discussions with 
the parties concerned first. 

Q. Returning to Latin America for 
a moment, the Carter Administration 
was talking to the Cubans pursuing an 
idea whereby the Cubans would take 
some of the criminal and mentally ill 
people who came over on the boatlift 
back in return for our agreement to ac- 
cept 100,000 people over the next 3 
years. Senator Childs has sent you a 
letter opposing that. Could you com- 
ment on that concept, on what you 
think our relations with Cuba ought to 
be and what we should talk to them 
about on this issue? 

A. I would not like to break any new 
ground on that subject today other than 
to remind you that the previous Adminis- 
tration undertook some efforts to get 
agreement with the Cuban Government 
on this subject of the return of ill and 
other kinds of refugees who came here. 
Those talks collapsed; they were a total 
failure due to the lack of cooperation of 
the Cuban Government, and that's just 
another issue that is going to be put into 
the calculator which will ultimately lead 
to a reassessment of our policies toward 

Q. Could you comment on that 
concept, on taking noncriminal and 
nonmentally ill people in exchange for 
their taking back people who are — 

A. This is an extremely delicate sub- 
ject, as you know, with strong views held 
on both sides of that issue by well- 
meaning people. And this is the kind of 
an issue that before I break new ground 
on it or express my views, I'd like to con- 
sult with the appropriate committees of 
the Senate and the House and to be sure 
I am espousing the views of the new Ad- 
ministration and President Reagan, and 
that's not so today. 

Q. How do you anticipate that the 
severe spending constraints on this 
Administration will play out on the for- 
eign policy, and particularly the foreign 
aid area? 

A. I'm very concerned about it; I'm 
concerned about it from two points of 
view. First, I'm concerned about the eco- 
nomic situation that has brought the 
necessity for even greater austerity upon 
us. And I leave that to other members of 
the Administration and the President 

himself to address, and I know he will; 
but we are in a serious situation requiring 

Secondly, I've been concerned — and 
we are in the process now of consulting 
with Mr. Stockman in OMB [David Alan 
Stockman, Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget] on this subject, and 
I'm talking about A.I.D. [Agency for In- 
ternational Development], our own se- 
curity assistance, and I hope that we are 
going to be able to get a recognition that 
both foreign assistance and foreign secu- 
rity assistance is sometimes a very cost- 
effective vehicle for insuring that the 
ideals and interests of this country are 
carried out effectively abroad. 

Q. As a strategist and a politician, 
how do you see the defense cooperation 
between the United States and Europe, 
especially from the viewpoint of bur- 
densharing in the light of the increas- 
ing threats in today's world? 

A. Again, I have a long litany of 
comments on this over 5 years, and I 
don't like to depart from it, and that is 
that I would like to see all of us do more. 
But I would also like to see an en- 
lightened appreciation here in the United 
States and among our own people for the 
great contribution that our effective par- 
ticipation in the alliance brings to our se- 

I think it was Jim Schlesinger some 
years ago who had a study done that sug- 
gested that if we did not have the NATO 
alliance and the security assets it brings 
to the American people, we would have 
to double the gross allocation of our na- 
tional product for defense to provide a 
comparable security capability. I don't 
know whether that's correct or wrong. I 
suspect it is a very modest assessment. 

I have also suggested that if you go 
back to 1970 to date, cutting out last 
year's increases, largely legislatively 
mandated by the American Congress, 
European contributions in the gross have 
been going up about 22% since 1970; 
American contributions for defense in 
NATO have gone down by about 13%. 
The point of departure in 1970 was very 
bad. The United States was carrying far 
more of the overall share, but that was a 
legacy of the birth of the alliance itself. I 
think sometimes we get too impatient and 
get bludgeoning people who are doing the 
best they can in very austere economic 
circumstances, too. What we have to find 
is a way for everyone to do more; and I 
include Japan in that. 

Press release 25. 

Feburary 1981 


East Asia 

September 18- 
October 15 

Deputy Director of Space Science and 
Technology division of the Chinese Acad- 
emy of Sciences Ji Bo leads a delegation 
to the U.S. Delegation meets with NASA 
officials in Washington to discuss future 
institutional arrangements for the 
LANDSAT ground recieving station. The 
group also tours NASA's Goddard Space 
Flight Center in the Washington area, 
the L.B.J. Space Center in Houston, and 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Los 

September 20- 
October 28 

Vice Minister of Metallurgical Industry 
Zhang Fan leads a delegation to the U.S. 
at the invitation of Reynolds Interna- 
tional Inc.; group tours Reynolds plants 
located throughout the U.S. 

September 22- 
October 6 

Governor Cliff Finch (Mississippi) leads 
forestry- delegation to China. 

September 30 

Xinhua News Agency reports that the 
U.S. and China have decided to postpone 
the unblocking of Chinese assets to Janu- 
ary 31, 1980. 

October 1 

First installment of $30 million is paid to 
U.S. by China under U.S.-China 
"claims-assets" agreement. 

October 8- 
November 9 

President of the China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation 
(CITIC) Rong Yiren visits U.S. to en- 
courage U.S. equity investment in China. 

October 10 

Mayor Jim Conway (St. Louis) announces 
establishment of sister city ties with Nan- 
October 15-27 

National Committee for U.S.-China Rela- 
tions sponsors a gubernatorial delegation 
to China; George Ariyoshi (Hawaii), 
Thomas Judge (Montana), Richard Lamm 
(Colorado), William Milliken (Michigan), 
Albert Quie (Minnesota), Robert Ray 
(Iowa), and Richard Snelling (Vermont) 

October 16 

Gubernatorial delegation meets with Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nian- 

long, Vice Minister of Agriculture He 
Kang, and President of the China Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade 
Wang Yaoting. 

October 17 

U.S. District Judge Oliver Gasch rules 
that termination of the U.S. -Taiwan 
Mutual Defense Treaty requires the ap- 
proval of either two-thirds of the Senate 
or a majority of both Houses of Congress. 

Gubernatorial delegation meets with Vice 
Premier Deng; they discuss the Kampu- 
chean refugee problem and China's eco- 
nomic modernization. 

October 20-30 

Governor Tom McCall (Oregon) leads an 
Oregon State trade delegation to China. 

October 22- 
November 1 

Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang visits 
U.S. to discuss the U.S.-China trade 
agreement and textile quotas. Minister Li 
holds meetings with Secretary of Com- 
merce Kreps, Secretary of the Treasury 
William Miller, Secretary of Agriculture 
Robert Bergland, Export-Import Bank 
President John Moore, and leaders of the 
House and Senate. 

October 23 

President Carter sends the U.S.-China 
trade agreement to Congress and signs a 
proclamation establishing China's qualifi- 
cation for MFN treatment under the 
Jackson- Vanik amendment to the Trade 
Act of 1974. 

October 31 

U.S. announces expansion of the May 31 
quotas to cover a total of seven catego- 
ries of Chinese textile imports. 

November 1-5 

Governor James Hunt (North Carolina) 
leads tobacco delegation to China. 

November 1-6 

Mayor Jim Conway (St. Louis) leads del- 
egation to China. 

November 2 

Sister city relations formally established 
between St. Louis and Nanjing. 

November 5- 
December 7 

Vice Minister Yuan Baohua leads State 
Economic Commission delegation to the 

November 6 

Vice Minister Yuan meets with Treasury 
Secretary Miller, Joint Economic Com- 
mittee members, and Department of 
Transportation officials. 

November 7 

Vice Minister Yuan meets with Com- 
merce Department officials and members 
of the Council of Economic Advisers. 

November 8 

Vice Minister Yuan meets with Deputy 

Under Secretary of Energy Robert 


November 8-16 

Assistant Secretary of State for Consular 
Affairs Barbara Watson visits China; in- 
spects U.S. consular operations in 
Guangzhou and Beijing and discusses 
progress on negotiations for a bilateral 
consular convention. 

November 14 

Governor James Rhodes (Ohio) and Gov- 
ernor Han Ningfu (Hubei Province) es- 
tablish sister state relations in Hubei. 

November 15 

Testimony before the Senate Finance 
Committee provokes disagreement 
among Senators over the granting of 
MFN status to China. 

November 19- 
December 19 

Director of the Ministry of Geology's 
Marine Division Tian Shao leads delega- 
tion of marine geologists to U.S.; group 
tours USGS facilities and visits east and 
west coast universities. 

November 20 

Ceremonies mark the formal opening of 
the Consulate General of the P.R.C. at 

November 21- 
December 3 

Chief Economist of the Department of 
Commerce Courtenay Slater leads U.S. 
statistical delegation to China. 

November 26- 
December 9 

Vice Minister of Textile Industry Hao 
Jianxiu and All China Youth Federation 
President Hu Qili lead delegation to U.S.; 
group meets with Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Holbrooke, Congressman 
Al Ullman, and National Security Council 
staff member Michel Oskenberg in Wash- 
ington, and with U.S. Ambassador to the 
U.N. Donald F McHenry in New York. 

February 1981 


East Asia 

November 26-28 

U.S. statistical delegation holds talks 
with the Chinese State Statistical Bureau 
(SSB) on bilateral statistical cooperation 
and Chinese statistical methodology. 

November 28- 
December 5 

National Committee for U.S. -China Rela- 
tions sponsors city planners' delegation to 
China; meets with a broad range of 
municipal officials in Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Nanjing, Shanghai, and Suzhou. 

November 29- 
December 17 

U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration marine sedimentation 
delegation visits China; tours Chinese 
State Bureau of Oceanography Insti- 

November 29- 
December 30 

Vice Minister of the Fourth Ministry of 
Machine Building Li Rui heads telecom- 
munications delegation to U.S. at the in- 
vitation of Honeywell Information Sys- 

November 30 

U.S. Court of Appeals overturns the Dis- 
trict Court decision of October 17 and 
rules that President Carter is constitu- 
tionally empowered to give notice of ter- 
mination under the U.S. -Taiwan Mutual 
Defense Treaty without congressional ac- 

December 13 

Ceremonies mark the formal opening of 
the Consulate General of the RR.C. at 
San Francisco. 

December 14 

U.S. Supreme Court upholds the 
November 30 decision of the Court of 
Appeals on the U.S. -Taiwan Mutual De- 
fense Treaty. 

December 29- 
January 1 

Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences 
President Huang Jiasi leads delegation to 
U.S.; group visits the California Acad- 
emy of Sciences in San Francisco, the 
University of California at Berkeley, 
Stanford University, and Hewlett- 
Packard Company. 

December 31 

U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan 


January 2 

U.S. announces new arms sales to 
Taiwan. Chinese Government immedi- 
ately protests, arguing that such sales 
and deliveries are contrary to the joint 
communique on Sino-American normali- 

January 5-13 

Defense Secretary Harold Brown visits 
China; meets with Premier Hua, Vice 
Premier Deng, Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs Huang, Vice Premier Geng Biao, 
and Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian. 
Secretary Brown affirms that "increased 
cooperation between China and the U.S. 
is a needed element in the maintenance of 
global tranquility." Secretary Brown's 
visit results in liberalization of controls on 
exports of U.S. high technology items, 
authorization on a case-by-case basis for 
sales of nonlethal military support 
equipment to China, and plans for regular 
consultations between the U.S. and 
China on Southwest Asian developments 
and other broad international issues (in- 
stitutionalized in spring 1980 so as to take 
place several times yearly). 

January 16-19 

Representative Lester Wolff (New York), 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Asian-Pacific Affairs, leads congressional 
delegation to China; meets with Vice 
Premier Ji Pengfei. 

January 17-23 

Senator David Boren (Oklahoma) leads 
delegation of the Senate Agriculture 
Committee to China; meets with agricul- 
ture and trade officials to discuss trade 

January 19- 
February 2 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Consular Affairs Hume Horan and Dep- 
uty Director of the Consular Affairs Divi- 
sion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Nie Gongcheng cochair negotiations on 
the U.S. -China consular convention in 

January 20-24 

U.S. delegation, led by the President's 
science adviser Frank Press, travels to 
China to attend first meeting of the 
Sino-U.S. Joint Commission on Coopera- 
tion in Science and Technology (Jan. 22- 
24); meeting is cochaired by Press and 
Vice Premier Fang Yi. Press signs an ac- 
cord providing for the establishment of a 
LANDSAT satellite ground-receiving sta- 

tion in China, as well as protocols for 
cooperation in earth sciences and earth- 
quake studies, and concludes a memoran- 
dum of understanding for cooperation be- 
tween the National Science Foundation 
and the Chinese Academy of Science. 
Both sides judge the meeting a "complete 

January 24 

U.S. Department of Defense formally 
announces that U.S. will consider issuing 
licenses for export to China of military 
support equipment (but not weapons) 
selected from the Munitions Control List. 

U.S. -China trade agreement, granting 
MFN tariff status to China, passes by a 
294 to 88 vote in the House and by 74 to 8 
in the Senate. 

January 31 

U.S. Treasury Department releases 
Chinese assets frozen since the Korean 
war (worth an estimated $80.5 million). 

February 1 

U.S. -China trade agreement takes effect; 
provides for MFN treatment for China; 
the establishment of business and trade 
offices; reciprocal and equivalent protec- 
tion of patents, trademarks and 
copyrights; and consultations on bilateral 
trade problems. 

February 2-6 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Administrator Douglas Costel leads dele- 
gation to China; meets with Director of 
China's Office of Environmental Protec- 
tion Li Chaobo to discuss cooperation in 
the field of environmental protection. 

February 4-9 

U.S. Chamber of Commerce President 
Richard Lesher leads delegation to 
China; meets with Vice Premier Kang 

February 5 

Sister city relations established between 
San Francisco and Shanghai. 

EPA and the Office of the Environmental 
Protection Leading Group of the State 
Council of China sign protocol for cooper- 
ation in the field of environmental protec- 

February 8- 
March 24 

Deputy Director of the China Research 
Institute of Aeronautics Liu Zhenghui 
leads delegation to U.S.; group tours 


Department of State Bulletin 

East Asia 

General Electric in Cincinnati, Honeywell 
Corporation in Fort Washington, and 
NASA's Lewis Research center in Cleve- 

February 23- 
March 4 

Mayor Edward Koch (New York City) 
leads delegation to China. 

February 28 

Sister city relations established between 

New York and Beijing. 

February 29 

Senior officials from four U.S. Govern- 
ment hydroelectric power administrations 
and representatives from the Agency for 
International Development (AID) arrive 
in Beijing to attend the first official meet- 
ing on cooperation in hydroelectric power 
and related water resource management 
between the U.S. and China. 

March 13-23 

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang 
Wenjin visits U.S. for consultations; talks 
initiate a dialogue on foreign policy mat- 
ters at the senior foreign ministry level. 
In Washington, Zhang consults with Sec- 
retary of State Vance, Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af- 
fairs Richard Holbrooke, and other senior 
officials on the Afghanistan issue and 
other matters of international concern. 
Vice Minister Zhang also meets with 
U.S. Trade Representative Reubin As- 

March 18 

Vice Minister Zhang calls on National Se- 
curity Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in 

March 19 

Vice Minister Zhang meets with Vice 
President Mondale to discuss U.S. -China 
relations and international issues. 

March 24 

U.S. Department of Labor delegation 
meets with Director of China's State 
Labor Bureau Kang Yonghe. 

March 25 

Department of State issues Munitions 
Control Letter No. 81 specifying the 
categories of military support equipment 
eligible for sale to China. 

March 31- 
April 3 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Maritime Affairs Samuel Nemirow and 

February 1981 

Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of 
the Ministry of Communications Dong 
Huamin cochair second round of the 
U.S. -China maritime negotiations in Beij- 
ing. Substantial progress is made, but 
final agreement is not achieved. 

April 2 

President Carter signs a determination 
authorizing Export-Import Bank financ- 
ing of exports to China. 

April 2- 

Vice Minister Mao Lin, Managing Di- 
rector of Jiangxi Copper Company, leads 
a company delegation to U.S.; group 
meets with officers of Fluor Mining and 
Metals, Inc. to review progress of phase I 
of the Dexing copper project. 

April 4-12 

Representative Jonathan Bingham (New 
York) leads delegation of the Interna- 
tional Economic Policy and Trade Sub- 
committee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee to China. 

April 4-25 

Governor of Hubei Province Han Ningfu 
leads economic study group to Ohio at the 
invitation of Governor James Rhodes. 

April 10 

Representative Bingham and his delega- 
tion meet with Vice Premier Gu Mu. 

April 11 

Representative Bingham and his delega- 
tion meet with Director of the General 
Bureau of Taxation Liu Zhicheng and 
Foreign Investment Commission Vice 
Chairman Wang Daohan on the issues of 
taxation and joint ventures. 

April 15-21 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Transportation and Telecommunications 
Affairs Boyd Hight and Deputy Director 
of the International Affairs division of the 
Civil Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC) Li Shufan lead the first round of 
civil aviation negotiations in Beijing; U.S. 
and Chinese teams begin discussion with 
fundamentally different positions. 

April 17 

Chinese Academy of Sciences delegation 
leaves Beijing for the annual meeting of 
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 
Washington; discussions are to be held on 
academic exchanges and cooperation pro- 

April 20- 

U.S. National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) dele- 
gation, led by Director Henry Geller, vis- 
its China; meets with Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications officials. 

April 24- 

Minister of Forestry Luo Yuchuan visits 

April 25 

U.S. Department of Commerce estab- 
lishes a new category (category "P") for 
China under the U.S. commodity control 
export regulations. 

April 28 

U.S. Consulate General is officially inau- 
gurated at Shanghai. 

April 28- 
May 14 

Chief U.S. Textile Negotiator H. Reiter 
Webb and General Manager of China Na- 
tional Textiles Import-Export Corpora- 
tion Wang Mingjun lead U.S. -China tex- 
tile negotiations in Beijing; negotiations 
conclude without agreement. 

April 28- 

Bank of China President Li Baohua leads 
delegation to U.S.; group meets with 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
Paul Volker and Treasury Secretary Mil- 
ler in Washington; tours New York, 
Houston, and San Francisco. 

May 5- 
June 18 

Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Lib- 
eration Army (PLA) Liu Huaqing leads 
delegation to U.S. at the invitation of 
Secretary of Defense Brown; group dis- 
cusses technology transfers with De- 
partment of Defense officials, tours IBM, 
AM General, General Motors, and Hon- 
eywell and visits several military installa- 
tions, including NORAD. 

May 10- 
June 30 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Transportation and Telecommunications 
Affairs Hight and Deputy Director of the 
International Affairs division of the Civil 
Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC) Li Shufan lead the second round 
of civil aviation negotiations in Washing- 

■ I / 





1 H ' 


East Asia 

May 14-15 

Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus 
and Secretary of Agriculture Bergland 
meet with Minister of Forestry Luo Yu- 
chuan and his delegation. 

May 22- 
June 22 

Vice Minister of Water Conservancy Li 
Huayi leads delegation to U.S., returning 
Secretary Brown's January visit; group 
meets with Department of Agriculture of- 
ficials in Washington; tours water conser- 
vatories, flood control facilities, and soil 
erosion and irrigation projects around 

May 24- 
June 8 

Vice Premier Geng Biao and a high level 
entourage from the PL A visit U.S. Visit 
is marked by talks with President Carter, 
Vice President Mondale, Secretary of 
State Edmund S. Muskie, National Secu- 
rity Adviser Brzezinski, and Secretary of 
Defense Brown; tours U.S. military in- 

June 4-16 

Governor Brendan Byrne (New Jersey) 
leads delegation to China to explore 
sister-state relations with Zhejiang Prov- 
ince and to enhance cultural and educa- 
tional exchanges between the two re- 
gions' universities. 

June 4-19 

Governor Harry Hughes (Maryland) 
leads delegation to China; meets with 
Vice Premier Wan Li, Anhui Province 
Governor Zhang Jingfu, and other Anhui 
Province officials. Governor Hughes and 
Governor Zhang agree to establish sister- 
state relations. 

June 4-20 

Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang 
visits universities and meets with Secre- 
tary of Education Shirley Hufstedler and 
senior American education officials. 

June 5-26 

Minister of Public Health Qian Xinzhong 
and his delegation visit U.S.; tour several 
U.S. medical schools, meet with health 
professionals, and study emergency pro- 
cedures and primary health care. 

June 6- 

Chairman and President of the Bank of 
China Bu Ming leads delegation to U.S.; 
group visits the International Monetary 
Fund, the Export-Import Bank, and the 
World Bank in Washington, and several 
banks in New York. 

June 10- 

Vice Minister of Light Industry Han 
Peixin leads delegation to U.S. at the in- 
vitation of Bobbin Publications; group 
discusses trade and joint venture possibil- 
ities with several U.S. companies. 

June 12 

Senator Richard Stone (Florida) an- 
nounces that the Department of State has 
approved sales presentations for the FX 
fighter aircraft to Taiwan. Chinese Gov- 
ernment subsequently protests the deci- 

June 14 

In response to press reports that U.S. 
Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan fa- 
vored restoring official relations with 
Taiwan, an authorative People's Daily 
press commentary condemns the restora- 
tion of such ties. 

June 15 

NASA delegation, led by Deputy Admin- 
istrator Alan Lovelace, arrives in Bei- 
jing; meets with Vice Premier Bo Yibo. 

June 15-23 

Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
Volker leads delegation to China to study 
the structure and functions of China's fi- 
nancial system, economic planning, and 
external financial relations. 

June 16 

Minister Qian meets with Secretary of 
Health and Human Services Patricia 
Harris in Washington. 

June 17 

Minister Qian meets with National Insti- 
tutes of Health Director Donald Fred- 
rickson in Washington and tours NIH 
clinical center. 

June 19 

Minister Qian meets with Presidential 
science adviser Press in Washington. 

June 23- 

Executive Secretary of the Department 
of State Peter Tarnoff and Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for International Narco- 
tics Matters Mathea Falco visit China. 

June 25 

Assistant Secretary Falco meets with 
Vice Director of the Ministry of Public 
Security Xie Heng to discuss drug abuse 
problems and with Vice Minister of Pub- 
lic Health Wu Zhaoheng to discuss narco- 
tics matters. 

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang 
Wenjin hosts dinner for Assistant Secre- 
tary Falco and Executive Secretary Tar- 

Executive Secretary Tarnoff speaks with 
Director of the Political Department of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lin 
Zhong and other Foreign Ministry offi- 
cials about the organization, personnel 
structure, and training of the U.S. For- 
eign Service. 

June 30- 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Holbrooke holds series of 
consultations in Beijing with Vice Minis- 
ter Zhang Wenjin and other key Chinese 

July 3-19 

Senior Vice Minister of Culture, Liu 
Fuzhi, leads delegation to U.S. at the in- 
vitation of the International Communica- 
tion Agency; delegation visits several 
cities and small towns for broad overview 
of American society and culture. 

July 5- 
Aug. 5 

Minister of Agriculture Huo Shilian visits 
U.S.; meets with with Secretary of Ag- 
riculture Bergland. 

July 6-14 

Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd 
(West Virginia) visits China at the invita- 
tion of the Standing Committee of the 
NPC; meets with Vice Chairman of the 
Standing Committee Ulanhu, Premier 
Hua, and Vice Premier Zhao Ziyang. 

July 9 

President Carter and Premier Hua meet 
in Tokyo while there for the memorial 
services for the late Japanese Prime Min- 
ister Ohira. Talks center on global issues 
of mutual concern and on Indochina. 

July 12- 
Aug. 11 

Vice Minister of China's State Construc- 
tion Committee Lu Kebai leads a delega- 
tion to U.S.; group meets with Commerce 
Department and Housing and Urban De- 
velopment Department officials and 
makes a general survey of urban planning 
and high rise construction in U.S. 

July 17 

U.S. Department of Commerce approves 
and implements new, liberalized export 
control guidelines for China. 


Department of State Bulletin 

East Asia 

luly 12-21 

Representative Stephen J. Solarz (New 
fork) leads delegation of the Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee to 

luly 20 

Representative Solarz meets with Vice 
Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin in Beij- 
ng; discusses Chinese views on North 
Korean and Kampuchean matters. 

luly 31 

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Ying 
fleets in Washington with Under Secre- 
:ary of State David Newsom, Assistant 
secretary of State for International Or- 
ganizations Richard McCall, Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs 
Richard Moose, and other senior U.S. of- 
ficials for consultations on multilateral 
md regional diplomatic issues. 

House and Senate approve legislation au- 
;horizing activation of Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) pro- 
grams in China and send it to President 

\ugust 8 

President Carter signs legislation au- 

:horizing the operation of OPIC programs 

n China and a Presidential determination 

;hat OPIC programs are in the national 


\ugust 16-21 

Director of the Bureau of Politico- 
Vlilitary Affairs of the Department of 
State, Reginald Bartholomew, visits 

\ugust 20-23 

Republican Vice Presidential candidate 
jeorge Bush visits China and meets with 
Vice Premier Deng and other high- 
*anking Chinese officials. 

Chinese Government attacks the Taiwan 
Relations Act following the emergence of 
:he Taiwan issue in the U.S. Presidential 
election campaign. 

\ugust 25- 
September 7 

Last of three rounds of civil aviation ne- 
gotiations are held in Beijing. Deputy 
\ssistant Secretary of State for Trans- 
aortation and Telecommunications Affairs 
flight and Deputy Director General of 
China's Civil Aviation Administration 
CAAC) Lin Zheng cochair the talks. 

August 30- 

September 8 

Governor Robert Ray (Iowa) leads a 

State delegation to China. 

August 31- 
September 4 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Maritime Affairs Samuel Nemirow and 
Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of 
the Ministry of Communications Dong 
Huamin cochair third and final round of 
the U.S. -China maritime negotiations in 

August 31- 
September 28 

Vice Premier Bo Yibo leads high-ranking 
delegation, which includes seven minis- 
terial level officials, on a tour of U.S. 

September 4 

Assistant Secretary Nemirow and Di- 
rector Dong initial the proposed U.S.- 
China maritime agreement in Beijing. 

September 6-19 

Under Secretary of Defense for Research 
and Engineering William Perry visits 
China to continue technology transfer 
talks; meets with Vice Premier Li Xian- 
nian and Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the 
PLA Zhang Aiping and Liu Huaqing; 
delegation tours Chinese defense re- 
search institutes, factories, and other fa- 

September 8 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Transportation and Telecommunications 
Affairs Hight and Deputy Director Gen- 
eral of China's Civil Aviation Administra- 
tion (CAAC) Lin Zheng initial U.S.- 
China aviation agreement in Beijing. 

September 9- 
October 15 

Vice Minister of Forestry Yong Wentao 
leads delegation to U.S. at the invitation 
of the Department of Agriculture; tours 
forestry research laboratories and uni- 
versity forestry facilities throughout U.S. 

September 10 

Director General of the State Bureau of 
Labor Kang Yonghe meets with Secre- 
tary of Labor Ray Marshall in Washing- 
ton for discussion of the U.S. labor 

September 13-28 

China holds its first official trade ex- 
hibition in the U.S. in San Francisco. 

September 16-18 

First annual meeting of the U.S. -China 
Joint Economic Committee is held in 
Washington; cochaired by Treasury Sec- 
retary Miller and Chinese Vice Premier 
Bo Yibo; committee predicts bilateral 
trade in 1980 will total about $4 billion, up 
about 75% from 1979. 

September 17 

President Carter and Vice Premier Bo 
Yibo sign agreements covering civil avia- 
tion and maritime links and regulating 
bilateral trade in textiles. They also sign 
a Consular Convention, the first formal 
treaty concluded between the two gov- 
ernments. China announces its decision to 
open consulates in New York, Chicago, 
and Honolulu, as U.S. announces its in- 
tention to open three additional consu- 
lates in China. 

September 21- 
October 6 

PLA delegation visits U.S. to study the 
U.S. military logistics management sys- 

September 28- 
October 23 

Chinese Minister of Building Materials 
Song Yangchu leaves Beijing for a visit to 
U.S. at the invitation of the National 
Council for U.S.-China Trade. 

October 1 

Second installment of $10.1 million paid to 
the U.S. by China under the U.S.-China 
"claims-assets" agreement. 

Mayor Kevin White (Boston) and Mayor 
Zhou Feng (Hangzhou) agree to establish 
sister city relations. 

October 2-18 

Minister of Posts and Telecommunica- 
tions Wang Zigang visits U.S.; meets 
with U.S. Postal Service officials. 

October 7 

Agreement covering procedures for the 

operation of OPIC in China initialed in 

Beijing. OPIC will provide political risk 

insurance to U.S. companies investing in 


October 9 

Postmaster General Bolger and Minister 
of Posts and Telecommunications Wang 
Zigang sign agreements in Washington 
covering parcel post and international 
express mail services between U.S. and 

February 1981 


East Asia 

October 10 

Los Angeles City Council proclaims Oc- 
tober 10 "Republic of China Day." (Proc- 
lamation formally approved by the City 
Council October 13.) 

October 11-28 

Vice Minister of National Defense Xiao 
Ke leads a delegation representing the 
PL A military academies to U.S. to tour 
military education facilities. 

October 14 

Chairman of the Guangzhou Revolution- 
ary Committee Yang Shangkun notifies 
Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley of 
the nullification of preliminary agree- 
ments for establishing sister city ties in 
protest of the October 10 proclamation. 

October 15 

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang 
Wenjin formally protests October 2 unof- 
ficial agreement on privileges and im- 
munities between the AIT and Taiwan's 

October 16 

Vice Minister Xiao meets with Secretary 
of Defense Brown in Washington. 

October 17-22 

U.S. Trade Representative Askew 
travels to China to consult with the 
Chinese on U.S. trade policy and invest- 
ment issues. 

October 18- 
November 7 

PL A marksman team visits U.S. to com- 
pete in bilateral and international shoot- 
ing matches. 

October 20 

Trade Representative Askew meets with 
Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang in 

October 20- 
November 6 

A gubernatorial delegation, led by 
Guangdong Governor Xi Zhongxun, visits 
U.S.; delegation members include Gov- 
ernors Lu Dadong (Sichuan Province), 
Ma Xingyuan (Fujian Province), Chen 
Puru (Liaoning Province), and Song Ping 
(First Secretary of Gansu Provincial 
Party Committee). 

October 21 

Trade Representative Askew meets with 
Vice Premier Gu Mu in Beijing. 

October 22 

Ambassador Woodcock and Minister of 
Foreign Trade Li Qiang sign long-term 
U.S. -China grain trade agreement in Bei- 
October 23 

Governor Xi Zhongxun and delegation 
meet with National Security Adviser 
Brzezinski in Washington to discuss stra- 
tegic issues and Asian regional questions; 
group also meets with Assistant to the 
President for Intergovernmental Affairs 
Eugene Eidenburg. 

October 24 

Governor Xi Zhongxun and his delegation 
meet with Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Hol- 
brooke and Deputy Secretary of State 
Christopher in Washington to discuss 
U.S. -China relations. 

October 25- 
November 3 

Senator Larry Pressler (South Dakota) 
leads delegation of businessmen to China. 

October 25- 
November 9 

China holds national trade exhibition in 

October 27- 
November 4 

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury De- 
partment Donald Lubick leads delegation 
from the Departments of Treasury, En- 
ergy, and Commerce to China. 

October 30 

Ambassador Woodcock and Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin sign 
OPIC agreement in Beijing. 

October 31 

Assistant Secretary Lubick and his dele- 
gation meet with Minister in Charge of 
the State Energy Commission Yu Qiuli to 
discuss Chinese energy situation. 

November 5 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a 
statement "on the occasion of Mr. 
Reagan's election as President of the 
United States," saying "we hope and ex- 
pect that the new United States Adminis- 
tration will adhere to the principles set 
forth in the Shanghai communique and 
the communique on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between China and 
the United States so that Sino- American 
relations may continue to progress and 
grow stronger." 

November 8-27 

Deputy Director of Civil Aeronautics 
Administration of China (CAAC) Li Shu- 
fan leads delegation to U.S.; group meets 
with State Department, Federal Aviation 
Administration, and Civil Aeronautics 
Board officials to discuss administrative 
and technical arrangements for im- 
plementing the U.S. -China civil aviation 

November 9-23 

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
of the Department of Commerce Sidney 
Diamond leads a delegation to China to 
study China's new patent law and to as- 
sist in China's efforts to develop a new 
patent system. 

November 11-26 

Director of the American and Oceanian 
Affairs Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Han Xu visits U.S. to at- 
tend the Williamsburg X conference (Nov. 
13-16), to consult with State Department 
officials, and to meet with prominent 
American public figures. 

November 12-19 

State trade mission, led by Governor 
James Rhodes (Ohio), visits Guangzhou, 
Shanghai, and Wuhan. 

November 15-21 

Under Secretary of Commerce Robert 
Herzstein leads delegation to Beijing to 
open U.S. National Trade Exhibition 
(Nov. 17-28). 

November 17 

Director Han Xu holds discussions with 
Under Secretary of State Newsom, As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Holbrooke, Assistant Sec- 
retary for Inter- American Affairs William 
Bowdler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Near East and South Asian Affairs Peter 
Constable, and other senior officials of 
the Department of State. 

November 21- 
December 16 

Minister of the Fifth Ministry of Machine 
Building Zhang Zhen leads a China North 
Industries Corporation (NORINCO) del- 
egation to U.S.; delegation tours major 
U.S. cities and visits factories. 

December 1-13 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man- 
power, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics 
Robin Pirie leads Department of Defense 
delegation to China, returning the visit of 
the PLA logistics delegation. 


Department of State Bulletin 

East Asia 

)ecember 6-28 

"hina holds national trade exhibition in 

Jew York. 

)ecember 7 

'an American airways inaugural flight 

inds in Beijing. 

)ecember 9-20 

)efense Mapping Agency delegation, 
eaded by Deputy Director for Manage- 
lent and Technology Owen Williams, vis- 
is China. 

)ecember 10 

'ice President of the Chinese Academy 
f Sciences Qian Sanqiang, Vice Presi- 
ent of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Iciences Mei Yi, and Assistant Director 
or International Programs of the Na- 
ional Science Foundation Harvey Averch 
ign basic sciences protocol in Washing- 
on; provides for cooperative research be- 
ween U.S. and China in several fields of 
iasic science encompassing both natural 
nd social sciences. 

December 15-17 

Chief Textile Negotiator H. Reiter Webb 
and Deputy Director of the Export De- 
partment of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade Dai Jie lead the first round of con- 
sultations under the U.S. -China Textile 
Agreement in Washington. Teams fail to 
agree upon a level for Chinese wool swea- 
ter exports to the U.S. 

December 15-19 

Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall leads a 
delegation to China; meets with Director 
General of the State Bureau of Labor 
Kang Yonghe; Vice Premier J. Pengfei. 

December 27-30 

Representative Stephen J. Solarz (New 
York) of the Asian and Pacific Subcom- 
mittee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee leads delegation to Beijing. 
Representative Joel Pritchard (Washing- 
ton) accompanies the delegation. ■ 

Drderly Departure Program 
For Vietnamese 

IEC. 8, 1980 ' 

'or a number of months, on behalf of 
lie U.S. Government, the U.N. High 
lommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
as been negotiating with S.R.V. 
socialist Republic of Vietnam] authori- 
ies on an orderly departure program 
>r those persons in Vietnam who wish 
a leave Vietnam legally for the United 
tates and who meet the provisions of 
ur immigration and refugee law. Those 
egotiations have resulted in an agree- 
lent, and departures are expected to 
egin December 11. 

Under its provisions, the UNHCR's 
!.S. representative went to Ho Chi 
linh City in early November to begin 
iterviewing these persons. A consid- 
rable amount of preprocessing by mail 
rom people in Vietnam and their rela- 
ives and sponsors in the United States 
ad already been carried out by the 
Irderly Departure Program Office of 
he American Embassy in Bangkok so 

that we and the Vietnamese authorities 
had agreed on a list of over 1,500 per- 
sons to be interviewed in Ho Chi Minh 
City. Following this interview and a 
medical examination, and then a final 
interview with an American consular 
officer, we would expect most and pos- 
sibly all these 1,500 persons to be 
authorized entry into the United States. 

The UNHCR is utilizing existing week- 
ly international flights between Ho Chi 
Minh City and Bangkok for their trans- 
portation. Approximately 1,000 persons 
could leave Vietnam each month under 
this program, assuming the list of 
names of those who are permitted to 
leave Vietnam and meet our program 
critera can be enlarged. 

The U.S. views the Orderly Depar- 
ture Program as a humanitarian issue 
which is unrelated to the political ques- 
tion of normalization of relations be- 
tween our two countries. 

*Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman John Trattner. 

ebruary 1981 



U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy in 
the Western Hemisphere 

by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr. 

Address before the Southern 
Governor's Conference in Williamsburg, 
Virginia, on September 16, 1980. Mr. 
Johnston is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs. 

From well before the time any of us 
were born, the Southern States have 
been leaders in recognizing the impor- 
tance of international trade to the coun- 
try and to the region. Starting with 
rice, indigo, naval supplies, tobacco, and 
king cotton before the Civil War, the 
South argued strongly for a policy of 
trade. Senator [Oscar Wilder] Under- 
wood of Alabama, then Chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee, put the 
Underwood tariff act into effect in 1912 
to take duties down to a level that had 
not been seen after the war and were 
not to be seen again until the end of 
World War II. It was Cordell Hull [U.S. 
Secretary of State, 1933-44] of Ten- 
nessee who, in 1934, inaugurated the 
radical U.S. policy of tariff-lowering in 
trade through reciprocal trade agree- 
ments. And it was Congressman [Wil- 
bur D.] Mills of Arkansas who for years 
was the guardian of an open U.S. trade 

But this is not just history; this 
relationship between the South and 
trade is still true now. Forest products 
and paper from Alabama, Georgia, 
Florida, and Mississippi; tobacco from 
North Carolina and Virginia; soybeans, 
grains, and cotton throughout the whole 
region; rice in Arkansas and Louisiana; 
planes from Texas, Virginia, and 
Georgia; electronics from Maryland and 
Texas; coal from West Virginia, Ala- 
bama, and Tennessee; textiles from 
Georgia and the Carolinas; machinery 
from Oklahoma, Missouri, Maryland, 
South Carolina, and Texas; transport 
equipment from Kentucky, Delaware, 
Georgia, Missouri, and Mississippi; and 
chemicals and plastics from Alabama, 
Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Ten- 
nessee, Texas, Virginia, and West 
Virginia all owe a large part of their 
prosperity to foreign markets. The 
basic interest of the South is still in 

I think it is also appropriate to 
recognize the particularly strong in- 
terest by the South in the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. One 
aspect of this is the bridge furnished by 
Puerto Rico. Another manifestation in 
the distant past was the interest, at 
one point, in seeing Cuba join the 
United States, the influence of south- 
erners in the filibusters in Nicaragua 
and Central American countries, par- 
ticipation by southerners in the con- 
struction of the Panama Canal, and an 
interest in Mexico that finally relieved 
it of half its territory. Needless to say, 
this is not an interest that has always 
been appreciated by its recipients, and 
I do not mean to imply that the South 
harbors, in its bosom, imperial designs 
toward Latin America. 

We are now in another century 
that has, in many ways, transformed 
the South more than the rest of the 
country — in urbanization, race rela- 
tions, industrialization, and making it 
by far the major source of energy for 
the United States. But the interest of 
the South in Latin America remains 
because the South is closer and more 
affected by what goes on across the 
Caribbean. Ask the Governors of Texas 
and Florida who keep as keen an eye on 
segments of Latin America as does the 
Secretary of State. 

Public Interest 

Public interest has heightened in the 
United States on trade as a result of re- 
cent large trade deficits, economic 
downturns, and rising unemployment. 
There has been an increased demand 
for return to high-tariff or new-tariff 
barriers to shield domestic industries 
from import competition. This height- 
ened interest has often looked at trade 
not as an opportunity but as a threat to 
the American economy. There is no 
doubt that the government has a re- 
sponsibility to slow down excessively 
rapid changes caused by bursts of im- 
ports when domestic workers and capi- 
talists are materially damaged, and we 
have provisions in the law that allow 
that. But the country does not benefit 
from keeping people in jobs where the 
United States is not most productive, 

and, if we did, the consumers and our 
own industry would suffer. The govern- 
ment's job is to keep the economy 
growing so that economic shifts can be 
digested. After all, within our own 
borders we have seen a shift of rice 
production from South Carolina to 
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. We 
have seen much cotton production shift 
from the old South to the Southwest; 
textiles have moved from New England 
to the Carolinas; petroleum production 
has moved from Pennsylvania to Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Louisiana. The true 
vibrancy of the United States comes 
from taking advantage of change. 

World Trade Growth 

The facts on world trade are moving 
faster, sometimes it appears, than our 
realizations of them. During a long por- 
tion of our history in this country we 
adapted ourselves to trade. But in the 
period from 1930 to the Second World 
War we had a policy of high tariffs, and 
the U.S. interest in trade languished. It 
was not the most vibrant of our eco- 
nomic periods. By 1950 only 7% of our 
production of goods was exported — 
about half the figure of 1913. Not until 
the late 1960s or early 1970s did we 
reach the 1913 figure again. But con- 
stantly since 1950, the trend, not only 
in this country but throughout the 
world, has been toward greater and 
greater dependence on trade to such a 
point that now one out of every five of 
the goods that we produce is sent 
abroad. This, of course, excludes serv- 
ices. In most years the rate of growth 
in world trade is twice the rate of 
growth in world production. 

Over two-thirds of our imports are 
of raw materials and fuels essential to 
the economy. Petroleum, now about 
35%, will cost about $90 billion this 
year. To help pay for this bill we have a 
surplus in trade of both manufactures 
and agriculture. One thing to keep in 
mind is that with the dramatic wrench 
caused by spiraling oil prices, members 
of the Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries (OPEC) will have a 
balance-of-payments surplus this year of 
about $120 billion — a surplus equal to 
10% of world trade. This surplus will 
be mirrored by deficits for the rest of 
the world. If that deficit was spread 
around evenly it would account for a 
U.S. deficit of about $20 billion, and 
other nonexporters of oil face the same 


Department of State Bulletin 


As the President has emphasized, 
tie major economic change facing the 
'nited States is to adapt to the change 
1 energy. We must both slow down our 
wn energy consumption, and we must 
nd new sources and new methods, 
ibout half of our merchandise imports 
ansist of products which are non- 
ompetitive with domestic products 
ither because they are not available 
ere or not available in sufficient sup- 
ly. Competitive products serve as a 
pur to keep down the inflation rate in 
his country. Between 2 and 2'/2 million 
omestic manufacturing jobs depend 
irectly on exports; one in nine U.S. 
lanufacturing jobs and one in three of 
ur farm acres produce for sales 

mportance of Trade to the South 

he importance of trade to the 
lenbers of the Southern Governors 
issociation is clear. Total exports from 
he 17 continental States this year 
hould be about $60 billion and, in this 
egion alone, we are talking about well 
ver half a million jobs attributable to 
xports. Texas will send about $14 
illion in goods abroad, Missouri about 
5 billion, Louisiana close to $4 billion, 
lorth Carolina more than $5 billion. I 
ave to admit that some of these fig- 
res are "hip-pocket" estimates since 
fie latest accurate figures go back to 
976 and our trade has about doubled 
ince then. Between 1973 and 1980, our 
xports and imports will have about 
ripled, a compound rate of growth of 
8% a year. 

Our trade with the Western 
[emisphere has grown even more, and 
includes two of our four largest 
•ading partners, Canada and Mexico, 
ur trade with the developing Western 
[emisphere nations exceeds that of any 
ther block of developing nations in- 
luding the Middle Eastern oil ex- 
orters. In 1979 we sent over $26 
illion of goods to the Latin American 
epublics, and we had a surplus of 
bout $4 billion. That same year we 
ent $33 billion to Canada and had a 
eficit of about $5 billion. Mexico takes 
10 billion of our exports, and 
enezuela and Brazil each take about 
4 billion. 

Iffects of Foreign Policy on Trade 

overnor [of Virginia, John N.] Dalton 
sked me to discuss how foreign policy 
ffects our trade in the Western Hemi- 
phere. The relationship is, in fact, a 

circular one. These enormous figures 
are of great importance to the U.S. 
economy and to the economy of our 
neighbors, thus an important element in 
our foreign policy interest in this hemi- 
sphere. After all, what is foreign policy 
but a compilation of the important in- 
terests that we have abroad? Pursuit of 
our trade interest should ultimately 
lead us in the same direction as pursuit 
of our political interest— toward a close 
relationship with the countries of North 
and South America, in which all recog- 
nize a shared interest in the security, 
stability, and economic well-being of the 

The Caribbean and Central Amer- 
ica are a case in point. Political 
deterioration and economic decline in 
this area are of great concern, though 
we are trying, in a time of tight budg- 
ets, to respond to these problems with 
increased aid aimed especially at 
strengthening the private sector in 
these countries. Aid alone cannot han- 
dle the job. Economic development de- 
pends primarily on actions which coun- 
tries themselves take to increase the 
productivity of their people and, thus, 
their standard of living. Despite aid to 
this region, trade prospects have a 
more important bearing on long-term 
economic development of these coun- 

Many are small and depend on min- 
erals or farm crops for most of their ex- 
ports. Some have unemployment rates 
of 40%. Many that have begun to de- 
velop have done so on the basis of an 
economy geared to low priced energy. 
Now they must reorient their econ- 
omies to pay for oil which has multi- 
plied its price by 10 times in less than a 

The United States is their most im- 
portant market. Our security interst 
would be well served if the Caribbean 
countries could take better advantage 
of our market. All of Latin America, 
with the obvious exception of Cuba, 
benefits from duty-free treatment for 
certain goods under our generalized 
system of preferences, and some of 
them among the poorest, such as Haiti, 
are taking the most advantage of the 

Making our political and economic 
interests mesh, however, is not always 
a smooth process. The United States is 
a global power with many objectives, 
some of which conflict in particular sit- 
uations. As a global power our reach is 
far. The world looks to us for con- 

stancy. Our concern with human rights 
goes back to the Revolution and is an 
old element in American policy, but it 
is occasionally cited as a foreign policy 
concern that interferes improperly with 
our trade interest. Human rights is a 
serious concern and, over the long haul 
in many countries, has an intricate 
bearing on political stability and eco- 
nomic progress. But I would like to 
point out that U.S. exports to Chile and 
Argentina, two of the prime focuses of 
our human rights efforts, increased in 
1979 by over 60% in Chile and 125% in 
Argentina. Governor [of Georgia, 
George D.] Busbee, in his work with 
you and in the President's Export 
Council, has been doing valiant work to 
keep these different aspects of our 
policy in perspective. 

The most typical case is one where 
economic differences lead to political 
problems. Sensitive imports from Mex- 
ico have caused problems for U.S. pro- 
ducers and spilled out into the political 
relationship. The choice of actions in 
such a situation is unattractive and in- 
volves tradeoffs among different domes- 
tic economic goals and with our exter- 
nal trade relationships. Likewise, 
energy imports, both gas and petro- 
leum, which the United States seeks 
from both Canada and Mexico at rea- 
sonable prices, have from time to time 
been sources of political contention. 

Other Latin exports to the United 
States are sensitive not because of low 
prices but because producers are seek- 
ing higher prices. I refer to primary 
commodities such as coffee, tin, and 
sugar. In the last 3 or 4 years, the 
United States has sought commodity 
agreements to dampen wild gyrations 
in commodity prices for about five com- 
modities. We wish, on the one hand, to 
avoid excessive peaks in the pricing 
that ratchet up the cost for our con- 
sumers. It is also, however, in our in- 
terest to avoid excessive valleys in 
prices which would discourage invest- 
ment in these commodities and, over 
the long haul, diminish supplies and 
thus exacerbate future price rises when 
the supply-demand situation changes. 

It is hard for us to realize how im- 
portant single commodities are to some 
of the Latin American countries. Over 
half of Bolivia's exports consist of the 
single commodity — tin; one-fifth of the 
exports of Barbados and the Dominican 
Republic are sugar; El Salvador and 
Guatemala get half their export re- 
ceipts from coffee, and Haiti, Honduras, 

sbruary 1981 



and Nicaragua get one-third. For Ja- 
maica, alumina and bauxite represent 
nearly three-fourths of the sales abroad. 

Economic Development and Foreign Aid 

The interaction between economic 
development in Latin America and 
foreign trade is complex. In the past, 
some of these countries have adopted 
highly protectionist strategies to en- 
courage infant industry, but the policy 
has most often been self-defeating. The 
infant, without the winds of competi- 
tion, could not seem to grow up. Chile 
and Argentina followed this strategy 
for many years. In the 1920s these 
countries' per capita product was 
equivalent to that of many European 
states. But by following this strategy 
their economies fell behind. The agri- 
cultural sector suffered. They have now 
abandoned these policies. Several other 
Latin American countries have sought 
to encourage new industry by requiring 
foreign investors to meet minimum lo- 
cal content and export criteria. The 
motivation behind these rules is under- 
standable, but if all countries followed 
this pattern, the results would be frus- 
trating. One country's local content re- 
quirement could block another's export 

Markets would be fragmented not 
only for the United States but for the 
developing Latin American countries, 
and the results would be self-defeating 
for the countries that try these 
methods since they would be encour- 
aging industry that does not know the 
discipline of competition. 

U.S. and Canada 

The intimate interaction between 
Canada and the U.S. economy presents 
different challenges. Most important, 
Canada is usually our largest single 
trading partner and the principal locus 
of U.S. foreign investment. In 1979 
total U.S.-Canadian trade was about 3% 
of our gross national product but 27% 
of Canada's. Canada took 20% of our 
exports. Trade in both directions is es- 
pecially heavy in machine and transpor- 
tation equipment — about 27% of our 
export! and 26% of our imports. Trade 
in automobiles and parts is even more 
concentrated because of the U.S.-Cana- 
dian auto agreement. 

The closeness of the two economies 
Inevitably lead* to contentious issues in 
the trade and investment fields. Canada 

has a population one-tenth of ours, 
though it is the second largest country 
in the world. The majority of its popula- 
tion lives within 60 miles of the U.S. 
border. The Canadians worry about our 
exports of fruits and vegetables, which 
get ripe in the United States before 
they do in Canada and which drive 
down Canadian prices before the items 
are picked. Canada is much concerned 
that its economy not be dominated by 
U.S. interests and, in 1974, instituted a 
foreign investment revenue agency to 
screen foreign investments and approve 
them when they are of "significant 
benefit" to Canada. We are concerned 
about possible trade and investment 
distortion resulting from the perfor- 
mance requirements by that agency. 
We make these concerns known to 

Canada in an effort to continue the 
favorable investment and trade climate 
so important to both our economies. 

The 1979 Trade Act suggests that 
we take the links that bind our econ- 
omy to that of our North American 
neighbors one step further and explore 
the prospect of setting up a North 
American free trade area. The Adminis- 
tration will make that study, but we 
should keep in mind that the prospect 
of such a free trade area does not seem 
the same from here as it does from the 
viewpoint of Canada or Mexico. Both of 
these countries have expressed serious 
reservations about the idea. Both are 
much smaller, they have a smaller in- 
dustrial base and less rich agriculture. 
They are concerned that their econ- 
omies not be overwhelmed by the much 

Trade With the 
Soviet Union 

OCT. 25, 1980 1 

You wrote to ask my views about section 402 
of the Trade Act of 1974, the Jackson- Vanik 

From the beginning of my Presidency I 
emphasized our commitment as a nation to 
human rights as a fundamental tenet on 
which our foreign policy would be based. 
That commitment of mine is as deep and as 
important to me today as it was then. 

You have always been a pioneer in the 
area of human rights and your leadership 
and support have been instrumental in our 
success. I am sure that the record will show 
that American words and actions in the last 
period have left their mark on the rest of 
the world. Because of our leadership the 
defense of human rights has its rightful 
place on the world agenda for everyone to 

The Jackson-Vanik amendment, which you 
authored, represents an important statement 
of our nation's commitment to the free 
emigration of Soviet Jewry. As you well 
know, I, along with you, have been specifi- 
cally concerned about Jewish emigration 
from the Soviet Union. The year before I 
became President, Jewish emigration was 

about 14,000. Last year it was up to 
50,000 — the highest level in more than 10 
years. The lower rate this year in the wake 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is of 
great concern. We will continue to register 
our strong concern about this low level of 
emigration at the Review Conference on 
Security and Cooperation which will meet in 
Madrid next month. The Soviet Union has an 
obligation to honor its Helsinki commitment. 

After the Afghanistan invasion, I took a 
number of steps, including the suspension of 
grain sales and the restriction of high- 
technology exports to the Soviet Union, to 
make quite clear to the Soviets that we can- 
not conduct business-as-usual with them 
while their troops are occupying another 

With the Soviet troops still in Afghani- 
stan and with unacceptable denials of free 
emigration, it is totally inappropriate to con- 
sider any changes to section 402 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, and I have no intention of 
doing so. Furthermore, I can assure you that 
the U.S. delegation under the leadership of 
Ambassadors Griffin Bell and Max Kampel- 
man at the CSCE Conference in Madrid will 
take every opportunity to make clear to the 
Soviet Union that their record of emigration 
is a violation of the Helsinki accords. 

I value your views on this subject and I 
look forward to working closely with you on 
these very vital issues. 


Jimmy Carter 

J Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 3, 1980. 


Department of State Bulletin 


rger U.S. industrial and agricultural 
achine. Both are eager to develop 
eir energy resources to the maximum 
om their own development point of 
ew. They are reluctant to mortgage 
eir energy supplies to one market, 
hey feel that their energy en- 
>wments are among the most precious 
onomic assets they have. Though 
ey recognize that proximity means 
at we are likely to be the principal 
irehaser of whatever they eventually 
(cide to export, they wish full freedom 
decide their production, price, and 
:port policy. They are both fiercely 
oud of their political independence. In 
ese circumstances, I am dubious that 
North American free trade area is 
;ely to become a reality in the near 
ture. We will continue to develop our 
ade relations but probably by other 


espite the problems I have mentioned, 
le outlook for expanding trade rela- 
ons with other countries in this 
smisphere is basically bright. We 
early face a challenge in adjusting to 
le more complex and sophisticated 
:onomies emerging in much of Latin 
merica and in adapting to the great 
rains of the new world energy situa- 
on, but economic expansion in the 
tgion clearly presents opportunities 
r American exporters. In addition, 
ie byproduct of greater economic 
rength in the Latin American coun- 
ies should be a lessening of the 
alitical sensitivity that now affects 
lany economic issues. Finally, I believe 
lat our neighbors in this hemisphere 
lare our view that trade and political 
jlations among us must be strength- 
ned in the interest of us all. ■ 

Continuing Crisis 

by Deane R. Hint on 

Address before the Mid-America 
Committee in Chicago on November 18, 
1980. Mr. Hinton is Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs. 

Generals are said to study warfare and 
often learn the wrong lessons. Politicians, 
businessmen, and even bureaucrats may 
also become adept at winning yesterday's 
battles, not tomorrow's. 

But history still instructs. Being 
wedded to the past is a mistake, but the 
past teaches us as well — if only to avoid 
repeating errors. In this vein, I suggest 
that lessons from the two oil crises of the 
1970s— the 1973-74 embargo and the 1979 
interruption of supplies from Iran — if 
applied to the future, can prevent the 
current oil supply interruption from seri- 
ously damaging our own and the rest of 
the world's economies. 

The current situation is serious, and 
the longer term crisis continues. We need 
to act in the short term due to the Iran- 
Iraq war and in the longer term due to 
the industrialized world's dependence on 
imported oil to supply its energy needs. 
Our efforts to combat these threats must 
be vigorous and informed by experience, 
often painfully acquired. 

The Right Lessons 

Our government, under both Democratic 
and Republican administrations, has 
learned the right lessons at times in the 
past. The 1973 oil embargo and the ac- 
companying cut in production were 
shocks to the system. Both our economic 
well-being and our security were put at 
jeopardy. We analyzed the problem and 
saw that there were two components — a 
need to protect ourselves against short- 
term supply interruptions and a realiza- 
tion that energy price and supply had be- 
come a long-term problem requiring on- 
going, concerted action in order to avoid 
continuing vulnerability. 

The establishment of the Interna- 
tional Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 was 
a response to both. This was an instru- 
ment to protect us against future embar- 
goes or other major supply interruptions 
and to help nations work together to re- 
duce our dependence on imported oil 
through conservation and acceleration of 

the development of alternative supplies. 
We realized then that the energy problem 
had the potential to divide us from our 
principal economic partners and security 
allies. Accordingly, we designed the IEA 
as an energy collective security arrange- 
ment. Its centerpiece is an emergency 
oil-sharing system which can be triggered 
when needed. The trigger mechanism can 
be called into operation if the IEA, as a 
whole, is suffering a shortfall greater 
than 7%. In addition, any nation suffering 
a 7% shortfall can activate the system 
and call upon the other nations to make 
up continuing additional shortfalls beyond 
the 7% mark. 

This sharing system has a number of 
strengths. It is capable of being im- 
plemented quickly and makes use of a 
previously agreed mechanism and for- 
mula. Triggering the system would give 
the United States and other IEA gov- 
ernments legal authority to implement 
strong domestic measures if necessary. 
Also, sharing would make oil available to 
hard-hit IEA countries and to oil-short 
companies in such countries, reducing the 
tendency to resort to the spot market 
where small quantities of petroleum 
products and crude oil are traded to clear 
the market, which is overwhelmingly 
dominated by long-term contracts. Price 
rises in the thin spot market create a 
psychology which encourages hikes in of- 
ficial prices — which consequently boost 
the overall oil bill. 

The long-term lesson from 1973 was 
that the era of cheap and accessible en- 
ergy had passed and that a continuing 
energy crisis was in train. Recognizing 
this, we embarked upon a vital journey, 
which is far from finished — a journey de- 
signed to improve our national approach 
to energy and to stimulate other coun- 
tries to do the same. We have made much 
progress. At home, we are reducing our 
dependence on imported oil. For exam- 
ple, U.S. oil imports were below 7 million 
b/d [barrels per day] in the first 6 months 
of 1980 compared to 8.6 million b/d in 
1977. In addition, increased energy effi- 
ciency has enabled us partially to de- 
couple GNP growth from growth in oil 
consumption so our economy can expand 
without increasing our dependence on 

I won't review here the evolution 
and the vicissitudes of our national en- 
ergy policy, but I think it can honestly be 
said that we have more than begun on the 
long road toward increasing our energy 
supplies and making better use of what 
we have. While we must concentrate first 
on putting our own house in order, we 

ebruary 1981 



also must continue to cooperate actively 
in pursuit of these same goals with our 
allies in the IEA and at the annual eco- 
nomic summits of the industrial de- 

The Second Crisis 

After the shocks of 1973 and 1974, we 
were making headway throughout the 
mid- and late-1970s. IEA efforts and our 
national policies were moving in the 
same, positive direction, although we 
were slower in starting than our IEA 

Unfortunately, in 1979, Iranian 
supplies were interrupted, and we were 
taught another lesson. This was a clear 
example of vulnerability to attack from 
an unexpected direction. The IEA system 
was designed to meet a recurrence of the 
1973 experience — a major shortfall 
(above 7%) or an embargo. But history 
did not repeat itself. The interruption in 
1979 was considerably less than 7%. We 
did not have an IEA mechanism on the 
shelf to deal with it. 

We soon learned a painful lesson that 
even a small interruption, under condi- 
tions of uncertainty, could have devastat- 
ing economic consequences. Although the 
decline in Iranian production was only 4% 
of world production, market dislocations 
and price increases buffeted a world 
economy which had still not fully recov- 
ered from the 1973 oil price shock. These 
blows helped push the United States into 
recession and slowed economic growth in 
the other industrial nations. In the 
United States our total inflation grew to 
double digits. For the industrialized na- 
tions as a whole, it is estimated that the 
price hikes of 1979 will ultimately cause a 
loss of about $300 billion in GNP. And the 
fragile economies of the developing na- 
tions have been scarred even more se- 
verely by these higher oil prices. 

The IEA developed a response to the 
1979 crisis. Its members made a commit- 
ment — albeit a loose one — to reduce the 
Kroup's demand for imported oil by 2 mil- 
lion b/d. Each nation's share of the reduc- 
tion, as well as the time within which 
action had to be taken, was unspecified. 
Although .significant savings of about 1.5 
million b/d, or 6% of 1978 IEA imports, 
were achieved by the end of 1979, this 
was too late to forestall sharp price in- 
IEA governments, focusing on 
the modest quantity of the shortfall, had 
underestimated the psychological impact 
of th< n the market. Midway 

through the year the United States came 
to thf conclusion that the IEA response 


Another Lesson: The Need for Better 

The United States, therefore, took the 
lead in giving the IEA and the world 
community better tools to meet a short- 
fall. The most important of these is na- 
tional ceilings on oil imports. At the 
Tokyo summit in June 1979, the seven 
largest industrial democracies adopted 
1985 oil-import targets. The IEA subse- 
quently refined and expanded these into 
national import ceilings for 1980 and na- 
tional import goals for 1985 for all its 
members. This process has been insti- 
tutionalized by the establishment of a 
system within the IEA in which ceilings 
would be imposed to counteract a market 
shortfall. Each nation would be responsi- 
ble for determining the measures neces- 
sary to achieve its ceiling. 

Thus, we are not without resources 
to face supply interruptions. In fact, our 
experience in the IEA has expanded our 
options beyond those which I have dis- 
cussed. And we have established prac- 
tices of consultation and cooperation 
which will permit us to tailor our re- 
sponses directly to any concrete situation. 

Dimensions of the Present Situation 

In this way, we have refined, through 
chastening experience, our abilities to 
deal with oil-supply interruptions. Now 
we are faced with another novel and 
threatening situation — the Iran-Iraq war. 
The energy effects of war between the 
two oil producers are serious, although 
they have been manageable thus far. The 
war has taken 3.8 million b/d of oil ex- 
ports off the world market, over 8% of oil 
produced in non-Communist countries. 
Since world consumption has declined, we 
can simply do without some of this oil — 
about 1 million b/d of it. Another 1-1.5 
million b/d can be made up through in- 
creased production from the Saudis and 
other OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] nations. This 
leaves a shortfall of over 1 million b/d, 
which is now being met by drawdowns of 
above normal stocks in some nations and 
by some belt tightening in nations with- 
out adequate stocks. 

The extent of any possible continuing 
shortfall will depend on a number of fac- 
tors, including how much additional sup- 
ply is made available by other OPEC na- 
tions, whether companies and individuals 
begin to hoard oil supplies and whether 
the war expands to other nations or inter- 
feres with gulf shipping. 

Since world stocks are at an all-time 
high, we should, in principle, be able to 
manage the current shortfall for at least 
the next 6 months. However, there are 
complicating factors. The current short- 
fall is not distributed evenly among coun- 
tries and companies. The United States 
lost a very small percentage of its oil. 
Some IEA members — Italy and Japan — 
lost 15% and 8% respectively, while 
others — Turkey and Portugal — were hit 
more severely. France lost 30%, and 
Brazil and India have been cut by more 
than 40% each. In addition, many devel- 
oping nations depended on Iraq for most 
of their oil and received it at much 
needed concessional terms. 

Even in countries which have lost 
little overall, certain companies have suf- 
fered substantial losses. This means that 
even though world stocks are high, some 
nations and companies are hurting now, 
and others will be in the near future. If 
they are unable to secure adequate 
supplies elsewhere, they may turn to the 
spot market to make up their shortfall. 

If they do so, spot market prices will 
increase, perhaps rapidly. OPEC minis- 
ters who meet in Bali on December 15 
will be very attentive to price trends on 
the spot market. If history repeats itself, 
official price increases would follow and 
be reflected in long-term contracts for 
1981 which will be negotiated next month. 
Some producers, in response to rising 
spot prices, may also impose surcharges 
on their official prices. Because of this 
price effect of a shortfall, all buyers 
would suffer. Even countries which lost 
few supplies — such as the United States 
— would bear a heavy burden. 

In trying to plot our course of action 
during the next months, we must begin 
with a premise: It is unacceptable to 
permit oil prices to skyrocket as they did 
in 1979. Several key elements in the 1979 
price escalator must be attacked — the 
leading role of spot prices, excess stock 
building, and fear of uncertainty in oil 
markets. If we focus on these factors and 
have learned our lessons well, we can de- 
fend ourselves adequately against an- 
other body blow to the world's economy. 

Peace Efforts and IEA Cooperation 

The first step is to reduce war-linked un- 
certainty in the oil market by encourag- 
ing those forces working for peace be- 
tween Iraq and Iran. 

• We are actively working through 
the U.N. Security Council toward a reso- 
lution of the conflict which does justice to 

Department of State Bulletin 


the legitimate concerns on both sides and 
follows the principles of international law. 

• The t'.S. po.-ition from the begin- 
ning of this conflict has been clear. We are 
impartial but not uninterested. The polit- 
ical, economic, and human consequences 
of a continuing conflict are of vital im- 
portance to us and the rest of the world. 

• We are concerned that the conflict 
not be expanded and have taken steps to 
prevent that. We believe, strongly, that 
there must be no infringement of the in- 
ternationally recognized freedom and 
safety of navigation in the Persian Gulf 
and welcome assurances given by both 
Ens and Iraq in this regard. 

• We believe, as well, that countries 
should be protected against interference 
in their internal affairs and that interna- 
tional disputes should be settled by 
peaceful means rather than by force. 

Beyond peace efforts, our principal 
aim is to keep the world supplied with oil 
in a way that reduces pressure on oil 
prices. On the supply side, certain gulf 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and the U.A.E. [United Arab Emirates] 
have increased production to try to make 
up some of the shortfall suffered by 
customers of Iraq. Exports may also in- 
crease from nations such as Nigeria, 
which were producing at less than normal 
levels due to slack demand. The most we 
can hope for from these countries is an 
extra 1-2 million b/d, with the lower end 
of the range more likely. 

On the demand side, we are cooper- 
ating with the 20 other industrialized na- 
tions which are members of the IEA and 
with France to calm the market. There 
are two related aspects to this effort. 
First, we can ease spot market pressure 
by using existing stocks. Second, we have 
to reduce overall demand for imported oil 
to compensate for reduced supply. 

IEA nations agreed on October 1 to 
avoid abnormal purchases on the spot 
market and to meet any shortfall through 
stock draws. This has had a useful effect 
thu.- far. The IEA policy is based on 
consultation and persuasion, and we are 
depending in the last instance on the 
cooperation of oil companies. We must 
recognize that companies may become re- 
luctant to draw down stocks even at nor- 
mal rates if they foresee a continuing 
shortfall. If this proves to be the case, 
the buffer of high stocks, lacking in 1979, 
but which has furnished a cushion for us 
in 1980, will comfort us less and less in 
the future. 

What we do further depends on our 
and the market's continuing assessment 

of prospects for resumption of something 
approaching normal levels of production 
from Iraq and Iran. This requires judg- 
ments about the length of the war and 
the likely pace at which their exports 
could be restored to more normal levels. 
Based on the limited information avail- 
able, damage to oil production and export 
facilities in both countries, to date, is not 
excessive, and exports will be likely to 
rise, to some extent, soon after hostilities 
cease. It may be some months, however, 
before exports would approach prewar 
levels. Any new or, as yet, unreported 
damage to oil facilities could extend this 
period, as would any difficulties in or- 
ganizing repair efforts. 

What Should Be Done Now? 

While we cannot foresee the outcome of 
the conflict, we can act to mitigate its ef- 
fect. We will be continuing discussions 
with our friends and allies in the next few 
weeks and will concert our responses to 
the oil markets in light of the situation in 
the Middle East. The adoption of import 
ceilings, activation of the sharing system, 
or other responses could require strong 
domestic measures. To handle short-term 
emergencies, nations have proposed 
measures such as fuel switching, 
emergency taxes or tariffs, temperature 
control standards, leaving cars home one 
day a week, and others. In 1979, we re- 
lied on fuel switching, temperature con- 
trols, and increasing production, where 
possible. We might need some additional 
mechanisms in 1981. 

Whether any of these actions is ever 
used, the point remains: In order to re- 
duce short-term price pressure, we need 
to reduce demand for oil. The choice is 
quite simple. We can cut back a bit now 
or risk paying the price. In this case, the 
price could be $30-$90 billion additional 
per year for our oil, resulting in reduction 
of growth, higher inflation, and diminu- 
tion of our strength and international 
position. This was the real choice facing 
IEA countries in 1979, though we did not 
know it at the time. 

Better Mechanisms and Expanded 

We still need to learn, for the next time. 
The public needs to understand that the 
energy problem is not going to go away. 
We need to act consciously to manage it. 
We need to have popularly supported 
mechanisms to minimize upward price 
pressure during short-term interruptions 
and, for the longer term, to reduce more 

rapidly the dependence of the United 
States and other nations on imported oil 
and speed the transition to other energy 
sources. We need to spur production. 

Some of these mechanisms we can 
adopt ourselves; others require coopera- 
tion from other industrialized nations as 
well as the producing nations. Short-term 
demand restraint possibilities have al- 
ready been mentioned. Longer term 
measures to increase available supply in- 
clude increasing production from domes- 
tic energy resources — coal, oil, gas, and 
nuclear; hastening the development and 
commercialization of new energy technol- 
ogies — solar, biomass, shale oil, liquids, 
and gas from coal; emphasizing conserva- 
tion and efficiency; and expanding cogen- 
eration of heat and power. 

Considerable effort should be de- 
voted to expanding secure energy 
supplies. We are taking the lead ourselves 
in coal. We are in the early stages of a 
substantial long-term coal export strat- 
egy by which we will increase our eco- 
nomic strength and also help our 
energy-deficient trading partners by pro- 
viding them with reliable long-term en- 
ergy supplies. 

Other nations with abundant energy 
resources should respond to the needs of 
their friends and the world economy. 
Under foreseeable circumstances, it pays 
no nation to limit energy production for 
short-term national interests. This pre- 
scription applies across the board, since 
the political and economic security of 
every nation would be threatened by a 
chaotic and crippled energy-short world 

In our relations with key OPEC na- 
tions, we have emphasized their stake in 
a sound world economy and the im- 
portance of adequate, reasonably priced 
oil supplies to world economic health. 
Some nations, particularly those of the 
Arabian Peninsula, see the merits of a 
long-term perspective and are producing 
at levels far above those required for 
their domestic economies. 

But the industrialized nations cannot 
ask OPEC to produce energy to respond 
to the needs of the world economy if they, 
themselves, will not. In this regard, 
Canada's recent announcement of a new 
national energy policy, which appears 
likely to result in limiting Canadian pro- 
duction, seems to be out of step with the 
rest of the world. We hope that, as details 
of Canada's new program are worked out, 
the Canadian Government will recognize 
its more general responsibilities to create 
incentives — including price increases — 
rather than disincentives to energy pro- 

February 1981 



duction. We also hope that nations such 
as the United Kingdom and Norway will 
produce at maximum efficiency in order 
to provide more secure sources of energy 

We are doing our part. Energy 
policies now in place are having an ap- 
preciable effect on our energy balance 
sheet. We have reduced our oil imports 
by 25% since the peak year of 1977, and 
we are well on the road to increased en- 
ergy production. We can now exercise 
greater leadership, internationally, in 
confronting the world's energy problems 
since we have turned from a nation with 
one of the weakest energy programs into 
a nation with one of the strongest. 
Policies and legislation have been effec- 
tive in reducing demand and increasing 
supply, especially through gradual oil and 
gas price decontrol, incentives for greater 
energy efficiency in homes and busi- 
nesses, fuel efficiency standards, building 
temperature controls, the synfuels pro- 
gram, and related measures. 

But we cannot rest on our laurels. 
We have a long way yet to go. The war 
between Iraq and Iran is a telling re- 
minder that the unpredictable and irra- 
tional do occur. We must strengthen our 
ability to react even to extreme cases. 
Ultimately, we will have learned the right 
lessons when the American people under- 
stand that our well-being and security are 
at stake in our response to the continuing 
energy crisis. ■ 

North Atlantic Council 
Meets in Brussels 

Secretary Muskie departed 
Washington, D.C., December 9, 1980, to 
attend the regular semiannual session 
of the North Atlantic Council minis- 
terial meeting in Brussels December 
11-12. Before returning to the United 
States, he stopped in London December 
12- lh to consult with British officials. 

Following are the texts of the final 
communique, the declaration approved 
by the 15 Foreign Ministers, and the 
minutes extracts made available to the 
press of December 12. 


The North Atlantic Council met in 
ministerial session in Brussels on 11th and 
12th December, 1980, against a background 
of growing uncertainty and tension in inter- 
national relations. Ministers agreed on the 

1. The continuing military build-up of 
the Soviet Union, its clear willingness, as 
seen in Afghanistan to use force in disregard 
of the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and Interna- 
tional Law and the Soviet menace which 
hangs over Poland give cause for grave con- 
cern to the members of the Alliance and to 
the entire international community. 

Allied strength and cohesion are thus 
essential to the maintenance of stability and 
peace. United in purpose, the Allies are 
determined to meet any challenge to the 
freedom and well-being of their peoples and 
to make the efforts and sacrifices required 
for deterrence and defense. In this way they 
do their part to preserve the basis for 

Genuine detente must be worldwide in 
scope and indivisible. It can succeed only if 
the Soviet Union strictly abides, in Europe 
and elsewhere, by the Helsinki Final Act in 
their entirety. Allied efforts to persuade the 
Soviet Union to change its policy from one of 
intervention in the affairs of other states to 
one of respect for their sovereignty serve 
the general interest of the international com- 
munity. The Allies will keep open channels 
of communication and be ready to respond 
positively to concrete steps by the Soviet 
Union to cease aggressive activities and to 
restore the basis for constructive East-West 
relations. In this connection, the Allies re- 
main committed to the pursuit of effective, 
balanced and verifiable measures of disarma- 
ment and arms control. 

2. Detente has brought appreciable 
benefits in the field of East-West cooperation 
and exchange. But it has been seriously 
damaged by Soviet actions. It could not sur- 
vive if the Soviet Union were again to vio- 
late the basic rights of any state to ter- 
ritorial integrity and independence. Poland 
should be free to decide its own future. The 
Allies will respect the principle of non-inter- 
vention and strongly urge others to do like- 
wise. Any intervention would fundamentally 
alter the entire international situation. The 
Allies would be compelled to react in the 
manner which the gravity of this devel- 
opment would require. Therefore the Council 
will keep the situation under close and con- 
tinuous review. At the same time, genuine 
Soviet efforts to restore the confidence 
necessary for detente will meet with a ready 
response from the Allies. 

3. It is important, particularly in the 
present circumstances, that the calm situa- 
tion in and around Berlin should be main- 
tained and that the positive effects of the 
Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September, 
1971, should not be impaired by unilateral 
measures. The international situation as a 
whole cannot fail to be affected by the situa- 
tion in Berlin. 

Recent measures introduced by the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic have substantially 
reduced inner-German travel and visits of 
Berliners. This development constitutes a 
setback in the relationship between the two 
German states. The Allies support the ef- 
forts of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
achieve the withdrawal of these measures so 
that relations between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic could develop further in the in- 
terest of stability and co-operation in Europe 
and of those affected. 

4. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
is unacceptable. One year after the Soviet in- 
vasion, the Afghan people still suffer from 
repression by foreign troops on their soil. 
The use of military force by the Soviet 
government to impose its will on the people 
of a neutral and non-aligned country belies 
its oft-repeated professions of friendship for 
the nations of the Third World, creating 
distrust about its future intentions. An over- 
whelming majority of the United Nations 
General Assembly has again called for the 
immediate removal of the foreign troops 
from Afghanistan. Despite the efforts of the 
Islamic Conference, the quest for a political 
settlement has made no progress because of 
Soviet intransigence. Such a settlement must 
provide for the total withdrawal of Soviet 
troops and enable the Afghan people to exer- 
cise fully their rights of independence and 

More than one million Afghans have 
been forced by the Soviet occupation to flee 


Department of State Bulletin 


heir homeland, causing great human suffer- 
lg and placing a heavy burden on neigh- 
ouring countries. In the spirit of the United 
lations Resolutions, Allied governments, in 
ommon with a number of neutral and non- 
ligned countries, are contributing to 
umanitarian aid to alleviate the plight of 
hese refugees. 

5. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
as major implications for the whole of 
outh-West Asia, an area of paramount in- 
?rest to the international community and 
fie security of the Allies. Members of the 
,lliance are prepared to work for the reduc- 
on of tension in the area and, individually, 
> contribute to peace and stability for the 
egion, while protecting their vital economic 
nd strategic interests. 

The Allies deplore the war between 
■aq and Iran, which causes further concern 
)r the stability of the affected region. In 
lis connection, they underline the impor- 
ince of maintaining freedom of navigation. 

Recalling positions previously taken by 
lie Council, the Allies reaffirm the need for 
arly achievement of a just, lasting and com- 
rehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli 

6. The enormous growth over a number 
f years of Warsaw Pact and in particular 
oviet military power gives rise to 
■gitimate concern in Europe and through- 
ut the world. This build-up contradicts the 
■equent assurances by the Warsaw Pact 
juntries that their aim is not military 

Under present circumstances there is 
articular need to look to deterrence and 
efence. The Allies will therefore take, in- 
ividually or collectively, the defensive 
teasures to meet the growth of Warsaw 
act capabilities and to deter any aggres- 

7. The strength of the Alliance lies not 
nly in its defensive capability but also in its 
jhesion and the readiness of its members to 
ive one another political and economic sup- 
ort. In particular they have greatly bene- 
ted from the practice of frank and timely 
snsultations on a broad range of issues, 
hey will vigorously pursue this practice 

ith the object of underscoring their 
slidarity on all matters affecting their com- 
lon interests. They will continue Allied pro- 
rams to strengthen the economies of the 
tss advanced member countries, undertaken 
i the spirit of article 2 of the North Atlantic 
reaty, which have gained additional sig- 
ificance and urgency. 

The deterioration of the situation in 
outh-West Asia underlines the necessity 
nd urgency of enhancing the defence 
osture of the South-Eastern flank and of 
laintaining stability and a balance of power 
l the Mediterranean region as a whole. 

The cohesion of the South-Eastern flank 
as been strongly reinforced by recent 
ositive decisions regarding this area, and 
tie capability of the alliance for deterrence 
nd defence has thereby considerably im- 
roved. These developments may, at the 

ebruary 1981 

same time, be considered as a welcome step 
to the restoration of mutual confidence be- 
tween Greece and Turkey, and they enhance 
the prospects for success of the bilateral ef- 
forts of the two governments. 

8. The Allies attach importance to the 
process initiated by the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
as a valuable framework for improving 
security and developing co-operation in 
Europe on the basis of full implementation of 
the commitments entered into at Helsinki. 
They remain committed to the continuation 
of the CSCE process beyond the present 
follow-up meeting in Madrid. This meeting is 
taking place in the shadow of the Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan and the continuing 
suppression of human rights in the Soviet 
Union proclaimed on the Helsinki Final Act. 
In condemning these violations, as during 
the thorough discussion of implementations, 
the Allies are seeking to preserve the in- 
tegrity of the Final Act, to which they re- 
main dedicated. 

In the same spirit, they are presenting 
important new proposals in all areas covered 
by the Final Act, including human rights, 
human contacts and information. In the 
security area the allies strongly support ex- 
panding and strengthening confidence 
building measures within a framework that 
ensures they will be militarily significant, 
verifiable and applicable to the entire conti- 
nent of Europe, including all of the European 
territory of the Soviet Union. In this regard, 
recalling their previous declaration in 
Ankara, the Allies took note that the pro- 
posal of the Government of France concern- 
ing a mandate for a conference on Disarma- 
ment in Europe, under the aegis of the 
CSCE, has been tabled in Madrid where it 
has been welcomed by many delegations. 

9. Sharing the widespread international 
concern at the continuing increase in armed 
forces and armaments throughout the world, 
Allied governments have put forward pro- 
posals in various form in which arms control 
and disarmament are discussed. These ef- 
forts are made more difficult if agreements 
already in force are not fully observed. In 
this connection, the Allies welcome all con- 
structive efforts by the contracting parties 
aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of ex- 
isting accords. The negotiation of new agree- 
ments must provide for adequate verifi- 
cation. The Allies will continue to seek 
agreements establishing greater security for 
all nations at lower levels of forces and arm- 
aments within the United Nations frame- 
work and elsewhere. 

10. The Allies engaged in the negotia- 
tions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions remain determined to achieve a more 
stable and equitable balance of forces in 
Central Europe through reductions in two 
phases leading to genuine parity in military 
manpower in the form of a common collec- 
tive ceiling, based on agreed data. The 
Western proposal of December 1979 pro- 
vides a realistic framework for a mutually 
beneficial phase 1 agreement involving 

United States and Soviet reductions and 
associated measures. Although the Eastern 
countries have recently made some limited 
moves towards an interim phase 1 agree- 
ment, as proposed by the West, they have 
regrettably still not provided the informa- 
tion necessary to reach agreement on the 
size of the forces of the Soviet Union in Cen- 
tral Europe, which is an essential prereq- 
uisite to a phase 1 agreement. Nor have the 
Eastern countries responded adequately to 
Western proposals concerning associated 
measures which are designed to ensure 
verification of force reductions and limita- 
tions and to enhance stability. 

11. Assuring strategic balance between 
the United States and the Soviet Union is 
central to the security of the Alliance. The 
Alliance supports further negotiations and 
remains deeply committed to the SALT 
process as a way of achieving meaningful 
mutual limitations on United States and 
Soviet strategic nuclear forces that will help 
enhance Western security and preserve 
East-West stability. 

12. The Allies who participated in the 
decision of 12th December, 1979 on Theatre 
Nuclear Forces (TNF), having received a 
second report from the Special Consultative 
Group on Progress in Arms Control involv- 
ing TNF, expressed their satisfaction with 
the close and fruitful consultations which 
have taken place within the Group. They 
noted with satisfaction the serious and 
substantive character of the recent discus- 
sions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Those Allies expressed their 
support for the United States negotiating ap- 
proach, elaborated in intensive consultations 
among them on the basis of the December 
1979 decision. A date for resumption of US- 
Soviet exchanges next year will be set 
through mutual consultations. 

The continuing implementation of the 
modernization element of the December 1979 
decision was noted. The Soviet preponder- 
ance in Long-Range TNF (LRTNF) deploy- 
ments remains cause for serious concern. 
The SS-20 bases already identified would 
alone support more warheads than are plan- 
ned for their entire modernization program. 
Allied solidarity in support of both moderni- 
zation and arms control involving TNF re- 
mains key to achieving progress toward 
agreed limitation. The scale of NATO'S 
Long-Range TNF requirements will be ex- 
amined in the light of concrete results 
achieved through negotiations. 

The withdrawal of 1,000 United States 
nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral 
part of the LRTNF modernization and arms 
control decision has been completed. 


The Foreign Ministers and representatives 
of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United King- 



dom and the United States of America 
recalled previous declarations regarding acts 
of violence and terrorism including those 
committed against diplomats and diplomatic 
missions. They noted with grave concern the 
suffering inflicted on innocent people, as well 
as the negative impact of the continuation 
and spread of such acts on the social struc- 
ture and democratic institutions of individual 
countries and on international relations. 
They vigorously condemned these terrorist 
acts as particularly odious, regardless of 
their causes or objectives. They agreed 
unanimously on the necessity, in accordance 
with the legislation of each country, for close 
inter-governmental cooperation and effective 
measures to prevent and combat terrorism. 
With particular reference to Iran, they 
expressed their continued deep concern over 
the flagrantly illegal holding of United 
States diplomatic personnel and property 
and repeated their call upon the Iranian 
authorities to release immediately and 
unharmed the American hostages. 


Economic Cooperation and Assistance 
Within the Alliance 

Reaffirming their attachment to the spirit of 
article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Ministers reviewed the particular problems 
faced by the economically less advanced 
member countries in the light of the difficult 
world conditions currently being experi- 
enced. They noted a report by the Secretary 
General on the progress so far achieved 
through appropriate bilateral and multilateral 
channels in improving the economic situation 
in those member countries. Following the 
political initiatives taken since 1978, sub- 
stantial results have been obtained, but 
Ministers underlined that continued political 
support was essential for solving the longer 
term economic problems of these countries, 
which would contribute to the consolidation 
of Alliance strength and solidarity. 

"Science for Stability" 

Ministers noted that concrete proposals had 
now been developed to implement the 
"Science for Stability" programme, whose 
establishment they endorsed last June, to 
strengthen the scientific and technological 
capabilities of the less developed member 
countries, and that these proposals would re- 
quire the provision of adequate funding over 
the next five years. 

The Situation in 
the Mediterranean 

Ministers noted the report on the situation 
in the Mediterranean prepared on their in- 

iri'i underlined again the necessity 
of maintaining the balance of forces in the 

whole area. They requested the Council in 
permanent session to continue to consult on 
the question and submit a further report at 
their next meeting. 

Equipment Cooperation 

Ministers examined a report by the Con- 
ference of National Armaments Directors 
and noted the encouraging progress being 
made both in periodic armaments planning 
and in cooperative projects for the develop- 
ment and production of defence equipment. 
They welcomed the efforts being undertaken 
under the transatlantic dialogue to initiate 
dual production projects and promote the 
study and introduction of families of 
weapons. Such a transatlantic dialogue pre- 
supposes the development of cooperation 
between European countries of the Alliance. 
Emphasizing the important contribution 
which standardization can make both to mili- 
tary effectiveness and a better use of 
resources, they welcomed the standardiza- 
tion achieved in respect of the calibres for 
infantry small arms. 

Noting the emphasis being placed on us- 
ing the technological potential of Alliance 
members to the best advantage for the 
development of defence equipment, Ministers 
urged that continuing attention be paid to 
assisting the less industrialized member na- 
tions. In this context they welcomed the re- 
cent leasing by the United States to Turkey 
of military industrial equipment. 

Recognizing the importance of a coor- 
dinated air defence programme to the defen- 
sive posture of the Alliance, Ministers 

welcomed with satisfaction the establishment 
for this purpose of a NATO Air Defence 
Committee under the Council. 

Civil Emergency Planning— Commitment 
of Merchant Ships and Civil Aircraft 
by Member Countries 

Ministers took note of progress made in this 
field and endorsed the action being taken to 
improve the state of contingency planning. 

Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society 

Ministers noted the annual progress report 
by the Secretary General on the work of the 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society (CCMS). They received a report on 
the high-level meeting held in Brussels on 
24th November 1980 when seven Ministers 
of the Environment and other senior officials 
exchanged views on the environment and na- 
tional planning, the problems posed by the 
utilization of diversified energy sources and 
the environmental management of chemicals. 
Ministers took note of the completion of 
a major pilot project concerned with reduc- 
ing the scale of emissions of sulfur oxide 
gases into the atmosphere. They under- 
scored the necessity for wide diffusion of the 
Committee's project reports and expressed 
the hope that recommendations be rapidly 
integrated into national environmental 
policies. In addition, they noted with interest 
the decisions to hold symposia next fall on 
technology assessment and hazardous wastes 

22d Report 
on Cyprus 

NOV. 20, 1980 1 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past 60 
days toward a negotiated settlement of the 
Cyprus problem. 

As was noted in my last report, inter- 
communal talks between representatives of 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots resumed on 
August 9 under the aegis of United Nations 
Special Representative Ambassador Hugo 
Gobbi. Systematic substantive examination 
of the essential problems dividing the com- 
munities began on September 16. The par- 
ties have been examining the following 
general subjects, on the basis of one topic 
each meeting: 

(A) Resettlement of Varosha under 
United Nations auspices; 

(B) Promotion of goodwill, mutual con- 
fidence and normal conditions; 

(C) Constitutional problems; 

(D) Territorial divisions. 

Meetings were held on September 24, 
October 1, 8, 15, and 31 and November 5 and 
12. We are encouraged by the fact that the 
negotiators at these sessions have engaged 
in serious examinations of their differences 
and are seeking mutually acceptable solu- 
tions. The negotiating atmosphere between 
the parties has remained congenial. 

I am hopeful that the good start 
achieved by these meetings will develop into 
sustained negotiations leading to a compre- 
hensive solution. Serious, sustained talks 
provide the best opportunity for reaching a 
just and lasting settlement of the issues that 
face Cyprus. 


Jimmy Carter 

'Idential letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Nov. 24, 1980). ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


well as strengthening the CCMS fellow- 
ip programme. 

Ministers noted that the recent plenary 
ssion of the Committee in the context of a 
neral review of projects currently in prog- 
ss devoted particular attention to 
ismology and earthquake loss reduction, 
inisters agreed that recent tragic events in 
ily gave additional importance to this 

Convention on Elimination 
of Discrimination Against 
Women Sent to Senate 

'Press release 348 of Dec. 16, 1980. ■ 

'resident Meets 
Vith Chancellor 


Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the 
ederal Republic of Germany visited 
le United States November 18-21, 
)80. Following is the text of a White 
ouse statement released at the conclu- 
on of the Chancellor's meeting with 
resident Carter on November 20. 1 

resident Carter and the Chancellor of 
le Federal Republic of Germany, 
elmut Schmidt, held a thorough con- 
ersation in Washington, November 20, 
uring the Chancellor's visit to the 
nited States, November 18 through 
1. The President hosted a White 
[ouse luncheon for the Chancellor and 
oreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
enscher on November 20 in which 
ecretary of State Muskie, National 
ecurity Adviser Brzezinski, and senior 
fficials also participated. 

The conversation between the 
resident and the Chancellor covered a 
ide range of political, security, and 
:onomic issues of mutual interest to 
le two countries. The President and 
le Chancellor agreed on the necessity 
f continuing these close consultations, 
icluding during the transition period, 
i order to assure continuing full coor- 
ination of the policies followed by the 
wo countries on major international 

In their conversation the President 
nd the Chancellor agreed on the con- 
inued importance of improving NATO's 
efense posture and of efforts aimed at 
eaching arms control agreements with 
he Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact 
Hies in order to insure a stable mili- 
ary balance. 

In their discussion of East-West 
elations, both sides welcomed the con- 
inuation of the CSCE [Conference on 
ecurity and Cooperation in Europe] 
rocess at the Madrid review con- 

NOV. 12, 1980' 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification (subject to 
certain qualifications and possibly to appro- 
priate implementing legislation), I transmit 
herewith a copy of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. The Convention was 
adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 18, 1979 and signed 
on behalf of the United States of America on 
July 17, 1980. The report of the Department 
of State with respect to the Convention is 
also transmitted for the information of the 

Adoption of this Convention by the 
General Assembly at the conclusion of its 
34th Session in December, 1979, was the 
culmination of a negotiating process that 
lasted several years. Throughout this 
process, the United States was an active par- 
ticipant and a vigorous supporter of a 
comprehensive and effective international 
instrument to achieve the elimination of 
discrimination against women. Although cer- 
tain earlier human rights treaties relate to 
the rights of women, none of these previous 
instruments attempted to deal with women's 

ference, to which both governments re- 
main committed. In this context they 
stressed the right of each country, ir- 
respective of its political or social sys- 
tem, to resolve its problems in free ex- 
ercise of its sovereignty and without 
intervention from any quarter. More- 
over, they reiterated, with reference to 
the resolution of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, their regret that 
there is no evidence of Soviet readiness 
to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan 
and to seek a political solution of the 
Afghanistan crisis. 

The President and the Chancellor 
discussed the latest developments in 
the Middle East. They reviewed the 
ongoing negotiations in the Camp David 
framework and stressed the urgent 
need for progress toward a comprehen- 
sive peace settlement. 

Secretary Muskie and Foreign 
Minister Genscher also held a separate 
meeting earlier in the day. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 24, 1980, 
which also contains the President's and 
Chancellor's remarks to reporters on the 
South Lawn of the White House following 
their meeting. ■ 

rights in as comprehensive a manner as this 
Convention. The wide scope of the Conven- 
tion is particularly noteworthy and 
commendable in that it calls upon States 
Parties to take "all appropriate measures" to 
eliminate discrimination against women in 
such diverse fields of human endeavor as 
politics, law, employment, education, health 
care, commercial transactions, and domestic 
relations. Moreover, the Convention estab- 
lishes a Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women to review 
periodically the progress being made by 
States Parties. 

Ratification of the Convention on the 
Political Rights of Women in 1976 was a re- 
cent express affirmation by the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the U.S. Govern- 
ment that human rights in general and 
women's rights in particular are matters of 
legitimate concern to the international com- 
munity and are not subjects with exclusively 
domestic ramifications. U.S. ratification of 
the Convention at hand, the newest of the 
international human rights instruments, 
would be consistent with this affirmation and 
would make clear at home and abroad the 
commitment of the United States to eliminte 
discrimination against women. 

The great majority of the substantive 
provisions of the Convention are consistent 
with the letter and spirit of the United 
States Constitution and existing laws. How- 
ever, certain provisions of the Convention 
raise questions of conformity to current 
United States law. Nevertheless, the Depart- 
ments of State and Justice and other inter- 
ested agencies of the Federal Government 
concur in the judgment that, with the adop- 
tion of certain qualifications and, possibly, 
appropriate implementing legislation, there 
are no constitutional or other legal obstacles 
to United States ratification. The report of 
the Department of State on the Convention 
and an attached legal memorandum describe 
the provisions of the Convention and identify 
those areas of concern that will require fur- 
ther discussion and treatment. 

This Convention is a significant new ele- 
ment in the development of the international 
law of human rights. By giving its advice 
and consent to ratification of the Convention, 
the Senate will confirm our country's tradi- 
tional commitment to the promotion and pro- 
tection of human rights and will enhance our 
nation's ability to achieve progress through- 
out the world. I hope that all States will 
become Parties to the Convention, and that 
it will be applied universally. I recommend 
that the Senate give early and favorable con- 
sideration to this Convention. 

Jimmy Carter 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1980. 

ebruary 1981 



Western Sahara Dispute 

by Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the Subcommit- 
tee on Africa of the House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee on December 4, 1980. 
Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 1 

There have been some modest develop- 
ments in the western Sahara dispute 
over the past 6 months which improve 
prospects for the negotiating process 
necessary to develop the terms of a 

As you are well aware, the Ameri- 
can Government has sought to encour- 
age all of the interested parties to turn 
their energies from the battlefield to 
the peace table. While we are neutral 
on the final outcome, we are deeply 
committed to bringing this war to an 
end so that our friendly relations with 
all of the countries of North Africa can 
continue to develop unclouded by the 
present distractions and complications 
of the war in the Sahara. 

In the deliberations of the Organi- 
zation of African Unity (OAU) in the 
past few months and the current U.N. 
General Assembly, tentative steps have 
been taken that may begin to lead the 
protagonists out of their current im- 
passe. Over the past 6 months, we have 
seen a gradual change in attitudes on 
all sides which has created an atmos- 
phere and an opportunity increasingly 
focusing the attention of the interested 
parties on those successive steps that 
must be taken if a compromise resolu- 
tion of this conflict is to emerge. 

I emphasize that the process is still 
highly tenuous and requires careful nur- 
turing. There is no quick and easy solu- 
tion. The road toward peace — in the 
western Sahara and elsewhere — will 
take the parties over some rough ter- 
rain as they maneuver to defend what 
they perceive to be their vital interests. 

U.S. Relations With the Parties 

Our relations with the parties to the 
dispute bear directly on our ability to 
work with them toward a solution. 
Today, partly as a result of our decision 
to sell certain types of arms to Morocco 
our measure of influence with Morocco 
is increased to the point where we can 
cooperate in constructive steps, most 
recently the Moroccan-sponsored reso- 
lution at the United Nations. 

At the same time, we have in- 
creased the intensity of our contacts 
with Algeria, especially on the question 
of our hostages in Iran. We believe 
such cooperation in one field will make 
it easier for us to work together in 
others. Also, we have established con- 
tacts with the Polisario, first in a meet- 
ing in Washington last spring, then by 
a visit to Polisario refugee camps in 
Algeria within the past week. 

Establishing a Negotiating Process 

As you know, the OAU has played an 
important role in trying to work out a 
compromise solution. Arising out of a 
decision taken by the OAU summit 

Bill of Rights Day, 
Human Rights 
Day and Week, 


On December 15, 1791, the Bill of Rights 
became part of the Constitution of the 
United States. On December 10, 1948, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Marking these anniversaries together gives 
us an opportunity to renew our dedication 
both to our own liberties and to the promo- 
tion of human rights everywhere. 

The Bill of Rights carries with it an im- 
plied responsibility for the governed as well 
as for the governing. No American citizen 
can rest satisfied until the Bill of Rights is a 
living reality for every person in the United 
es, irrespective of race, religion, sex, na- 
tional or ethnic origin. We cannot simply 
r<ly on the decency of government or the 
alertness of an active free press. Each indi- 
vidual musi shoulder his or her share of the 

.risibility for seeing that our freedoms 
will survive. 

7 hi' I niversal Declaration of Human 
Ki«hts is the cornerstone of a developing 

international consensus on human rights. 
Through it, the members of the United Na- 
tions undertake to promote, respect and 
observe human rights and fundamental free- 
doms for all without discrimination. We must 
continuously monitor the progress of this 
effort and the records of governments 
around the world. 

The promise of the Declaration is 
remote to all those who suffer summary 
executions and torture, acts of genocide, 
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, banish- 
ment, internal exile, forced labor and 
confinement for political cause. It is remote 
to the countless refugees who flee their 
lands in response to the elimination of their 
human rights. It is remote to those subjected 
to armed invasions or to military coups that 
destroy democratic processes. The Declara- 
tion will ring hollow to that segment of a 
population discriminated against by laws of 
apartheid or by restrictions on religious 
freedom. It will ring hollow to those threat- 
ened by violations of freedom of assembly, 
association, expression and movement, and 
by the suppression of trade unions. 

The Declaration must also ring hollow 
to the members of the U.S. Embassy staff 
who have been held captive for more than a 
year by the Government of Iran. 

The cause of human rights is embattled 
throughout the world. Recent events make it 
imperative that we, as Americans, stand 
firm in our insistence that the values em- 
bodied in the Bill of Rights, and contained in 
the Universal Declaration, be enjoyed by all. 

I urge all Americans to support ratifica- 
tion of the Genocide Convention, the Con- 
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the American Convention on Human Rights. 
I renew my request to the Senate to give its 
advice and consent to these important 

Now. Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1980, as 
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1980, 
as Bill of Rights Day, and call on all Ameri- 
cans to observe Human Rights Week begin- 
ning December 10, 1980. It should be a time 
set apart for the study of our own rights, so 
basic to the working of our society, and for a 
renewal of our efforts on behalf of the 
human rights of all peoples everywhere. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this fourteenth day of Novem- 
ber, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and eighty, and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the two 
hundred and fifth. 

Jimmy Carter 

! No. 4804 of Nov. 14, 1980 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Nov. 17). ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

Middle East 

neeting last July, the OAU's ad hoc 
nediation committee on the western 
■Sahara (more commonly referred to as 
he Wisemen Committee) met in 
September and approved a peace plan 
■ailing for an immediate cease-fire by 
December 15, return of the Moroccan 
ind Polisario forces to their base 
•amps, a U.N. peacekeeping force to 
supervise the cease-fire, and an OAU 
eferendum assisted by the United Na- 
ions on the issue of the future political 
status of the western Sahara. For the 
irst time, all of the interested par- 
ies—Algeria, Mauritania, Polisario, 
ind representatives of Saharan 
>rganizations in the western Sahara, in- 
iuding Morocco— attended this session 
>f the Wisemen Committee even though 
io negotiations took place among 
he interested parties. 

Morocco, which regards itself as 
he aggrieved party to Polisario attacks 
vithin Morocco proper, readily accepted 
he OAU call for an immediate cease- 
ire but expressed reservations about 
he referendum, while the Polisario sup- 
jorted a referendum but refused to ac- 
•ept a cease-fire until Morocco agrees 
o enter into direct negotiations. 
\lgeria, for its part, maintained its 
>osition that it was not a party to the 
iispute even though the Polisario is 
(ranted assistance and asylum by the 
\lgerians. It is widely anticipated that 
f the current OAU initiative does not 
ead to substantial progress toward a 
legotiated settlement by next June — 
vhen the 1981 OAU summit will take 
jlace — the Polisario will be admitted to 
he OAU. This may lead to increased 
naterial assistance to the Polisario and 
o further isolation of Morocco. 

Further developments occurred 
luring consideration of the western 
; ahara issue by the U.N. General 
Assembly's Fourth Committee last 
nonth. The resolution supported by 
Vlgeria passed easily, criticizing Moroc- 
an occupation of the western Sahara 
nd calling for direct negotiation 
>etween the Polisario and Morocco 
eading to self-determination and "in- 
lependence." By referring to "independ- 
ence" and to the Polisario as "repre- 
entative of the people of the western 
Sahara," it seemed to us that this 
esolution prejudged the issue and to 
ome degree contradicted the Wisemen 
ecommendation for a referendum 
vhich would allow the inhabitants of 
he western Sahara to express their 
•wn preferences. 

The Moroccans offered a resolution 
vhich supported the initiatives of the 

U.S., Israel 
Settle Claim on 
U.S.S. Liberty 

DEC. 17, 1980 1 

The U.S. Government has accepted the 
proposal by the Government of Israel 
to pay $6 million in three annual install- 
ments of $2 million each, beginning on 
January 15, 1981, as final settlement of 
the U.S. claim for compensation for 
damage to the U.S.S. Liberty as a 
result of actions of the Israeli Armed 
Forces on June 8, 1967. 

The Government of Israel paid in 
full in 1968 the U.S. claim for $3,323,500 
on behalf of the families of the crew- 
men who were killed in the incident, 
and in 1969 the Government of Israel 
paid in full the U.S. claim for $3,452,275 
for injuries sustained by the members 
of the Liberty's crew. 

'Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman John Trattner. 

Wisemen Committee. We would have 
liked to have seen specific reference to 
the core elements of the Wisemen's rec- 
ommendations. However, in a statement 
the Moroccan delegate said: "Morocco is 
cooperating and will continue to coop- 
erate diligently with the ad hoc commit- 
tee to implement its mandate of Free- 
town, particularly as it relates to the 
free choice of the population." We con- 
sidered this statement a significant 
step forward and, on the basis of it, 
supported the Moroccan draft resolu- 

Future Prospects for Negotiation 

Although the Moroccan draft resolution 
was defeated by one vote, we followed 
up with bilateral discussions with both 
the Moroccans and Algerians to explore 
how the recommendations of the Wise- 
men Committee could be implemented. 
We have also sought to elicit from 
various members of the OAU their sug- 
gestions for maintaining the momentum 
set in train by the September resolu- 
tions of the OAU Wisemen Committee. 
There are a number of questions which 
might be usefully addressed in this 
regard. How would a referendum be 
carried out? How would one establish 
voting eligibility? Which institutions 

would be best equipped to carry out a 
referendum? Would it be useful for the 
OAU to establish a subcommittee of 
experts to work out some of these 

We do not embrace any particular 
solution to the conflict, although the 
OAU call for a cease-fire and a referen- 
dum does appear to us as a useful basis 
upon which to move forward. As a 
result of my discussions with interested 
and concerned parties, I note a height- 
ened interest in accelerating the peace 
process. Compared with the situation a 
year ago, I believe that we can take 
some satisfaction in the progress that 
has been made. 

• The interested parties have 
met with the OAU subcommittee. 

• The complexities involved in 
reaching a peaceful solution have been 
brought out more clearly. 

• The OAU has laid down general 
principles which could serve as the 
basis for a settlement. 

• And most important, the inter- 
ested parties seem to have come to an 
awareness of the urgency of embarking 
on negotiations as the only way out of a 
stalemate on the battlefield. 

Nevertheless, the principal parties 
remain far apart on their demands. We 
believe a process of peace is required to 
bring about a convergence of views. 

Military Situation 

While the military situation in the past 
year has improved for the Moroccans 
and they appear able to hold their con- 
trol of the principal towns in the west- 
ern Sahara, Polisario attacks continue. 
Thus the war of attrition continues 
without any indication that either side 
has reason to hope for a military vic- 

We have been particularly con- 
cerned about Polisario attacks deep into 
Morocco's southern provinces which in 
some instances could have shifted the 
locus of the fighting toward the 
Moroccan-Algerian border. In talks 
with both Algeria and the Polisario, we 
have attempted to discourage especially 
attacks outside of the disputed terri- 
tory. There are some indications that 
our concern has been fruitful. Reports 
of increased Polisario movement in 
Mauritania and the role of Libya are 
also of concern to us. We do not believe 
that either Morocco or the Polisario has 
won — or can win — a decisive advantage 
on the battlefield. Therefore, our 

ebruary 1981 


original premise that the war is unwin- 
able in any ultimate sense is still 
valid. That fact, of course, should be an 
added incentive for encouraging the 
interested parties to reach a compro- 
mise settlement. 

Status of U.S. Arms Sales to Morocco 

I would like to end my remarks with a 
few comments on the status of U.S. 
arms deliveries to Morocco. With 
regard to the arms package which was 
approved earlier this year, consisting of 
6 OV-10 reconnaissance aircraft, 20 
F5-E fighter aircraft, and 24 heli- 
copters, none of these items has yet 
been delivered to Morocco. There is 
some question whether the Moroccans 
are still interested in the purchase of 
the helicopters, and a delivery schedule 
is still pending. The first fighter air- 
craft deliveries should commence in 
mid-1982. Morocco has made a request 
for the sale of 108 M-60 tanks, and it is 
under review in the Department. 


The western Sahara conflict is a com- 
plex issue in which our North African 
friends are themselves divided. It is our 
hope that the United States will con- 
tinue its role of encouraging the inter- 
ested parties to concentrate on the 
negotiating process itself and that out 
of the give and take which such a proc- 
ess involves, a compromise settlement 
will emerge. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 


Law of the Sea 

by George H. Aldrich 

Address before the National Asso- 
ciation of Manufacturers in San Fran- 
cisco on December 9, 1980. Mr. Aldrich 
is Acting Special Representative of the 
President for the Law of the Sea Con- 

In the course of my present assignment, 
I have met many Americans who are 
involved in one way or another with our 
mineral industry or are concerned 
about our future access to minerals. 
These have not all been the most 
friendly of encounters, despite the fact 
that I share many of these concerns. 
Often I find myself facing questions as 
to why we have permitted our future 
access to the mineral resources of the 
deep seabeds to become hostage to a 
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
The clear implication of many of these 
questions and the comments that often 
accompany them is that our govern- 
ment, either through naivete or duplic- 
ity, is playing fast and loose with our 
economic security in order to curry fa- 
vor with the Third World. While I am 
sure that none of you share any of 
these delusions, the purpose of my re- 
marks today is to explain why they are 
delusions — just in case. 

To understand the effort in which 
we are engaged in the Law of the Sea 
Conference and our goals with respect 
to deep seabed mining, it is necessary 
to review, at least briefly, both the his- 
tory of the efforts since the Second 
World War to codify and develop the 
international law governing uses of the 
oceans and the legal problems and re- 
quirements of a pioneer industry facing 
up to the task of exploiting the mineral 
resources of one of the world's common 
areas, the seabeds beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. In a very real 
sense, it is the interaction of these two 
lines of development and their not eas- 
ily compatible imperatives that defines 
our present struggle to obtain assured 
access to seabed resources as part of a 
comprehensive treaty on the law of the 

Historical Background 

Postwar efforts to develop and codify 
the international law of the sea have 
resulted in three U.N. conferences. The 
first produced four conventions adopted 

in 1958 — one concerning the high seas; 
another the Continental Shelf; a third, 
the territorial sea and contiguous zone; 
and the fourth, fishing and the conser- 
vation of the living resources of the 
high seas. The second U.N. conference 
failed, in 1960, to reach agreement on 
the major question before it — the max- 
imum permissible breadth of the terri- 
torial sea. The third conference is now 
in its eighth year and, if successful, will 
establish a new and comprehensive le- 
gal regime for the oceans. 

Let us pause a moment to consider 
why the nations of the world have 
needed three successive conferences and 
why, even after all this effort, success, 
although likely, is still in the future. 

The 1958 conventions were designed 
in part to bring an end to "creeping ju- 
risdiction," the steady expansion of 
claims by coastal states to exercise ju- 
risdiction off their coasts. To be suc- 
cessful, they would have to have been 
generally accepted or at least complied 
with by most, if not all, coastal states, 
and they would have to have imposed 
limits on the breadth of the territorial 
sea and on the extent of the jurisdiction 
that could be exercised by coastal 
states. Unfortunately, they failed on all 
counts, and the years since 1958 have 
seen a steady growth of coastal state 
claims of sovereign rights, particularly 
over offshore resources. 

The High Seas Convention, which 
was the most widely accepted of the 
four 1958 conventions, has only 56 
states party to it, whereas there are 158 
states participating in the third U.N. 
conference. Almost all of the major 
maritime powers became party to that 
convention, but most of the coastal 
states stayed out and led the fight for 
expanded jurisdiction. 

For the United States, maritime 
freedoms have historically been more 
important than offshore resources. In 
the past 35 years, however, the United 
States has become increasingly aware 
of the importance of the natural re- 
sources off its coasts: first, of the oil 
and gas under the Continental Shelf 
and, more recently, of the coastal 
fisheries. Nevertheless, despite these in- 
creasing concerns with our offshore 
resources, the United States remained 
very much aware of its dependence on 
the unimpeded passage of ocean corn- 

Department of State Bulletin 


nerce and of its security needs for free- 
lorn of naval navigation and overflight 
hroughout the oceans, including the 
ransit of straits. Our increasing and 
infortunate dependence on imports of 
oreign oil have reinforced these needs. 

In the late 1960s, the United States 
oined with the Soviet Union and some 
ither major maritime powers to pro- 
note renewed efforts by the United Na- 
ions to develop and codify the law of 
he sea in ways that would be univer- 
ally accepted and would effectively 
iring to an end the rapid expansion of 
oastal state jurisdiction. Simulta- 
leously, other voices in the United 
Nations were calling for international- 
zation of ocean space beyond national 
urisdiction. These separate efforts re- 
iulted in the establishment, first, of a 
J.N. Seabed Committee and, subse- 
luently, of the Third U.N. Conference 
>n the Law of the Sea. 

This third conference quickly de- 
eded that the convention it hoped to 
)roduce would be comprehensive — 
reating all aspects of the law of the 
>ceans. Unlike the conventions of 1958, 
vhich divided the subject into discrete 
rategories, the new law was to be a 
'package deal" dealing with navigation, 
•esources, pollution, and international 
juestions. While this made the nego- 
:iating task harder by requiring success 
>n all fronts, it tended to insure that 
:he results would be accepted univer- 
sally. The coastal states would agree to 
:he navigational protections and the 
imitation of territorial seas to 12 miles 
,n breadth in return for the recognition 
sy all other states of 200-mile economic 
iones; and all states would feel com- 
pelled to become parties in order to 
participate in the new international or- 
ganization created to manage the re- 
sources of the deep seabeds, which were 
beyond the national jurisdiction and 
A'hich had been declared by the U.N. 
General Assembly in December 1970, by 
unanimous resolution, to be "the com- 
mon heritage of mankind." This is how 
the search began for the comprehensive 
'package deal." 

Seabed Mining's Special Problems 

Sow, let us turn our attention to the 
jpecial problems of resource recovery 
"rom an area beyond national jurisdic- 
:ion and the alternatives available to us 
n dealing with such an area, which we 
nay refer to as a part of the commons 
?f the world— that is, those areas be- 
.ond the jurisdiction of any nation 
Jtate available for the use of all. 

These commons are: first, the 
oceans, including the bottom of the 
oceans— that is the seabeds — beyond 
the limit of national jurisdiction; sec- 
ond, outer space, above the limits of na- 
tional jurisdiction (wherever that may 
be); and third, Antarctica, although one 
must note that some states have still 
preserved their territorial claims to 
parts of Antarctica under the Antarctic 
Treaty regime which has made it possi- 
ble to continue scientific activity in 
Antarctica without resolving disputes 
over the legal status of that territory. 
These common areas, particularly the 
oceans and outer space, have been re- 
ferred to as the "common 
heritage of mankind," but there is 
nothing magic in the name; it is their 
location beyond the jurisdiction of any 
nation that gives them their special 

There are, in my judgment, only 
two ways of treating these common ar- 
eas for legal purposes: Either we can 
consider them available for national ap- 
propriation, like North and South 
America in the 15th to 18th centuries, 
and Africa in the 19th century, or we 
must consider them not available for 
national appropriation, like the high 
seas since at least the days of Hugo 

The United States, along with vir- 
tually all other states, has given consis- 
tent support to the second of these legal 
approaches during all the years since 
the end of the Second World War. We 
have done this, it is fair to say, because 
we were convinced that this was the 
better approach in our own interests 
and in the interests of world order and 
the avoidance of unnecessary conflict. 

Difficulties in the use of the world's 
commons are likely to arise only when 
some states want to exploit some of the 
resources of these common areas. There 
has been exploitation of the living re- 
sources of the high seas for many years 
without major difficulty, although it has 
been found necessary to create a num- 
ber of international organizations to co- 
ordinate conservation efforts such as 
the protection of marine mammals. 
Significant problems, however, arise 
wherever exclusivity of access to a par- 
ticular site becomes necessary. By 
definition, an area beyond national ju- 
risdiction is one to which no national 
authority can accord such exclusive 
rights. With respect to the resources of 
the seabeds, although in our view they 
are available, like fish, to all states on a 
first-come, first-served basis, as a prac- 
tical, economic matter, that simply isn't 

good enough for seabed miners. Miners 
the world over and their bankers re- 
quire an exclusive right to an ore body 
before investing in the recovery and 
processing of the ore. It seems clear 
that considerations of this type would 
force the deferral of mining activities 
in these seabed areas until exclusive ac- 
cess to particular sites could be ac- 
corded. I think it is self-evident that 
where exclusivity of access is essential 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction it 
can only be conferred by international 
agreement among at least most of the 
interested states. 

This fundamental point may have 
been somewhat obscured by the con- 
gressional debates of recent years on 
seabed mining legislation; and there 
may be some, particularly in the Con- 
gress, who really believe that the en- 
actment of the legislation in June of 
this year will result, without more, in a 
rush of investment and the early ex- 
ploitation of deep seabed resources. 
Certainly the enactment of the legis- 
lation gave an important psychological 
boost to the fledgling industry, and we 
are hopeful it will encourage the con- 
tinuation of further necessary research 
and development efforts. But I have 
seen nothing to indicate that this 
legislation — even when supplemented 
by similar and reciprocal legislation by 
other states with the greatest present 
interest in seabed mining— would pro- 
vide a sufficient legal framework to per- 
mit the industry to move forward 
quickly to commercial production. This 
is not to suggest that commercial recov- 
ery of deep seabed mineral resources 
will never occur if an international re- 
gime capable of granting exclusive li- 
censes is not created. Never is a long 
time. But it does seem almost certain to 
me that the failure to create such an 
international regime would long delay 
seabed mining, perhaps by a quarter 
century or more. If there is a substan- 
tial risk that this judgment is correct, 
then there should be no doubt about the 
urgent need for an acceptable inter- 
national legal regime for the ex- 
ploitation of deep seabed minerals. 

Seabeds and the "Package Deal" 

Since 1970, a key part of the search for 
the "package deal" in the Seabed Com- 
mittee and in the conference itself has 
been the terribly complex effort to cre- 
ate a new international organization — 
the International Seabed Authority — to 
regulate access to seabed mineral re- 



sources and to provide the exclusive le- 
gal right that prospective miners need. 
In fact, this turned out to be the most 
elusive of the necessary elements of an 
acceptable "package deal." The vital 
freedoms of navigation and overflight in 
straits, exclusive economic zones, and 
archipelagic waters have been agreed 
for years. The final compromises on the 
nature and limits of coastal state juris- 
diction over the resources of the 
200-mile economic zone and the Con- 
tinental Shelf and the control of marine 
pollution were hammered out sometime 
ago. However, only last summer were 
the last major issues settled with re- 
spect to the seabed mining regime. Only 
now is it possible to reach meaningful 
conclusions about the emerging seabed 

The time available today does not 
permit me to summarize all of the ele- 
ments of the seabed regime as found in 
the new draft convention. I have de- 
cided to concentrate on those provisions 
dealing with access to seabed mineral 
resources — the provisions that tell the 
potential investor what steps he would 
have to take, and the provisions he 
must analyze to determine what risks 
he would run and what are the chances 
of something going wrong with his 

There is one point I must empha- 
size at the outset of this summary. It is 
patently impossible to negotiate at a 
conference of some 150 countries and to 
include in a treaty all the detailed rules 
and regulations necessary to insure the 
proper functioning of the International 
Seabed Authority. The preparation of 
these rules, regulations, and procedures 
will be the task of a Preparatory Com- 
mission, to be established soon after 
the treaty is signed and to work full 
time for several years. Industry will 
have to be intimately involved in this 
process, and the work done by industry 
and the Department of Commerce dur- 
ing the coming year under our recently 
enacted Deep Seabed Hard Minerals 
Act should give us a great advantage in 
that Preparatory Commission. The 
rules developed there can be changed by 
the Authority later only if there is a 
consensus in the 36-nation Council. Any 
final judgments by the United States on 
the acceptability and viability of the 
treaty's mining regime must await 
these rules. 

Assured Access 

To be assured of access to the oppor- 
tunity to engage in deep seabed mining, 
a prospective miner who has the neces- 
sary capital and know-how must be as- 
sured that the International Seabed 
Authority's contract approval process is 
fair, clear, and well-nigh automatic. 
The criteria spelled out in Annex III of 
the treaty satisfy this requirement. An 
applicant has only to be sponsored by a 
state party and to satisfy the financial 
and technical qualifications spelled out 
in the regulations. His plan of work 
must fulfill the specifications with re- 
spect to such matters as size of area, 
diligence requirements, and mining 
standards and practices, including those 
relevant to protection of the marine en- 
vironment, that will also be set forth in 
the regulations. If these requirements 
are met, his plan of work rmist be ap- 
proved; there is no discretionary basis 
for its rejection. 

The determination that the appli- 
cant and his plan of work do in fact 
comply with these criteria is the job of 
the Legal and Technical Commission. 
The Commission will have 15 members 
elected to 5-year terms by a three- 
fourths vote of the 36-member Council 
from among candidates nominated by 
states parties who meet the "highest 
standard of competence and integrity 
with qualifications in relevant fields." 
The Commission is obligated to base its 
recommendations solely on the pro- 
visions of Annex III and to report fully 
to the Council. The majority required 
for decisions by the Commission is to 
be established in the rules, regulations, 
and procedures of the Authority, and 
I expect our representatives on the 
Preparatory Commission to insist that 
this must be no more than a simple 

Any plan of work which the Com- 
mission finds consistent with the re- 
quirements of Annex III will be deemed 
approved by the Council within a fixed 
time unless the Council decides— by 
consensus— to disapprove it. While we 
would have preferred the "deeming" de- 
vice to apply regardless of the Commis- 
sion's findings, the Conference — 
understandably, I think— felt that some 
organ of the Authority would have to 
attest to conformity with the applicable 
standards of Annex III. Doubtless this 
would also have been true of the simple 
licensing system originally advocated 
by the industrial countries. The auto- 
maticity of the system could only be 

frustrated if three-fourths of the mem- 
bers of the Council make a conscious 
and determined effort to elect unsuit- 
able Commission members who will ig- 
nore the requirements of the treaty. 

The Production Ceiling 

Although we were able to get agree- 
ment in Geneva that approval of a plan 
of work should no longer be tied to the 
availability of a nickel production allot- 
ment, the timing of access still depends 
on the authorization of production un- 
der the ceiling. Certainly from an eco- 
nomic point of view it makes no sense 
to limit arbitrarily production of a min- 
eral from one source and not from oth- 
ers. There is no reason to believe that 
seabed resources will be cheaper to re- 
cover and refine than land-based 
resources — quite the opposite, at least 
during the first several decades in 
which the seabed minerals industry is 
developing. But even if they were 
cheaper, why shouldn't we let them 
take over markets from the more ex- 
pensive competition? Consumers de- 
serve a break; they seem to get few 
enough these days. 

Unfortunately, however, we are 
trying to produce a universal treaty- 
one that will be accepted by virtually 
all coastal and maritime nations, and 
that large group includes a number of 
countries that produce either nickel, 
copper, cobalt, or manganese, and an 
additional number that think they 
might become producers in the not-too- 
distant future. Those countries must, if 
they are to accept the Law of the Sea 
Convention, be able to show that their 
producer interests are protected, at 
least for an interim period. Moreover, 
the interest of most developing coun- 
tries as consumers is minimal, for they 
do not yet have the industry to be ma- 
jor consumers. Most developing coun- 
tries tend to sympathize with and be 
protective of raw material producers, a 
tendency that has been encouraged art- 
fully by Canada, the leading nickel pro- 
ducer. Thus, it has long been clear that 
there could not be a generally accepted 
Law of the Sea Convention that does 
not contain an interim production ceil- 
ing. As now formulated, the production 
ceiling is not likely to bar access for 
any qualified miner. The amount of per- 
mitted production is substantial, a 
"floor" has been added, and the con- 
straint on seabed production is limited 
in duration. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Because the formula in the text is 
based on a projection forward of past 
trends, it is impossible to predict ex- 
actly what level of production will be 
allowed during the 15 years the limit 
will, in effect, apply. But on the basis of 
the Bureau of Mines' mid-range 
projection of the growth in nickel con- 
sumption during the balance of this 
century (3.4%) and the earliest prac- 
ticable start-up date for commercial 
production (1988), the first group of 
miners to apply for production author- 
izations could produce annually an ag- 
gregate of about 200,000 tons of nickel. 
Thereafter, the limit for the industry as 
a whole would increase so that after 5 
vears, in 1992, 320,000 tons could be 
produced; after 10 years, 490,000 tons; 
and after 15 years, 590,000. 

In fact, the 15-year trend line 
growth rate for nickel consumption is 
currently about 3.9%, and if that rate 
were extended into the future, the ton- 
nage allowed to seabed mining would be 
considerably higher. If future growth 
should turn out to be lower than antici- 
pated, the full effect of the drop would 
not be felt because of the "floor" pro- 
vision in the formula. This substitutes a 
minimum 3% growth rate for any act- 
ual rate lower than 3%. Even if the 
growth rate fell as low as 2.2%, seabed 
miners could— if they thought they 
could make money in the kind of eco- 
nomic climate implied by such a dis- 
couraging trend— still supply up to 18% 
of the nickel market in the first year of 
production and up to 36% by the 15th 
year. Notwithstanding the share of 
production taken up by the Enterprise, 
acting alone or in joint ventures, there 
would still be sufficient tonnage under 
any reasonable set of assumptions to 
insure that private miners would get 
their authorizations when they need 
them. It is thus probable that market 
forces, not the production limitation 
formula, will determine how much 
nickel and, therefore, how much copper, 
cobalt, and manganese, will be produced 
by the first generation of seabed mining 

Seabed mining is a pioneering ven- 
ture. So too is the effort of the world 
community to base the structure of a 
new international seabed regime on the 
proposition that the global commons 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of 
any state. It has been a difficult under- 
taking, the building of this structure, 

Soviet Invasion 
of Afghanistan 

DEC. 24, 1980 ■ 

One year has passed since the Soviet 
Union launched its brutal assault on its 
small, nonaligned neighbor, Afghani- 
stan. On December 27, 1979, Soviet 
paratroopers seized key Afghan institu- 
tions in Kabul, including the Presiden- 
tial Palace, where President Amin was 
then killed. The Soviets installed a pup- 
pet government under the nominal 
leadership of Babrak Karmal, who was 
in the Soviet Union at the time. 

The tragedy that has continued to 
unfold in Afghanistan over the past 12 
months weighs heavily on all Ameri- 
cans. We have watched the Soviet 
Armed Forces employ massive fire- 
power and increasingly brutal tactics. 
We have seen the ranks of Afghan 
refugees fleeing devastation and 
political and religious oppression at 
home swell to more than 1.2 million in 
Pakistan alone. And amid this grim 
spectacle, we have been heartened to 
witness the brave resistance of the 
Afghan people, who have continued 
their struggle for independence and the 
right to determine their own political 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and attempted forceful occupation of 
that fiercely independent, nonaligned, 

Muslim nation has had a profoundly 
negative impact on the international 
community. An overwhelming majority 
of member states of the United Nations 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan in a 
special General Assembly session in 
January 1980. An increased majority 
reiterated this demand following care- 
ful General Assembly consideration of 
the Afghanistan issue last month. The 
40-member Islamic conference has been 
particularly forceful in condemning 
Soviet actions and in seeking an appro- 
priate political solution. If the Soviet 
leaders expected that the world would 
avert its eyes and quickly forget their 
aggression in Afghanistan, they have 
been disappointed. 

We urge the Soviet Union to re- 
spond to those nations urging with- 
drawal of Soviet military forces and 
inviting Soviet cooperation in the 
search for a political solution to the 
Afghan crisis. For our part, we have of- 
fered to join in the effort to find a 
political solution involving a Soviet 
withdrawal, and we repeat that offer 
today. The suffering of the Afghan peo- 
ple must be brought to an end. 

The Afghan people and their strug- 
gle have not been forgotten and will 
not be forgotten by the rest of the 
world. We call on the Soviet Union to 
work with us and others in finding a 
way to bring peace to that tormented 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 29, 1980. 

the most difficult I have ever been a 
part of. But the same pioneering spirit 
and the same confidence in the future 
that have brought seabed mining and 
the seabed mining regime so close to 
reality can also assure a harmonious 
relationship between the two. And we 
must not forget that the recovery of 
seabed mineral resources is not only 
important as a potential source of min- 
erals; it is also the remaining linchpin 
in the whole Law of the Sea 
Convention— the last major item in the 
long sought "package deal." Given the 

distance we have come and the inter- 
ests at stake in the success of this vast 
undertaking, we cannot fail to finish 
the job. Pioneering ventures are 
difficult enough in a stable legal order. 
Without law— without this new compre- 
hensive legal system for the oceans — 
seabed mining will be only one of the 
victims of the more chaotic and danger- 
ous world that would result. This we 
cannot permit. ■ 

February 1981 



The United Nations and U.S. Policy 

by Richard L. McCaU. 

Address before the Harvard Model 
United Nations in Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts, on December -4, 1980. Mr. 
McCallis Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
national Organization Affairs. 

Pollsters have taken a pretty bad 
shellacking lately — they, therefore, 
may not be the most authoritative 
source to establish my basic premise 
for this discussion. The point is, how- 
ever, that contrary to conventional 
wisdom, public perception does support 
the notion that there is room for the 
United Nations in American foreign 
policy. According to recent polls by 
Gallup and Roper, Americans by a 
two-to-one margin want to increase 
U.S. participation in the U.N. system. 

Nonetheless, the consumers of 
conventional wisdom continue to pur- 
port that American public support for 
the United Nations is on the decline 
and, accordingly, we ought to be 
reducing our financial assistance to 
the U.N. family. In dollars and cents 
terms, these advocates of retrench- 
ment have succeeded to a considerable 
extent. Thirty years ago, the United 
States contributed almost one-half 
(47.5%) of the United Nations' 
budget. Today, our share is only 
25.6 c ' r , a little over $1 billion, about 
$4 for each American — less than what 
each of us spent to see the movie 
"Apocalypse Now." 

Along with this less than adequate 
performance, outlays for programs, 
such as foreign aid, which are critical 
in creating a more harmonious inter- 
national community, have also declined 
over time and in comparison with 
other countries. For example, in the 
past 15 years, the net U.S. official 
development assistance decreased 
from 0.49 ", of our GNP to 0.17^ . In 
contrast, the total development as- 
sistance effort of other traditional aid- 
giving countries has increased five- 
fold during the same period. 

Why the discrepancy between our 
professed beliefs and our willingness 
to provide adequate financial resources 
whifh would reinforce these beliefs? 

There arc probably lists of rea- 
for it, none of then fully explana- 
• each of them Bufficienl to 

Perhaps in its genesis, 

we have ascribed greater hopes to the 
United Nations than it could possibly 
fulfill in our lifetimes. Idealistic meas- 
uring sticks are bad bases for judg- 

The U.N.'s Record 

Almost 30 years ago when the United 
Nations was created, it was seen as 
the great global instrument that would 
banish forever the scourge of war. 
Since then, there have been at least 
five major military conflicts on the 
average every year. As we celebrate 
the 35th anniversary of the United 
Nations' founding, a war is going on 
unabated between Iraq and Iran, vio- 
lent conflicts continue in at least four 
areas in Africa, direct Soviet, or 
Soviet-backed, military interventions 
violate the sovereignty of three coun- 
tries in Asia, and civil strife has 
taken 8,000 lives in El Salvador this 
year alone. Annually, the world spends 
over $400 billion on armaments and 
as many as 35 countries (and even 
terrorist groups) could have nuclear 
weapons by the end of this century. 

Thirty years ago nations pledged 
to adhere to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Today there are 
some 16 million refugees, one-fourth 
of this Earth's population is mal- 
nourished, and millions face starva- 
tion. Torture and imprisonment have 
remained convenient tools of govern- 
ance irrespective of race, religion, or 

The United Nations has had a 
checkered history in the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. It was either 
impotent to act, as in the cases of re- 
peated Soviet aggression in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, or 
fearing impotency did not even get 
involved, as in the case of recent 
African wars. It has become bogged 
down in negotiations on the global 
economy, and its impact on global arms 
control is more exhortatory than real. 
For a country that has placed so 
much faith in the imperatives of 
world order, that has spent so much 
effort and sacrificed so much for it — 
these are indeed legitimate causes for 
disappointment. It is not surprising 
then that the majority of Americans 
are critical of the United Nations — 

53% according to the polls — for fallin 
short of their hopes and expectations 
about resolving international 

Falling short, however, is not the 
same as failure. As we acknowledge 
shortcomings — serious shortcomings 
— let us also be mindful of certain 
facts and salient achievements. 

The United Nations has become a 
truly universal organization. Its mem- 
bership, tripling since its founding, 
now numbers 154 nations. Its budget 
has increased 16 times ; its agenda has 
grown by leaps and bounds to encom- 
pass practically all aspects of inter- 
national behavior. The General As- 
sembly, which was once an annual 
affair, has become for all practical 
purposes — counting all the special and 
emergency sessions and full member- 
ship conferences — a year-round 
meeting. The Security Council, which 
had fallen into such disuse in the 
1950s, meeting 5 or 10 times a year, 
now meets on the average of 100 times 
a year. 

The United Nations has become 
the source of innovative measures to 
reduce international tensions. Peace- 
keeping forces — not even envisioned i 
the original charter — are in place in 
Cyprus and the Middle East. These 
forces have prevented local conflicts 
from festering into major wars and 
have been some of the United Nations 1 
least heralded success stories. 

The United Nations has had a 
steady, calming, and steering presence 
in the greatest transformation of the 
political geography of this Earth — 
aiding formerly colonialized people to 
achieve independence without major 
conflicts and in a relatively orderly 

The United Nations' purview ovei 
what constitutes threats to collective 
security has expanded to include globa 
economic security. At the present, al- 
most 90% of its resources are devoted 
to this task — to development, to 
environmental protection, to interna- 
tional trade, finance, investment, and 
to other measures of economic, social, 
cultural, and scientific cooperation. 
Through its specialized agencies and 
programs, the United Nations has in- 
creased concessional assistance to 
developing countries in the past decad' 


Department of State Bulleti 

United Nations 

from less than $500 million to over 
|1.6 billion. Together with the multi- 
lateral development banks i such as the 
World Bank and the regional banks) 
it has been the channel for the growth 
of net tlow of resources to the Third 
World from less than $1 billion to 
$ I billion annually in that same period. 

The United Nations has had a 
pioneering role in setting standards 
and rules that make the life of all of 
lis more secure, healthier and better — 
in international aviation; in communi- 
. atiens ; in the protection of the envi- 
ronment ; in the husbandry of our 
resources in the deep seas and in 
outer space; in the promotion of health 
standards ; and in the entire range of 
protection of civil, political, social, 
cultural, and economic rights. 

The list is almost endless, and 
>v i t h such selective illustrations I have 
probably failed to mention some very 
important ones. There is little question 
:hat the United Nations has become 
he central forum for diplomatic 
initiatives of many small countries; 
:hat through its direct and joint over- 
sight development efforts it has trans- 
formed formerly "basket case" coun- 
ties into food sufficient states. It has 
aeen a major facilitator for American 
nvestment and export, and its net- 
works of solidarity among labor 
groups gave birth to concrete meas- 
ures to make life better for the 
•vorkers. And perhaps more than any 
)ther international institution it has 
successfully promoted women's rights. 

Such is not a record of failure. 
[ do not, however, want to dwell too 
ong on what the United Nations has 
lone or failed to do in making my 
wint about the challenges we must 
onfront today and in the future. The 
L'nited Nations will certainly remain 
in arena of conflict between East and 

" as it has also come center stage 
in the continuing dialogue between 
North and South. Yet it must also 
become a springboard for our collec- 
tive efforts to address the common 
problems which this entire planet 
faces in the decades ahead. Permit me 
then to focus on the critical role of the 
United Nations in the context of the 
■ rivalry, the North-South 
relationships, and in light of the 
prospects we hold for the future. 

l.a-t-West Relations 

The past year bore witness to porten- 
tous events in world affairs, events that 
have neither run their full course nor 
are they as yet fully predictable in 
their outcome. We see the flagrant 
violation of the most elementary norms 
of international diplomatic practice 
and decency in Tehran; the naked 
aggression against the people of 
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos; 
the unceasing armed conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa; war and renewed 
threats to peace in the Middle East; 
and the current crisis in Poland. Each 
of these events has posed and will con- 
tinue to pose major obstacles in the 
path of reasoned relationships between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. 

Each event in direct or in subtle 
ways affects or is affected by the state 
of relationships between the two giant 
nuclear powers. We need not be so 
Pollyannaish as to presume that global 
interests always coincide with ours, 
but we need not be so simple-minded, 
either, as to assert that every threat to 
our interest is automatically a net gain 
for the Soviets. 

The recent Soviet globetrotting 
from Angola to Grenada does not 
exactly reveal great success for their 
brand of adventurism. Nor does the 
emergence of numerous and busy 
Russian advisers in the area, now 
called the arc of crisis, suggest the tip 
of the iceberg of some grand plan of 
world domination. It does, however, 
point to the Soviet propensity of 
opportunism : to take advantage of the 
opportunities created by the correla- 
tion of forces and to extend their 
sphere of influence. 

In the coming years, I am sure, 
there will be a lot of rethinking and 
debate about the appropriate Ameri- 
can foreign policy stance toward such 
Soviet behavior. One thing is, how- 
ever, certain; we will either have to 
confront them at a point or place of 
their own choosing — once they are 
already on the move — or, alternately, 
work for a world order in which the 
correlation of forces does not favor 

Which approach is more expen- 
sive, more risky, I leave to your imag- 
ination and common sense. Today we 
spend about 5% of our GNP on de- 
fense purposes and there are persua- 
sive arguments to increase this to 

7%. At the same time, we devote less 
than 0.05 % of our GNP to the United 
Nations, and there are some who 
consider even this little amount to be 
too much. But the arguments about 
the appropriate level of defense spend- 
ing is not my issue here. My point is 
that it is reasonable to assume that a 
stronger United Nations would be 
more capable of dealing with political 
upheavals and tensions. 

In several recent instances, the 
United Nations has proven to be the 
preferred instrument with sufficient 
international support to lead the 
search for political solutions to inter- 
national problems. In each case, this 
approach also closed the door on Soviet 

• The United Nations provided 
the mechanism through which a peace- 
ful resolution was found to the chal- 
lenge of majority rule and independ- 
ence for Zimbabwe. 

• The Security Council resolu- 
tions laid the basis for the successful 
Camp David negotiations leading to- 
ward greater peace between Egypt and 

• Continuing efforts for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes in 
southern Africa, specifically Namibia, 
could not go forward without the 
leading role of the United Nations. 

I do not intend to suggest that the 
United Nations can always act as a 
great buffer against Soviet designs. 
Realism dictates that we accept the 
limits imposed on the United Nations' 
ability to act in every case. But I do 
suggest that the United Nations can 
have a tempering influence on Soviet 
behavior and can serve, as it has 
served in the past, as a forum of 
diplomatic initiative to avoid direct 
East- West confrontations. 

North-South Dialogue 

In 1945, the United States emerged 
indisputably as the most powerful and 
influential nation on Earth. We shaped 
the United Nations in our own image 
and likeness and provided for it the 
necessary economic muscle. Over time, 
we were the principal architect of the 
International Monetary Fund to in- 
sure monetary order and stability; of 
the World Bank to promote the recon- 
struction of Europe and economic 
growth all over the world ; and of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade to stimulate world trade. 

February 1981 


United Nations 

For a while these worked ideally. 
We commanded the primary influence 
because the United States accounted 
for 60% of the world's industrial pro- 
duction and 50% of its monetary 
reserves. But this is no longer the 
case. Only 30% of the world's indus- 
trial production and less than 7% of 
its monetary reserves are ours today. 
Western Europe and Japan have 
emerged as major and competitive 
economic powers. Cartels, such as the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), drastically re- 
wrote the rules of global economy. 
And a new bloc of nations, the Third 
World, emerged demanding a fairer 
share and a greater voice in the world 

It is this new bloc, comprised of 
the developing countries, that com- 
mands majorities in the United Na- 
tions and demands attention to its 
own priority — a new international 
economic order. It wants systemic 
changes in the world monetary sys- 
tem, greater resource transfers from 
the industrialized countries, better 
access to technology, and a greater 
voice in international economic deci- 
sion making. 

The developing countries' de- 
mands do not always make economic 
sense, but there is a ring of justice in 
their call. After all, they comprise a 
substantial majority of the world's 
population but receive only 15% of 
the global income. Yet they are vitally 
important to the industrialized coun- 
tries. The dependence of the North on 
the oil supplies from the South only 
dramatizes but does not complete the 
picture of how mutually dependent — 
indeed interdependent — we have be- 
come. And the dynamics of this inter- 
dependence also imply a condition of 
mutual vulnerability which begs for 
intensive search and drastic resolution 
of the outstanding differences. 

The welfare, progress, and eco- 
nomic stability of these developing 
countries have become critically im- 
portant to the West and to the United 
States. Our trade with the Third 
World surpasses that with Western 
Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. 
The United States sells one-third of 
its exports to developing nations, and 
they supply 42% of our imports. 
Approximately 1 million American 
jobs depend on U.S. exports to these 
ntries, as does one quarter of our 

agricultural productivity. We have 
more than $40 billion in investment 
riding on the fortunes of the develop- 
ing world. 

This is why we press continu- 
ously, in a spirit of compromise, for 
agreement in the current round of glo- 
bal negotiations. And this is again 
why the United Nations has become an 
indispensable forum for the rich as 
well as the poor countries to fashion 
international institutions that are 
capable of responding to the growing 
global economic crises. 

Global 2000 Report 

This year saw the publication of two 
important studies dealing with our 
future. These studies, the Brandt 
Commission's Programme for Survival 

and the Global 2000 Report to the 
President of the United States, are 
not for the faint-hearted. They both 
diagnose the current state of global 
economy and ecology as dismal. Their 
prognoses are identical — the worst is 
yet to come. 

I could cite dozens of other 
studies. They all point to the same 
conclusion, and they all urge unprec- 
edented global cooperation as the only 
way to avoid global catastrophe. Yet, I 
am struck by the fact of how the 
glaringly obvious has failed to pene- 
trate our collective psyche, how oblivi- 
ous we continue to remain in the face 
of the clear and present danger that 
world hunger and poverty present to 
our countries, to our economic pros- 
perity, and to our freedoms. 

We are hurtling toward a future 
world population of 2% billion more 

U.S. Participation 
in the U.N. , 1979 

JAN. 7, 1981 1 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress 
this report of the activities of the United 
States Government in the United Nations 
and its affiliated agencies during calendar 
year 1979. 

The international crisis created by the 
seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran 
and the taking of Americans hostage over- 
shadowed much of the 34th General 
Assembly. In this atmosphere, the United 
States directed its efforts in the United 
Nations toward supporting the work of the 
Secretary General and the Security Council 
to resolve this breach of international law. 
The Secretary General brought the issue to 
the Council which unanimously called upon 
the Government of Iran to release the 
hostages. Ironically, after three years of 
negotiations, the Assembly adopted by con- 
sensus the Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages. This Convention affirms that 
there is no valid excuse for the taking of 
hostages and that there are no circumstances 
under which the seizure of hostages can be 

Both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly focused international 
attention on the continued military occupa- 
tion of Kampuchea by Vietnam. Of particular 
note during 1979 was the Security Council's 
termination of sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia, a result of the agreement by the 
Lancaster House Conference. 

On economic issues, UN actions ranged 
from highly technical meetings such as those 

on commodities, to continuing the work of 
the International Monetary Fund and to 
political discussions in the General Assembly 
on the future of international economy and 

These discussions, attended by almost 
all UN members, saw a continuous, intense, 
and sometimes acrimonious series of ex- 
changes between the developed and develop- 
ing countries on the organization of the 
international economic relations, and the 
effects of both on economic development. 
This resulted in the decision by the 34th 
General Assembly to hold further meetings 
on these issues. We believe that negotiations 
of this kind and at this level are important 
and necessary to relations between devel- 
oped and developing countries. However, 
whether the U.S. participates in these global 
negotiations will depend on how effectively 
we use but do not intrude upon the agencies 
of the UN and other international organiza- 

The United States continues to monitor 
closely UN expenditures and programs and 
supports the Secretary General's efforts to 
limit budget growth. 

Our participation in the United Nations 
and its related agencies and programs is an 
integral part of our foreign policy. As this 
report makes clear, the United Nations 
system of organizations is important and 
sometimes indispensable to the achievement 
of many of our central foreign policy objec- 
tives. This report should contribute to 
American understanding of and support for 
the United Nations and to the continuing 
active and constructive role of the United 

Jimmy Carter 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 12, 1981. 


Department of State Bulletin 

United Nations 

people than inhabit the Earth today, 
most of them destined to live in the 
poorest countries, with per capita in- 
comes hovering at a level of abject 
poverty, with arable land running out, 
with forests receding, fresh waters 
disappearing, and deserts expanding. 

Today, one-third of humanity 
exists in the absence of adequate 
shelter or food, ill and idle, with no 
glimpse of a better future and enraged 
by the injustice of it all. This creates 
a dangerous global climate — a climate 
where oceans of suffering breed hur- 
ricanes of hate, lashing out with 
destructive force not only where they 
are spawned but wherever they reach 
U well. 

In this shrinking world of ours, 
distance no longer guarantees safety. 
The crises we face do not respect 
national boundaries or ideological 
frontiers. Let me select a few pertinent 
projections of the future. 

• In the next 20 years there will 
be 2 : o billion more people. 

• The food deficit for the Third 
World alone will hover around 75 mil- 
lion metric tons by the year 1990, 
drawing down global food reserves and 
leading to worldwide competition for 
food and to a rapid rise of price 

• The search for alternative 
sources of food will cause drastic de- 
pletion of fishery resources. 

• Increased fossil fuel consmp- 
tion and the greater use of fluorocar- 
bons for this growing population will 
correspondingly raise atmospheric 
carbon dioxide and will cause ozone 
depletion, both of which entail serious 
climatic changes — in turn affecting 
our ability to produce food. 

• The inability of the developing 
countries to meet the growing de- 
mands — for food and energy alone — of 
their growing populations will deplete 
their foreign exchange reserves, raise 
their debts, in turn lead to defaults 
and global monetary instability. 

• Growing scarcities as well as 
the growing demands of more and 
more people will place unacceptable 
strains on the stability of many devel- 
oping countries, leading to frequent 
political upheavals threatening every 
nation's security. 

In a world where billions are sub- 
jected to the degradation of poverty — 
abject poverty — the struggle for sur- 

vival will become the paramount 
human endeavor. Abject poverty de- 
humanizes because it subjects life to 
the exigencies of mere existence. It is 
a condition in which people exhaust 
their energies at the grueling task of 
just being, with never a chance of 
becoming. It is a condition in which 
people squander their energies in the 
fight for mere physical survival, with 
their talents unchallenged, their 
human potential unfulfilled. 

Where the basic human needs of 
food, health, and shelter remain the 
sole object of unfulfilled wants, no 
desire can emerge for liberty and no 
strength is left to protect rights. 
Where the struggle for liberation 
from daily necessities overwhelms 
the necessity for freedom, neither 
basic human needs nor human rights 
will ever be satisfied. And in a world 
where tyranny becomes the order of 
things, no nation, however prosperous 
and free, can long remain an island of 

To confront these growing threats 
to global security, each nation, each 
government must do its share. None of 
the problems can be tackled by one 
country alone, and no country alone 
can long endure to carry the principal 

It is clear that the followup to the 
Global 2000 Report will require an ex- 
tended program of cooperative inter- 
action within the worldwide system of 
international organizations. The 
United Nations is the ideal focal point 
for strategists in formulating an 
agenda which could deflect projected 
ecological, economic, and social catas- . 
trophes in the coming millennium. The 
very nature of the entity that is the 
United Nations lends it to the creative 
long-range effort which could bring 
to fruition the massive economic 
development that the current world 
environment demands. Yet we can no 
longer attack problems in a piecemeal 

It will not be enough merely to 
ask for increased funding from the 
world's financial institutions. We must 
evolve a precise strategy that will 
coalesce hardware with human re- 
sources, that points toward a conver- 
gence of intellectual and technological 
tools which concentrate our collective 
efforts in problem solving for both 
developed and developing nations. 

The Challenges of Change 

East and West, North and South, our 
present and our future — they are 
symbols of our concerns. Pitted 
against each other in dynamic tension, 
they reveal the promise and possibili- 
ties of change. 

Will we control this change or will 
we permit events to control our lives? 
Can we allow the prognoses of the 
Global 2000 Report to come true? Can 
we resign ourselves to an unbridled 
East- West conflict and prepare to live 
in a world where the structures of 
global cooperation will have been re- 
placed by the worst kind of inter- 
national struggle for the survival of 
the unfittest? I need not posit the 

We Americans have never feared 
change. To the contrary, I sincerely 
feel that most of the change for the 
better that is taking place today has 
been prompted by our very presence 
in the world, our ideals, our ways, and 
our responses. We created the United 
Nations not to put the brakes on 
change but to design our future. 

In a month or so, I will be leaving 
my post as Assistant Secretary of 
State in charge of U.N. affairs. I am 
proud to have been associated with an 
American foreign policy that has 
steadfastly supported the United Na- 
tions. To be sure we saw changes 
coming, yet we did not fear them. We 
understood the changes taking place 
in the United Nations, and we tried to 
steer them in a direction consistent 
with our values and beliefs. So as 
I leave office, I am confident that the 
seeds of our ideals that we planted 
with the United Nations 35 years ago 
will grow into a bountiful harvest — as 
long as we have the will and foresight 
to cultivate with care and compassion 
this fragile structure of global 
cooperation. ■ 

February 1981 


United Nations 

World Court Hears U.S. Argument on 
Transfer of WHO Regional Office 

In the 33d World Health assembly, held 
in Geneva in May 1980, several Arab 
states introduced a proposal to transfer 
the World Health Organization's (WHO) 
Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office 
(EMRO) from Alexandria, Egypt, to 
Amman, Jordan. The reason given for 
the proposal was that most of the coun- 
tries in the region had decided to break 
diplomatic relations with Egypt and did 
not wish to conduct their WHO busi- 
ness through the Alexandria office. The 
motive for the move was acknowledged 
to be political The United States and 
many other countries opposed transfer 
as an improper and costly political 
interference in the highly successful 
workings of a technical and nonpolitical 
specialized agency. 

Apart from the merits and 
demerits of moving the office, Egypt 
and the United States maintained dur- 
ing the assembly's discussion of the 
resolution to transfer the office that the 
WHO could not move EMRO from 
Egypt without regard to the 2-year 
notice provision in the WHO's host 
agreement with Egypt regarding the 
regional office. Some other states 
argued that this notice provision ap- 
plied only to negotiations over a change 
in the privileges and immunities of 
WHO officials in Egypt and that it 
would not apply to a decision by the 
WHO to move the regional office. 

In order to resolve this dispute, 
the United States introduced a resolu- 
tion deferring any decision on removal 
of the regional office until the Inter- 
national Court of Justice (ICJ) could 
give an advisory opinion on the ques- 
tion of the applicability of the host 
agreement to removal of the office. On 
May 20, 1980, the World Health Assem- 
bly approved the U.S. resolution, which 
referred the following questions to the 
('•i art: 

1. Are the negotiation and notice 
pro\ isioiu of section 37 of the agree- 
rrn at 'it March 25, 1951, between the 
World Ih tilth Organization and Egypt 
applicable in the event that either 
pari q to the agreement wishes to have 
the regional office transferred from the 
l< rriloru oj Egypt? 

yi Ij ..<). what would be the legal 
r, i„,n tibilitu i nl hoth the World 
Health Organization <i"<l Egypt, with 

regard to the regional office in Alexan- 
dria, during the 2-year period between 
notice and termination of the agree- 

The Court invited all states parties 
to its statute that also belonged to the 
WHO to submit written statements and 
to participate in oral argument. Writ- 
ten statements were filed by Bolivia, 
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and the 
United States. On October 21, 22, and 
23, 1980, the Court met in The Hague 
to hear oral argument. Presentations 
were made by the United Arab 
Emirates, Tunisia, the United States, 
Syria, Egypt, and the World Health 

Representing the United States in 
the case were Stephen M. Schwebel 
Deputy Legal Adviser of the Depart- 
ment of State; Stephen R. Bond, Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. Mission to Inter- 
national Organizations, Geneva; Ralph 
Drury Martin, Attorney-Adviser, 
Department of State; and Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, Special Assistant to the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State. 

Following are excerpts from the 
U.S. oral argument made to the Court 
by Mr. Schwebel 

1. The argument that the host agree- 
ment is not a headquarters agreement 
but merely an agreement on privileges 
and immunities. 

. . . [L]et us consider what the signifi- 
cance is of the contention that the host 
agreement is no more than an agree- 
ment on privileges and immunities. It 
raises the complementary question of 
the significance of the contrasting con- 
tention of Egypt and the United States 
that the host agreement is a head- 
quarters agreement. The distinction 
between a headquarters agreement and 
an agreement on privileges and immuni- 
ties is not semantic. We are concerned 
with the fundamental question of the 
role and the content of the host agree- 
ment of 1951. 

It is the contention of the United 
States that the host agreement of 1951 
provides the full and comprehensive 
legal basis for the continuing presence 
and operation of the regional office in 

Alexandria. This is not a situation in 
which the 1951 host agreement regu- 
lates an ancillary aspect of a preexist- 
ing and independent legal relationship. 
The function of the host agreement is 
to place on a proper and enduring legal 
footing the establishment, maintenance, 
and operation of the regional office. 
Mutatis mutandis, the host agreement 
is the particular international conven- 
tion which, in the words of article 38 of 
the statute of this Court, establishes 
the "rules expressly recognized by the 
Contesting States." When we speak of 
the host agreement as a headquarters 
agreement, we use a kind of legal short- 
hand which expresses the essence of 
our argument. Similarly, when the 
states that seek a negative answer from 
the Court speak of an agreement on 
privileges and immunities, they use a 
kind of legal shorthand which expresses 
the essence of their argument. 

Now, if the characterizations of the 
host agreement as an agreement on 
privileges and immunities were correct, 
there would have been no need for the 
host agreement. At the time the host 
agreement was signed, the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies of the United Na- 
tions was in force. Egypt was asked by 
the 2d World Health Assembly provi- 
sionally to apply it and apparently did, 
pending its accession [to the 
convention]. Moreover, the Organization 
and Egypt had already entered into a 
bilateral privileges and immunities 
agreement in connection with the Orga- 
nization's provision of services in 
Egypt. That agreement was concluded 
on 25 August 1950. Thus if the only 
purpose of the 1951 host agreement 
was to regulate privileges and immuni- 
ties, it would have been superfluous. . . . 

The host agreement is undeniably 
concerned with privileges and immuni- 
ties, but clearly it goes beyond that 
concern. The fact is that Egypt and the 
Organization decided, before the estab- 
lishment of the regional office, to con- 
clude an agreement governing its estab- 
lishment and maintenance. That agree- 
ment is a headquarters agreement in 
form and content. To be sure, the host 
agreement of 1951 is not entitled "head- 
quarters agreement." It does not ex- 
pressly provide that the Organization's 


Department of State Bulletin 

United Nations 

regional office "shall be established and 
maintained in Alexandria." Neverthe- 
less, it is clear that the parties, in 
concluding the host agreement, con- 
templated maintenance of a permanent 
seat of the Organization for and in its 
Eastern Mediterranean region. They 
did not have in mind a legal regime of 
privileges and immunities for officials 
of the Organization passing through or 
temporarily assigned to Egypt. The 
Organization and Egypt assumed, 
understood, and expressed their mutual 
accord that this seat would be physi- 
cally located in Egypt, specifically in 

Thus in the agreement the parties 
refer to "the Regional Office in Alexan- 
dria" (section 1, para. V), "the premises 
of the Organization in Egypt" (section 
6), and "the seat of the Organization" 
(section 30). These are references to a 
physical location of the Eastern Medi- 
terranean Regional Office at its Alex- 
andria headquarters. They are refer- 
ences to a permanent location contained 
in an agreement of indefinite duration. 
Moreover, under the host agreement, 
the obligations of the parties embrace 
the establishment, operation, and main- 
tenance of physical facilities in Alexan- 
dria. For example, section 30 provides 
for electricity, gas and water supply, 
refuse removal, and police protection. 
These are the earmarks of a head- 
quarters agreement, not a privileges 
and immunities agreement. If this host 
agreement is compared with other 
headquarters agreements, their essen- 
tial identity of content is manifest, as 
the written statements of the United 
States and Egypt demonstrate. 

The intentions of the parties ac- 
cordingly are clear from the terms of 
the agreement itself. But further 
evidence of the parties' intentions is 
abundantly available. The negotiating 
history of the agreement, including the 
development of the models on which it 
was based, suggest that there was 
never any doubt in the minds of 
the negotiators that a permanent 
headquarters regime was being estab- 
lished. . . . 

2. The claim that the Alexandria office 
was established by an agreement other 
than and anterior to the 1951 host 

. . . Where we differ with our distin- 
guished colleagues from the United 
Arab Emirates and Kuwait is in this: 
We do not agree that the governing 

headquarters agreement is anything 
else but the host agreement between 
the Organization and Egypt of 25 
March 1951. 

We cannot agree that the 1949 
decision of the Executive Board of the 
Organization to locate EMRO in Alex- 
andria and its acceptance by Egypt con- 
stitute the governing international 
headquarters agreement. If this be the 
governing international agreement, 
where is it to be found? It is not 
printed in the United Nations Treaty 
Series or in the publications of the 
World Health Organization. It has not 
been presented to the Court. There ap- 
pears to be no written record of such 
an agreement anywhere, even in an ex- 
change of letters between the Organiza- 
tion and the Egyptian Government. The 
terms of any such agreement are 
unknown. And most importantly for 
these proceedings and for this Court, 
this alleged agreement has not been 
registered with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations pursuant to Article 102 
of the U.N. Charter. Consequently, it 
cannot be invoked before the Court by 
any party to it, nor presumably, by a 
third state on behalf of any such party. 

It cannot be believed that any 
government would permit the indefinite 
establishment on its territory of a 
regional headquarters of an interna- 
tional organization on the basis of so 
simple a simplified agreement. Still less 
can it be believed that Egypt would so 
agree. The sensitivity of Egypt to 
several legal problems dealt with in the 
negotiations between Egypt and the 
Organization over the terms of the 1951 
agreement demonstrates that Egypt 
was not prepared lightly to agree to 
the indefinite establishment and main- 
tenance of an international organization 
on its territory. The parliamentary 
debates to which I have referred and 
their preoccupation with capitulations, 
as well as the history of the Alexandria 
Sanitary Bureau and its predecessors, 
graphically show that Egypt did not 
ever treat the emplacement of an inter- 
national organization on its territory 
casually, as, for example, a matter to be 
dealt with in a summary resolution of 
an international organization to which 
Egypt would manifest unwritten 

On the contrary, beginning early in 
1949, Egypt carefully considered the 
host agreement and meticulously 
negotiated it. And, for the reasons 
which I have earlier described, both 
Egypt and the Organization plainly 

regarded the host agreement as the 
governing headquarters agreement for 
the Eastern Mediterranean Regional 
Office at Alexandria 

... To be sure, the regional office 
was actually installed in 1949, before 
the host agreement came into force in 
1951. But the fact that the host agree- 
ment was ratified in 1951 by no means 
proves that the host agreement is not 
the governing headquarters agreement. 
All it shows is that, in 1949, Egypt per- 
mitted the conversion of the long- 
established Alexandria Sanitary Bureau 
into the regional office of the World 
Health Organization in view of the con- 
tinuing negotiation of a host agreement 
based on the existing model host agree- 
ment. That is to say, Egypt was 
prepared to agree to the selection of 
Alexandria as the site of the regional 
office for the Eastern Mediteranean 
area which the Executive Board had 
conditionally approved, and to integrate 
the functions of the Alexandria Sani- 
tary Bureau into, and to transfer that 
bureau's files to the regional office upon 
the commencement of its operations. 

But, both Egypt and the Organiza- 
tion well knew that the preliminary 
measure of agreement indicated by the 
Organization's resolution and Egypt's 
actions was reached in contemplation of 
the parties completing negotiations for 
a host agreement — as, in fact, they did. 
And when they concluded that host 
agreement, the preliminary understand- 
ings evidenced by the Executive 
Board's resolution and Egypt's acts 
were merged and integrated into the 
host agreement. That integration is 
definitive. It alone, in the terms of the 
host agreement, fully and adequately 
expresses the intention of the parties 
concerning the location and regulation 
of the seat of the regional office. The 
host agreement of 1951 is a complete 
and formal headquarters agreement 
which contains a denunciation clause. 
Accordingly, that clause rather than a 
nonexistent clause in a nonexistent 
agreement governs any disestablish- 
ment of the Alexandria office. . . . 

3. The alleged legal effect of the breach 
of diplomatic relations with Egypt. 

. . . [T]he political attitudes of some of 
the Organization's members can have 
no effect on the legal relationship 
entered into between the Organization 
and Egypt in the host agreement of 

February 1981 


United Nations 

It has and will often be the case 
that the government acting as host to 
an international organization will not 
have diplomatic relations with some of 
the members of the organization. It is a 
commonplace that delegations of states 
members of the United Nations that do 
not enjoy diplomatic relations with the 
United States take part in U.N. meet- 
ings at its New York headquarters. 
Some of the very states that now argue 
against the applicability of section 37 
chose to sever diplomatic relations with 
the United States in 1967 but never for 
a moment did they cease to send dele- 
gations to U.N. headquarters in New 

Thus the severance of diplomatic 
relations among a few, or even many, of 
the members of an international organi- 
zation cannot change the legal relation- 
ship between the host government and 
the organization. In fact, one of the 
principal purposes of a host agreement, 
such as that between Egypt and the 
World Health Organization, is to insure 
that the legal regime remains stable 
regardless of political winds affecting 
the character of intergovernmental 

There is no reason to believe that 
the Alexandria regional office cannot 
function in the absence of diplomatic 
relations between Egypt and most 
states of the region. And it is these 
states which have caused the very 
situation which they now invoke as a 
justification for removal of the office. If 
there be any problem, it is caused by 
their political decision to refrain from 
performance of their own obligation to 
the Organization, under article 50 of its 
constitution, to "supervise the activities 
of the regional office." But no legal or 
practical obstacle prevents them from 
sending delegations to Alexandria and 
performing that supervisory task. 
There is no legal or practical obstacle 
to the regional committee meeting in 
Alexandria or, as it frequently has, at 
other cities in the region. Only the 
political objectives of these states, 
which are extraneous to those of the 
Organization, stand in their way. In 
fact, they have created this difficult 
situation for reasons unrelated to any 
limitations on their actual ability to 
operate in Alexandria, or to any pur- 
pose of the World Health Organization. 

Moreover, it is established inter- 
national law reflected in Article 63 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties that severance of diplomatic 

relations does not affect treaty rela- 
tions "except in so far as the existence 
of diplomatic or consular relations is in- 
dispensable for the application of the 
treaty." The absence of diplomatic rela- 
tions between some states and a host 
government may make day-to-day deal- 
ing more cumbersome, but it can hardly 
be said that the existence of diplomatic 
relations is "indispensable" to the ongo- 
ing functioning of the Organization in 
the territory of the host. 

Nor is a changed circumstance ra- 
tionale for invalidating the agreement's 
notice provision applicable here. As our 
written statement establishes in some 
detail at pages 60 to 61, the doctrine of 
rebus sic stantibus has little relevance 
to treaties containing provision for ter- 
mination upon relatively short notice, 
such as 2 years. The purpose of the doc- 
trine is to provide an implied escape 
clause for treaties of indefinite or 
lengthy duration that do not otherwise 
establish a mechanism for revision or 
termination as circumstances change. 
Since section 37 of the 1951 host agree- 
ment is exactly such a mechanism, it 
must be followed if either party wants 
the office to relocate. 

Furthermore, the doctrine of 
changed circumstances can only be in- 
voked in the event of an unforeseeable 
change that "radically" transforms 
obligations under the treaty. For the 
reasons discussed in our written state- 
ment, these requirements cannot be 
established in the present case. As the 
Court well appreciates, the burden of 
establishing invalidity of a treaty obli- 
gation on these or any other grounds, 
must be on the party seeking to be ex- 
cused from performance under the 
treaty. I respectfully suggest that it 
has not been established that the Orga- 
nization can carry this burden. . . . 

Summary of the argument in favor of 
the applicability of section 37. 

I have concluded the presentation of 
the substantive sections of the submis- 
sions of the United States. I should now 
like to recapitulate in the most sum- 
mary terms the essential elements of 
our position. . . . 

First, the host agreement of 1951 
between Egypt and the Organization is 
not solely a privileges and immunities 
agreement but is a typical headquarters 
agreement, imposing mutual obligations 
on the parties concerning the location, 
maintenance, and operation of a specific 
office in a specific place — that is, the 

Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office 
of the World Health Organization in 

Second, the host agreement is the 
only international instrument defining 
the obligations of the parties with 
respect to that regional office. The 
historical evidence submitted to the 
Court has shown that from the outset 
the Organization and Egypt viewed the 
host agreement as the definitive ex- 
pression of the decision to locate the 
office in Egypt. It has shown that, 
although for reasons of convenience the 
office was actually installed before the 
host agreement was concluded, the par- 
ties intended to express their long-term 
rights and obligations in the host agree- 
ment and through the host agreement 

Third, the host agreement does not 
make sense if it is interpreted as my 
colleagues from Syria, Kuwait, Tunisia, 
the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and 
Jordan would wish, because its terms 
would not be effective. 

Article 31 of the Vienna Conven- 
tion on the Law of Treaties codifies the 
fundamental principle of general inter- 
national law that treaties shall be inter- 
preted in good faith. This paramount 
principle embraces the principle of ef- 
fectiveness, which the Vienna conven- 
tion encompasses in the following 
magisterial formula: "A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their con- 
text and in light of its object and pur- 

In deciding this case, this Court 
must choose between two conflicting in- 
terpretations of the host agreement 
between Egypt and the Organization. 
One of the those interpretations would 
allow the parties to terminate the effec- 
tiveness of virtually all provisions of 
the agreement without observing the 
notice requirement of section 37. The 
other would give full effect to that re- 
quirement. One interpretation would 
allow either party to disrupt any 
orderly transition during removal of the 
office; the other interpretation would 
require that a prescribed transition 
period remain in effect. 

In such circumstances, the Inter- 
national Law Commission has forth- 
rightly stated which is the choice to be 
made. "Where a treaty is open to two 
interpretations, one of which does and 
the other does not enable the treaty to 
have appropriate effects, good faith and 


Department of State Bulletin 

United Nations 

he object and purpose of the treaty 
lemand that the former interpretation 
should be adopted." 

It is incontestable that the object 
>f the host agreement is the regional 
iffice in Alexandria. The purpose of 
his treaty is to set out the terms by 
vhich Egypt and the Organization 
igreed to establish, maintain, and 
egulate the Office. 

Any interpretation of the agree- 
nent which would allow the object and 
>urpose of the treaty to be vitiated 
vithout regard to the 2-year transition 
>eriod specified by section 37 renders 
section 37 illusory. Since there is 
lothing in the language or history of 
he host agreement to suggest that the 
>arties intended such a result, it must 
>e presumed that they intended the 
:ontrary — that is, intended section 37 
)f the treaty to be effective. 

It must be borne in mind that 
emoval of a major regional office of a 
irge international organization is not a 
linor matter. The cost of moving 
eaches the millions of dollars. Removal 
f the office would remove several addi- 
ional millions from the economy of the 
ost state. It simply does not make 
ense to conclude that the parties to 
he host agreement could have intended 
hat the same language which provides 
or a 2-year notice period to deal with 
mresolved differences over privileges 
nd immunities would simultaneously 
llow the object of the agreement to be 
emoved, at a large cost, without notice 
t all. 

International organizations and 
lost states have generally undertaken, 
iy agreement, to provide for the 
irderly disestablishment of any head- 
luarters which is removed from a host 
tate. The terms of the host agreement 
if 25 March 1951, its history, and the 
pplicable principles of treaty inter- 
tretation all indicate that the host 
greement of 25 March 1951 is such an 

Finally, I would like to make one 
ast point. It is important to note that 
nterpreting this agreement as its 
anguage and history indicate that it 
ihould be interpreted — to apply to 
emoval of the office — imposes no ex- 
raordinary burden on the parties to 
he agreement. 

Simply as a practical matter, 
emoval of an office is not something 
hat can be successfully accomplished 
>vernight. It took a year for the Orga- 

nization's working group merely to 
study the question. It could easily take 
as long or longer for the actual move to 
be accomplished. 

It is believed that the only legal 
obligations imposed by section 37 are 
those discussed in the written state- 
ment of the United States. Namely, the 
parties would have to keep the existing 
legal regime in effect for 2 years; they 
would have to negotiate in good faith 
for the gradual disestablishment of the 
office over the 2-year period. These are 
not onerous burdens. They are, in fact, 
probably nothing more than what 
would, as a practical matter, in any 
event be required in order to secure an 
orderly removal of the office. This fact 
apparently is recognized by our distin- 
guished colleagues from the Syrian 
Arab Republic, whose written state- 
ment contains the following sentence 
concerning transfer of the regional 

Of course, for reasons of expediency and 
convenience and once the decision to trans- 
fer the Office is taken, the provisions of the 
Agreement . . . can continue to be applied un- 
til a date to be agreed between the two par- 
ties for its termination, (p. 69.) 

Where, it is submitted, this state- 
ment misses the mark is in its failure to 

appreciate that the parties have already 
arranged for these provisions to con- 
tinue until an agreed date, and that 
date is 2 years from the official notifica- 
tion of the decision to move the office. 
Why does it surprise our colleagues 
from Syria that Egypt and the Organi- 
zation could have perceived in 1951, as 
Syria perceives in 1980, that when a 
regional office is moved, expediency 
and convenience require continuation of 
the existing legal regime for a period of 
time? It is not difficult to see that 
Egypt and the Organization assumed, in 
1951, that it was in the interest of both 
to provide for binding legal obligations 
which would assure an orderly removal 
of the office, rather than to leave such 
an important matter to whatever good- 
will the parties might summon in the 
midst of the tensions which undoubtedly 
surround any unilateral removal. 

There is no question that an abrupt 
and arbitrary removal of the regional 
office from Egypt would work hardship 
on Egypt and, therefore, serve the 
political purpose of those states which 
press for removal. I submit, however, 
that it has been demonstrated to the 
Court that it was just this type of hard- 
ship—the precipitous removal of an 
office without time to prepare for 
cushioning its effects — that the Organi- 


On January 15, 1981, Stephen M. 
Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State, was elected a 
judge of the International Court of 
Justice by the U.N. General Assembly 
and Security Council. He succeeds the 
late Judge Richard R. Baxter. 

Mr. Schwebel has served since 
1977 as a member of the U.N. Inter- 
national Law Commission, the U.N.'s 
principal treaty drafting body on which 
the large majority of the Court's cur- 
rent judges sat prior to their election to 
the Court. At 51 years of age, he is the 
youngest U.S. national ever elected to 
the Court. 

Mr. Schwebel has been U.S. 
counsel in two recent cases before the 
ICJ. He played a leading role in the 
U.S. decision to take the case of the 
American hostages in Iran to the Court 
and participated in the oral argument 
of it. In October 1980, he presented the 
U.S. argument to the Court in advisory 
proceedings brought by the World 

Health Organization in response to ef- 
forts by anti-Camp David Arab states 
to require WHO peremptorily to 
remove its regional office from Alexan- 
dria, Egypt. 

Deputy Legal Adviser of the State 
Department since 1974, Mr. Schwebel 
has also served as the Department's 
Counselor on International Law 
(1973-74) and Assistant Legal Adviser 
for United Nations Affairs (1961-66). He 
was Executive Director of the 
American Society of International Law 
(1967-73). Since 1967 he has been pro- 
fessor of international law at the School 
of Advanced International Studies of 
The Johns Hopkins University, serving 
as Edward B. Burling Professor of 
International Law and Organization 
since 1973. Mr. Schwebel was assistant 
professor of law at Harvard Law School 
(1959-61) and has been a visiting faculty 
member at Cambridge University, the 
Australian National University, and 
The Hague Academy of International 
Law. He is the author of two books and 
some 60 articles in the field of interna- 
tional law. 

February 1981 



zation and Egypt agreed to avoid 
almost 30 years ago. 

For all these reasons, the Govern- 
ment of the United States submits that 
the answer to the primary question put 
by the World Health Assembly to the 
Court must be in the affirmative. . . . 


An advisory opinion issued December 
20, 1980, in The Hague by the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice was hailed by 
State Department Legal Adviser 
Roberts Owen as "a victory for the rule 
of law in the relations between states 
and international organizations." 

The opinion holds that, should the 
World Health Organization decide to 
remove its eastern Mediterranean 
regional office from Alexandria, Egypt, 
the WHO and Egypt will be legally 
obliged "to consult together in good 
faith as to the question under what con- 
ditions and in accordance with what 
modalities a transfer of the regional of- 
fice from Egypt may be effected." The 
Court held that the mutual obligations 
of the WHO and Egypt "place a duty 
upon the party which wishes to effect 
the transfer to give a reasonable period 
of notice to the other party for the ter- 
mination of the existing situation. . . ." 

Arab states opposed to the Camp 
David agreements have sought to 
ostracize Egypt by requiring interna- 
tional organizations with offices in 
Egypt to remove them. Attempts in the 
World Health Assembly to require 
removal of the WHO regional office 
from Alexandria have been frustrated, 
most lately by a resolution sponsored 
by the United States which requested 
the International Court of Justice to 
give an advisory opinion on the legal 
principles which would govern any such 

Egypt and the United States, both 
of which oppose any move, argued to 
the Court that, should the WHO decide 
to remove the Alexandria office, 2 
years' notice would have to be given 
under the Egyptian-WHO host agree- 
ment or that, in any event, reasonable 
notice would have to be given. The 
Court's opinion, by a vote of 12-1, sus- 
tains the latter argument. Only the 
member of the Court of Soviet na- 

El Salvador 

Following are a statement of 
December 12, 1980, on the special 
Presidential mission to El Salvador 
(December 6-9, 1980, and Department 
statements of January Ik and 17, 1981 
on resumption of military assistance to 
El Salvador. 

DEC. 12, 1980 

William D. Rogers, former Under Sec- 
retary of State for Economic Affairs 
and Assistant Secretary of State under 
President Ford, and Assistant Secre- 
tary of State William G. Bowdler met 
with the President yesterday to report 
on their special mission to El Salvador. 
Today they are briefing members of the 
Congress on their mission. They are 
also submitting a confidential written 
report to the President. 

During their December 6 through 9 
stay in El Salvador, the special mission 
members held a series of meetings with 
Ambassador White and the Embassy 
staff, the governing Junta, and Arch- 
bishop, the Chief of Police, the special 
Salvadoran Investigating Commission, 
nuns from the same order as two of the 
murdered women, and others. They told 
those with whom they met that the 
murder of the four American church- 
women had shocked the conscience of 
the American people. They expressed 
our grave concern that the increased 
incidence of violence in El Salvador 
raised a fundamental question about 
the ability of the government to main- 
tain a minimal degree of civil order. 
They urged prompt and effective action 
not only to apprehend and punish the 
murderers but also to control the vio- 
lence and prevent such tragic incidents 
from recurring. 

The special mission reported that, 
thus far, there was no direct evidence 
of who committed the crime. Especially 
because of circumstantial evidence of 
possible security force involvement in 

tionality, Judge Platon Morosov, 

Mr. Owen described the Court's 
opinion as "the second excellent deci- 
sion which it has issued this year." He 
stated that it "more than satisfactorily 
upholds" the U.S. position and "demon- 
strates that international organizations, 
no less than states, must adhere to the 
rule of law in international 
relations." ■ 

the case, the mission urged the authori- 
ties of El Salvador to conduct a com- 
plete, thorough, and professional inves- 
tigation of these murders so that these 
questions can be answered and those 
responsible be brought to justice. 

The governing Junta requested that 
the mission communicate to the Presi- 
dent, the government, and people of the 
United States El Salvador's profound 
regret with respect to the crime. They 
told our mission that the investigation 
would be pursued wherever it led, any- 
where in the country, at any level. 

To this end, the Junta has appointed 
an official four-man ad hoc investigating 
commission. The commission, which is 
actively pursuing its task, has requested 
our technical and professional investiga- 
tive support. Several agents of the FBI 
are already in El Salvador providing 
technical assistance to the commission. 
We will continue to cooperate fully 
with this investigation. 

Our special emissaries also dis- 
cussed the desirability of permitting 
outside observers of the investigation. 
The commission has welcomed this. We 
expect that organizations such as the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commis- 
sion will be able to play such a role. 
Our Embassy will also be closely moni- 
toring the progress of the investigation. 

We consider the appointment of 
the investigative commission, its efforts 
to date, its desire to have U.S. investi- 
gative experts assit in its work, and its 
willingness to permit outside observers 
to monitor the investigation as positive 
responses to our mission. 

In the course of the mission's dis- 
cussions with the governing Junta and 
others, it was pleased to note that 
there appears to be a consensus on the 
need to act quickly and effectively to 
investigate, thoroughly, the killings of 
our citizens, to gain greater control 
over the widespread violence, to under- 
take a reform and restructuring of the 
government and to make it more effec- 
tive, to make the military high command 
more responsive to duly constituted 
authorities, to implement the reform 
program, and to open a dialogue with 
democratic leaders of the opposition to 
end the terrible internal conflict that is 
costing so many lives. 

Negotiations are going on in El 
Salvador between the Christian Demo- 
crats and the military toward these 
ends. Statements by Salvadoran offi- 
cials involved indicate that some signif- 
icant restructuring of the government 
and shifts in military personnel are 


Department of State Bulletin, 

Western Hemisphere 

nticipated. The United States is ready 
resume its assistance to El Salvador 
pon such progress. 

We will be following these develop- 
lents and carefully assessing the way 
i which they improve the effectiveness 
f the government pursuing its reform 
rogram, in controlling violence, and in 
especting human rights. Progress 
award these objectives is essential to 
void further polarization, either to the 
xtreme right or to the radical left. 

AN. 14, 1981' 

he Administration has decided to 
»sume its Fiscal Year 1981 military 
ssistance to El Salvador, which was 
?mporarily suspended on December 5. 
pecifically, we will continue with our 
3maining $420,000 international mili- 
iry education and training (IMET) pro- 
ram and proceed with implementation 
f our $5 million foreign military sales 
•'MS) credit program. Within the FMS 
rogram we will proceed, immediately, 
nth the sale of approximately $2.3 mil- 
on in nonlethal equipment. We will 
lso proceed with the loan of two 
JN-1H (Huey) transport helicopters, fi- 
ancing related costs from the FMS 
redit. This helicopter loan program has 
een under consideration for several 

When we announced resumption of 
ur economic assistance to El Salvador 
n December 17, we stated that our 
lilitary assistance would continue to be 
emporarily suspended. We indicated 
hat we would be following develop- 
lents in El Salvador with regard to 
ertain areas of concern, especially con- 
inued progress in the investigation of 
he murders of the four American 

The investigation of the murders 
iy the Government of El Salvador's 
pecial investigation commission is pro- 
eeding. The commission has questioned 
nany persons in El Salvador and devel- 
ped some leads. Our FBI has furnished 
echnical assistance to the commission 
nd will, this week, deliver to the com- 
nission its assessment of the evidence 
•btained from the two autopsies per- 
ormed in the United States and from 
he visit of FBI technicians to El Sal- 
vador. The Salvadoran Attorney Gen- 
:ral is proceeding with arrangements 
or auiopsies on the two women buried 
n El Salvador. The Salvadoran Em- 
>assy in Ottawa is to interview the 
P"oup of Canadian missionaries who 
alked with the women at the airport. 

The Government of El Salvador 
has invited the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission to observe the work 
of the investigating commission. We are 
supporting this invitation. 

Our decisions regarding military 
assistance have also taken account of 
the current military situation in El Sal- 
vador. A major military offensive was 
conducted by the leftist guerrillas over 
the past weekend in which they demon- 
strated that they are better armed and 
constitute a military threat. Captured 
documents and weapons confirmed that 
the guerillas have received a substan- 
tial supply of arms from abroad. 

Although the government forces 
contained the guerrilla offensive, they 
expended considerable materiel and lost 
their last transport helicopter. As a re- 
sult, their need for military assistance 
has become greater and more urgent. 

Taking full account of the progress 
in areas of concern to us, especially the 
investigation of the murders of the four 
American churchwomen, and considering 
the overall military situation, the Admin- 
istration has decided to resume its mod- 
est military assistance to El Salvador. 

JAN. 17, 1981 1 

For the past 15 months, we have 
assisted the moderate military/civilian 
Government of El Salvador in its efforts: 

• To implement its agrarian 
reform and electoral program; 

• To put a stop to the violence of 
right-wing terrorists; and 

• To defeat the Marxist guerrillas. 

We are encouraged that there has 
been progress in these areas. 

To assist the government to imple- 
ment the reforms which were so essen- 
tial to give the underprivileged of El 
Salvador a greater stake in that society, 
we have provided approximately $82 
million of economic aid. We have also 
provided military aid, both as a means 
of encouraging progress in areas of 
common concern and of supporting such 
steps when they occur. We believe that 
continued progress with the agrarian 
reform and electoral program and a 
readiness to negotiate are just as 
important to the long-term success of 
the government in ending the violence 
and defeating the guerrillas as its mili- 
tary efforts. 

On January 10, Marxist guerrillas 
launched a major offensive in El Sal- 
vador. Evidence emerging from this 

offensive and intelligence reports con- 
firmed that the guerrillas have obtained, 
from abroad, a substantial quantity of 
lethal weapons, including grenades, 
recoilless rifles, and mortars. The evi- 
dence also indicates that a number of 
countries are supporting the Marxist 
guerrillas and are continuing to supply 
them arms and ammunition. Up until 
this offensive, the United States pro- 
vided limited military assistance to help 
meet the Salvadoran Government's 
legitimate defense needs. (This included 
$5.7 million FMS credits and $250,000 
IMET in fiscal year 1980 and $5 million 
FMS credits and $500,000 IMET for fis- 
cal year 1981.) 

The Government of El Salvador is 
in control of the country despite 
repeated outbreaks of terrorism and 
scattered guerrilla attacks. However, in 
dealing with the current offensive, the 
Salvadoran armed forces have had to 
draw down their